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Since   2005,   when   the   International   Criminal   Court   (ICC)   issued   its   opinion  
deeming   the   Israeli   Separation   Wall   and   settlements   illegal,   there   have   been  
significant   developments   in   the   nonviolent   methods   adopted   for   countering  
Israeli  occupation.  While  Palestinian  nonviolent  resistance  has  existed  throughout  
history,  from  this  time  onwards,  there  have  been  a  number  of  factors  that  give  this  
period  its  unique  traits.    
The   most   central   method   that   has   been   adopted   by   all   nonviolent   actors   is   to  
influence   economic   interaction   with   Israel   in   a   way   that   is   in   line   with  
international   law,   and   is   supportive   of   the   official   positions   adopted   by   the  
countries  that  nonviolent  activists  aim  to  influence.    
  
While   Israeli   settlements   are   illegal   according   to   international   law,   they   include  
industrial   areas   that   export   products   to   many   countries.   Through   this  
contradiction,   nonviolent   activists   have   found   an   opportunity   to   pressurise  
countries  to  end  their  economic  ties  with  those  settlements,  and  consequently  put  
pressure   Israel   to   change   its   settlement   policies.   Some   of   these   call   for   ending  
economic  ties  with  Israel  itself,  because  it  is  upholding  the  settlements,  and  some  
call   for  ending  ties  only  with  Israeli  settlements;   in  other  words,  some  target  the  
criminal  and  others  just  the  crime.      
  
In   2010,   the   Palestinian   National   Authority   (PNA)   adopted   its   first   unilateral  
program  that  was  not  in  agreement  with  Israel,  and  which  introduced  a  strategy  
for  the  cessation  of  economic  ties  with  Israeli  settlements.  This  was  done  through  
a   mixture   of   national   public   awareness   campaigns   to   influence   consumer  
behaviour,   and   the   introduction   of   legislation   by   which   it   became   illegal   for  




After   starting   by   focussing   on   its   own   markets,   the   PNA   called   upon   other  
countries   to   follow   suit   by   lobbying  government  officials,  parliamentarians,   and  
financial   institutions.  However,   this   action   came   five   years   after   a   call   for   a   full  
boycott,   including   divestment   and   sanctions   against   Israel,  made   by   Palestinian  
civil   society  organizations  and  political  parties.  This   call,  known  as   the  BDS  call  
had   gained   tremendous   support   and   amalgamated   a   large   pool   of   members  
internationally  by   the   time   that   the  PNA  started  with   its  campaign   for  a   limited  
boycott.   This   disparity   has   had   a   significant   influence   on   the   dynamics   of   the  
boycott  movement,  both  locally  in  Palestine  and  globally.    
  
This   research   explores   those  dynamics.   It   takes   an   in-­‐‑depth   look   at   the   effort   to  
end  economic  ties  with  settlements,   including  who  the  actors  are,  what  they  aim  
for,  how  they  interact,  and  how  effective  they  have  been.  The  PNA’s  program  to  
end  economic   ties  with   settlements  was   chosen  as  a   case   study   for   this  doctoral  
thesis,  because  of  its  central  position  in  relation  to  the  topic  and  the  unique  access  
to  its  documentation  through  the  author’s  previous  role  as  its  director.    
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Chapter  1    
Introduction    
	  
At  the  time  of  writing  this  introduction,  the  Middle  East  seems  to  have  fallen  into  
complete  disarray.  On  the  surface,	  since  the  outbreak  of  the  Arab  Spring  different  
Arab   dictators   have   been   replaced,   regimes   have   fallen,   and   fanatic   extremists  
have  taken  over  large  parts  of  Syria  and  Iraq.  The  latter  have  overridden  borders  
that  were   imposed   by   colonial   powers   and,   in   doing   so,   are   compromising   the  
entire  region’s  stability  and  terrorizing  its  people.    
  
The   more   one   examines   the   Middle   East   by   analysing   the   underlining   factors  
relating  to  these  disturbing  events,  the  more  apparent  it  becomes  that  it  is  in  fact  
the  system  instated  during  colonial  times  that  is  falling  apart  and  expiring.  From  
some  perspectives,  this  system  seemed  to  have  worked  for  the  greater  part  of  the  
twentieth   century,   at   least   in   terms   of   stability;   although   socio-­‐‑economic  
conditions  were  poor,  regimes  were  in  place  and  in  control.  Yet,  now,  it  seems  to  
have  significantly  deviated  from  the  vision  of  a  stable  Middle  East  that  is  at  peace  
with  its  dictators.  And,  in  consequence,  Arab  countries  are  no  longer  in  order,  and  




In  the  midst  of  this  regional  chaos  lies  a  further  complicated  issue  that  also  does  
not  seem  to  be  working:  the  Israeli  –  Palestinian  conflict.   Its  roots  go  back  to  the  
same   era   that   witnessed   so   much   colonial   involvement   as   do   those   of   the  
neighbouring   Arab   states.   In   particular,   in   1918,   the   Arab   leader,   King   Faisal,  
accepted  the  establishment  of  a  Jewish  political  entity  under  the  British  mandate  
in   Palestine.   Lawrence   of   Arabia’s   report   to   the   British   government   regarding  
King  Faisal’s   response   to   the   imposition  of   this   indicated  how   the   situation  was  
used  as  a  political  bargaining  point:  
[Faisal]   was   ready   to   accept   the   Zionists’   demands   if   the   British   would  
guarantee   for   him   the   throne   of   Syria,   otherwise   he   would   adopt   the  
Palestinian  cause  and  resist  Zionism.  In  other  words,  his  throne  was  of  great  
significance   to   the   extent   that   he   had   the   intention   of   giving   Palestine   in  
exchange  for  Syria  (Ayyad,  1999,  p.  81)  .  
However,  even  before  the  establishment  of  the  state  of  Israel  in  1948,  the  Israeli  –  
Palestinian   conflict   was   first   an   Arab   –   Zionist   conflict.   Arabs   had   objected   to  
policies   advancing   Jewish   immigration   that   were   adopted   first   by   the   Turkish  
Empire  and,  subsequently,  by  the  British  mandate.  The  creation  of  a  homeland  for  
the  Jewish  people  in  Palestine  undermined  Arab  efforts  towards  independence  in  
Palestine,  which  reflected  the  desire  for  Arab  independent  states  across  the  region.  
The  Balfour  Declaration  of  1917  that  preceded  this  intended  to  introduce/establish  
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a  workable  solution  by  creating  a  Jewish  homeland  in  Palestine.  However,  it  also  
stated   the   following   notable   intention:   “nothing   shall   be   done   which   may  
prejudice   the   civil   and   religious   rights   of   existing   non-­‐‑Jewish   communities   in  
Palestine”  (Balfour,  1917).    
  
Long  before  the  establishment  of  Israel,  Arabs  were  wary  of  the  transfer  of  Arab  
land  to  Jews  and  had  opposed  both  Turkish  and  British  legislation  that  eased  this  
transfer.   Meanwhile,   the   Jewish   immigrants   established   kibbutzim   (cooperative  
settlements)   on   purchased   land.   Consequently,   Arabs   have   protested,   both  
violently   and  nonviolently,   against   the   establishment   of   Jewish   settlements   ever  
since  they  learned  about  the  Zionist  movement,  and  its  determination  to  establish  
a   homeland   for   the   Jews   in   Palestine.   This   includes   a   period   of   over   130   years  
following  the  first  wave  of  Jewish  immigration  to  Palestine  in  1882  during  which  
Palestinians   have   been   struggling   to   live   with   Israeli   settlements   (Attias   and  
Benbassa,  2003);  that  is,  over  65  years  since  the  establishment  of  the  state  of  Israel  
in  1948  -­‐‑  and  in  2017  it  will  be  50  years  since  Israel  captured  the  West  Bank  in  1967  
and  the  Occupied  Palestinian  Territories  (OPT)  came  into  existence.    
  
Many  settlements  have  been  established  during  these  years,  and  vary  in  location,  
type   and   size.   Reasons   for   supporting   them   also   vary,   as   do   the   reasons   for  
objecting  to  them.  Nevertheless,  however  many  variables  exist,  one  thing  remains:  
the  settlement  issue  continues  to  be  at  the  core  of  the  Palestinian  –  Israeli  conflict.  
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Palestinians   view   this   as   the   reason   why   repeated   attempts   for   a   peaceful  
resolution  have   failed.  Some  argue   that   Israeli  occupation  exists   just   to  maintain  
the  settlements,  and  the  land  and  resources  that  they  exploit:  
The  fact  that  Israel’s  settlement  construction  has  been  based  on  the  economic  
exploitation  of  the  OPT  has  been  widely  documented.  This  has  included  the  
confiscation   of   large   swathes   of   Palestinian   land   and   destruction   of  
Palestinian   property   to   use   for   construction   and   agriculture   purposes;  
seizure   of   water   resources   to   the   extent   that  599,901   settlers   use   six   times  
more  water  than  the  whole  Palestinian  population  in  the  West  Bank  of  some  
2.86   million;   appropriation   of   touristic   and   archeological   sites;   and  
exploitation   of   Palestinian   quarries,   mines,   Dead   Sea   resources,   and   other  
non-­‐‑renewable  natural  resources  (Farsakh,  Botmeh  and  Arafeh,  2015).    
In   the   first   few   years   of   the   settlements,   construction   was   mainly   focused   on  
agricultural   activity   that   benefited   from   the   modern   agricultural   practices  
introduced  through  the  kibbutzim.  Today,  settlements  are  associated  with  a  wider  
range  of  industry  and  business,  and  in  many  cases  include  entire  industrial  zones.  
Their   types   of   industry   include   information   technology,   hardware,  
pharmaceuticals,   construction   materials,   weapons,   chemicals,   agriculture,   food  
and   beverages.   Moreover,   settlement   companies   have   been   exporting   to  
international  markets  as  well  as   the   local   Israeli  and  Palestinian  ones.  Therefore,  
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different   states   have   developed   their   own   positions   on   trade   with   Israeli  
settlements.  The  most  recent  of  these  positions  is  perhaps  the  recent  EU  guidelines  
on   labelling   settlement   products,   issued   in   November   2015.   Prior   to   these  
guidelines,   settlement   products   were   marketed   in   Europe   as   Israeli   products;  
however,  since  the  EU  considers  settlements  to  be  outside  Israel,   it  now  requires  
them   to   be   labelled   as   “From   settlements   in   the   West   Bank”.   The   guidelines  
specified  this  on  the  grounds  that  its  consumers  had  the  right  to  know  the  origin  
of  the  products  so  they  could  make  an  informed  choice  regarding  their  purchase.  
Nevertheless,   Israel   made   clear   that   it   considers   this   new   policy   to   be  
discriminatory,   claiming   it   is   anti-­‐‑Semitic   and   echoes   the   Nazi   era   (Beaumont,  
2015).    
  
1.1  The  contemporary  problem  with  settlements  
On   the   22nd   of  May   1979,   United   Nations   Security   Council   (UNSC)   resolution  
number   446   determined:   "ʺthat   the   policy   and   practices   of   Israel   in   establishing  
settlements  in  the  Palestinian  and  other  Arab  territories  occupied  since  1967  have  
no   legal   validity   and   constitute   a   serious   obstruction   to   achieving   a  
comprehensive,  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East"ʺ  (UNSC,  1979).  
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However,  several  decades  later,  on  the  18th  of  February  2011,  the  UNSC  failed  to  
condemn  Israeli  settlements  as  an  obstacle  to  peace  given  the  United  States’  veto  
on  a  further  resolution  put  forward  by  the  Arab  countries  (BBC,  2011).  
  
This   contrast   in   the   Security   Council’s   position   contradicts   considerable  
diplomatic   development   since   1979   to   2011,   through   which   the   peace   process  
came  to  exist  along  with  internationally  recognized  Palestinian  representation  that  
acknowledges  Israel’s  right  to  exist  and  is  officially  committed  to  achieving  a  two  
state  solution.  There  has  also  been  a  significant  shift   in  Arab  countries’  positions  
with  the  introduction  of  the  Arab  Peace  Initiative  in  2002  that  offers  Israel  normal  
relations  with   the  Arab  world   if,   among   other   things,   it   gives   up   its   settlement  
activity.      
  
After  the  1967  war,  when  Israel  captured  the  West  Bank,  the  Israeli  Labour  party,  
which  was  in  office  until  1977,  often  referred  to  the  captured  areas  (at   that  stage  
these  included  the  Golan  Heights,  Gaza  Strip  and  Sinai  Peninsula)  as  “bargaining  
chips”   to   be   cashed   in   for   peace   with   the   Arab   world.   However,   its   interest  
changed   when   it   found   itself   enjoying   the   economic   benefits   and   religious  
significance  of  the  captured  land  (Mosely  Lesch,  1977).    
  
In  the  beginning,  the  Israeli  government  had  sent  its  army  to  remove  settlers  who  
immediately   started   claiming   possession   of   the   captured   land.   The   settlers  
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however   kept   coming   back   and   the   government   gave   in.   In   his   book,   The  
Accidental  Empire;  Israel  and  the  Birth  of  Settlements,  1967-­‐‑1977,  Gresham  Gorenberg  
explains   that:   ”More   than   deciding   on   settlements,   the   government   drifted   into  
permitting  it”  (Gorenberg,  2006).    
  
On  the  ground,  the  West  Bank  evolved  from  36  settlements  in  1977  at  the  end  of  
the  Labour  party’s  term  to  121  settlements  in  2011.  By  then,  these  were  inhabited  
by   462,000   people,   with   an   annual   population   growth   rate   between   4   and   6%  
(compared  to  1.5%  in  Israel)  (The  Palestinian  Monitor,  n.d.).  
  
Today,  although  built  on  only  about  3%  of  the  West  Bank,  settlements  control  over  
40%   of   its   land   and   resources   (The   Palestinian   Monitor,   n.d.);   which   indicates  
another   economic   element   associated   with   settlements,   as   they   are   not   simply  
buildings  inhabited  by  settlers.  Through  the  lands  they  confiscate,  along  with  the  
bypass  roads  which  Palestinians  do  not  have  access  to  and  the  security  restrictions  
in   general,   settlements   are   allowed   access   to   over   40%   of   the  West   Bank  while  
denying  Palestinians  that  access.    
  
To  sum  up,  the  PLO’s  Negotiations  Support  Unit  provides  a  useful  explanation  of  
the   underlying   function   of   the   settlements   in   terms   of   their   effectiveness   in  
shoring   up   the   occupation.   At   the   same   time,   they   effectively   undermine   any  
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processes   aimed   at   establishing   a   Palestinian   state   or   lasting   peace   between   the  
two  countries:  
The   aim   and   effect   of   Israel’s   settlement   enterprise   has   been   to   alter   the  
OPT’s   status,   both   physically   and   demographically,   so   as   to   prevent   its  
return   to  us.   The   construction  of   Israeli   settlements   is  designed   to   illegally  
confiscate  our  land  and  natural  resources  while  confining  our  population  to  
unsustainable,  ever-­‐‑shrinking  enclaves  and  severing  East  Jerusalem  from  the  
rest  of  the  OPT.  By  limiting  the  territorial  contiguity  and  economic  viability  
of   the   OPT,   Israeli   settlements   pose   the   single   greatest   threat   to   the  
establishment  of  an   independent  Palestinian   state,   and  hence,   to  a   just   and  
lasting  peace  between  Israelis  and  Palestinians  (PLO,  2016).  
  
The  economic  nature  of  settlements    
In  the  context  of  this  thesis,  it  is  the  settlements’  economic  nature  that  is  especially  
significant.   In   relation   to   this,   the  PLO’s  Negotiations   Support  Unit  makes   clear  
that  it  is  economic  incentives  that  have  made  the  settlements  attractive:  
  
Incentives   offered   by   the   Israeli   government   have   succeeded   in   luring  
thousands  of  Israeli  settlers  to  the  OPT.  According  to  a  poll  conducted  by  the  
Israeli   organization   Peace  Now,   77   percent   of   surveyed   settlers   live   in   the  
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OPT   for   “quality   of   life”   reasons   and  not   for   religious   or   national   security  
reasons  (PLO,  2016).  
Just   as   economic   incentives   are   less   recognised   as   a   reason   for   the   expansion  of  
settlements,   so   too   is   their   overall   economic   nature.   Settlement   companies   that  
enjoy   economic   ties  with   foreign  markets   have   expanded   over   the   past   decades  
and   have   become   an   integral   part   of   the   settlement   enterprise.   However,   some  
thorough   research   into   the   economic   ties   between   settlements   and   a   number   of  
European  countries  has  been  conducted  by  groups  such  as  ProsperPalestine.  Such  
research  provides  evidence  that    
the  main  European  countries  …  have  trade  and  investment  links  with  at  least  
44   settlement   companies.  We   found   five   European   countries   to   have   trade  
and   investment   links  with  more   than   20   settlement   companies:   the  United  
Kingdom   (31),   Germany   (25),   France   and   the   Netherlands   (24   each)   and  
Belgium   (23).   They   are   followed  by   Spain   (20),   Italy   (18),   Sweden   (12)   and  
Denmark  (11),  which  all  have  trade  and  investment  links  with  more  than  ten  
settlement   companies.   Norway   (7)   and   Finland   (6)   have   trade   and  
investment   links   with   only   a   small   number   of   settlement   companies  
(ProsperPalestine,  2011).  
The  settlement  economy  became  more  noticeable  when  the  European  Union  (EU)  
demanded  that  a  clear  distinction  be  made  between  settlement  products  and  those  
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of   Israeli   origin   entering   its   markets.   Prior   to   the   2005   EU   decision   to   exempt  
settlement   products   from   preferential   treatment,   Israeli   products   enjoyed   this  
same   treatment   as   part   of   its   free   trade   agreement   with   Israel;   consequently,  
settlement  products   flowed  into  European  markets  as  Israeli  products.  Although  
the   EU   has   been   continuously   criticized   for   not   applying   proper   procedures   to  
make   the  distinction   between   the   two  origins,   the  decision   triggered  much   civil  
society  activism  and  research  highlighting  the  origin  of  settlement  products.  This  
ongoing   situation   has   given   rise   to   a   growing  demand   for   the   various   forms   of  
boycott  that  form  the  subject  of  this  thesis.  
  
1.2  Research  Aims  
In  the  light  of  the  situation  discussed  above,  the  aim  of  this  research  is  to  examine  
the   movement   to   boycott   Israeli   settlements   and   to   analyse   the   conditions   and  
events  that  led  to  the  recent  EU  guidelines.  Boycott  is  explored  here  as  a  specific  
approach   that   is   widely   considered   as   nonviolent   and,   after   explaining   the  
historical   background,   the   research   analyses   the   different   tactics,   strategies,   and  
methods   adopted   by   the   contemporary   Palestinian   nonviolent   movement.   In  
doing  so,  it  attempts  to  answer  the  main  research  questions:    
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What  are  the  different  nonviolent  programs  to  boycott  settlements  products  
between  2005  and  2012?  How  effective  were  they?  and  What  are  the  different  
perspectives  and  approaches  to  boycotting  settlements?  
Different   terms   have   been   used   by   activists   and   scholars   to   describe   activism  
against   the   occupation.   “Popular   struggle”   is   used   to   refer   to   the   civilian   based  
modes   of   resistance   used   by   Palestinian   activists   and   society.  More   specifically,  
the  term,  “unarmed  resistance”,  is  used  by  Rigby  (1991)  to  reflect  the  reality  that  
many  of  the  clashes  with  the  settlers  or  the  Israeli  army  has  not  been  nonviolent  
insofar   as   they   have   included   stone-­‐‑throwing   and   other   non-­‐‑lethal   means.  
However,  other  scholars  continue  to  use  the  term  ‘nonviolent’  despite  the  fact  that  
some  Palestinian  actions  have  inflicted  direct  harm  upon  Israeli  opponents.      
  
To   answer   these   in   detail,   the   different   forms   of   nonviolent   resistance   in  
Palestinian   history   are   described   according   to  major   events   that   have   occurred,  
such  as   the  Great  Revolt  of  1936,   the  first   Intifada,   the  post-­‐‑Oslo  Agreement  era,  
the  second  Intifada.  However,  the  thesis  focusses  specifically  on  the  post-­‐‑2005  era  
following   the   International   Criminal   Court’s   (ICC)   advisory   opinion   that   the  
Israeli   Separation   Wall   and   settlements   were   illegal.   This   decision   sparked  
nationwide  and  even  worldwide  nonviolent  activism  objecting   to   the  Separation  
Wall,   settlements,   and   occupation.   Indeed,   the   Wall   provided   a   physical  
embodiment  of  Israeli  occupation  that  could  be  clearly  targeted  by  activists  to  the  
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point   where   nonviolent   activity   against   it   became   established   with   weekly  
demonstrations  occurring  in  a  number  of  Palestinian  villages,  such  as  Bil’in,  Ni’lin,  
Al-­‐‑Masara,  Nabi  Saleh,  and  others.    
    
The  original  contribution  of  this  thesis  is  focused  on  the  case  study  of  Al-­‐‑Karameh  
(Dignity)  National  Empowerment  Fund  (NEF),  which  is  of  particular   interest   for  
several   reasons.   As   an   initiative   by   the   government   in   partnership   with   the  
Palestinian  private  sector,  aimed  at  severing  economic  ties  with  Israeli  settlements  
both   from   Palestine   and   the   international  market,   it   is   one   of   its   kind.  Andrew  
Rigby   and  Marwan  Darweish   refer   to   this   as   “a   strange   hybrid   –   initiated   and  
funded  by  a  coalition  between  business  and  political  elites  in  the  West  Bank,  but  at  
the   same   time   trying   to   engage   and   empower   people   at   the   grass-­‐‑roots   level”  
(Darweish   and   Rigby,   2015,   p.   84).   While   international   law   considers   Israeli  
settlements   illegal,   trade   with   them   still   exists,   and   Palestinians   and   their  
supporters  have  been  continuing  to  call  upon  countries  to  end  those  ties.  However,  
at  the  time  the  NEF  was  initiated,  a  major  contradiction  lay  in  the  fact  that  there  
was   a   strong   presence   of   settlement   products   in   Palestinian   markets,   making  
awareness  of  this  one  of  the  programmes  tasks.    
The  NEF  took  a  purely  nonviolent  approach  and  at  every  point  it  emphasized  its  
objection  to  violence,  not  only  in  practice  but  also  in  the  language  and  rhetoric  it  
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adopted.  The  organisation  also  had  an  ambiguous  position  amongst  the  different  
actors   and   movements   that   were   already   carrying   out   boycott   campaigns   of  
various  types.  Some  of  these  were  more  enthused  than  others  that  the  Palestinian  
National   Authority   (PNA)   had   decided   to   join   the   boycott   efforts.   Positions  
ranged  from  those  seeing  it  as  a  breakthrough  and  important  step,  and  those  that  
saw   it   as   threatening   the   already   existing   Boycott,   Divestment   and   Sanctions  
(BDS)  campaign,  which  called  for  a  full  boycott  of  Israel  rather  than  a  limited  one.  
I  was  the  Chief  Executive  of  the  NEF  during  its  existence  and  responsible  for  the  
leadership   and  management   of   the   organisation.   This   position   gave  me   unique  
access  to  information  and  people  that  were  essential  to  this  research.    
  
While   the   scope  of   this   study   is   concerned  with   the  period   from  2005  and  2012,  
there   have   been  many   events   organised   by   the   boycott  movement   since   then   –  
many   of   which   can   be   considered   as   victories.   Here,   I   would   like   to   present   a  
recent   example   that   illustrates   how   effective   boycotts   can   be.   This   concerns   a  
company  called  “Soda  Stream”  which  had  previously  operated   in   the  settlement  
industrial   zone,  Mishur  Adomim.   This   zone   is   attached   to   the  Ma’ale   Adomim  
Settlement  to  the  East  of  Jerusalem.  As  one  may  expect,  Soda  Stream  is  a  factory  
with   products   related   to   the   fizzy   beverage  market,   which   reach   the   Americas,  
Europe,  Australia,   and  many  Asian   countries.   It   is  one  of   the  biggest   settlement  
companies   that,   in   the  past,  had  a  value  of  USD  1.5  billion.  However,   that  value  
has  now  decreased  to  around  USD  300  million  (Zerachovitz,  2015).     While  many  
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purely  market   related   factors   -­‐‑   such  as   the   rise  of  new  competitors  and  shifts   in  
consumer   health   consciousness   -­‐‑   will   have   contributed   to   this   acute   decline,   I  
would  suggest  that  it  is  no  coincidence  that  the  company  has  been  a  prime  target  
of  boycott  campaigns.  It  was  one  of  the  first  companies  to  be  listed  as  one  of  the  
NEF’s  blacklisted  companies,  and  activists  since  then  have  been  campaigning,  and  
calling   on   consumers   to   boycott   its   products.   In   September   2015,   the   factory  
decided  to  shut  down  its  site  in  Meshor  Adomin,  and  relocate  to  the  Negev  desert  
in   Israel.   Its   CEO,   Daniel   Birnbaum,   rejects   the   claim   that   this   was   due   to   the  
boycott   campaign,   claiming   “It’s   propaganda.   It’s   politics.   It’s   hate.   It’s   anti-­‐‑
Semitism.   It’s  all   the  bad  stuff  we  don’t  want   to  be  part  of.”  On   the  other  hand,  
Omar  Barghouti,  the  co-­‐‑founder  of  the  BDS  movement  was  clear  the  boycotts  had  
been  a  significant  influence;  saying  that  he  considered  their  withdrawal  from  the  
settlement  a  “clear-­‐‑cut  BDS  victory  against  an  odiously  complicit  Israeli  company”  
(Birnbaum,  2015).    
  
There   are   no   hard   statistics   that   can   prove   the   point   either   way;   however,   the  
boycott   campaign   did   have   an   impact   on   the   company’s   reputation,   despite  
Birnbaum   insistence   that   it   was  marginal.   In   the  media,   the   issue   was   covered  
extensively   and   this   coverage   was   especially   intense   when   actress   Scarlett  
Johansen  officially  became   the   face  of   Soda  Stream   in   the  US  markets.  Not  only  
was   the   actress   barraged   with   complaints   protesting   her   involvement   with   an  
illegal  settlement  company,  but  the  topic  of  settlement  companies  became  covered  
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by   mainstream   media.   Consequently,   people   from   all   walks   of   life   became  
interested   in   the   issues,  and  not  simply   those  who  were  already  concerned  with  
the   Israeli   Palestinian   conflict.   In   particular,   people   interested   in   following  
celebrity   news   and   gossip   became   aware   of   the   issue   of   settlements   and   their  
products,   as   well   as   the   difference   between   them   and   products   made   in   Israel  
proper.  A  main  objective  for  many  activists  and  leaders  of  boycott  campaigns  is  to  
raise   awareness  of   the   issues;   as  my   interviewee,  Adri  Nieuwhof,   a  BDS   leader,  
explains  in  Chapter  8,  the  objective  is  to  “tell  the  story  of  occupation”.1  Or,  as  the  
head   of   the   Palestine   Solidarity   Campaign   (PSC),   Sara   Colborne,   asserted   in   an  
interview  with  the  author,  the  aim  of  their  activities  is  “to  keep  the  discussion  on  
Palestine   going”.2  Clearly,   the   case   of   Soda   Stream   illustrates   how   this   objective  
has  been  achieved  very  successfully.  
  
1.3  Thesis  Outline  
This  dissertation  is  divided  into  three  major  parts:    
Part   I   comprises   the   Literature   Review   and   the   Methodology,   including   an  
explanation  of  the  analytical  framework  that  informs  the  thesis.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Interview	  with	  the	  Adri	  Nieuwhof	  in	  Switzerland	  using	  Skype,	  11/12/2013	  
2	  Interview	  with	  the	  Sarah	  Colborne	  in	  London,	  19/02/2013.	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Part  II  consists  of  two  chapters;  Chapter  4  provides  a  detailed  examination  of  the  
background   to   Israeli   settlements;   their   roots,   types,   and  motivations,   as  well   as  
their  relationship  to  the  different  forms  of  Zionism.    Chapter  5,  on  the  Palestinian  
nonviolence  movement,  discusses  the  maximalist  position  calling  for  total  boycott  
of   Israel  and   the  minimalist  position  advocating  boycott  of   settlements  products  
only.  This  part  of  the  thesis  presents  the  different  arguments  and  debates  both  in  
support  of  and  against  each  of  these  positions.  The  Israeli  position  on  the  boycott  
movement  is  also  briefly  reviewed  in  this  chapter.    
  
Part   III   focuses  on   the  Palestinian  civil   society  and   international  actors  and   their  
role  in  the  boycott  campaign.  Firstly,  Chapter  6  provides  the  context  in  which  the  
following  chapters  are  presented.   It  gives  a  detailed  account  of   the   two   types  of  
boycotts  of  Israel:  the  BDS  movement  which  calls  for  a  full  boycott  of  Israel,  and  
the   other,   which   is   a   more   diffuse  movement   focussed   on   a   limited   boycott   of  
Israeli   settlements.   The   arguments   for   and   against   each   of   these   are   presented  
before   key   political   decisions   and   divestments   that   undermine   trade   with  
settlements   are   discussed.   The   Israeli   position   on   the   boycott  movement   is   also  
briefly  reviewed  in  this  chapter.    
  
Following  this,  focus  on  the  civil  society  and  international  actors  carrying  out  the  
boycotts;  based  on  the  original  research  carried  out  as  part  of  this  study.  Chapter  7  
examines  the  Palestinian  nonviolent  movement,  since  it  is  this  that  spearheads  the  
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boycott  activities.  Interviews  were  conducted  with  leaders  of  Palestinian  popular  
struggle   to   better   understand   their   motives,   strategy,   tactics,   challenges,   and  
objectives;   and   the   issues   and  ways   in  which   these   are   aligned   or   contrast   each  
other   are   considered.   A   major   obstacle   that   was   identified   is   the   absence   of   a  
national   strategy   for   popular   struggle   that   can   unite   all   actors,   and   align   their  
respective   actions   so   that   they   all   contribute   towards   shared   objectives.   Instead,  
the  interviews  revealed  many  areas  of  disagreement  and  contention  amongst  the  
groups  leading  Palestinian  popular  struggle.  The  structure  of  the  popular  struggle  
movement   is  described,  demonstrating  many  complications  and   the  competition  
among   its   different   committees   for   the   leadership   of   popular   struggles.   How  
members   and   committees   interact   with   the   political   leadership,   and   its   Fatah  
youth  movement  is  also  presented.    
  
Since  Palestinian  popular  struggle  largely  depends  on  its  international  supporters,  
leaders  of  the  international  boycott  movement  are  interviewed  in  Chapter  8.    Just  
as   the   motivation,   tactics,   and   objectives   of   the   Palestinian   popular   struggle  
movement   is  examined   in   its  preceding  chapter,   this   chapter  examines   the  same  
for   international   supporters,  whether   they   support   a   full   or   a   limited  boycott   of  
Israel.   How   they   interact   with   the   PNA   and,   more   importantly,   leaders   of  
Palestinian   popular   struggle   is   thoroughly   examined.   Their   perception   of  
achievement  and  victory  is  presented  and  evaluated  against  their  desired  outcome  




Chapter  9  presents  the  case  study  of  the  NEF,  explaining  why  it  was  established,  
and  the  two  tier  approach  adopted  to  end  the  existence  of  settlement  products  on  
the   West   Bank:   introducing   a   law   making   it   illegal   to   trade   with   them   and  
carrying   out   public   awareness   campaigns.   These   campaigns   made   clear   the  
difference  between  settlement  products  and  those  produced  in  Israel  proper,  their  
detrimental  effect  on  the  Palestinian  economy,  and  the  implications  of  Palestinian  
consumer   behaviour.   The   PNA   saw   a   chance   through   this   effort   to   involve   the  
public  in  the  economy  building  and,  therefore,  state  building  efforts  of  Palestine.    
  
At   a  practical   level,   the  NEF   targeted  a  number  of   Israeli   settlement   companies.  
Those   companies  were  blacklisted   in  a  booklet   that  was  widely  distributed.  The  
exact   impact   on   those   companies   and   the   volume   of   their   trade   is   not   precisely  
known,  however,  reports   that  are  presented  throughout  the  chapter  suggest   that  
several   companies   did   in   fact   collapse,   especially   those   depending   on   the  
Palestinian  markets.    
  
The   chapter  presents   the  main   findings   from  my   interviews  with   those  who   led  
the  activities  of  the  NEF;  from  the  prime  minister  at  the  time,  Dr  Salam  Fayyad,  to  
the  coordinators  of   the  NEF’s  grassroots  activities,   such  as   its  door   to  door,  and  
shop   to   shop   campaigns.  The   implications   of   the  NEF  and   the  practical   effect   it  
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had   form   the  main   focus,   including   Israel’s   response   to   the   campaign  given   the  
PNA’s  major  involvement.    
  
Finally,   in   the   Conclusion,   I   assess   the   effectiveness   of   the   various   boycott  
movements  and  consider  the  usefulness  of  the  analytical  framework  used  in  this  
thesis,  as  set  out  in  Chapter  3.  I  consider  the  value  of  the  work  in  addressing  the  
gap  in  academic  literature  regarding  settlement  boycotts  and  suggest  how  it  may  
be  built  on  in  further  research.  
  





Literature  Review:  Nonviolence  in  theory  
	  
2.1  Introduction  
Literature   on   nonviolence   dates   back   thousands   of   years.   The   Old   and   New  
Testaments,  the  Quran,  and  many  other  documentations  of  prophets’  words  and  
actions   all   refer   to   nonviolence.   Throughout   the   years   up  until   the   present   day,  
nonviolence   in   theory   and  practice   continues   to   be  documented   and   studied.   In  
literature,   boycotts   have   been   labelled   both   as   a   nonviolent  means   of   resistance  
and   as   violent   protest;   and   descriptions   range   from   that   of   Qardawi,   which  
presents  them  as  peaceful  (Halevi  2012,  p.  53)  to  that  of  Harper’s  magazine,  which  
calls  boycotts  a  “new  form  of  terrorism”.  Critics  claim  that  boycotts  aim  to  harm  
and  kill  and,  in  the  case  of  boycotting  Israel,  opponents  refer  to  this  as  a  new  form  
of  the  anti-­‐‑Semitism  that  preceded  the  Nazi  Holocaust  (Hallward,  2013,  p.  18).  On  
the  other  hand,  there  has  been  some  significant  research  into  the  positive  effects,  
in  particular  that  of  Gene  Sharp  and  others  whose  work  is  discussed  below.      
This  chapter  explores  how  nonviolence  has  been  theorised,  strategized  and  put  
into  practice  according  to  contemporary  academic  discourse.  The  first  section  
considers  the  accepted  definition  of  nonviolence  as  well  as  the  two  main  schools  
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of  thought  on  how  the  subject  needs  to  be  approached.  The  chapter  then  provides  
a  brief  review  of  the  distinctions  between  pacifism,  passivity  and  nonviolence.  The  
next  two  sections  examine  more  practical  issues,  firstly  looking  at  how  
nonviolence  can  be  used  to  challenge  oppressive  power  structures  and  then  
reviewing  the  various  methods  employed  as  presented  in  the  relevant  literature.  
This  leads  on  to  a  discussion  of  the  Palestinian  situation  in  relation  to  nonviolence,  
looking  specifically  at  the  boycotts.  The  chapter  closes  by  considering  how  this  
thesis  may  contribute  to  or  challenge  current  academic  thought  on  the  subject.  
2.2  Nonviolence  in  theory  
i.  Definition,  perceptions,  and  positions  
An   examination   of   an   authoritative   definition   of   nonviolence   highlights   the  
attributes  and  contentions   that   lie  within   the  subject   itself.     Webster’s  dictionary  
gives  the  following  definition:    
[A]  philosophy  and  strategy  for  social  change  that  rejects  the  use  of  physical  
violence.   As   such,   nonviolence   is   an   alternative   to   passive   acceptance   of  
oppression  and  armed  struggle  against   it.  Practitioners  of  nonviolence  may  
use  diverse  methods  in  their  campaigns  for  social  change,   including  critical  
forms   of   education   and   persuasion,   aggressive   civil   disobedience   and  




This   suggests   that   there   are   different   attributes   to   nonviolence;   a   philosophy,   a  
strategy,   an   alternative   to   both   passivity   and   violent   resistance,   and   a   practice.   It   also  
makes  clear  that  nonviolence  depends  on  a  variety  of  methods  to  achieve  its  goal  
of  social  change  without  the  use  of  physical  violence.  
Nevertheless,   in   the   first   part   of   this   chapter,   I   explore   how   existing   literature  
relating  to  nonviolence  challenges  the  attributes,  methods,  and  goals  as  presented  
by  this  definition.  To  begin,  I  note  that  nonviolence  is  presented  above  as  both  a  
philosophy  and  strategy,  and  this  suggests  that  the  two  go  hand  in  hand,  and  are  
not   separate.   However,   this   is   a   rather   controversial   issue   among   scholars   and  
practitioners  who  hold  a  variety  of  positions  regarding  this.  
ii.  Nonviolence  as  philosophy,  principle,  or  “personal  perfection”:    
One  school  of   thought  argues   that  nonviolence   is  a  philosophy,  a  way  of   life,  or  
principle   rather   than   a   strategy   that   is   limited   in   terms   of   time   and   interest.  As  
such,   it  does  not   justify  violence  under  any  circumstances.  This  position   is  often  
found   in   religions   and   embedded   in   ideologies   presented   by   the   likes   of  
Mohandas  K.  Gandhi  whose  philosophy  developed  from  Jainism  and  Buddhism.  
Gandhi  argued  that.  “Victory  attained  by  violence  is  tantamount  to  defeat,  for  it  is  
momentary”  (Gandhi,  1919,  p.  5).  More  controversially,  he  also  argued  that  “[i]t  is  
better   to  be  violent,   if   there   is  violence   in  our  hearts,   than  to  put  on  the  cloak  of  
nonviolence  to  cover  impotence”(quoted  in  Merton  and  Kulansky,  2007).  There  is  
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ample   evidence   of   Gandhi’s   rejection   of   violence   in   any   form   and   under   any  
external  circumstance,  which  is  reflected  through  his  teachings.    
In   line   with   Gandhi,   many   authors   argue   that   a   correlation   exists   between   the  
means  and  the  ends.  Robert  Holmes  (1990)  explains  that  when  the  choice  to  adopt  
violence   is  made  and  seen  as   justifiable,  we  rarely   factor   in   "ʺthe  extent   to  which  
the  means  we  use  to  attain  our  ends  transform  the  moral  quality  of  the  resultant  
state   of   affairs;   we   fail,   that   is,   to   see   the   extent   to   which  means   and   ends   are  
interrelated"ʺ  (Holmes,  1990,  p.  4).  
This  school  of  thought  aims  to  win  the  hearts  and  minds  of  opponents  rather  than  
destroying   or   hurting   them.   Holmes   expresses   this   when   introducing   Gandhi’s  
concept  of   the  Satyagraha  and  of  a  person  associated  with  this,  a  Satyagrahi.  He  
explains  that  if  someone  gives  us  pain  through  ignorance,  as  Satyagrahi  we  shall  
win  him/her  through  love  (Holmes,  1990).    
A  Satyagrahi  does  not  fear  for  his  body,  he  does  not  give  up  what  he  thinks  
is   truth;   the  word  "ʺdefeat"ʺ   is  not   to  be   found   in  his  dictionary,  he  does  not  
wish  for  the  destruction  of  his  antagonist,  he  does  not  vent  anger  on  him;  but  
has  only  compassion  for  him  (Holmes,  1990,  p.  53).    
Mary   E,   King   (2007,   p.12)   supports   this,   stating:   “The   technique   of   nonviolent  
action   carries   within   it   the   potential   for   benefiting   both   parties   to   a   conflict,  
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because   it   does   not   seek   to   accomplish   its   goals   by   wounding   or   harming   the  
adversary  except  politically.”    
As  mentioned  above,  principled  nonviolence  is  often  advocated  by  religions  and  
ideologies.  The  spiritual  leader  and  scholar,  Tich  Nhat  Hanh,  presents  a  Buddhist  
position   on   nonviolence   and   explains   the   interrelation   between   knowledge,  
understanding,   anger,   and   nonviolence.   He   explains   that   something   may   be  
different  in  reality  to  what  it  is  in  our  minds  since  our  perception  is  merely  what  
we  think  of  or  conceive  as  reality.  However,  we  have  many  misperceptions  in  the  
course  of  our  lives;  in    Tich  Nhat  Hanh  (1987,  p.  46)  words:  "ʺif  you  look  at  me,  the  
me  in  myself  may  be  different  from  the  me  you  perceive,  if  I  don'ʹt  understand  you,  
I  may   be   angry  with   you."ʺ   Therefore,  we  must   learn   to   understand   each   other.  
According  to  the  Buddha,  in  order  to  understand,  we  must  become  one  with  what  
we   want   to   understand,   and   knowledge   itself   may   be   an   obstacle   to  
understanding  since  it  can  act  like  ice  blocking  the  flow  of  water.  Thus,  for  things  
to   reveal   themselves   to   us,   we   must   be   willing   to   give   up   any   preformed  
perception  of   them  since   there   should  not  be  any   room   for  preconceptions.  One  
should   not   assume   to   know   things   as   this   may   dictate   one’s   course   of   action  
erroneously.   Therefore,   understanding   that   enables   us   to   avoid   misperceptions  
and  consequent  inappropriate  treatment  or  anger  is  relevant  to  oneself  before  it  is  
relevant  to  others.  If  a  person  does  not  understand  their  anger  to  be  part  of  their  
self,   s/he  will   deal  with   it   badly   and   not   know   how   to   transform   this   negative  
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feeling  into  a  constructive  one.  Tich  Nhat  Hanh  makes  clear  that  feelings  such  as  
anger   are   a   type   of   energy,   and   energy   cannot   be   destroyed   -­‐‑   it   can   only   be  
converted.      
I  would  not  look  upon  anger  as  something  foreign  to  me  that  I  have  to  fight,  
to  have  surgery  to  remove  it.  I  know  that  anger  is  me,  and  I  am  anger.  Non-­‐‑
duality,   not   two.   I   have   to   deal  with  my   anger  with   care,  with   love,  with  
tenderness,   with   nonviolence....   In   Buddhism   we   do   not   consider   anger,  
hatred,   greed   as   enemies  we   have   to   fight,   to   destroy,   to   annihilate.   If  we  
annihilate   anger,   we   annihilate   ourselves.   Dealing  with   anger   in   that   way  
would   be   transforming   yourself   into   a   battlefield,   tearing   yourself   into  
parts...if  you  struggle  in  that  way,  you  do  violence  to  yourself.  If  you  cannot  
be   compassionate  with  yourself,  you  cannot  be   compassionate  with  others.  
(Tich  Nhat  Hanh,  1987,  p.  41)  
  
At  a  more  academic  level,  Holmes  (1990)  gives  special  attention  to  nonviolence  in  
Judaism  and  Christianity.  He  notes   that  most   of   the  philosophical   and   religious  
thinking  on  nonviolence  began  in  the  Eastern  world  and  explains  nonviolence  in  
Eastern   philosophy   and   religion,   starting   with   Jainism,   which   accepts   the  
postulates  of  nonviolence  as  the  highest  ideal  of  life,  and  as  the  means  to  attaining  
liberation.  Jainism  has  five  principles:  “nonviolence,  truth,  non-­‐‑stealing,  celibacy,  
and   non-­‐‑possession”   (Sharma,   cited   in   Holmes,   1990,   p.   12).   Starting   with   the  
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Palestinian  Talmudic   sources   from   the  middle   third   century   (BCE)   and   into   the  
early  fourth  century  (BCE),  he  cites  a  number  of  stories  or  Midrash  that  offer  a  two  
point  program  for  reconciliation;  to  control  your  urge  to  hate,  and  to  act  in  such  a  
manner  that  your  enemy  will  become  your  friend.  Questions  like  -­‐‑  ‘How  far  does  
the  prohibition  to  kill  extend?’  -­‐‑  and  -­‐‑  ‘How  does  one  react  to  a  potential  murder?’  
-­‐‑   are   answered   through   a   number   of   stories   from   the   Talmudic   period.   For  
instance,  one  Midrash   explains   that   the  blessing  of  peace  worthy  of   Israel   is   that  
"ʺHe   does   not   choose   the   way   of   violence   even   to   overthrow   his   oppressors”  
(Holmes,   1990,   p.   25).   It   follows   that   the   sign   of   Israel’s   righteousness   is   its  
rejection   of   violence.   Another   Midrash   explains   that   God   is   always   with   the  
persecuted  (Holmes,  1990).  
  
In   regard   to   Christianity,   Holmes   mentions   some   of   the   teachings   of   the   New  
Testament  that  resemble  the  transforming  power  that  Christianity  adopts.  Of  the  
teachings  he  discusses,  three  are  especially  worth  mention  here:  1)  "ʺAll  who  take  
the  sword  will  parish  by  the  sword"ʺ;  2)  "ʺYou  have  heard  that  I  said,  'ʹYou  shall  love  
your   neighbor   and   hate   your   enemy.'ʹ   But,   I   say   to   you,   love   your   enemies   and  
pray  for  those  who  persecute  you"ʺ;  3)  "ʺIf  your  enemy  is  hungry,  feed  him;  if  he  is  
thirsty,  give  him  drink;  for  by  doing  so  you  will  heap  burning  coals  on  his  head.  




Holmes  also  introduces  the  works  of  Leo  Tolstoy  (1828-­‐‑1910),  Gandhi  (1869-­‐‑1948),  
and   Martin   Luther   King   Jr.   (1929-­‐‑1968)   as   three   modern   philosophers   of  
nonviolence:  
Tolstoy   and   King   both   derive   their   conclusions   from   their   Christian   faith,  
and   Gandhi   from   Hinduism.   Tolstoy   pursued   this   understanding   of  
Christianity  to  what  he  saw  as  its  logical  conclusion:  the  rejection  not  only  of  
the   organized   violence   of   war   but   also   of   the   institutionalized   violence   of  
government  itself,  which  makes  war  possible  (Holmes,  1990,  p.  42).  
  
While   Gandhi   and   King,   and   surely   any   pacifist,   would   agree   with   Tolstoy'ʹs  
renunciation  of  violence  and  war,  they  do  not  follow  him  into  anarchism.  Gandhi  
thought  of  himself  as  engaging  in  an  experiment  with  truth  and  asserting  that  one  
must  first  seek  the  truth,  and  be  open  to  the  possibility  that  one'ʹs  convictions  may  
present  a  partial  or  imperfect  grasp  of  a  situation  in  a  similar  manner  to  Tich  Nhat  
Hanh.  Moreover,  he   considered   that,   in   seeking   truth,  one  may   suffer   and  must  
endure  the  suffering  for  the  truth’s  sake.  King,  also,  was  concerned  with  seeking  
the   truth   and   rejecting   cowardice.   He   saw   that   the   truth   in   the   socioeconomic  
system   that  develops  out  of   capitalism   is   the   spiritual  values,   the  valuing  of   the  
individual,  and  freedom.  King  put   forward  five  main  principles  on  nonviolence:  
1)  nonviolence  is  not  for  cowards;  2)  it  seeks  friendship  and  reconciliation  rather  
than  defeat  and  humiliation  of  the  opponent;  3)  it  is  evil  that  nonviolence  seeks  to  
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defeat  and  not   the  persons  victimized  by   it;   4)  nonviolence  must  not  only  avoid  
physical  violence  but  also  the  internal  violence  of  the  spirit;  and  5)  one  must  have  
faith  that  the  universe  is  on  the  side  of  justice  (Holmes,  1990,  p.  44).  
  
Irwin   and   Faison   (1984)   provide   further   insight   into   the   differences  within   this  
school   of   thought   by   describing   three   types   of   group   that   follow   modern  
principled  nonviolence:  
The   first   sizable   groups   in   the  modern  world  who   attempted   to   live   their  
nonviolent   ideals   were   small   “non-­‐‑resistant”   Christian   sects,   such   as   the  
Mennonites  and  Anabaptists,  who  in  times  of  war  refused  conscription  into  
the   army  and  bore  punishments   laid   on   them  without   resisting.  A   second,  
more   worldly   nonviolence,   which   may   be   called   active   reconciliation,   is  
subscribed   to   by  many  Quakers   and   individual  pacifists.   They  particularly  
aim  to  reconcile  parties  in  conflict,  to  aid  victims  of  war  and  poverty,  and  to  
persuade  by  education  and  example  rather  than  coercion.  A  third  category  of  
adherents   of   nonviolence   can   be   called   advocates   of   moral   resistance.  
Although   advocating   and   engaging   in   education   and   projects   promoting  
human   cooperation,   they   frequently   lack   an   overall   social   analysis   or  
comprehensive  program  of  social  change  (Irwin  and  Faison,  1984,  p.  37).  
Clearly,  all  these  groups  are  very  much  followers  of  the  school  of  thought  seeing  
nonviolence  as  a  philosophy  or  way  of  life.  
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Of   particular   interest   to   this   thesis,   Rajmohan   Gandhi,   Mohandas   Gandhi’s  
grandson,  makes  a  link  between  nonviolent  resistance  as  described  above  and  the  
situation  in  Palestine.  In  his  paper,  “Mohandas  Gandhi,  Abdul  Ghaffar  Khan,  and  
the   Middle   East   Today”(Gandhi,   2005),   he   explains   that   his   grandfather’s  
teachings   and   those   of  Abdul  Ghaffar  Khan   are   relevant   to  Palestinians   in   their  
quest   for   independence.   The   paper   emphasizes   the   psychological   victories   of  
Mohandas  Gandhi  and  Abdul  Ghaffar  Khan,  which  he  sees  as  relevant  goals   for  
Palestinians  in  their  nonviolent  resistance.  
iii.  Nonviolence  as  strategy,  pragmatism,  or  “political  realism”:  
Following  a  more  pragmatic   approach,  Gene  Sharp   (2005)   asserts   that   one  must  
not  necessarily  reject  violence  in  principle  to  wage  nonviolent  struggle.  He  states:    
Only   in   rare   historical   instances   did   a   group   or   a   leader   have   a   personal  
belief   that   rejected   violence   in   principle.  Nevertheless,   even   in   these   cases,  
nonviolent   struggle  based  on  pragmatic   concerns  was  often   still   viewed  as  
morally  superior  (Sharp,  2005,  p.  19).      
Sharp   also   criticizes   those  who   divide   social   and   political   behaviour   into   either  
violent  or  nonviolent,  since   this  naturally  categorizes   the  violent  as  evil,  and  the  
nonviolent  as  good,  although  nonviolent  action  may  be  used  for  evil    (Sharp,  1973).  
In  a  later  work,  he  states  his  belief  that,  “nonviolent  action  or  nonviolent  struggle  
is  a  technique  of  action  by  which  the  population  can  restrict  and  sever  the  sources  
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of   power   of   their   rulers   or   other   oppressors   and   mobilize   their   own   power  
potential  into  effective  power”  (Sharp,  2005,  p.  41).    
It   is  therefore  clear  that,  unlike  Gandhi,  Sharp  does  not  seek  to  win  the  hearts  of  
his  opponents;  rather,  he  aims  at  ridding  the  oppressed  from  the  oppressor.  In  this  
sense,   a   nonviolent   struggle   group   should   target   its   opponent’s   power   sources  
that  enable  it  to  reduce  or  destroy  their  capacity  to  continue  with  the  struggle.  It  is  
for   this   reason   that   Sharp   focuses   on   exploring   the   power   paradigm   and   how   its  
roots  can,  in  fact,  be  tapped  to  benefit  the  oppressed,  as  will  be  further  examined  
in  Section  2.3.    
One   can   argue   that   Islam’s   position   on   violence  may   also   be   considered   in   this  
category  since  under  certain  circumstances  the  use  of  violence  is  justified  in  Islam.  
In  explaining  nonviolence  in  Islam,  Mohammad  Abu-­‐‑Nimer  (2003)  states  that,   in  
Islam,   peace   goes   hand   in   hand  with   justice   for   there   can   be   no   peace  without  
justice.      In   Islam,   action   dedicated   to   Allah   is   understood   to   be   action   that   is  
seeking   justice.      Therefore,   a  major   call   of   Islamic   religion   is   to   establish   a   just  
social   reality.   While   divine   justice   in   Islam   is   rooted   in   what   the   Prophet  
communicated,  its  public  rulings  and  laws  are  arrived  at  through  scholars'ʹ  ijtihad,  
or  reasoning;  thus,  as  Abu-­‐‑Nimer  explains,  "ʺScholars  therefore  agree  on  the  Divine  
nature  of   justice  but  disagree  on  how   it   should  be   implemented  on  earth"ʺ  (Abu-­‐‑




Islamic   peace   building   strategies   are   drawn   from   this   ideal   and   comprehensive  
notion   of   justice,   whereby   each   individual   has   the   responsibility   of   fighting  
against   injustice.   The  Quran   stresses   the   importance   of   justice   by  mentioning   it  
and  its  synonyms  over  100  times.  It  also  gives  over  200  warnings  against  injustice.  
Indeed,  except  for  the  existence  of  one  God,  no  other  religious  moral  principle  is  
emphasized   in   the   Quran   as   much   as   principles   of   justice,   equality,   and  
temperance.  Thus,  as  Abu-­‐‑Nimer  asserts,  "ʺThe  interconnection  and  independence  
of  peace  building  and  justice  are  thus  never  far  from  the  surface  of  Islam.  Peace  is  
the  product  of  order  and   justice."ʺ   (Abu-­‐‑Nimer,  2003,  p.  53)However,  while   these  
principles   are   greatly   emphasized,   there   are   no   specific  measures  mentioned   in  
the  Quran  as  to  how  to  establish  justice  on  earth;  therefore,  this  responsibility  lies  
with  scholars.    
  
Abu-­‐‑Nimer   mentions   many   testaments   to   Islam'ʹs   emphasis   on   social  
empowerment   through   doing   good   (that   is,   khair   (goodness)   and   ihsan  
(excellence)),  and  charity  is  prescribed  in  at  least  25  Qur'ʹanic  verses.  These  make  
clear   that   Muslims   have   an   obligation   towards   the   underprivileged   in   their  
societies  and  the  abolition  of  slavery  was  a  clear  example  of  Islam'ʹs  commitment  
to  ending  oppression,  poverty,   and  human  suffering.  Muslims  are   to  have  good  
interrelations.   The   Prophet   states   that:   "ʺNo   Muslim   can   become   a   Mu'ʹmin  
(genuine  believer)  unless  he  likes  for  all  others  (not  only  Muslim)  what  he  likes  for  
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himself  and  makes  friends  with  them  for  God'ʹs  sake"ʺ  (Al  Tirmidhi,  quoted  in  Abu-­‐‑
Nimer,  2003,  p.  56)(brackets  are  Abu-­‐‑Nimer’s).  
  
Human  dignity,   the   sacredness   of   human   life,   knowledge   and   reason,   creativity  
and  innovation,  forgiveness,  and  patience,  are  given  special  attention  in  Islam  and  
parallels  can  be  drawn  between  these  virtues  and  contemporary  nonviolent  action  
and  conflict  resolution.  For  instance,  one  cannot  resolve  a  conflict  without  having  
a   comprehensive   knowledge   of   its   circumstances   and   context,   as   well   as   those  
involved.   This   is   exemplified   in   the   account   of   Prophet   Mohammad’s   creative  
solution   to  a  conflict  between  tribes  concerning   the  placing  of   the  Black  Stone,  a  
symbolic   object   of   great   religious   significance.   Through   his   knowledge   of   all  
involved  he  provides  a  solution  to  the  conflict  by  proposing  that  the  Stone  be  held  
in  a  cloth  that  all  competing  clan  representatives  could  hold  when  placing  it  into  
its  rightful  place  on  the  Ka'ʹabah.      
  
Muslims  believe   that  God   is   the   creator  of   all  people  and,   consequently,  human  
beings  are  the  manifestation  of  God'ʹs  will  on  earth.  Therefore,  protecting  human  
life  and  respecting  human  dignity  is  a  central  part  of  Islam.  As  the  Qur'ʹanic  verse  
states:   "ʺIf   anyone   saved   a   life,   it   would   be   as   if   he   saved   the   life   of   the  whole  
people"ʺ   (The   Holy   Koran,   quoted   in   Abu-­‐‑Nimer,   2003,   p.   59).   Abu-­‐‑Nimer   also  
explains  that  it  is  forbidden  to  harm  resources  that  are  useful  to  the  human  race,  




Peace   in   Islam   is   understood   as   a   state   of   physical,   mental,   spiritual,   and  
social  harmony,  living  at  peace  with  God  through  submission,  and  living  at  
peace   with   one'ʹs   fellow   human   beings   by   avoiding   wrongdoing.   ...   The  
ultimate  purpose  of  Qur'ʹanic   revelation   for  Muslims   is   to   create  a  peaceful  
and  just  social  order  (Abu-­‐‑Nimer,  2003,  p.  60).  
  
Islam  therefore  involves  a  quest  for  peace.  It  shuns  violence  and  aggression  in  all  
its  forms.  This  is  stressed  through  many  verses  from  the  Quran  and  Hadith.  The  
Prophet   always   discouraged   the   use   of   violence   to   resolve   conflicts,   and   Islam  
always  had  a  preference   for  peaceful   resolution  of  conflicts.  Yet   in  certain  cases,  
resort   to   violence   is   allowed   for   the   greater   good   and   advancement   of   peace.  
However,  many  restrictions  are  placed  on  the  type  and  amount  of  force  used,  and  
whom  it   targets.   Islam  prefers   forgiveness  and  amnesty,  and  considers   these   the  
best  reaction  to  anger  (Abu-­‐‑Nimer,  2003).    
  
The  Prophet  set  an  example  of  nonviolent  resistance  from  the  early  days  of  Islam  
when  he  lived  in  Mecca  with  his  followers  before  his  journey  to  Medina.  His  main  
focus  was   on   patience   and   steadfastness   in   the   face   of   oppression.   For   thirteen  
years,  the  Prophet  depended  on  his  spiritual  preaching  in  dealing  with  aggression  
and   confrontation,   adopting   only   nonviolent   methods.   He   never   cursed   his  
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enemies  or  encouraged  violence.  He  prayed  for  his  oppressors'ʹ  enlightenment  and  
wished  them  forgiveness  and  peace    (Abu-­‐‑Nimer,  2003).  
  
iv.  Nonviolence,  passivity  and  pacifism:    
Nonviolence  has  a  complex  relationship  with  passivity  and  pacifism  and  it  is  
important  to  understand  the  differences  between  the  latter  two  concepts.  The  case  
of  Rosa  Parks,  who  refused  to  comply  with  a  directive  to  vacate  her  place  on  a  bus  
in  favour  of  a  white  person,  constitutes  an  act  of  passive  resistance,  and  as  such  is  
not  passivity;  to  have  relinquished  her  seat  would  have  been  passivity.  This  
illustrates  how,  sometimes,  to  refuse  to  perform  a  certain  act  is  to  be  active,  
whereas  to  perform  the  act  is  to  be  passive.    
Moreover,  there  are  different  types  of  pacifism  just  as  there  are  different  types  of  
nonviolence:  absolute  pacifism,  according  to  which  no  war  is  justified  under  any  
circumstance;  conditional  pacifism,  which  asserts  that  war  in  the  world  as  we  
know  it  is  wrong;  and  nuclear  pacifism  that  is  only  opposed  to  nuclear  wars.  In  all  
these  forms,  being  a  pacifist  does  not  necessarily  entail  being  nonviolent  since  one  
may  justify  violence  as  a  means  to  opposing  wars  (Holmes,  1990).  
Sharp   explains   the   relationship   between   nonviolence   and   passivity   by   stating  
simply,   “Nonviolent   action   is  not  passive;   it   is   action   that   is  nonviolent”  (Sharp,  
2005,   p.   41).   He   also   explains   that   all   responses   to   conflict,   whether   violent   or  
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nonviolent,   can   first   be   divided   into   those   of   action   and   those   of   inaction.   This  
clearly   rules   out   the   perception   that   nonviolent   action   means   being   passive   or  
submissive.    
Carter,  Clark  and  Randle,  however,  argue   that  passive   resistance  can  be  used   to  
denote   hidden   resistance.   Based   on   their   study   introducing   a   geographically-­‐‑
categorized  comprehensive  overview  of  the  most  relevant  studies  on  nonviolence  
relating   to   conflicts   across   all   continents,   they   have   compiled   a   bibliography   of  
books  and  studies,  Bibliography  of  people  power  and  nonviolent  protest   (2013).     Here,  
they   explain   that,   while   popular   resistance   using   nonviolent  means,  which   had  
previously   been   termed   passive   resistance,   has   come   to   be   known   as   ‘people  
power’,  passive  resistance  still  has  its  place  as  a  hidden,  under  the  radar,    form  of  
resistance  (Carter,  Clark  and  Randle,  2013).      
To  sum  up  using  the  words  of  A.  A.  Milne,  author  of  Pooh  Bear,  the  distinctions  
between   pacifism   and   passivity   can   be   understood   as   follows:   "ʺpacifism   is   the  
conviction  that  war  is  wrong.  Morally  wrong.  It  is  not  that  war  is  merely  bad,  or  
terrible.  And  to  desire  peace   is  not   to  be  a  pacifist."ʺ   (Quoted  in  Holmes,  1990,  p.  
114)  
2.3  Practical  issues  of  nonviolence  
i.  Challenging  oppressive  power  structures:  
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Through   the  discussion   above,   it   becomes   clear   that   the   two   schools   of   thought  
aim  to  achieve  different  goals.  Those  who  follow  nonviolence  as  a  principle  seek  
to  convince  the  other  of  the  rightness  of  their  cause  and  feel  that  if  they  hurt  their  
opponent   in   achieving   a   successful   resolution   they   have   undermined   their  
purpose.   Meanwhile,   those   who   see   nonviolence   as   a   strategy   to   be   used   to  
dismantle  their  opponents’  power  structure  are  not  so  concerned  with  convincing  
them.  Moreover,  getting  rid  of  a  regime  by  severing  its  power  resources  requires  
different  methods  and  strategies  than  those  used  to  persuade  it  to  change  its  ways.  
This   approach   assumes   the   existence   of   a   power   paradigm   that   depends   on  
variables,  and  an  understanding  of  these  variables  then  determines  the  nonviolent  
group’s  strategy  for  change.    
Sharp  explains   that   there  are   two  views  on  the  nature  of  power:  The  first   is   that  
people   are   dependent   on   the   good   will,   support,   and   decisions   made   by   their  
government  or  hierarchical  system  to  which  they  belong.  In  other  words,  political  
power  is  monolithic.  The  other  view  sees  political  power  as  the  exact  opposite;  in  
this   case,   the  government   is  dependent  on   the  people   -­‐‑   in  other  words,  political  
power   is   pluralistic.   Nonviolent   action   is   based   on   the   second   of   these   views  
(Sharp,  1973).  
  
According   to   Sharp   (2005),   nonviolent   action   assumes   that   political   power   can  
most  probably  be  controlled  at  its  sources  and  it  is,  therefore,  important  to  identify  
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the   opponent’s   sources   of   power   since   only   then   can   nonviolent   groups   target  
them.   Moreover,   as   he   earlier   explains,   political   power   emerges   from   the  
interaction  of  all  or  several  of  the  following  sources:  “authority,  human  resources,  
skills   and   knowledge,   intangible   factors,   material   resources,   and   sanctions”  
(Sharp,  1973,  p.  11).  These  interactions  are  governed  by  three  variables  -­‐‑  the  ruler,  
the  subject,  and  the  situation.  He  further  asserts   that  all  of   these  sources  depend  
on  obedience  at  some  level,  and  this  obedience  is  voluntary,  even  when  sanctions  
are   applied:   "ʺWithout   the   various   types   of   cooperation   and   assistance,   no   ruler  
could  impose  sanctions"ʺ  (Sharp,  1973,  p.  14).  This  obedience  can  be  understood  to  
relate  to  many  causes:      
  
[T]he   reasons   why   people   obey   rulers   are   complex   and   interrelated,   they  
include  habit,  fear  of  sanctions,  moral  obligation,  self  interest,  psychological  
identification  with   the  ruler,   indifference,  absence  of  self   confidence  (Sharp,  
2005,  p.  32).  
  
He   goes   on   to   describe   how   the   support   a   ruler’s   party   gives   him/her   conveys  
his/her  power  throughout  the  rest  of  society:    
All   rulers   use   the   obedience   and   cooperation   they   receive   from   part   of  
society   in   order   to   rule   the   whole.   The   part   of   the   administration   that  
administers   and   enforces   the   rulers’   policies   is   most   likely   to   obey   and  
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cooperate   in   those   duties   because   feelings   of   moral   obligations   and   of  
personal  interest,  especially  motives  related  to  economic  gains,  prestige,  and  
status.  Most  people  in  the  general  population  obey  out  of  habit  (Sharp,  2005,  
p.  32).  
Dealing   with   oppression,   Sharp   argues,   is   a   matter   of   maintaining   gradual  
withdrawal  of  cooperation  despite   repression.  Factors   that  need   to  be   taken   into  
account   regarding   controlling   political   power   include   the   relative   desire   of   the  
populace  to  do  so,  the  relative  strength  of  society’s  independent  institutions,  and  
the  population’s  ability  to  withhold  consent  by  concrete  actions  (Sharp,  2005).  Or,  
as   he   states   in   his   earlier   publication,   "ʺThe   degree   of   liberty   or   tyranny   in   any  
government  is,  it  follows,  in  large  degree  a  reflection  of  the  relative  determination  
of   the   subjects   to   be   free   and   their   willingness   and   ability   to   resist   efforts   to  
enslave  them"ʺ  (Sharp,  1973,  p.  29).  
According   to   this   line   of   argument,   to   over   throw   a   power   system,   the   cost   of  
sustaining   the   status   quo   must   be   increased   so   that   the   ruler(s)   can   no   longer  
sustain   their   rule  without   accommodating   the   protestors’   demands.   This   can   be  
achieved   by   intentional   disruption,   as   Chenoweth   and   Stephan   (1983,   p.   28)  
explain:  
The   result  of   sustained  disruption   include   the   failure  of   the  government   to  
perform  basic  functions,  a  decline  in  GDP,  investment,  and  tax  revenues,  loss  
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of   power   by   government   elites,   and   the   breakdown   of   normal   order   of  
society.  
Taking  a  slightly  different  approach,  Kenneth  Boulding  (1999)  explains  that  there  
are   three   types  of  power;   threat  power,  economic  power,  and   integrative  power.  
The   last,   he   states,   is   the   most   important   since   the   group   subject   to   the   ruler  
wielding   this   form   of   power   acknowledges   its   legitimacy.   Thus,   it   is   through  
conviction   and   understanding   that   this   power   is   respected   and  wielded.  While  
responses   to   the   other   two   types   of  power  may  vary,   it   is   economic  power   that  
boycotts   challenge   and   which   is   consequently   of   most   relevance   to   this   study  
(Boulding,  1999).  The  next  section  describes  how  activist  have  gone  about  putting  
these  challenges  to  oppressive  power  structures  into  practice.  
  
ii.  Methods  of  nonviolent  resistance:  
Just   as   violent   action   has   its  methods,   requirements   and   characteristics,   so   does  
nonviolent   struggle.  Darweish  and  Rigby   (2015)  use  a  categorisation  of   forms  of  
nonviolent   action   according   to   five   characterizations   (based   on   those   originally  
suggested   by   Werner   Ring)   as   a   framework   for   identifying   different   types   of  
nonviolent   action:   symbolic   resistance,  polemical   resistance,   offensive   resistance,  
defensive  resistance,  and  constructive  resistance  (Darweish  and  Rigby,  2015).    
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Meanwhile,   Sharp   explains   that   nonviolent   groups   achieve   their   goals   through  
one   of   four   mechanisms;   conversion,   accommodation,   nonviolent   coercion,   or  
disintegration,  or  a  combination  of   these   (Sharp,  2005).  Many  methods  exist   that  
can  be  categorized  in  this  way.  In  his  book,  There  Are  Realistic  Alternatives  (2003),  
he   lists   and   categorises   198   methods,   explaining   that   this   collection   in   no   way  
constitutes  a  definitive  list  and  many  more  methods  can  be  devised  and  added.    
A  significant  method  described  by  Sharp,  which   illustrates  his  understanding  of  
nonviolence  as  a  strategy,  is  that  of  political   jujitsu.  In  jujitsu,  the  martial  art,  the  
attacker'ʹs   violent   thrust   is   not   met   with   a   physical   blockage   or   counter   thrust.  
Instead,   the   attacked   person   pulls   the   opponent   forward   in   the   same   direction  
they  have  already  started  to  strike.  This  causes  the  opponent  to  lose  balance  and  
fall.  In  the  same  way,  Sharp  explains  that  nonviolent  action  can  be  used  to  turn  a  
political   opponent’s   strength   back   on   him   or   herself:   "ʺIn   political   jujitsu,   the  
opponents'ʹ   violent   attack   is   not   met   with   counter   violence,   but   instead   with  
nonviolent  defiance"ʺ  (Sharp,  2005,  p.  406).  
  
Sharp  explains  that  the  opponent  prefers  violence;  therefore,  the  resistors  must  not  
fall  into  that  trap  and  use  violence  at  any  stage.  The  opponent  will  take  advantage  
of   such   a   mistake   and   in   return   will   weaken   the   resistors’   movement.   Instead,  
nonviolent  behaviour   is  needed,  and  resistors  must  never  be   identified  with  any  
kind  of  sabotage.    
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Nevertheless,  repression  must  be  expected  in  response  to  resistance  since  the  fact  
that  the  struggle  is  nonviolent  does  not  rule  out  that  it  will  be  met  with  violence,  
although  methods  will  vary.  However,  this  can  be  understood  as  a  positive  sign,  
as   Sharp   explains:   “repression   is   an   acknowledgment   by   the   opponents   of   the  
seriousness   of   the   challenge  posed  by   the   resistance”   (Sharp,   2005,   p.   378).   This  
understanding  is  especially  useful  in  relation  to  Palestinian  boycotts  in  the  light  of  
Israel’s  sometimes  violent  response..  
Moreover,   as   the   opponent’s   forms   of   repression   are   generally   better   suited   to  
counter  violent  campaigns,  nonviolent  resisters  will  have  much  scope  to  make  the  
repression   ineffective.   Yet,   Sharp   asserts,   it   remains   important   not   to   show  
weakness:   “If   the   resisters   show   in   any   way   that   the   repression   weakens   the  
movement,   they   will   signal   to   the   opponents   that   if   they   make   the   repression  
severe   enough   it   will   produce   submission”   (Sharp,   2005,   p.   381).   Therefore,  
resisters  must  persist  while  maintaining  their  nonviolent  discipline.  To  be  effective,  
they  must  persist   through  whatever  brutalities   and   suffering   they  meet   through  
the   hands   of   a   repressive   regime   and   maintain   their   fearlessness,   nonviolent  
discipline,   and   firmness.   At   the   same   time,   all   their   actions   must   serve   the  
strategic  purpose  they  set  out  to  achieve.    
Indeed,  repression  can  legitimize  the  resistance  movement  because  it  deepens  the  
injustice  and  reveals  the  true  nature  of  the  opponents.  Extreme  repression  against  
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violent   resistors   is  unlikely  to  provoke  protests  and  opposition  from  persons  and  
groups  within  the  repressor’s  own  group.  In  contrast,  extreme  repression  against  
nonviolent  resisters  is  more  likely  to  create  opposition  from  within  the  repressor’s  
own  group.    
  
From   the   above   discussion,   it   becomes   clear   that   persistence,   bravery,  
commitment   to   nonviolence,   casting   off   fear,   and   the   will   to   sacrifice   are   all  
requirements  for  nonviolent  groups.  Furthermore,  nonviolent  action  must  be  part  
of  a  broader  strategy  for  change.  As  Irwin  and  Faison  (1984,  p.  39)  state:    
Nonviolent  action   is  not  simply  any  method  of  action  which   is  not  violent.  
Broadly   speaking,   it   means   taking   action   that   goes   beyond   normal  
institutionalized   political   methods   (voting,   lobbying,   letter   writing,   verbal  
expression)   without   injuring   opponents.   Nonviolent   action,   like   war,   is   a  
means   of   waging   conflict.   It   requires   a   willingness   to   take   risks   and   bear  
suffering  without  retaliation.  On  the  most  fundamental  level,  it  is  a  means  by  
which  people  discover  their  social  power.  
Many   scholars   have   taken   the   theories   of   nonviolence   and   examined   their  
relevance   in   particular   areas   and   specific   conflicts.   Comparing   the   effects   that  
nonviolence   has   produced   as   part   of   those   conflicts   has   then   led   to   instructive  
lessons.  While  each  conflict  has  its  unique  conditions,  through  each  one,  teachings  
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such  as   those  of  Gandhi,  King,   and  Sharp  have  been  weighed   in   real   situations.  
These  theories  have  been  tested  in  conflicts  of  many  types  and  in  many  countries,  
although  some  have  received  more  attention  than  others.  In  the  next  section,  I  look  
specifically   at   the   situation   involved   in   the   nonviolent   action   against   the   Israeli  
occupation  of  Palestine.  
2.4  Palestinian  nonviolence:    
The   topic   of   Palestinian   nonviolence   has   attracted   a   number   of   academics   and  
there  have  been  numerous  case  studies  and  papers  presented,  in  addition  to  books  
dedicated   to   examining   Palestinian   nonviolence.   These   consider   Palestinian  
nonviolent  struggle  since  the  Ottoman  Empire  era  where  Palestinians  thrived  due  
to   superior   political   representation   and   policies,   and   official   objection   to  
conditions   that   allowed   for   transfer   of   land   ownership   to   Jewish   immigration.  
Moreover,  the  struggle  for  an  independent  Arab  state  under  the  British  mandate,  
and  later  on  efforts  to  thwart  the  creation  of  a  Jewish  state,  formed  rallying  points  
for   the  Palestinian  people.  However,   since   1948  when   Israel  was   established   till  
the  present  day,  Palestinian  nonviolent   struggle   against   Israeli  policies  has  been  
particularly  extensively  studied.    
Qumsieh’s   (2011)   detailed   study   of   Palestinian   nonviolence   provides   useful  
insight   into   to   its   early   beginnings   in   the   final   decades   of   Turkish   rule   over  
Palestine  up  until  the  struggle  against  the  construction  of  the  Wall.  Palestine  was  a  
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province  of   the  Ottoman  Empire   for  almost  500  years  up  until   the  end  of  World  
War  1.  Qumsieh  explains   that   the  revival  of  European   interest   in  Palestine  grew  
out   of   the   perceived   need   to   plant   a   foreign   body   -­‐‑   in   the   form   of   a   sovereign  
Jewish  state  -­‐‑  in  the  middle  of  the  Arab  states  of  the  Middle  East  to  help  prolong  
their  colonization  of  the  area.     Due  to  this  desire,  along  with  the  weakness  of  the  
Ottoman  Empire  and  the  existence  and  growing  strength  of  the  Zionist  movement,  
Palestine  became  vulnerable  to  the  Jewish  settler  movement.  After  explaining  this  
background,   Qumsieh’s   book   then   introduces   the   different   nonviolent  methods  
that   Palestinians   have   adopted   in   their   struggle   in   response   to   the   resultant  
situation.  These   included   forming  political  parties,  media  outreach,   and  protests  
(Qumsieh,  2011).    
Qumsieh  describes  how  there  have  been  a  number  of  benchmarks  in  the  history  of  
the  Palestinian  nonviolent   resistance.  Notable  among   these,   is   the  1936   revolt  or  
the   ‘Great   Revolt’,   which   lasted   for   six   months   and   involved   a   number   of  
nonviolent   forms   of   resistance,   including   demonstrations,   boycotts,   economic  
sabotage,   tax   revolts   and  other   acts  of   civil  disobedience.  The  British  authorities  
responded   violently   by   killing,   detaining,   expelling,   executing   thousands   of  




The  Palestinians  paid  a  heavy  price  for  the  uprising  of  1935  –  39  in  material  
and  human   losses.   In   the   first  year  of   the  uprising,  about  1000  Palestinians  
were  killed,  more  than  half  of  them  unarmed;  by  the  time  the  uprising  ended  
over   5000   Palestinians   were   dead   and   a   thousand   more   injured   …   As  
collective  punishment,  whole   sections  of   Jaffa   and  many  other  places  were  
demolished  and  the  local  economy  devastated.  Approximately  10  percent  of  
the  males  were   imprisoned.  Hundreds  were   executed   and   hundreds  more  
exiled  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  85).  
Another  milestone  was  the  first  Palestinian  Intifada  (1987-­‐‑1993).  Andrew  Rigby’s  
Living  the   Intifada   (1991)  delves  deeply   into   the  dynamics  of   this  uprising.  Rigby  
explains   the   social,   economic,   and   political   actions   that   Palestinians   adopted.  
While  the  most  graphic  aspect  of  the  Intifada,  which  consequently  received  much  
media   attention,  was   stone   throwing   by   Palestinian   youths,   the   revolt   involved  
many  more  nonviolent  forms  of  protest,  such  as  strikes,  forming  local  committees,  
and   various   forms   of   self-­‐‑governance.   In   2015,   a   newer   version   of   Living   the  
Intifada,  called  The  First  Palestinian  Intifada  Revisited,  was  published  in  May  2015.    
Mary   King   also   wrote   a   classic   reference   book   on   the   first   Intifada;   A   Quiet  
Revolution   (2007).  This   focuses  on   the  nonviolent  nature  of   the   Intifada,  giving  a  
detailed  account  of  its  leadership  structure.  She  explains  how  the  Unified  National  
Leadership   Command   came   to   surface   as   the   leadership   on   the   ground   of   the  
Intifada.    In  explaining  the  different  positions  and  opinions  that  were  manifested  
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in  the  strategies  of  the  Palestinian  society’s  leaders,  she  makes  clear  that  the  most  
visible   division   was   that   between   the   external   leadership   (the   Palestinian  
Liberation   Organisation   (PLO))   and   the   internal   leadership   (i.e.,   the   Unified  
National   Leadership   Command).   King   explains   the   emerging   conflict   between  
those   in   favour  of   an   exclusively  nonviolent  uprising  within   the  Command  and  
with  the  PLO:      
The   combining   of  military   and   nonviolent  methods   of   struggle,   the   theory  
advocated  by  Palestinian  theorists  as  “all  means  of  struggle”,  was  the  main  
area  of   conflict  within   the  Command  and   the   issue   that   eventually  became  
the  most   conspicuous   disagreement   between   Palestinians   in   the   territories  
and  the  PLO  in  Tunis  (Kuttab,  cited  in  King,  2007,  p.  211).  
Rigby   explains   that   the   Unified   National   Leadership   Command   or,   in   the  
appellation   he   uses,   the  Unified  National  Command   of   the   Intifada,   along  with  
several   popular   committees,   was   established   “to   provide   an   alternative  
organizational   infrastructure   to   meet   people’s   needs   and   provide   some   service  
previously  administered  by   Israel  and   its  appointees”  (Rigby,  1991,  p.  21).  Rigby  
lists  and  explains  these  popular  committees  which  include  the  following:  
- Strike  forces  
- Women’s  committees  
- Guard  committees  
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- Popular  education  committees  
- Food  and  supply  committees  
- Social  reform  committees  
- Committees  to  confront  the  tax  
- Merchants’  committees  
- Information  committees  (Rigby,  1991)  
  
Thus,   it   is   clear   that   Palestinian   resistance   involved   a   great   deal   more   than  
boycotts.   While   these   may   have   had   a   significant   effect   and   lead   to   the  
establishment  of  many  of  the  contemporary  Palestinian  institutions,  in  the  present  
day   boycotts   have   received   a   great   deal   more   attention   both   locally   and  
internationally.   As   the   subject   of   this   thesis,   it   is   important   to   have   a   specific  
understanding  of  how  boycotts  have  been  represented  in  previous  literature  and  
the  next  section  discusses  this  in  detail.    
        Economic  Boycotts  
In  his  2013  book,  How  Nonviolent  Struggle  Works  -­‐‑  a  distilled  version  of  his  earlier  
book,  The   Politics   of   Nonviolent   Action   -­‐‑   Gene   Sharp   explains   that   there   are   two  
main   categories   of   economic   non-­‐‑cooperation;   economic   boycott   and   strike.   He  
defines   an   economic   boycott   as   “the   refusal   to   buy,   sell,   handle,   or   distribute  
specific  goods  and  services”  (Sharp,  2013,  p.  31).  
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While  there  have  been  a  number  of  studies  on  boycotts,  as  discussed  below,  a  
paper  that  is  especially  relevant  to  this  thesis  is  that  of  Klein,  Smith  and  John  
(2004):  “Why  we  Boycott:  Consumer  Motivations  for  Boycott  Participation”.  This  
article  examines  what  motivates  people  to  participate  in  boycotts,  and  when  it  is  
more  likely  to  have  greater  numbers  of  participating  boycotters.  It  starts  by  
presenting  the  research  done  on  the  topic,  yet  the  authors  point  out  that  until  their  
study  all  previous  research  focused  on  the  boycotted  company  or  product,  or  why  
it  is  being  boycotted,  rather  than  the  boycotters  themselves  (Klein,  Smith  and  John,  
2004).    
The   paper   first   gives   some   history   on   boycotts,   stating   that   consumer   boycotts  
date   at   least   as   far   back   as   the   fourteenth   century.   One   can   however   think   of  
examples  that  date  back  far  before  then.  During  the  seventh  century,  for  instance,  
the  Quraish,   the  people  of   an  Arab   tribe   that   resided   in  Mecca,   boycotted   those  
who  had  converted  to  Islam  from  their  own  tribe.  Their  boycott  was  both  cultural  
and  economic  (Rizvi,  n.d.).    
Klein,  Smith  and  John  (2004)  go  on  to  consider  how,  due  to  the  increased  power  of  
transnational   corporations   and   the   heightened   vulnerability   of   corporate  
reputation,   in   modern   times   the   socio-­‐‑political   motives   behind   boycotts   are  
diminishing  in  favour  of  those  focusing  on  corporate  practices.  The  authors  later  
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expand  on  this  assumption  by  emphasizing  the  growing  importance  of  corporate  
social  responsibility  in  defusing  consumer  anger  at  corporate  practices.    
However,  a  main  focus  of  the  paper  is  on  the  social,  economic  and  psychological  
motivations   of   boycotters.   Their   premise   is   that   there   are   four   factors   used   to  
predict  boycott  participation:  
1) The  desire  to  make  a  difference  
2) The  scope  for  self-­‐‑enhancement  
3) Counterarguments  that  inhibit  boycotting  
4) The  cost  to  the  boycotter  of  constrained  consumption  
  
Once   a   consumer   encounters   an   offensive   act   by   a   company,   s/he   compares   the  
expected   costs   of   the   boycott   with   its   benefits.   The   study   sees   the   decision   to  
participate   in   a   boycott   as   similar   to   that   involved   in   offering   help   to   others   in  
need;  one  takes  a  benefit  –  cost  approach.  Research  has  also  shown  that  the  more  
competent   a   potential   boycotter   feels,   the  more   likely   s/he   is   to   offer   help   or   to  
participate   in  a  boycott.  The  last   three  considerations  mentioned  above,  all  work  
to  support  the  first  point;  the  desire  to  make  a  difference  (Klein,  Smith  and  John,  
2004).    
Among   the   elements   affecting   boycotters’   participation   is   how   well   noticed   a  
company’s   offence   is,   and  how   it   is   perceived.  Yet   even  when  people   share   the  
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same  anger  towards  a  company’s  practice,  not  all  of  them  participate  in  a  boycott,  
proving  that  other  motives  are  involved  (Klein,  Smith  and  John,  2004).  
Furthermore,   all   previous   research   has   found   that   people   are  more   cooperative  
with  social  dilemmas  if  they  think  the  group  is  able  to  realize  its  goals.  However,  
Klein,  Smith  and  John  point  out  that  many  people  have  been  found  to  participate  
in   boycotts   just   to   feel   good   about   themselves   by   helping   others,   or   to   rid  
themselves   from   feelings   of   guilt   for   not   caring.   These   are   all   psychological  
variables  that  are  directly  related  to  a  person’s  self-­‐‑enhancement.  Also,  they  found  
that  participation  enables  boycotters  to  boost  their  social  and  personal  self-­‐‑esteem,  
whether  by  associating  themselves  with  a  group  or  cause  (Klein,  Smith  and  John,  
2004).    
In  their  research  entitled  “Ensouling  Consumption:  a  Netnographic  Exploration  of  
the  Meaning  of  Boycotting  Behavior”,  Robert  Kozinets  and  Jay  Handelmam  (1998)  
explain   that  boycott  behaviour  has  been  theorized  as  a  collective  effort   to  coerce  
corporate  change.  They  also  site  the  following  empirical  studies  that  are  consistent  
with  this  view  of  boycotts  as  a  collective  consumer  act,  explaining  that  they  have  
focused   on   their   potential   impact   on   the   target   organizations.   These   studies  
include  the  following:    
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Pruitt  and  Friedman  (1986)  found  that  the  mere  announcement  of  a  boycott  
can  have   a  negative   effect   on   an  organization’s   stock  prices.  Garrett   (1987)  
and   Putnam   and   Muck   (1991)   noted   that   boycotts   negatively   affect   an  
organization’s   image,   and   divert   managerial   resources   towards   increased  
public  relations  aimed  at  damage  control.  Miller  and  Sturdivant  (1977),  in  a  
rare   empirical   study   examining   boycotting   behavior   from   a   consumer-­‐‑
oriented  position,   still  had  attitude   toward   the   company,  an  organizational  
outcome,  as  their  focus  (Kozinets  and  Handelmam,  1998,  p.  472).  
Like  Klein,   Smith   and   John’s   study,  Kozinets   and  Handelmam’s   (1998)   research  
also   aimed   to   understand   the   subjective   meaning   of   boycott   participation,   and  
concluded   by   describing   two   emerging   themes   which   challenge   the   traditional  
collective  participation  nature  of  boycotts:  “First,  boycotters  see  their  involvement  
not  merely   as  part   of   collective   effort   but   as   a   complex   emotional   expression   of  
their  individuality.  Second,  boycotting  serves  as  a  vehicle  for  more  self-­‐‑realization.”  
(Kozinets  and  Handelmam,  1998,  p.  475)  
In   relation   to   boycotting   activities   targeting   Israel,   in   her   book   Transnational  
activism  and  the  Israeli-­‐‑Palestinian  conflict  (2013),  Maia  Carter  Hallward  focuses  on  
explaining  the  boycott  and  divestment  side  of  the  BDS  movement.  She  highlights  
that  sanctions  are  in  the  realm  of  states  rather  than  civil  society;  although  the  latter  
can  pressure   the  government   to   adopt   sanctions.  More   specifically,   she   refers   to  
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the   situation   in   the   US   where   there   is   a   general   appetite   for   supporting   Israel  
rather  than  sanctioning  it;  therefore,  this  means  there  is  little  influence  from  civil  
society  to  guide  the  state  towards  sanctions  (Hallward,  2013).    
While  this  certainly  does  reflect  common  belief,  it  must  be  noted  that,  in  1990,  the  
more  conservative  first  Bush  administration  withheld  loan  guarantees  from  Israel  
for   the   exact   amount   of  money   it   allocated   for   settlement   expansion,   as   long   as  
Israel   continued  with   its   settlement   activity.   In   his   book,  Zealots   for   Zion,   Inside  
Israel’s   West   Bank   Settlement   Movement   (1992),   Robert   Friedman   explains   this  
situation  further.  In  1990,  the  US  state  department  officials  privately  vowed  to  cut  
Israel’s  3.5  billion  USD  annual  aid  by  the  same  amount  it  spends  on  its  settlement  
activity.  Freidman  gives  a  glimpse  of  the  heightened  tension  between  the  US  and  
Israel   over   settlements,   and  how   the  US   indeed  used   economic  means   to   coerce  
Israel  to  join  the  Madrid  peace  talks.    
Increasing  tension  over  the  settlement  issue  set  the  stage  for  a  bitter  row  over  
Israel’s   request   in   spring   1991   for   $10   billion   in   U.S.   government   loan  
guarantees  to  absorb  the  vast  exodus  of  Jews  from  the  Soviet  Union.  The  U.S.  
guarantee  would  enable   Israel   to  borrow  money   from  commercial  banks  at  
lower   interest   rates   than   it   would   normally   be   able   to   obtain.   The   United  
States   would   have   to   repay   the   loan   should   Israel   default.   The   Israeli  
government,  which  felt  so  confident  about  securing  the  loan  guarantees  that  
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it  included  the  first  installment  of  $2  billion  in  its  1992  budget,  was  stunned  
when  Secretary  of  State  James  Baker  asked  Congress  on  September  4,  1991,  
to   delay   the   bill   until   after   a   Middle   East   peace   conference   that   was  
scheduled  for  October  1991  in  Madrid  (Friedman,  1992,  p.  2).  
The  strategy  proved  successful,  at  least  in  that  Israel  did  take  part  in  the  Madrid  
peace   talks.   In   evaluating   the   strategy,   the  Boston   Study  Group  on  Middle  East  
Peace  considered  that  the  reason  behind  this  success  was  that  the  intervention  was  
“very   specific   and  pinpointed   in   its   focus   –   both   in   the   actions   against  which   it  
was  directed  and  in  the  sanctions  it  introduced”  (Berger  et  al.,  2008).    
Stephen  Zunes  (2015),  however,  supports  Hallward  in  her  assumption  that  the  US  
is   increasingly   supportive   of   Israel   regardless   of   its   occupation   and   settlement  
activity.   In   fact,   in   his   paper,   “Bipartisan   Attacks   against   Anti-­‐‑occupation  
Divestment  Campaigns”  (2015),  Zunes  explains  that  the  US  political  parties  have,  
in   fact,  undermined  efforts   to  boycott   Israel   or  divest   from  companies   complicit  
with   its   occupation.   He   provides   a   number   of   examples   where   grassroots  
movements,   student  bodies,  unions  etc.  voted   in   favour  of  divestment  and  were  
swiftly   attacked   in   response   by   US   politicians,   and   even   state   legislation  
condemning  them  as  being  anti-­‐‑Semitic,  and  promoting  hatred,  intimidation,  and  
intolerance.  Citing  the  contradiction  in  US  standards,  Zunes  explains:    
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The  anti-­‐‑BDS  fervor  has  gone  beyond  statements  and  nonbinding  resolutions.  
This  spring,   the  Illinois   legislature  passed  a  unanimous  measure  sponsored  
by   Democratic   leaders   which   requires   divesting   state   pension   funds   from  
companies  that  invest  in  Iran  or  Sudan,  but  ironically  also  call  for  divesting  
from   companies   that   boycott   Israel,   Israeli   settlements,   or   otherwise   use  
economic  means  to  oppose  the  occupation  (Zunes,  2015).  
Lastly,   the  above  discussions  show  that,  as  Hallward   (2013)  points  out,  boycotts  
are  generally  studied  either  through  the  perspective  of  business  and  economics,  or  
through  the  lens  of  social  movement  theory.  She  explains  how  the  approaches  of  
these   two   perspectives   differ   significantly   because   while   both   require   the  
mobilization  of  adequate  numbers  of  people  to  be  effective  in  economic,  social,  or  
political  terms,  their  ultimate  goals  are  different:  
In   contrast   to  economic  approaches,  which   tend   to   focus  on  market   factors  
including  sales,  incomes,  and  labor  conditions,  social  movement  approaches  
to  boycott  and  divestment  are  less  motivated  by  activists’  perceptions  of  the  
boycott’s   likelihood   of   success   in   strict   financial   terms   and   instead   have   a  
more   socially   oriented   agenda   in   which   activists   attempt   to   coerce   their  




In   this   way,   she   supports   the   arguments   of   Klein,   Smith   and   John   that   the  
motivations  of  boycotters  go  beyond  the  purely  economic.  Moreover,  the  socially  
orientated  agenda  that  Hallward  describes  was  clearly  reflected  in  the  accounts  of  
some   of   the   leaders   of   the   BDS   movement   that   I   interviewed   as   part   of   this  
research.  To  them,  as  will  be  seen  in  later  chapters,  boycotting  Israel  is  not  only  a  
means  to  assert  economic  pressure  but  was  also  a  socially  motivated  action  aimed  
at  telling  the  story  of  Israeli  occupation.    
2.5  Conclusion  
To  conclude  by  returning  to  my  opening  discussion  regarding  whether  boycotts  
violent  or  nonviolent.  And  does  a  boycotter  have  to  be  strictly  in  favour  of  
nonviolent  action,  and  shun  anything  that  is  violent?  In  the  above  discussions,  this  
literature  review  presented  the  unequivocal  demand  of  both  Sharp  and  Gandhi  -­‐‑  
along  with  other  classical  thinkers  -­‐‑  that  nonviolent  activists  should  never  resort  
to  violence  under  any  circumstance;  they  should  never  fall  into  such  a  trap  that  
would  undoubtedly  suit  their  oppressors  well.  However,  Hallward  refers  to  the  
Stop  the  Wall  Campaign  as  “[c]haracterizing  the  struggle  as  a  whole  as  nonviolent  
does  not  necessarily  equate  with  the  values  of  the  oppressed  for  whom  BDS  forms  
one  part  or  mechanism  of  support  for  their  struggle”  (Hallward,  2013,  p.  5).  
Moreover,  this  is  an  issue  where  the  current  research  found  no  consensus  among  
those  interviewed,  neither  among  those  who  are  leaders  of  boycott  campaigns  or  
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those  involved  in  the  official  boycott  campaign.  This  ambiguity  is  reflected  in  the  
findings  of  this  research,  which  therefore  challenges  accepted  thought  to  some  
extent,  while  also  contributing  to  our  understanding  of  the  subject,  as  presented  in  
the  following  chapters.  
This   chapter   has   gone   some  way   towards   indicating  how  nonviolence   has   been  
understood   in   academic   discourse;   both   at   a   conceptual   level   -­‐‑   as   either   a  
philosophy  or  a  strategy  –  and  in  terms  of  the  issues  involved  in  its  practice.  The  
studies  that  considered  the  economic  and  social  aims  of  boycotters  as  well  as  their  
subjective   experience   are   of   particular   relevance   to   this   thesis.   However,   one  
notable   issue   in  the  context  of   this  research  is   the   lack  of  previous  studies  of   the  
experiences  and  attitudes  of  boycotters  themselves,  as  highlighted  by  Klein,  Smith  
and   John,   above.   In   the   next   chapter,   I   set   out   an   analytical   framework   that  
facilitates   an   understanding   of   the   issues   involved   in   boycotts   of   the   Israeli  
settlements   and,   by   projection,   boycotts   and   nonviolent   resistance   in   general.  
Through  this,  the  present  research  will  be  able  to  fill  this  gap  in  academic  research  
in   quite   significant   detail,   hopefully   providing   insight   into   the   boycotting  
activities  of  an  official  organisation  as  well  as   the  subjective  view  of  civil  society  
boycotters.  As  this  former  phenomenon  is  all  but  absent  as  a  subject  of  academic  
study,  I  feel  this  research  will  be  able  to  advance  our  knowledge  of  the  challenges  




  Methodology    
  
3.1  Introduction  
The   settlement   movement   triggered   various   anti-­‐‑settlement   groups   and   efforts  
crafted   to   counter   the   different   motives   fuelling   their   existence.   The   PLO   has  
adopted   a   diplomatic   approach   that   has   encouraged   the   UNSC   to   pass   more  
resolutions   condemning   Israel   than   it   has   for   all   other   nations   combined,  
including   Iraq!   (Middle   East   Facts,   n.d.).      The   PNA   on   the   other   hand   has  
developed   programs   to   counter   the   economic   nature   of   settlements.   Many  
Palestinian,  Israeli,  and  international  civil  society  organizations  have  also  played  a  
visible  role  in  countering  the  settlement  movement  that  is  reportedly  endorsed  by  
the   Israeli   government.  Moreover,   while   there   continues   to   be   strong   economic  
cooperation   and   investment   between   the   EU   and   the   settlements,   there   is   a  
particular  challenge  for  the  boycott  movement  to  highlight  the  illegal  nature  of  the  
situation  and  its  violation  of  international  law.  
  
To   get   a   comprehensive   view   of   the   issues   involved,   it   is   important   to   include  
consideration  of  all  the  significant  players.  Among  others,  these  include  the  PLO,  
the   PNA   (through   the   NEF   and   ProsperPalestine),   and   the   BDS   National  
Committee.   The   leaders   and   supporters   of   the   global   Palestinian   solidarity  
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movement,   as   well   as   those   of   Israeli   organizations,   such   as   Gush   Shalom   and  
WhoProfits,  are  also  primary  players  that  need  to  be  included.    
  
3.2  Analytical  framework  
From   the   literature   reviewed   in   the  previous   chapter,   one   can   conclude   that   the  
basic  assumption  informing  most  studies  of  nonviolent  civil  resistance  in  pursuit  
of  social  and  political  change   is   that  all   forms  of  domination  and  oppression  are  
dependent  on  various  sources  of  support,  internal  and  external.  These  include  the  
cooperation   (willing   or   forced)   of   significant   sectors   of   the   occupied   population  
(Sharp,  1980),  as  well  as  international  political  and  economic  systems  of  support.  
Repressive   occupation   depends   not   only   on   fear   and   intimidation   of   the   local  
population,  including  the  use  of  coercive  power  of  the  police  and  army,  but  also  
on  the  preparedness  of  subjects  to  cooperate  with  the  occupying  force  -­‐‑  by  paying  
taxes,  supporting  their  economy  and  complying  with  the  rules  and  regulations  it  
imposes.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  identify  and  try  to  undermine  the  pillars  of  
support   that   maintain   the   occupier   power.   This   can   be   based   on   political,  
economic  and  moral  grounds  both  internally  within  the  “occupying  society”  and  
internationally.   To   support   this,   many   studies   of   regime   change   through  
nonviolent   civil   resistance   focus   on   identifying   the   key   pillars   of   support,   and  
explore   the   ways   in   which   these   pillars   might   be   undermined   and   the   regime  




Boycott   and   divestment   are   actions   taken   to   empower   movements   advocating  
social   and   political   change   and   force   an   occupying   power   to   reconsider   its  
policies;   and   there   are   many   examples   throughout   history   of   boycott   and  
divestment  movements.  The  history  of   the  Palestinian  nonviolence  movement  as  
discussed   in   this   thesis   clearly   indicates   two   major   actions   of   boycott   and  
divestment,  namely,  during  the  Great  Revolt  in  1936  and  second  Intifada  in  1987.  
  
In  these  cases,  internationals  and  Palestinians  utilised  boycott  and  divestment  as  a  
means   to   exert   pressure   on   Israel   to   reconsider   its   policies.   Here,   I   suggest   a  
framework  of  three  factors  to  consider  in  the  analysis  and  facilitate  understanding  
of  the  boycott  against  settlements.  The  “cost  of  the  occupation”,  “Israel’s  image  as  
a  democracy”  and  “telling  the  story  of  the  occupation  oppression”  will  be  used  to  
deepen   our   conceptualisation   of   the   issues   under   discussion   and   to   enable   the  
reader  to  have  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  limitation  and  achievement  
of  the  boycott  movement.  
  
1. Raising  the  cost  of  occupation:  Israel  has  installed  a  system  and  structures  
of   control   and   repression   to   preserve   and   maintain   the   occupation.   This  
system   involves   securing   Israeli   settlements,   providing   them   with   the  
required   infrastructure,   access   roads,   and   resources.   Settlements   have  
evolved   to   become   sources   of   income   for   settlers,   and   therefore   Israel,  
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through   the   businesses   and   industrial   areas   that   produce   products   and  
attract   international   investment.   Boycott   and   divestment   from   this  
economy  will  leave  Israel  with  the  cost  needed  to  maintain  them  and  force  
it   to   rethink   its   policies.   Furthermore,   in   the   case   of   the   BDS  movement,  
which  boycotts  Israel  as  a  whole,  their  success  will  mean  that  Israel  proper  
will  also  be  paying  a  price  for  maintaining  occupation.  Some  scholars  have  
emphasised   the   significance   of   nonviolent   resisters   influencing   regime  
policies  by  means  of  activities  that  raise  the  costs  of  its  repressive  policies.  
Ackerman   and   Kruegler   (1994)   call   this,   "ʺmuting   the   impact   of   the  
opponents'ʹ  violent  weapons"ʺ,  which  means  discouraging  them  from  using  
violence   and   being   prepared   to   limit   damage   to   the  movement   (cited   in  
Mayton,  2007,  p.  51).  
  
2. Israel  as  a  democracy:  Israel  claims  to  be  the  only  democracy  in  the  Middle  
East   and   has   been   successful   in   maintaining   this   image   for   a   long   time.  
Therefore,   the  decisions   that   are  made   in   Israel   to  maintain   its   settlement  
policies  and  occupation  are  reached  through  a  democratic  process,  making  
Israel   as   a   whole   responsible   and   accountable   for   its   policies   of  
discrimination   and   violation   of   international   law   and   international  
humanitarian   law   in   the   OPT.   If   Israel   claims   to   be   a   part   of   Western  
democracy  and  uphold  its  values  then  it  must  be  held  accountable  to  those  
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values   and   ideas.   Through   the   boycott   campaign,   Israel   will   become  
exposed  as  an  undemocratic  occupying  regime  that  does  not  respect  basic  
democratic  values  when  it  deals  with  the  Palestinians.  This  is  the  argument  
that  those  in  favour  of  a  full  boycott  of  Israel  adopt,  whereas  in  the  case  of  
those   calling   for   a   limited   boycott,   such   as   the   NEF,   these   are   seen   to  
boycott  the  act  rather  than  the  actor.    
  
3. Telling  the  story  of  occupation:  This  involves  storytelling  about  the  control  
and   oppressive   systems   of   the   Israeli   occupation   against   the   Palestinians  
and   actions   that   “shame   the   power”(Galtung,   1989,   p.   19)   of   Israel.   This  
may  be  done  through  specific  cases  where  Israel   is  shown  to  benefit   from  
its   occupation;   for   instance,   by   preventing   the   occupied   population   from  
access  to  their  own  resources  and  instead  using  them  for  itself.  Such  actions  
are   illegal   according   to   international   law,   specifically   the   Fourth   Geneva  
Convention.  In  particular,  article  49  states:  “The  Occupying  Power  shall  not  
deport  or   transfer  parts  of   its  own  civilian  population   into   the   territory   it  
occupies.”   Moreover,   article   52   of   the   convention   states:   “All   measures  
aiming  at  creating  unemployment  or  at  restricting  the  opportunities  offered  
to  workers  in  an  occupied  territory,  in  order  to  induce  them  to  work  for  the  




As  this  thesis  documents,  the  PNA  developed  a  strategy  of  boycotting  settlement  
products,   therefore  calling  for  a  boycott  of   the  act,  while  Palestinian  civil  society  
has  adopted  a  strategy  of  full  boycott  of  Israel,  in  other  words,  calling  supporters  
to  boycott   the  actor.  To  aid   the  analysis  of   these   two  approaches,   the   factors   set  
out  above  provide  a  framework  that  is  used  to  facilitate  an  understanding  of  the  
effectiveness  and  challenges  of  these  two  forms  of  resistance.  
  
3.3  Overall  Aim    
The   overall   aim   of   this   research   is   to   analyse   the   political   and   economic   issues  
relating  to  nonviolent  action  against  Israeli  settlements  on  the  West  Bank  between  
2005  and  2012,  both  locally  in  Palestine  and  internationally.  The  research  examines  
the  emergence  of  the  movement  to  boycott  settlements  products  and  the  debates  
within   the   movement   and   critically   assesses   the   role   of   the   PNA   and   the   BDS  
movement.  It  also  analyses  the  role  of  the  Israeli  groups  in  such  a  campaign.  
  
Palestine   has   a   long   history   of   nonviolent   action;   and,   in   recent   years,   this  
movement   has   been   influenced   by   the   presence   of   new   tools,   communication  
methods  and  strategies.  Many  nonviolent  groups  with  programs  targeting  Israeli  
settlements  have  come  into  existence,  and  a  large  number  of  these  groups  surfaced  
only  after  the  second  Intifada  broke  out  in  September  2000.  To  gain  an  insight  into  
the   nonviolent   movement   protesting   against   the   settlements,   the   main   groups’  
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internal   dynamics   are   analysed   in   this   thesis,   as   are   their   interactions   and  
coordination  with  other  groups  that  share  similar  goals.    
  
The  Arab  Spring  had  an  impact  on  the  entire  Middle  East,  including  Palestine  and  
its   struggle   to   end   the   occupation.      One   ramification   of   this   was   that   the   PNA  
seemed   more   inclined   to   support   popular   peaceful   resistance.   Not   only   did   it  
support  and  encourage  nonviolent  groups,  it  also  had  nonviolent  programs  of  its  
own;   the   first  specifically   targeted   the   Israeli   settlement  economy  at  a  grassroots  
level,   and   the   other,  which  was  more  diplomatic   in  nature  while   also   involving  
grassroots   recruitment,  was   its   bid   in   2012   for  UN  membership   as   a  Palestinian  
state   within   the   1967   borders.   Thus,   the   PNA’s   interaction   with   the   already  
existing   nonviolent   groups   (many   representing   left   wing   political   groups)   is  
particularly   significant   in   terms   of   the   boycott   movement   and,   consequently,  
another  important  objective  of  this  thesis  is  to  gain  detailed  insight  into  this.    
  
Specific  Objectives  
To   enable   the   achievement   of   the   more   general   objectives   stated   above,   the  
following  specific  objectives  were  established:  
  
- To   examine   the   strategy,   tactics   and   goals   of   the   main   actors   against  
settlements   products   and   analyse   their   different   perspectives.   The   study  
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will   also   evaluate   their   progress   and   effectiveness   in   the   context   of   their  
actions  against  settlements.    
- Exploring  the  interaction  among  local  and  international  nonviolent  groups  
concerned  with  settlements,  and  whether  their  relationship  has  contributed  
or  hindered  their  overall  shared  goals.    
- Analysing   the   relationship   between   the   PNA   and  nonviolent   groups   that  
are  active  against  settlements.    
- Analysing   the   PNA’s   nonviolent   program   to   resist   the   settlements   by  
means  of  Al  Karameh  National  Empowerment  Fund.    
- Evaluating   the  political  and  economic   impact  of  nonviolent  action  against  
Israeli  settlements.    
  
3.4  Definitions:    
The   following   concepts   and   definitions  will   form   part   of   the   framework   of   this  
research,  mark  the  boundaries  of  the  research  and  make  clear  its  focus.      
  
I. Boycott:   There   are   several   schools   of   thought   concerning   boycotts.   The  





[E]conomic   and   political   campaigns   that   seek   a   selective   or   total  
cutting  of   ties  with   the  State  of   Israel.  Such  campaigns  constitute  one  
tactic   used   by   those  who   challenge   the   legitimacy   of   Israel'ʹs   right   to  
exist  or  oppose  Israeli   territorial  claims  in  the  West  Bank  and  policies  
towards  the  Palestinians  over  the  course  of  the  Arab-­‐‑Israeli  and  Israeli-­‐‑
Palestinian  conflict  (The  Free  Dictionary,  n.d.).    
  
However,  in  this  study,  I  make  two  particular  distinctions  between  various  types  
of  boycott.   Firstly,   there   is   the  difference  between  boycotts   targeting   Israel   itself  
and  boycotts   targeting  only   the  settlements.  Secondly,   there  are  several  different  
forms  of  boycott:  the  boycott  of  products,  the  boycott  of  services  and  investments;  
and   political   and   cultural   forms   of   boycott.   In   particular,   I   term   the   form   of  
boycott   that   targets   only   the   products   of   the   settlements   as   the   limited   form   of  
boycott.  This  is  the  form  adopted  by  the  NEF.  
  
II. Settlements:   These   are   understood   to   be   the   Israeli   settlements   built  
beyond   the   1967   armistice   line   where   Israelis   live   for   ideological   or  
economic  reasons.  They  have  been  described  in  many  ways,  including:  “An  
Israeli  settlement  is  a  Jewish  civilian  community  on  land  that  was  captured  
by   Israel   during   the   Six-­‐‑Day   War   and   is   considered   by   much   of   the  
international   community   to   be   occupied   territory”   (Newman,   1989).   It   is  
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important  to  note  that  these  have  been  deemed  illegal  under  international  
law   since,   on   the   22nd   of   May   1979,   United   Nations   Security   Council  
resolution,  number  446,  determined:  "ʺthat  the  policy  and  practices  of  Israel  
in   establishing   settlements   in   the   Palestinian   and   other   Arab   territories  
occupied   since   1967   have   no   legal   validity   and   constitute   a   serious  
obstruction   to   achieving   a   comprehensive,   just   and   lasting   peace   in   the  
Middle  East"ʺ  (UNSC,  1979).  Since  1967,  a  number  of  similar  UN  resolutions  
have   been   passed   that   condemned   settlements   and   confirm   their   illegal  
status.    
  
III. Boycott,   Divestment,   Sanctions:   The   movement   that   emerged   from   the  
2005   Palestinian   civil   society   call   for   an   Israeli   boycott,   including  
divestment  and  sanctions  until  Israel  complies  with  international  law.  This  
movement  calls  for  a  total  boycott  of  Israel  at  cultural,  academic,  political,  
and  economic  levels.    
  
Lastly,   different   terms   have   been   used   by   activists   and   scholars   to   describe  
activism  against  the  occupation.  “Popular  struggle”  is  used  to  refer  to  the  civilian  
based   modes   of   resistance   used   by   Palestinian   activists   and   society.   More  
specifically,  the  term,  “unarmed  resistance”,  is  used  by  Rigby  (1991)  to  reflect  the  
reality  that  many  of  the  clashes  with  the  settlers  or  the  Israeli  army  has  not  been  
nonviolent   insofar   as   they   have   included   stone-­‐‑throwing   and   other   non-­‐‑lethal  
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means.  However,  other  scholars  continue  to  use  the  term  ‘nonviolent’  despite  the  
fact   that   some   Palestinian   actions   have   inflicted   direct   harm   upon   Israeli  
opponents.      
  
3.5  Research  scope  
While   the   main   emphasis   of   this   study   is   limited   to   nonviolent   action   against  
Israeli   settlements   between   2005   and   2012,   it   includes   research   on   the   BDS  
movement  and  other  initiatives  that  go  beyond  a  limited  boycott  both  in  terms  of  
geography   and   targets.   However,   it   is   not   always   easy   to   draw   a   line   between  
nonviolent   action   specifically  directed   against   settlements   and  nonviolent   action  
against   Israeli   occupation   in   general   since   all   aspects   of   occupation   serve  
settlements  and  their  economy.  As  concrete  examples  of  this,  the  Israeli  Separation  
Wall,   road   blocks,   checkpoints,   and   land   classifications   all   have   an   impact   on  
settlements   and   their   growth.   However,   the   study   focus   will   remain   on   action  
directed  against  settlements  and  their  economy.  In  geographic  terms,  the  research  
focusses   on   areas   that   have   instituted   boycotts   of   some   kind;   these   include   the  
West  Bank,  Israel,  and  particular  western  European  countries,  such  as  the  United  
Kingdom,  France,  Spain,  and  Italy.    
  




- The   EU   in   general   has   been   the   main   area   targeted   by   many   of   the  
settlement   boycott   campaigns.   It   is   therefore   important   to   evaluate   how  
successful   these   campaigns   were   in   altering   consumer   behaviour   and  
regulations  in  the  EU.    
- The  most  active  organizations  that  have  adopted  calls  to  boycott  settlement  
products   exist   in   Europe.   Not   only   have   these   organizations   made   clear  
their  positions  on  economic  ties  with  settlements,  they  in  fact  actively  lobby  
and  campaign  to  end  such  ties.    
- ProsperPalestine   was   launched   in   the   United   Kingdom,   Spain,   Italy   and  
France.  This  research  will  therefore  revisit  these  four  countries,  which  will  
serve  as  a  representative  sample  of  the  rest  of  the  EU.    
- The   EU   introduced   legislation   in   the  wake   of   a   case   known   as   the   ‘Brita  
case’   that   exempts   settlement  products   from   the  benefits  of   the   free   trade  
agreement  that  Israel  has  with  the  EU  (Ynetnews,  2010).  Thus,  it  has  made  a  
clear  distinction  between  Israeli  and  settlement  products,  giving  it  a  unique  
position  of  particular  relevance  to  this  study.    
  
In   terms  of   timescale,   the  study  will   focus  on  nonviolent  resistance  from  2005  to  
2012.   This   is   because   in   2004   the   pivotal   International   Court   of   Justice’s   (ICJ)  
ruling   on   the   illegality   of   the   Israeli   Separation  Wall   and   settlements   triggered  
unprecedented   focused   nonviolent   action   in   2005   protesting   against   both   the  
Israeli   Separation   Wall   and   the   settlements.   Thus,   a   clear   shift   in   Palestinian  
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nonviolent   resistance   followed   with   significant   consequent   developments   and,  
therefore,  2005  represents  an  important  year  for  the  study’s  subject  matter.  
  
3.6  Selected  case  study:  Al-­‐‑Karameh  National  Empowerment  fund  
In  his  book  Politics   of  Change   in  Palestine:  State-­‐‑Building  and  Nonviolent  Resistance,  
Bröning   was   among   the   first   to   publish   brief   yet   credible   work   about   the  
campaign   within   academic   circles.   He   explains   that   in   early   2010,   Palestinian  
Prime  Minister   Fayyad   set   up  NEF   as   a   joint   PNA  and  private   sector   initiative,  
and   declared   that   the   boycott   from   then   on   would   be   “a   daily   expression   of  
rejecting  the  occupation”  (Bröning,  2011  p.  145).  Palestinian  President  Mahmoud  
Abbas  approved   legislation   in  April   2010  making   it   illegal   to  deal  or   trade  with  
settlement  products  (Bröning,  2011  p.  145).  From  then  on,  NEF  became  responsible  
for   enforcing   the   presidential   decree   and   engaged   in   comprehensive   public  
awareness  campaigns  with  the  help  of  several  hundred  volunteers.  
  
The  primary  reason  for  choosing  NEF  as  a  case  study  was  its  unique  position  in  
terms  of  Palestinian  nonviolent  politics.  In  particular,  it  involved  almost  all  levels  
of   Palestinian   society   and   international   supporters,   grassroots,   politicians,  
academics,   and   private   businesses.   Initiated   by   the   PNA,   it   represents   an  
informative  example  of  collaboration  between  the  government  and  private  sector  
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and   also   throws   light   on   the   PNA’s   subsequent   international   campaign,  
ProsperPalestine.    
  
Moreover,  as  the  director  of  both  programs,  I  am  well  placed  to  have  knowledge  
of  and  access  to  resources  that  were  not  made  available  publically,  although  these  
were  not  deliberately  made   confidential.   This   is   the   first   time   that   the  PNA  has  
established   such   a   programme   and   supported   it   politically   and   financially.  We  
worked  closely  with  the  Palestinian  Prime  Minister  and  the  Ministry  of  Economy.  
My   key   role   in   this   initiative   as   director   provided   access   to   documents   and  
personnel   from   both   the   PNA   and   Fatah   that  would   have   been   difficult   for   an  
outsider  to  reach.        
  
3.7  Research  Questions  
The   overall   research   question   that   this   study   aims   to   answer   is   “What   are   the  
dynamics  of  the  different  nonviolent  programs  against  settlements  between  2005  
and  2012,  and  how  effective  were  they?”    
  
However,  many  sub-­‐‑questions  were  considered  as  a  means  to  answering  the  main  





- What  are  the  different  forms  of  nonviolent  resistance  against  settlements?    
- Who  are  the  main  actors  in  the  nonviolent  campaign  against  settlements?    
- What   kind   of   relationship   exists   between   different   nonviolent   groups  
working  against  settlements?    
- What   is   the   PNA’s   relationship   with   other   nonviolent   groups   working  
against  settlements?    
- In  what  ways  was  the  BDS  campaign  effective?    
- How  was  the  PNA’s  nonviolent  program  against  settlements  effective?    
- What  economic   ties  exist  between  settlements  and   the  PNA  on  one  hand,  
and  European  countries  on  the  other?    
  
3.8  Hypothesis  
To   date,   Palestinian   nonviolent   groups   have   been   unsuccessful   in   ending  
economic   ties   not   only   between   European   countries   and   Israeli   settlements   but  
also  between  Palestine   itself  and   the  settlements.  The  hypothesis  of   this   thesis   is  
that   this   is   due   to   inefficient   strategies.   There   is   disparity   between   the   desired  
goals   of   nonviolent   groups   and   the   actions   they   choose   to   counter   Israeli  
settlements,   due   to   a   variety   of   political   and   organizational   affiliations,  
competition  and  lack  of  strategy.  Namely,  groups  that  desire  to  end  economic  ties  
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with  settlements  have  inaccurately  stated  this  desire  as  being  to  end  all  ties  with  
Israel  by  adopting  the  BDS  call  of  2005.      
  
Evidence  supporting  or  contradicting  this  hypothesis  will  result  from  comparing  
what   has   been   achieved   by   the   campaigns   that   have   adopted   the   BDS   call,   and  
those   that   have   favoured   a   limited   boycott,   while   taking   into   consideration   the  
time,  effort,  and  human  resources  that  go  into  each  campaign.  Also,  by  following  
specific   cases   against   economic   ties   with   Israel   in   general,   and   others   against  
settlement   products   in   particular,   reactions   and   opinions   of   different   relevant  
stakeholders  and  activists  are  presented  and  analysed  to  provide  further  evidence  
supporting  or  challenging  this  study’s  hypothesis.    
  
3.9  Research  approach  
A  qualitative  approach  appropriate  for  research  seeking  to  understand  an  existing  
pattern,  or  patterns  of  behaviour,  and   to  analyse   it  based  on   the  experience  of  a  
limited  number  of  people.  Thus,   this   approach  was  adopted   for   this   research  as  
the  aim  was  to  understand  and  interpret  the  experience  of  activists  who  have  been  
engaged  in  the  Palestinian  boycott  movement,  with  a  particular  focus  on  the  case  
study   of   the   NEF.   By   conducting   in-­‐‑depth   interviews   with   a   small   number   of  
respondents,  a  study  is  able  to  explore  particular  ideas  or  situations,  consequently  
these   were   used   as   one   of   the   main   data   collection   procedure.   Moreover,  
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qualitative   research   and,   in   particular,   in-­‐‑depth   interviews   using   open-­‐‑ended  
questions,   allows   a   researcher   to   gather   an   “accurate”   understanding   of   the  
informants   and   their   experience.   Consequently,   these   are   suitable   for  
ethnography,  grounded   theory  or  as  method  of  data  collection   for  work  such  as  
this   study   (Boynce   and   Neal,   2006).      In   relation   to   this,   the   researcher’s  
involvement   with   NEF   and   its   stakeholders   can   be   capitalised   upon   through  
qualitative   research.  Consequently,   in   this   context,   using   a   qualitative   approach  
has  distinct  advantages  over  quantitative  research.  Moreover,  the  typical  sources  
of  data  for  qualitative  research  are  all  available  and  accessible  for  the  researcher;  
that  is,  interviews,  documents,  and  observations.  
  
3.9.1  Data  sources  
The   primary   sources   of   information   for   this   study   are   interviews   and   material  
released   by   relevant   organizations   and   movements.   Given   my   previous  
involvement  with   the  NEF,   I   had   access   to   original  material,   unpublished   data,  
policy   papers,   political   leaders,   civil   society   representatives,   and   stakeholders  
across  the  Palestinian,  Israeli,  and  European  societies.    
Interviews  were  conducted  with  representatives  of  the  following  organisations:  
- Palestinian  politicians  
- Palestinian  nonviolent  activists  
- Israeli  peace  organizations  
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- Representatives   of   Palestinian   solidarity   groups   and   organizations   in  
Europe  
  
Interviews  were  held  with  a  number  of   actors   from  each  of   these   categories.     A  
total   of   19   interviews   were   conducted.   (See   Annex   A   for   the   full   list   of  
interviewees   and   questions   asked).   The   interviews   were   consistent   with   the  
overall  aim  of  the  research  and  reflected  the  research  questions  and  objectives  and  
the   list   of   questions   and   themes  was   agreed  with   each   interviewee   beforehand.  
These   interviews   mostly   took   place   at   the   organization   or   group’s   offices   in  
Palestine,   Israel,  or   the   respective  European  countries  when  possible.   Interviews  
that   could  not   be   held   face   to   face  were  done  using   Skype.   Each   interview  was  
recorded   in   full,   and   later   transcribed.   Questions   were   prepared   beforehand   to  
guarantee   that   all   the   research   questions   previously   listed   were   properly  
addressed   and   answered.   Since   the   researcher   can   speak   both   languages,  
interviews   were   conducted   in   Arabic   or   in   English   depending   on   the   native  
language   of   the   interviewee;   translation,   where   necessary,   was   verified   by   my  
supervisor  who  also  speaks  both  languages.    
  
To  complement  the  interviews,  I  also  studied  various  forms  of  documentation.  In  
particular,  all   available  documents,  meeting  minutes,  plans,  and  correspondence  
from   the  NEF’s   program  were   gathered,   examined   and   analysed.   I   also   studied  
the  documents  produced  by  other  organizations  that  have  led  campaigns  against  
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settlements,   which   include   the   Palestinian   BDS   National   Committee   (BNC),  
ProsperPalestine,   WhoProfits   from   Occupation,   Gush   Shalom,   and   Diakonia.  
Some   of   these   organizations   have   led   and   won   legal   cases   against   settlement  
companies  in  European  courts  and  the  information  made  available  by  such  active  
organizations  was  gathered,  compared,  and  analysed.  
  
Since   this   research   is   based   on   qualitative   data,   its   analysis   will   involve  
organizing,   interpreting,   highlighting   similarities   and   disagreements,   drawing  
lessons,   evaluating,   and   explaining   the  gathered  material.  The  date  validity   and  
reliability   were   tested   through   a   triangulation   method   which   enabled   the  
researcher   to   review   the   findings   and   uncover   insights   and  meanings   from   the  
data   and   deepen   understanding   of   the   issues   under   discussion.   This   is   also  
contributed  to  increase  the  level  of  validity  of  the  data.  
  
3.9.2  Specific  challenges  and  limitation  of  the  research  
This   study   faced   a   number   of   challenges.   Firstly,   as  mentioned   before,   it   is   not  
always  easy  to  single  out  action  specifically  targeting  settlements  since  any  action  
against   occupation   is   eventually   against   some   form   of   maintaining   settlements  
and   the   resources   they   control.   Therefore  nonviolent   action   opposing   the   Israeli  
Separation  Wall,   for   instance,   is  effectively  against  the  occupation  of   land  within  
the  1967  borders  that  is  annexed  to  settlements.  Similarly,  campaigns  that  call  for  a  
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complete  boycott  of  Israel,  such  as  the  BDS  campaign,  naturally  call  for  boycotting  
settlements   as   a   part   of   their   comprehensive   programs.   Indeed,   nonviolent  
programs   against   settlements   are   mostly   absorbed   within   wider   programs,   or  
programs  that  state  other  goals  besides  countering  settlements.    
  
As   the   only   Palestinian   program   with   goals   concerned   solely   with   Israeli  
settlements,  the  NEF  –  the  research  case  study  -­‐‑  treated  the  settlement  economy  as  
if  it  were  detached  from  the  reality  of  occupation.  This  made  it  especially  difficult  
to  determine  its  effectiveness.  Moreover,  since  internationally  there  is  no  program  
with  goals  similar  to  those  of  the  NEF,  neither  is  there  any  comparative  material.  
In   Israel,   however,   a   number   of   organizations   do   exist   with   programs   clearly  
targeting  Israeli  settlements,  which  were  easy  to  identify  and  examine.    
  
A   further   challenge   for   the   research,   as   for   organisations   promoting   a   limited  
boycott,   was   how   to   determine   what   economic   ties   actually   do   exist   between  
settlements  and  other  countries  due  to  the  fact  that  the  settlements  are  an  integral  
part   of   the   Israeli   economy.   Even   those   businesses   who   favour   letting   go   of  
settlement   side   of   their   operations,   as   part   of   a   future   peace   deal   with   the  
Palestinians,   remain  part  of   Israel  until   that  deal   is  made.  Therefore,   Israel  does  
not  differentiate  between  settlement  products  and  Israeli  ones,  and  does  not  make  
any  clear  distinction  between  the  two  on  product  labels.  With  the  recent  demands  
by   the   European  Union   for   settlement   products   to   be   presented   as   such   (rather  
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than   as   Israeli   products),   settlement   companies   have   put   even  more   effort   into  
hiding  their  products’  link  with  settlements.  This  is  so  that  their  products  would  
enjoy   the   same   preferential   treatment   that   Israeli   products   enjoy  when   entering  
European   markets.   In   addition,   it   is   especially   difficult   to   identify   settlement  
products  when  some  are  only  partially  processed  on   settlements.   In   some  cases,  
crops   are   grown   on   settlements   and   then   produced   in   other   forms   (e.g.   jam)   in  
Israel   proper.   Such   products’   labels   will   state   an   Israeli   origin   rather   than   one  
within  internationally  recognised  occupied  land.    
  
Due  to  such  difficulties,  this  study  did  not  set  out  to  determine  all  economic  ties  
that  settlements  have  with  other  countries.  Rather,  the  aim  was  to  understand  the  
kind  of  relationship  that  settlements  have  with  other  markets,  as  well  as  some  idea  
of  their  economic  magnitude.    
  
3.9.3  Measuring  effectiveness  
Assessing   the  effectiveness  of  on-­‐‑going  nonviolent  action   is  not   straightforward,  
especially   so   in   circumstances   where   the   indicators   of   success   are   not   readily  
available,  as  is  the  case  in  the  Palestinian  movement.  However,  there  are  a  number  
of  suggested  ways  to  get  an  accurate  (although  not  comprehensive)  sense  of  how  




- By   comparing   the   number   of   economic   ties   that   have   been   severed  with  
settlement   companies   in   relation   to   the   number   severed   with   Israeli  
companies  over  the  same  time  period;  the  ratio  provides  a  clear  indicator  of  
which  goal  has  been  more  effective/achievable.    
- Some  supermarkets  in  the  UK  have  decided  to  make  the  labelling  clear  so  
that   consumers   are   able   to   distinguish   settlement   products   from   other  
Israeli  products.    The  research  will  indicate  whether  nonviolent  campaigns  
against   settlements  were   able   to   raise   the   average   consumer’s   awareness  
regarding  settlements,  and  why  they  are  different  from  Israel  and  whether  
there  was  a  decline  in  consumer  demand  for  settlements  products.  
- In   interviews   with   stakeholders   and   activists,   the   researcher   asked  
questions   regarding   specific   and   tangible   success   stories.   These  were   not  
only   in   relation   to   moral   victories   but   also   instances   where   real   change  
occurred  in  the  nature  of  economic  ties  with  settlements  or  Israel  as  a  direct  
result  of  their  work.    
- Another   useful   indicator   was   the   annual   financial   reports   of   major  
settlement  companies  that  depend  on  foreign  markets.  If  there  seems  to  be  
an   acute   decline   in   one   of   the  markets  where   the   BDS   or   anti   settlement  
product   campaigns   were   active,   this   could   be   an   indication   of   their  
effectiveness.   If   these   campaigns   had   put   all   their   weight   in   a   specific  
market  yet  settlement  companies  are  not  reported  to  have  suffered  any  loss,  
then  this  may  indicate  their  ineffectiveness.      
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- The   goal   of   settlement   boycott   campaigns   is   straightforward:   to   end  
economic   ties   between   settlements   and   other   parties,   organizations,  
countries…etc.  This  goal   can  be  understood   to  be  achieved   through   these  
campaigns   if   they   meet   a   number   of   objectives:   the   introduction   of  
regulations  in  other  countries  that  would  make  it  illegal  to  have  economic  
ties   with   settlements;   making   the   cost   of   maintaining   an   economic  
relationship   higher   than   ending   it   through   pressure   on   company  
stakeholders;  convincing  company  stakeholders  that  what  they  are  doing  is  
unethical.  Many  of  these  objectives  are  tangible  and  cases  where  they  had  
been  achieved  can  be  seen  and  measured.      
  
3.9.4  Subjectivity  
There   are   several   issues   associated   with   subjectivity   that   were   taken   into  
consideration  while  conducting  and  analysing  the  research.  Due  to  the  nature  of  
the   subject,  most   of   the   people   interviewed   belonged   to   a   certain  movement   or  
were   affiliated  with   a  particular  political   group.  This  presented   the   challenge  of  
ensuring   they  gave   their  honest   and  personal  opinion   -­‐‑   rather   than   their  official  
party  line  -­‐‑  on  matters  being  discussed.    
  
This   was   countered   through   the   way   I   introduced   myself   and   the   interview  
process   and   the   type   of   questions   I   used   during   interviews.   The   fact   that   I   am  
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Palestinian  myself,   and   have   interacted   or   worked   in   one-­‐‑way   or   another   with  
most   of   the   interviewees,   or   at   least   the   organizations   and  political   groups   they  
represent,   meant   that   I   already   had   first-­‐‑hand   experience   of   their   official  
arguments.   Through   this   I   was   able   to   limit   the   amount   of   talk   along   general  
official  political  lines  and  instead  bring  the  discussion  round  to  more  specific  and  
realistic  perspectives  and  to  make  the  discussion  more  honest  and  real.  By  doing  
this,  I  ensured  that  the  interviewees  were  presenting  their  own  subjective  opinion.  
    
As  for  the  effects  of  my  own  subjectivity,  I  came  to  this  research  with  a  hypothesis  
that   I   sought   to   support   through   the   information   gathered   and   analysed.  
However,  a  balanced  presentation  of  all  data  found  will  be  made,  even  if  it  leads  
in  fact  to  disproving  my  hypothesis.    
  
My  previous  engagement  with  the  NEF,  the  subject  of  the  case  study,  can  be  seen  
both  as  an  advantage  and  disadvantage.  It  was  an  advantage  since  it  enabled  me  
to   have   special   access   to   material   and   stakeholders   relevant   to   the   research,  
including   unpublished   material,   meeting   minutes,   strategies   etc.   However,   my  
previous  involvement  with  the  project  also  meant  that  I  had  a  personal  attachment  
which  could  affect  my  objectivity  as  a  researcher.  This  was  overcome  through  my  
supervisor’s  monitoring  my  work  and  challenging  my   ideas  so  as   to  ensure   this  
did  not  happen.  To  support  this,  I  preceded  the  main  research  with  a  pilot  phase  
in   which   the   developed   questions,   the   format   of   the   interviews,   the   interview  
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process   itself  were   examined   by   the   supervisor.   Following   this,   certain   changes  
were  made   to   the  questions   and   the  process   to   ensure   further   objectivity   before  
conducting   the   actual   interviews.   It  was  very   important   to   find   the  balance   and  
address   the   risk   of   bias   throughout   the   research   stages   and   be   aware   of   bias   in  
research   design,   data   collection   and   bias   in   data   analysis   and   interpretation.  
Therefore,  every  PhD  student  at   the  Centre  for  Trust,  Peace  and  Social  Relations  
has   to   submit   the   research   proposal   and   research   methodology   to   conduct   the  
interviews  and  collect  the  data  to  be  approved  by  an  external  “Ethics  Committee”  
within  the  Centre.    
  
Lastly,  all   the  participants   in   the  research  have   to  sign  a  consent   form  and  were  
given   the   option   not   to   participate   or   to   withdraw   from   the   research.   The  
researcher   explained   verbally   or   by   introductory   letter   about   the   aims   and  
objectives  of  the  research.    
  
3.10  Conclusion:  Why  this  study  is  important?  
While  many  studies  have  been  carried  out  on  Palestinian  nonviolent  struggle,  no  
thorough  research  specifically  on  nonviolent  resistance  to  Israeli  settlement  policy  
has  been  conducted.  Nor  have  there  been  any  studies  of  the  role  and  interactions  
between   the  different   nonviolent   groups   leading   this  movement.   Therefore,   this  
research  will  provide  an  original  contribution  to  the  debate  and  knowledge  in  this  
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field.  It  will  be  an  important  academic  contribution  to  research  and  will  enhance  
the  understanding  of  academics,  practitioners  and  policy  makers  in  relation  to  the  
issues  under  discussion.  This  has  become  especially  interesting  since  international  
solidarity   groups   have   become   so   widespread,   along   with   the   development   of  
Israeli  organizations  that  have  nonviolent  programs  countering  Israeli  settlement  
activity.   The   PNA’s   National   Empowerment   Fund   and   ProsperPalestine  
campaigns   are   programs   that   tackled   issues   relating   to   boycotting   settlement  
products  and  withdrawing  investments  in  the  settlement  economy,  and  this  forms  
a   main   focus   of   this   study.   As   such,   it   constitutes   the   research’s   original  
contribution  to  the  wider  topic  of  Palestinian  nonviolent  struggle.    
  
The  NEF’s  program  to  ban  and  combat  settlement  products,  which  was  launched  
in  2010,  has  not  been  documented  or  researched.  The  research  studied  the  PNA’s  
campaign  as  a  case  study,  documenting,  analysing,  and  evaluating  its  impact.      
  
This   study   is   therefore   important   in   that   it   researches   a   major   Palestinian  
nonviolent  program  that  was  led  by  both  the  PNA  and  Palestinian  grassroots,  and  
executed   by   myself   as   the   director;   and   if   it   were   not   for   this   research,   this  
program  would  not  be  documented.  Moreover,  my  former  role  as  director  of  the  
program   enabled  me   to   have   unique   access   to   documents,   informants,   contacts  




What   also  makes   this   study   important   is   its   attempt   to   explore   the   relationship  
and  interaction  among  relevant  nonviolent  groups.  By  doing  so,  gaps  and  missed  
opportunities   will   be   identified,  making   it   possible   to   suggest   what   can   in   fact  
bridge   those   gaps   to   have   a   more   effective   nonviolent   campaign   against  
settlements.   Suggestions   and   recommendations   that   are  made  will   be   both   on   a  
coordination/logistic  and  general  policy   level.  Thus,  by  attending   to   these   issues  
through  its  original  analytical  framework,  this  study  aims  to  address  a  gap  in  the  
literature   and   to   make   an   original   contribution   to   academic   thought   on   the  








Background:  Israeli  settlements  
  
“Judea  and  Samaria  are  part  of  the  land  of  Israel,  if  we  want  to  achieve  Jewish  sovereignty,  
we  have  to  settle.  Those  who  have  the  power  here  will  prevail  -­‐‑  and  we  have  the  strength.  I  
read   the  Bible.   It   doesn’t   talk   about   the   borders   of   England.  But  Eretz  Yisrael   is   in   the  
Bible.  According  to  the  Bible,  I  have  the  right  to  the  East  Bank  too.  For  my  generation  the  
West   Bank   is   enough.   As   for   the   next   generation,   the   East   Bank   is   their   problem.”    
Matityahu   Drobless,   Co-­‐‑Chair   of   the   World   Zionist   Organization’s   Settlement  
Department  (Friedman  R.  ,  1992).  
  
4.1    Introduction  
This  chapter  aims  to  provide  an  analysis  of  what  Israeli  settlements  are,  how  they  
were   first   established,   and   what   motivated   the   settlement   project.   The   chapter  
opens  by  exploring  links  between  Zionism  and  the  settlement.  Firstly,  it  explains  
the  different  types  of  Zionism,  secular  and  religious,  and  how  these  translated  into  
different   types   of   settlement,   namely,   secular,   agricultural,   or   religious.   The  
history   of   each   of   these   types   of   settlement   is   introduced,   along   with   who  
supported   each   form.   Furthermore,   a   distinction   is   made   between   Zionist  
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religious   settlers   and   ultra-­‐‑Orthodox   settlers   who   opposed   Zionism   in   the   first  
place.    
This  chapter  is  concerned  with  two  main  eras,  pre-­‐‑  and  post-­‐‑1967  settlements.  The  
settlement  movement  that  advocated  settling  the  captured  land  after  the  1967  Six  
Day  War   is   introduced,   along  with   its   relationship  with   the   Israeli   Labour   and  
Likud  governments  of  that  time.    
In  the  second  part  of  the  chapter,  four  different  plans  that  were  prepared  by  these  
governments   regarding   settlements   are   explained   before   giving   an   overview   of  
how  many  settlements  were  established  along  with  their  population  growth  since  
1967.    
The  third  part  of  the  chapter  considers  how  settlements  are  perceived  according  to  
international   law   and   several   UN   resolutions   relating   to   this   are   listed   in   the  
following   part   of   the   chapter.   The   chapter   then   gives   an   economic   account   of  
settlements  in  terms  of  the  Israeli  government’s  investment  in  them  and  the  costs  
it  incurs  to  maintain  them.  
The   final   section   of   the   chapter   introduces   the   industry   that   is   associated   with  




4.2    Origins  
While   this   study   is   concerned  with   settlements   built   beyond   the   1967   armistice  
line,   the   settlement   movement   started   much   earlier.   Thus,   to   understand   its  
originating  motives,  we  must  examine  the  period  when  the  Jewish  settlements  in  
Palestine  actually  began.  
Long  before  Israel  took  over  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip  in  1967,  and  even  
before  announcing  its  independence  in  1948,  positions,  motives  and  views  relating  
to   Jewish   settlements   and   their   nature   varied   and   often   conflicted.   These  
differences   reflected   divisions  within   Zionism   and   the   Zionist  movement;  most  
notably,   between   secular,   religious,   and   spiritual   Zionism.   Consequently,   when  
Jewish  settlements  were  being  built  at  the  end  of  the  19th  and  beginning  of  the  20th  
centuries,  such  divisions  within  Zionism  also  influenced  the  nature  of  settlements,  
resulting  in  settlements  with  different  characters.  As  Kaufman  (1926,  p.  1)  explains,  
“To  understand  the  construction  of  the  new  Jewish  settlements  in  Palestine  some  
knowledge   is   essential   of   the   character   and   objects   of   the   Zionist   movement,  
which  aims  at  the  settlement  and  revival  of  the  Jewish  people.”    
4.2.1    The  Zionist  Influence  on  Settlements    
Although   this   chapter  does  not   focus  on  Zionism  or   the  Zionist  movement,   it   is  
relevant   to   note   that   the   very   first   goal   agreed   by   delegates   to   the   First   Zionist  
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Congress   in   Basel   on   August   29,   1897,   was   stated   as:   “The   promotion   by  
appropriate   means   of   the   settlement   in   Eretz-­‐‑Israel   of   Jewish   farmers,   artisans,  
and   manufacturers.”   (The   American-­‐‑Jewish   Cooperative   Enterprise,   The   First  
Zionist  Congress  and   the  Basel  Program,  2013).  However,  while  Zionism  sought  
to  gather  world   Jewry   in  Palestine   (after   considering  other   countries   as  possible  
options),  it  is  generally  perceived  to  be  a  secular  movement.  Its  founder,  Theodore  
Herzl  argued:    
I   consider   the   Jewish   question   neither   a   social   nor   a   religious   one,   even  
though  it  sometimes  takes  these  and  other  forms.  It  is  a  national  question,  
and  to  solve   it  we  must   first  of  all  establish   it  as  an   international  political  
problem  to  be  discussed  and  settled  by  the  civilized  nations  of  the  world  in  
council  (Sharansky,  2005).  
While  settling  ‘Eretz-­‐‑Israel’  3is  central  to  all  types  of  Zionism,  these  largely  differ  
in  their  reasons  as  to  why  Jewish  settlements  should  exist  and  how.  For  instance,  
Labour   Zionism   was   a   secular   movement   that   expressed   its   socialist   ideals   by  
setting   up   kibbutzim4  across   Palestine   early   in   the   twentieth   century.   Religious  
Zionism,  on   the  other  hand,  perceives   Israel  as  an  unfolding  messianic   scenario.    
Therefore,  when  Israel  took  over  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  in  1967,  religious  
Zionists   saw  this  as  an  essential   stage   in   the  process   in  which   the  captured  area  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Hebrew	  for	  the	  “Land	  of	  Israel”	  
4	  Hebrew	  for	  “Cooperative”	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was  understood  to  belong  to   the   Jewish  people  by  divine  decree  (The  American-­‐‑
Jewish  Cooperative  Enterprise,  Radical  Messianic  Zionism,  2013).  
As  mentioned  earlier,  this  chapter  does  not  delve  into  different  types  of  Zionism,  
however,  to  provide  a  background  to  the  main  thesis,  the  following  sections  give  
an   overview   of   the   two   main   types   of   settlements:   agricultural   settlements  
(influenced  by  secular  Zionism)  and  religious  settlements  (influenced  by  religious  
Zionism).    
4.2.2    Agricultural  settlements  
In  his  paper,  ‘Agricultural  Settlements  in  Palestine,  1882  –  1914’,  Yossi  Katz  (1998)  
explains   that   ten   different   types   of   Jewish   agricultural   settlements   had   been  
developed   in  Palestine  by   the  end  of  World  War  1.   In   relation   to   this,  he   states:  
“This  proliferation  of  agricultural  settlement  forms  was  primarily  the  result  of  the  
nationalist  drive  to  promote  the  Jewish  settlements  project   in  Palestine  via  every  
possible  manner  while   simultaneously   examining   the   optimal   settlement  modes  
for  attaining  this  goal.”     However,  only  two  of   these  methods  survived  after   the  
war  ended;  the  kibbutz  and  the  moshav.  Katz  links  these  with  settlements  existing  
today   when   he   states,   “From   the   1920s   until   this   day,   Jewish   agricultural  
settlement  in  Palestine  has  rested  on  the  kibbutz  and  the  Moshav...”  (Katz,  1998)      
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As  Katz  elaborates,   in  1882,  a  number  of  organizations,  made  up  of  middle  class  
and   religious   orthodox   Jews,   began   establishing  moshavot   (plural   of  moshava)   in  
various  locations  in  Palestine.  Different  support  groups  contributed  to  the  Jewish  
settlement  project  as  a  whole,  each  in  its  own  way,  and  through  this  fostered  the  
agricultural  settlements.  A  main  contributing  group  was  Hovevei  Zion  (Lovers  of  
Zion),  which  promoted  immigration  to  Palestine,  among  other  things,  for  the  sake  
of  agricultural  settlement.  This  was  supported  by  their  umbrella  organization,  the  
Hibbat   Zion   movement   (also   known   as   the   Odessa   Committee),   and   Baron  
Edmund  de  Rothschild,  who   financed  and   facilitated   the  establishment  of  many  
early  Jewish  settlements  (Katz,  1998).    
After  realizing  that  the  agricultural  settlements  were  not  economically  sustainable  
without  his  support,  de  Rothschild  handed  the  management  of  the  moshavot  to  the  
Jewish   Colonization   Association   (JCA),   which   in   turn   took   measures   towards  
guaranteeing   the   profitability   of   agricultural   settlements.   The   Zionist  
Organization  itself  became  involved  with  the  accelerating  agricultural  settlement  
movement  when,  in  1908,  it  established  its  own  agency  in  Palestine,  the  Palestine  
Bureau,  which  established  the  Palestine  Land  Development  Company  (PLDC).  As  
Katz  explained,    
[this   organization]   engaged   in   purchasing   lands   in   Palestine,   and   in  
examining   various   settlement   patterns   in   order   to   determine   the   optimal  
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form   of   settlement   for   basing   future   Zionist   settlements.   Additionally   it  
established   settlements   for   workers,   while   simultaneously   seeking   to  
attract   private   Zionist   capital   for   settling   the   country,   and   assisting   the  
establishment  of  special  settlements  suited  for  this  private  capital.”  (Katz,  p.  
67)  
                From  Moshavah  to  Moshav  
By   1914,   forty-­‐‑eight   agricultural   settlements   existed,   twenty-­‐‑four   of  which  were  
moshavot.   The   moshavah   met   the   goals   of   both   Hovevei   Zion   and   Baron   de  
Rothschild   since   it   created   the   reality   of   the   ‘Jewish   Farmer’   in   Palestine   that  
worked   the   land   to   support   himself.   A   moshava   is   a   kind   of   colony   whose  
members   farmed   their   land   independently.   However,   moshavot   proved   to   be  
economically   weak   and   could   not   accommodate   the   rate   at   which   the   Zionist  
movement  wanted  Eretz-­‐‑Israel  to  receive  Jewish  immigrants  (Katz,  1998).    
On   the   other   hand,   as   Katz   explained,   the  moshav   was   a   method   or   settlement  
pattern   that   evolved   after   experimenting   over   decades   of   different   types   of  
settlements.  The  moshav   revolved   around   the   notion   that   a   farmer’s   family  will  
earn   its   livelihood   solely   from   their   agricultural   work.   It   allowed   for  
individualism   in   order   for   everyone   to   have   full   and   free   use   of   his   talent.  
However,   purchasing   and   selling  was  made   on   a   cooperative   basis,   and   public  
institutions  were  also  communally  funded.    
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Troen  and  Ilan  summarize  the  number  of  Jewish  settlements  built,  as  follows:  
From   the   1880s   until   Israel   was   granted   statehood   in   1948,   about   250  
villages   of   various   types  were   established.  With   recruits   drawn   from   the  
massive   post-­‐‑Independence   immigration   of   the   1950s   and   the   enlarged  
territory   and   financial   resources   generated   with   statehood,   400   more  
settlements  were  founded  until  the  Six-­‐‑Day  War  in  1967,  when  agricultural  
colonization  largely  ended.  Thus,  in  less  than  a  century,  from  1882  to  1967,  
Zionist  colonizers  established  more  than  650  villages  (Troen,  2003,  p.  4).  
  
4.2.3    Religious  settlements  
In   his   book,   Religious   Zionism,   Dov   Schwartz   (2009)   describes   his   subject   as  
revolutionary  for  two  main  reasons:  
1) It  challenges  Jewish  thinking  that  redemption  for  the  Jewish  people  should  
be  anticipated  to  occur  when  God  desires.  Instead,  it  allows  for  the  living  to  
take   God’s   place   in   paving   the   road   to   redemption.   Religious   Zionists  
believed   that   “God,   as   it   were,   was   waiting   for   mortals   to   initiate   the  
redemptive  process  and  would  intervene  only  then”  (Schwartz  D.  ,  2009,  p.  
3).  
2) It   created   the   notion   of   the   ‘redeemed   person’   who   would   respond   to  
contemporary  demands  and  requirements  to  “construct  a  modern  political  
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entity,   reshaping   his   or   her   religious   faith   in   accordance   with   these”  
(Schwartz  D.  ,  2009,  p.  1).  
This  indicates  why  religious  Zionism  conflicted  first  and  foremost  with  Rabbinical  
Authority.   Schwartz   (2009,   p.   5)   explains   that   the   “[r]evolt   grew   out   of   a   given  
situation,   in  which  most  leaders  of  the  Torah  world  were  opposed  to  the  Zionist  
movement  and  rejected  it  outright”.    
The  founding  of  an  independent  Mizrahi  faction  within  the  Zionist  Organization  
marked   the   political   institutionalization   of   religious   Zionism.  While   the   Zionist  
Organization  and  its  various  factions  respected  Rabbinical  Authority,  the  Mizrahi  
faction  knew  from  its  very  beginning  that  it  would  initially  have  to  clash  with  its  
religious  mentors.   Indeed,  many  differences  arose  with   the  Rabbinical  Authority  
on  life-­‐‑related  and  cultural   issues.  For   instance,  Maimon,  a   leader  of  the  Mizrahi  
movement,  when   commenting   on   his   support   for  women’s   right   to   vote,   put   it  
bluntly  when  he  said:  “In  matters  of  issur  ve-­‐‑hetter  [purely  religious  matters]  …  we  
consult   the  Rabbis,   but   in  matters   of   life   in   the  marketplace,   they  must   ask   us”  
(Freidman,  1977,  p.  5).    
Religious  Zionists’  disrespect  for  the  Rabbinical  Authority  undermined  their  own  
status   within   the   entire   Zionist   Organization,   and   this   was   reflected   in   their  
building  their  own  settlements,  termed  ‘religious  settlements’.  These  were  widely  
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challenged   and   opposed   by   the   World   Zionist   Organization   and   its   various  
departments.  As  Schwartz  (2008,  p.  63)  argues,    
Concrete   attempts   to   establish   religious-­‐‑Zionist   settlements   came   in   the  
wake   of   the   third   aliyah5  (1919–1923),   which   brought   idealistic   religious  
youths,  mostly  from  Hasidic  families,  seeking  to  settle  on  the  land  to  build  
it   through  manual   labor  and  hoping   to   lead  a   full   religious   life.  They  did  
not   foresee   the   problems   they   would   encounter   on   the   way,   but   their  
ideological  and  political  steadfastness  finally  resulted  in  the  establishment  
of   settlements  …  Religious-­‐‑Zionist   settlements  became  a   reality,  as  noted,  
only  after  a  long  struggle  with  the  Zionist  bureaucracy,  which  consistently  
obstructed  religious-­‐‑Zionist  settlement.    
The  Mizrahi   movement’s   attempts   to   build   such   religious   settlements   began   in  
1925,   but  were   repeatedly   rejected  or   thwarted  by   the  Zionist  Organization   and  
the  Jewish  National  Fund.  Further  unsuccessful  attempts  were  made  in  1927  and  
1928,   but   in   1932   the   movement’s   efforts   finally   bore   fruit   when   the   Jewish  
National   Fund   recognized   the   Sheikh   Abrek   settlement:   the   first   religious  
settlement.   By   the   end   of   the   1930’s   several   other   settlements   had   been   built  
(Schwartz  D.  ,  2008,  p.  65).  
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  immigration	  of	  Jews	  in	  the	  diaspora	  to	  the	  land	  of	  Israel	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                    Religious  Zionist  settlers  versus  ultra-­‐‑Orthodox  settlers  
Above,   I   explained   the   clashing   positions   of   the   Rabbinical   Authority   and  
religious  Zionism  in  the  latter’s  struggle  to  establish  religious-­‐‑national  settlements.  
Historically,  ultra-­‐‑Orthodox  Jews  rejected  active  Zionism  since  they  saw  the  road  
to  redemption  being  found  through  religious  practice  rather  than  through  secular  
movements.  In  1938,  Neturei  Karta  was  established  in  Jerusalem  and  became  the  
most  vocal  anti-­‐‑Zionist   faction  of   the  ultra-­‐‑Orthodox   Jews   (International  Neturei  
Karta).   Yosseph   Shilhav   explains   the   Heredim   (i.e.,   ultra-­‐‑Orthodox   Jews)   as  
follows:    
[A]   society   whose   religious   conception   rests   on   fundamentalist   bases.  
Together  with  other  cultural  and  religious  traits,  this  community  displays  a  
complex   attitude   towards   the   modern   world.   However,   this   rejection,  
evoked   in   defense   of   the   community’s   cultural,   values,   and  
Weltanschauung,   is   by   no   means   total.   The   Heredi   community  
indiscriminately   idealizes   traditional   patterns   of   organization   and  
management  only  when  cultural  and  religious  patterns  are  involved.  (Ben-­‐‑
Zadok,  1993  ,  p.  177)    
Today,   however,   ultra-­‐‑Orthodox   settlements   do   exist   on   the  West   Bank   despite  
their   idealism.   These   have   their   own   religious   attributes   that   distinguish   them  
from  other  secular  or  religious-­‐‑nationalist  settlements.  Although  this  may  seem  to  
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be  in  contradiction  to  their  opposition  to  Zionism  and  the  ‘modern  state’,  Shilhav’s  
explanation   of   the   Heredi’s   non-­‐‑total   rejection   of   the   modern   world,   which  
preserves   their   social,   cultural,   and   religious   traits,   offers   some   justification   for  
their   settlement   on   the   West   Bank   and   elsewhere   in   Israel.   The   first   ultra-­‐‑
Orthodox  settlement  was  established  on  the  West  Bank  in  the  early  1980’s  as  part  
of  the  Likud  Party’s  policy  to  widely  establish  and  expand  settlements.      
Dror   Etkis   and   Lara   Friedman   (2005)   assert   that   the   first   Likud   government   of  
1977  found  an  ideal  target  in  the  ultra-­‐‑Orthodox  movement  despite  their  rejection  
of  secular  Zionism.  As  they  explain,  
[the  Heredim]  preferred  to  live  in  segregated,  homogeneous  communities,  
whose   rapid   birth   rate   was   causing   them   to   constantly   outgrow   their  
communities   inside   Israel,   and   who   suffered   from   a   chronic   lack   of  
resources.   The  ultra-­‐‑Orthodox  were   a   natural   fit   for   the   new   settlements,  
which  offered  cheap  housing,  segregated  communities,  and  easy  access  to  
Israel  (with  the  new  ultra-­‐‑Orthodox  settlements  located  close  to  the  Green  
Line)  (Etkis  and  Friedman,  2005).    
From  the  above  discussion,  we  can  see  that  some  of  the  religious  differences  in  the  
early   days   of   Zionism   later   manifested   as   a   different   type   of   settlement   that  
maintained   a   distance   from   Zionism’s   secular   nature.   These  Heredi   settlements  
aimed   to  preserve   Jewish   life,   tradition,   and   culture.   Thus,   they  have   their   own  
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unique  motivations   that  are  not   shared  by  other   religious-­‐‑nationalist,   secular,  or  
agricultural  settlements.        
4.3    Post-­‐‑1967  Settlements  
Immediately   after   the   1967   war   and   Israel’s   capture   of   the  West   Bank,   settlers  
began  placing  pressure  on  the  government  to  settle  the  newly  captured  land.  Levi  
Eshkol,   then  Prime  Minister,  was  himself   head   of   the   Settlement  Department   at  
the  World  Zionist  Organization   and   the   Jewish  Agency   from   1948   to   1963   (The  
American-­‐‑Jewish   Cooperative   Enterprise,   Levi   Eshkol,   2013).   However,   the  
captured   land  was   generally   seen   as   something   Israel   could   exchange   for   peace  
and  normal  relations  with  the  Arabs,  as  Lein  and  Weizman  (2002,  p.  11)  explain:  
During   the  months   immediately   following   the  war,   this   government   did  
not  have  any  clear  policy  regarding  Israeli  settlement  in  the  West  Bank.  The  
initial   inclination  of  most  of   the  members  of   the  government  was   to  hold  
the  territory  as  a  bargaining  chip  for  future  negotiations.  Accordingly,  they  
opposed  plans  to  establish  civilian  settlements  in  this  area.  However,  these  
inclinations   were   rapidly   eroded,   due   both   to   the   pressures   exerted   by  
various   interest   groups   and   as   the   result   of   initiatives   from   within   the  
government.  
An  argument   supporting   the   security   advantage  of  having   Israeli   settlements   in  
the   West   Bank,   Golan   Heights,   and   Sinai   Peninsula   also   prevailed   during   this  
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period.  This  worked  to  the  advantage  of  the  first  Israeli  civilian  settlement  on  the  
West  Bank:  Kfar  Etzion  (the  village  of  Etzion).  This  was  the  first  of  17  villages  that  
today   comprise   the   Gush   Etzion   settlement   block,   located   to   the   south   of  
Jerusalem  (Gush  Etzion  (1),  n.d.);     although  it  was  established  in  1968,   it  was  not  
officially   recognized   by   the   government   until   the   mid-­‐‑1970’s   (Feige,   2009).  
According   to   Gush   Etzion’s   official   website   (and   also   recorded   by   various  
scholars),  a  number  of  attempts  were  made  to  settle  this  particular  area  after  the  
1920’s,  but  all  to  no  avail  until  1967:    
Four   brave   attempts  were  made   in   the   last   century   to   populate   the   area,  
until   finally  on   the   fourth,   after   the  1967  Six  Day  War,   the   Jewish  people  
were  successful   in  settling   the  area  permanently.  The   first  attempt  was   in  
1927,   but   harsh   physical   conditions   forced   the   settlers   to   abandon   the  
settlement   they   had   established,   Migdal   Eder.   The   second   attempt   was  
made   by   Shmuel   Holtzman   in   1935,   who   established   the   village   of   Kfar  
Etzion   and   after   whom   Gush   Etzion   is   named.   Repeated   Arab   attacks  
drove   the   pioneers   away.   The   third   attempt  was   in   1943,  when   different  
affiliated   groups   established   four   settlements,   the   rebirth   of   Kfar   Etzion,  
Masuot  Yitzchak,  Ein  Tzurim,  and  Revadim,   for  a   total  population  of  450  
adults.   In   1948,   all   four   settlements   were   totally   destroyed.   The   Arabs  
murdered  240  men  and  women,  with  another  260  being  taken  into  captivity  
(Gush  Etzion  (2),  n.d.).    
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It  was  not  difficult  for  Kfar  Etzion  settlers  to  convince  the  Eshkol  government  of  
the  security  advantage  of   their  settlement.   In  this  respect,   former  Prime  Minister  
David  Ben  Gurion  had  stated  after  the  1948  Arab-­‐‑Israeli  war:    
I  can  think  of  no  battle   in  the  annals  of   the  Israel  Defense  Forces  which  was  
more   magnificent,   more   tragic   or   more   heroic   than   the   struggle   for   Gush  
Etzion   …If   there   exists   a   Jewish   Jerusalem,   our   foremost   thanks   go   to   the  
defenders  of  Gush  Etzion  (Jewish  National  Fund).  
On   succeeding   Levi   Eshkol,   Golda  Meir   and   her   government   were   also   placed  
under  great  pressure   -­‐‑  both   from  the  settlers  and  because  of   the  security  benefit  
they  argued  -­‐‑  to  settle  all  of  the  biblical  land  of  Israel.  Her  government  succumbed  
to   this   and   established   a   number   of   security   oriented   settlements   in   the   Sinai  
Desert,  along  the  Jordan  Valley  of  the  West  Bank,  and  on  the  Golan  Heights.  This  
settlement  plan  had  been  circulated  from  the  beginning  of  Meir’s  term  (1969–1974)  
and  was  approved  just  before  her  term  ended  (Galchinsky,  2004).  
                      The  two  main  settlement  movements  (post  1967)  
The  movement   that  established  Kfar  Etzion  was  called  “The  Children  of  Etzion”  
and  was  part  of   the  National  Religious  Party,  which  had   taken   the   first   steps   to  
settle  the  newly  captured  land  in  the  year  after  the  1967  war.  This  was  initiated  by  
the  orphans  who  had   lost   their   fathers   in   the  previous  unsuccessful   attempts   to  
settle  Kfar   Etzion.   The  National   Religious   Party   saw   Israel’s   victory   in   the   1967  
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war  as  an  opportunity  to  bring  the  idea  of  “Greater  Israel”  into  existence.  Before  
this   victory,   anyone   who   spoke   of   “Greater   Israel”   was   seen   as   detached   from  
reality.    However,  after  1967,  the  Israelis  renewed  their  contact  with  sacred  Jewish  
sites  on   the  West  Bank   that  are  mentioned   in   the  Torah.  This  aroused  messianic  
feelings  among  the  National  Religious  Party  and  others,  which   formed  a   further  
motivating  force  for  settlement.    
In  the  early  1970s,  the  organisation,  Alon  Moreh  Gari’in,  was  established  to  settle  
in   the   area   of   Shechem   (Nablus).   Consequently,   Alon   Moreh   became   the   first  
settlement   recognized  by  an   Israeli   government.   In   1974,   after   the  1973  war,   the  
Gush   Emonim  movement,   (which   translates   as   the   ‘Block   of   the   Faithful’),   was  
formally   established   in   Kfar   Etzion   as   part   of   the   National   Religious   Party.   It  
captured  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  Israelis  disappointed  by  the  outcome  of  the  
war  by  protesting  any  land  concession  to  be  made  by  the  government.  Even  later,  
Gush  Emunim  broke   loose   from  the  National  Religious  Party   to  gain  even  more  
popularity.  However,  Gush   Emunim   and   the  Alon  Moreh  Gari’in  maintained   a  
strong   relationship   as   they   shared   the   same   ideology   and   drive   for   settlement.  
Gush   Emunim   demonstrated   against   any   peace   treaties  with   the  Arabs,  mainly  
those   in   Egypt   at   that   stage,   and   called   for   the   continuous   establishment   of  
settlements.  These  demonstrations  along  with  the  Alon  Moreh  Gari’in’s  repeated  
attempts  to  settle  shaped  the  initial  formative  years  of  the  settlement  movement.    
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In   1977,  Menahim  Begin,   then  prime  minister   of   Israel,   announced  his   desire   to  
create   many   settlements   like   Alon   Morehs.   Meanwhile,   Gush   Emunim   was  
successful   in   creating   more   settlements   in   the   same   year   and   began  
institutionalizing   itself.   The   settlement   agency,  Amana,  was   established   and   the  
Yesha  Council,  which  included  representatives  from  all  settlements,  convened  for  
the  first  time  in  1980.  However,  Gush  Emunim  ceased  to  exist  in  1985  when  some  
of  its  members,  and  even  some  leaders,  were  found  to  be  members  of  the  Jewish  
Underground,   an   extremist  group  of   settlers   that  had  attempted   to  blow  up   the  
Temple  Mount.  The  group  was  also  responsible  for  the  assassination  of  the  mayor  
of  Halhoul,  and   the  unsuccessful  attempt   to  assassinate   the  mayor  of  Nablus  by  
blowing   up   his   car,   leaving   him   with   severed   legs.   However,   although   Gush  
Emunim  no   longer   existed,   its   settlement  project   continued   to   grow  and  gained  
more  power  and  political  influence  (Feige,  2009).  
  
4.4    Settlement  plans  
Four  decisive  settlement  plans  were  prepared  in  the  years  after  the  Six  Day  War:  
1)   The   Yigal   Alon   plan   that   started   immediately   after   Israel   captured   the   West  
Bank,  Sinai,  and  Golan  Heights;  2)  the  Matitiyahu  Drobless  plan,  which  represented  
the  Likud  Government  of  1977;  3)   the  Sharon  plan;  and  4)   the   ‘Master  plan  for  the  
development  of  settlement  in  Judea  and  Samaria,  1979-­‐‑1983’.  
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1)  The  Alon  plan  
Prepared  by  Yigal  Alon,  who  served  as  the  head  of  the  ministerial  committee  on  
settlements  in  late  1967,  this  plan  suggested  building  settlements  in  such  a  way  as  
to  achieve  the  following  objectives:      
To  redraw  the  borders  of  the  State  of  Israel  to  include  the  Jordan  Valley  and  
the   Judean   Desert   within   the   territory   of   the   state,   which   the   plan'ʹs  
proponents   argued   was   necessary   to   ensure   state   security.   …   Ensuring   a  
"ʺJewish   presence"ʺ   and   constituting   a   preliminary   step   leading   to   formal  
annexation  (Lein  and  Weizman,  2002,  p.  12).  
While   the   Alon   Plan   initially   recommended   avoiding   areas   that   were   Arab  
populated,   its   final   1970   draft   was   effectively   suggesting   annexation   of   around  
50%   of   the   West   Bank.   In   this,   the   1970   draft   went   far   beyond   what   the   plan  
originally  suggested.  It  was  no  longer  confined  to  the  Jordan  Valley  and  a  strip  of  
the  Judean  Desert  but  now  involved  Gush  Etzion,  almost  the  entire  Judean  Desert,  
and  areas  south  of  Hebron.  Moreover,  it  suggested  that  the  remaining  land  would  
be  where   a   future   Palestinian-­‐‑Jordanian   state   could   be   built.   By   1977,  when   the  
Likud  government  came  into  power,  around  4,500  settlers  lived  in  almost  30  West  
Bank  settlements,  and  around  50,000  had  settled  around  East  Jerusalem.  While  the  
plan  was  ignored  by  the  Likud  government,  which  focused  on  settling  other  areas  
of   the  West  Bank,   it  became  part  of   the  subsequent  national  unity  government’s  
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official  policy  under  the  leadership  of  Shimon  Peres  and  Yitzhak  Shamir.  Through  
this,   government   resources  were   allocated   to   settlements   according   to   the  Alon  
plan  (Lein  and  Weizman,  2002,  p.  12).    Map  1,  below,  demonstrates  this  settlement  
plan.  
Map  1:  The  Alon  Plan  
  
    Source:  Arieli  (1),  n.d.       
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2)  The  Drobless  plan  
As  mentioned   above,   the   Likud   government   did   not   follow   the   Alon   plan   and  
instead   focused   on   settling   other   areas.   These   were   settled   following   a   plan  
prepared  by  Matitiyahu  Drobless,  and  published  in  1978.  This  sought  to  accelerate  
the   construction   of   settlements   by   establishing   new   settlements   around   existing  
ones   and   connecting   them   to   the   infrastructure   and   utilities   of   the   latter.   The  
plan’s  aims  can  be  understood  from  the  following  text:  
The   civilian  presence  of   Jewish   communities   is   vital   for   the   security   of   the  
state  ...  There  must  not  be  the  slightest  doubt  regarding  our  intention  to  hold  
the  areas  of  Judea  and  Samaria  for  ever...  The  best  and  most  effective  way  to  
remove   any   shred   of   doubt   regarding   our   intention   to   hold   Judea   and  
Samaria  forever  is  a  rapid  settlement  drive  in  these  areas  (Drobless,  1980,  p.  
3).    




Map  2:  The  Drobless  Plan  
  
                                                                                                                              Source:    ISM  (2005)  
3)  The  Sharon  Plan  
Ariel   Sharon   prepared   his   own   settlement   plan   while   serving   as   Minister   of  
Agriculture   from   1977   to   1981.   The   plan   that   bore   his   name   was   not   officially  
endorsed   by   the   government;   however,   it   significantly   contributed   to   the  
settlements   due   to   Sharon’s   position.   The  Ministry   of   Agriculture   manages   the  
Israeli  Lands  Administration  that  allocated  the  land  for  settlements,  as  well  as  the  
resources  needed  for   their  establishment.   In   fact,   this  ministry  managed  all   state  
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
found in the Lancester Library, Coventry University.
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land   and   the   financing   of   the   World   Zionist   Organization’s   settlement   activity  
(Lein  and  Weizman,  2002,  p.  14).  
Through   this   plan,   Ariel   Sharon   reflected   his   belief   that   “it   was   important   to  
prevent  the  creation  of  a  contiguous  area  populated  by  Arabs  on  either  side  of  the  
Green  Line,   leading   to   the  connection  of   the  area  west  of   Jenin  and  Nablus,  and  
north   of   Ramallah,   to   the   Palestinian   communities  within   Israel   adjacent   to   the  
Green  Line,  such  as  Umm  el-­‐‑Fahm  and  Kafr  Qasem”  (Aronson,  1987,  p.  71).  Map  3  
below  further  illustrates  this.  
Map  3:  The  Sharon  Plan  
  
                                                                                                                                                                              Source:    http://www.shaularieli.com  
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4)  The  ‘Master  plan  for  the  development  of  settlements  in  Judea  and  Samaria,  
1979-­‐‑1983’  
This   was   prepared   by   the   Ministry   of   Agriculture   and   the   World   Zionist  
Organization   in  March  1979  as   a   compromise  between   the  Sharon  and  Drobless  
plans.   The   plan   envisaged   settlement   development   until   2010,   and   included   an  
operational  plan  for  the  period  between  1983  and  1986.  The  plan  over  this  period  
aimed   at   creating   46   new   settlements   over   a   five   year   period   to   house   16,000  
settler   families   and   to   add   another   11,000   families   to   the   already   existing  
settlements  that  were  to  be  expanded  according  to  this  plan  (Bar-­‐‑Siman-­‐‑Tov,  1994).  
Twenty  of  the  46  settlements  were  NAHAL,  that  is,  military  settlements.  The  plan  
was  also  known  as  the  ‘One  Hundred  Thousand’  plan  since  it  aimed  at  bringing  
the  number  of  settlers  on  the  West  Bank  up  to  100,000.  However,  things  did  not  go  
according  to  plan  in  terms  of  settler  population,  which  only  reached  around  half  
of  that  anticipated  in  1986  (51,000  settlers)  (Lein  and  Weizman,  2002,  p.  15).  
In  his  book,   Israel  and  the  Peace  Process  1977-­‐‑1982,  Yacov  Bar-­‐‑Siman-­‐‑Tov  explains  
the   different   groups   existing   within   Israel   in   the   late   1980’s   in   relation   to   the  
settlements  and  who  represents  each  group:    
One   group,   headed   by   Begin,   Sharon,   Chaim   Landau,   and   Hammer,  
demanded  massive   settlement   of   Judea   and   Samaria   to   reinforce   Israel’s  
presence  there  and  prevent  a  Palestinian  state.  An  opposing  group,  which  
included  Dayan,  Weizmann,  and  Yadin,  argued  that  although  Israelis  had  
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the  right   to  settle  anywhere   in  Eretz   Israel,  at  some  times  and   locations   it  
might  be  better  not  to  implement  this  right  (Bar-­‐‑Siman-­‐‑Tov,  1994,  p.  204  ).  
Bar-­‐‑Siman-­‐‑Tov  also   explains   that  Ariel   Sharon  had  profound   tactical  differences  
with   Weizmann   who   preferred   larger   urban   settlements.   Sharon,   on   the   other  
hand,   favoured   many   small   settlements   distributed   all   over   the   West   Bank,  
including  areas  close  to   large  Arab  populations.  He  argued  that   fragmenting  the  
West  Bank  in  such  a  way  would  prevent  a  Palestinian  state  from  ever  existing.  
It  can  be  seen  that  all  four  settlement  plans  share  the  desire  to  redraw  the  future  
Israeli  borders   in  practical   terms,  prevent   the   territorial   continuity  of   any   future  
Palestinian  state,  and  ensure  everlasting   Jewish  presence  on   the  West  Bank.  The  
security  advantage  of  settlements  is  also  argued  in  all  plans.  The  Sharon  Plan  and  
the  ‘Master  Plan’  clearly  stated  an  additional  desire  to  prevent  the  creation  of  any  
future  Palestinian  -­‐‑  Jordanian  entity  on  the  West  Bank.    
The   following   section   will   demonstrate   how   and   to   what   extent   the   different  
settlement  plans  achieved  their  goals,  and  indicate  the  challenge  that  settlements  
currently   pose   to   the   creation   of   a   Palestinian   state,   as   the   Israeli   –   Palestinian  
Peace   Process   and   the   Oslo   Peace   Accords   suggest.   At   the   same   time,   the  
permanent  Jewish  presence  that  all  plans  aimed  to  ensure  required  the  creation  of  
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a   system   that   sustained   the   settlements   and  made   them   economically   viable   for  
settlers.    
Overview  -­‐‑  From  1967  
As  a  result  of  the  above-­‐‑mentioned  plans,  the  settlements’  populations  grew  at  a  
fast  pace  once  they  were  established.  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  growth  in  settler  
population   in  East   Jerusalem  shown  in   the   two  tables  below.  Table  1  below  lists  
the  settler  population  between  2005  and  2009  and  Table  2  gives  an  overview  of  the  
period  between  1972  and  2007.  
Table  1:  The  Settler  Population  in  East  Jerusalem,  2005-­‐‑2009  
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Table  2:    Overview  of  Israeli  Settlement  Population
  
                                                                                                    (Source:  the  Center  for  Security  Studies:  ETC  Zurich)  
  
According   to   the   Palestinian   Negotiation  
Support  Unit   (NSU),   in  2014  there  were   'ʹover  
half  a  million  settlers  living  on  the  West  Bank,  
over   190,000   of   which   live   in   East   Jerusalem  
(Negotiations   Affairs   Department,   2015).  
Annex  B,  “The  Humanitarian  Impact  of  Israeli  
Settlement   Policies”,   a   report   prepared   in  
January  2012  by  the  United  Nations  Office  for  
the   Coordination   of   Humanitarian   Affairs  




Map  4  Settlement  Distribution  
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500,000  settlers  on  the  West  Bank  and  East  Jerusalem.  The  report  further  explains  
that  the  growth  rate  of  the  settler  population  over  the  previous  decade  had  been  
5.3%,  a  much  higher  rate  than  that  of  Israel,  which  stood  at  1.8%.  In  terms  of  the  
number  of  established  settlements  between  1967  and  2012,  the  report  explains  that  
150  settlements  and  100  settler  outposts  were  established  during  that  period.    
Previously,  in  June  2006,  the  Guardian  had  reported  that  the  settler  population  of  
the   West   Bank   (not   including   East   Jerusalem)   had   exceeded   350,000,   and  
explained  that,  over  the  previous  12  years,  it  had  doubled  in  number.  Similarly,  in  
East   Jerusalem,   the   number   of   settlers   had   exceeded   300,000.   This   brought   the  
total  number  of  settlers  to  over  650,000  (Sherwood,  2012).  Different  sources  argued  
that  there  were  121  settlements  in  2008  and  an  additional  100  that  were  referred  to  
as  “outposts”,  which  were  not  even   recognized  as   legal  by   Israel   itself.   (Council  
for  European  Palestinian  Relations,  n.d.).  Map  4,  on  the  previous  page,  illustrates  
the  settlement  distribution  over  the  West  Bank  in  2011.    
Table  3,  below,  prepared  by  the  Israeli  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics,  illustrates  the  
population,   and   the   growth   of   settlements   on   the   West   Bank,   excluding   East  





Table  3:  Settler  Population  Growth  East  and  West  of   the  Separation  Wall,  2000   -­‐‑  
2009  
  
In  its  settlement  report,  September–October  2012,  The  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies  
explains  that  settlements  located  to  the  east  of  the  Israeli  separation  barrier  have  
been  growing  at  a  faster  pace  than  those  on  the  west.  Since  this  is  the  side  of  the  
wall  that  reaches  furthest  into  the  West  Bank,  it  is  worth  noting  here  that  this  fact  
weakens  any  assumptions   that   Israel   intended  the  barrier   to  be   its   future  border  
with   a   possible   Palestinian   State.   To   illustrate   this,   the   Journal   compiled   the  
following  table  (Table  4)  sourcing  its  information  from  the  Israeli  Central  Statistics  
Bureau  (Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  2013):  
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Table  4:  Fastest  Growing  West  Bank  Settlements  
  
	  
4.5    Settlements  and  International  law  
This   section   gives   an   overview   of   international   laws   that   indicate   that   Israeli  
settlements  are  illegal.  These  are  mainly  based  on  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  
and  have  been  supported  by  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ),  the  Treaty  of  
Rome  and  a  commission  of  the  United  Nations  Human  Rights  Council.  According  
to   international   law,   mainly   based   on   the   Fourth   Geneva   Convention,   Israeli  
settlements   are   illegal.   This   has   been   reiterated   through   a   number  UN   Security  
Council   Resolutions   and   hundreds   of   General   Assembly   resolutions.   Of   the  
former  the  following  are  especially  pertinent:  
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-­‐ Resolution  242  (November  22,  1967)  
-­‐ Resolution  446  (March  22,  1979)  
-­‐ Resolution  465  (March  1,  1980)  
-­‐ Resolution  478  (August  20,  1980)  
-­‐ Resolution  497  (December  17,  1981)  
-­‐ Resolution  904  (March  18,  1994)  
  
Article  49  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  makes  clear  that  forcible  transfers  of  
people  are  prohibited,  stating  that:  
Individual   or   mass   forcible   transfers,   as   well   as   deportations   of   protected  
persons  from  occupied  territory  to  the  territory  of  the  Occupying  Power  or  to  
that  of  any  other  country,  occupied  or  not,  are  prohibited,  regardless  of  their  
motive.  .  .  .  The  Occupying  Power  shall  not  deport  or  transfer  parts  of  its  own  
civilian  population   into   the   territory   it   occupies  (International  Committee   of  
the  Red  Cross  (ICRC),  1949).  
Israel   challenges   this   by   asserting   that   the   Fourth  Geneva  Convention   does   not  
apply   to   its   settlements  built  on   the  West  Bank  as   it  does  not   consider   the  West  
Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  to  be  occupied  land.  However,  in  July  2004,  the  International  
Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)  issued  an  Advisory  Opinion  that  found  that:  
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The  construction  of  the  Wall  in  the  West  Bank,  and  its  associated  régime,  are  
contrary   to   international   law.   In   the   analysis   leading   to   this   conclusion,   the  
Court  also  reiterated  the  de  jure  application  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention,  
the   status   of   the   oPt   as   an   occupied   territory,   and   the   illegality   of   Israeli  
settlements  built   therein.  The  Court  stated  that  Israel  established  settlements  
in  the  OPT,  including  East  Jerusalem,  in  breach  of  Article  49(6)  of  the  Fourth  
Geneva   Convention.   It   quoted   the   UN   Security   Council   position   on  
settlements,   namely   that   such   policy   and   practices   “have   no   legal   validity”  
and   constitute   a   “flagrant   violation”   of   the   Fourth   Geneva   Convention  
(Diakonia,  n.d.  ).  
Furthermore,  Article   (8)  of   the  Rome  Statute  of   the   International  Criminal  Court  
describes  what  it  considers  to  be  war  crimes  as  follows:    
The   transfer,   directly   or   indirectly,   by   the   Occupying   Power   of   parts   of   its  
own   civilian   population   into   the   territory   it   occupies,   or   the   deportation   or  
transfer   of   all   or  parts   of   the  population  of   the   occupied   territory  within   or  
outside  this  territory”  (Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court,  1998).    
In   January   2013,   a   three   member   commission   formed   by   the   United   Nations  
Human  Rights  Council   to  examine   Israeli   settlements  made  a  clear   link  between  
Article  (8)  of  the  Rome  Statute  and  Israeli  settlements.  The  commission  explained,    
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Israel’s  policy  of  settlement  building  is  a  war  crime  that  could  lead  to  future  
prosecution   from   the   International   Criminal   Court   (ICC).   Christine   Chanet,  
who  chaired  the  panel,  claimed  that  the  offense  of  “moving  one’s  own  civilian  
population   into   occupied   territory”   falls   under   Article   8   of   the   ICC   statute  
[Rome  Statute]  (Prosser,  2013).  
	  
4.6  The    settlement  economy  
According  to  Robert  Friedman,  between  1967  and  1992,  Israel  invested  $15  billion  
in   settlements.   By   1992,   there   were   more   than   100,000   settlers   living   in   144  
settlements,  excluding  East  Jerusalem  settlements  (Friedman  R.  ,  1992).  Moreover,  
the   Journal   of   Palestine   Studies   summarizes   the   investment  made   by   the   Israeli  
government  in  settlements  from  then  until  2012,  as  follows:    
During  the  Oslo  era,  successive  Israeli  governments  have  invested  almost  $7  
billion  to  encourage  and  expand  settlement  in  the  West  Bank  and,  until  2005,  
in   the   Gaza   Strip.   After   the   signing   of   the   Oslo   accords   in   1993,   the  
government   of   Yitzhak   Rabin   inaugurated   huge   infra-­‐‑structure   projects  
favoring  settlement  in  the  West  Bank,  most  notably  the  new  system  of  bypass  
roads   linking   settlements   to   Israel.   In   1993,   governmental   investment   in   the  
territories   peaked   at   more   than   $627   million,   $605   million   of   which   was  
earmarked   for   construction,   housing,   and   development.   From   1994   to   1997,  
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investment   averaged   $376  million   annually,  while   in   2003,   it   reached   about  
$527   million.   According   to   data   compiled   by   Israel’s   Central   Bureau   of  
Statistics,  from  1992  to  2011  the  Israeli  government  invested  more  than  $6.77  
billion  (in  2011  dollars)  in  the  territories  (Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  2013).  
According  to   these   two  sources,   the   total   investment   in  settlements  made  by  the  
Israeli  government  between  1967  and  2012  is  around  $22  billion.  It  is  worth  noting  
that  this  does  not  include  the  cost  of  occupation  in  itself  or  the  security  needed  to  
maintain   those   settlements.   For   instance,   according   to   the  Adva  Center,   Israel’s  
separation  barrier  was  doubled  in  length  just  to  annex  settlements  that  are  located  
west  of   the  barrier.  Therefore,   instead  of   the  wall  being  313km  long,  as   it  would  
have  been  if  built  along  the  green  line,  it  is  in  fact  790km  long,  costing  the  Israeli  
government  NIS13  billion  (around  $3.6    billion).    While  the  Adva  Center  explains  
that  it  is  impossible  to  calculate  exactly  how  much  it  costs  the  Israeli  government  
to  maintain   its  occupation  of   the  Palestinian   territories,   the  Center  has  compiled  
the  following  table  (Table  5)  that  summarizes  the  likely  cost  of  Israeli  occupation  
between  1989  and  2010:    
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Table  5:  Cost  of  Occupation  
  
(Source:  Adva  Center,  2012)  
  
4.7    Industrial  settlements  
While  financial  and  political  incentives  have  drawn  many  non-­‐‑ideological  settlers  
to   live   on   the   West   Bank,   another   type   of   settlements   has   been   a   growing  
attraction:   industrial   zones   or   industrial   settlements.   As   Drobless   stated,   “The  
problem   is   finding   jobs   for   Jews  who   live   in   the   territories.   I  need   factories,  and  
investment  capital  from  America”  (Friedman,  1992,  p.  3).    
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 




As  discussed   earlier,   settlements  have  drastically   evolved  over   the  past  decades  
since  the  1967  war  and  the  occupation  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.  While  this  
chapter  started  by  explaining  the  ideological  motivations  to  settle  Eretz  Israel  for  
Jewish   immigrants   and   settlers,   since   new   “economic”   type   of   settlements   have  
evolved  over  the  last  two  decades,  it  is  pertinent  to  close  by  discussing  these.      
First,  polls  today  show  less  spiritual  or  ideological  motives  among  Israeli  settlers.    
The  majority  of  settlers  (85%  it   is  reckoned)  are  so-­‐‑called  ‘economic  settlers’,  
of  no  particular  ideological  stance,  who  reckon  they  can  get  a  better  life  for  the  
same   money   living   in   a   settlement   than   in   Israel   proper.   Settlements   are  
heavily   subsidized   by   the   Israeli   government:   housing   is   cheaper,   there   are  
tax   breaks   for   their   children’s   education   -­‐‑   and   the   view   from   the   hilltop   is  
outstanding.  A  minority  of  settlers  however  are  there  for  ideological  reasons  
(Palestinian  Primer).  
In   relation   to   this,  Canadians   for   Justice   and  Peace   in   the  Middle   East   (CJPME)  
define  settlement  industrial  zones  as    
fortress-­‐‑like   hill-­‐‑top   factory   complexes   connected   to   nearby   hill-­‐‑top  
settlements.   They   are   the   economic   engines   of   the   illegal   Israeli   settlement  
blocs.   In   the   best   cases,   they   provide   an   industrial   base   for   Israel’s   illegal  
colonial  development  in  the  territories,  exploiting  cheap  Palestinian  labour.  In  
the  worst  of   cases,   they  offer  a  particular  attraction   to   industries   considered  
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toxic  or  otherwise  undesirable   in   Israel  proper  due   to   the   fact   that   stringent  
Israeli   labour   and   industrial   laws   are   not   applies   in   the   occupied   territories  
(CJPME,  2005).  
Thus,  hundreds  of  Israeli  companies,  factories,  workshops,  and  various  businesses  
exist  on  the  West  Bank,  and  are  referred  to  as  settlement  companies.  Who  Profits  
From  Occupation  is  an  Israeli   left  wing  charity  and  one  of  the  leading  advocates  
against   settlement   companies   and   any   financial   involvement   with   them.   This  
organization  explain  the  situation  as  follows,  
Israeli   industrial   zones   within   the   occupied   territories   hold   hundreds   of  
companies,  ranging  from  small  businesses  serving  the  local  Israeli  settlers  to  
large   factories   which   export   their   products   worldwide.   Several   settlements,  
especially   in   the   Jordan  Valley   and   the  Golan  Heights,  produce   agricultural  
goods,   such   as   fruits   and   flowers,   and   sell   them   in   Israel   and   abroad.  
Settlement   production   benefits   from   low   rents,   special   tax   incentives,   lax  
enforcement   of   environmental   and   labor   protection   laws   and   other  
governmental  supports  (Who  Profits,  n.d.).    
The  same  organization  offers  detailed  profiles  of  around  200  settlement  companies,  
what  products  they  produce,  and  where  their  products  are  marketed.  Other  Israeli  
organizations  that  have  openly  lobbied  against  settlements  and  their  industries,  as  
well  as  against  trading  with  them,  include  B’tselem,  Gush  Shalom,  and  Peace  Now.  
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Among   others,   these   organizations   provide   information   on   settlement   products  
and  the  companies  producing  them.    
  
4.8    Conclusion  
This   chapter   introduced   the   Israeli   settlements,   explaining   their   different   types  
and   what   the   motives   behind   their   establishment   were.   There   is   a   clear   link  
between  Zionism  and  the  construction  of  settlements,  as  it  is  clear  that  they  were  
the  means  to  realising  Zionism.  Thus,  the  different  types  of  Zionism  also  resulted  
in  different  types  of  settlements.  The  chapter  explained  how  settlements  evolved  
from  a  mere  idea  to  the  reality  today  where  there  are  over  500,000  settlers  living  
on   the   West   Bank.   The   different   conditions   that   enabled   the   establishment   of  
settlement   were   also   discussed.   These   conditions   provided   a   fostering  
environment   that   saw   the   settlement   project   evolve   and   include   strong   support  
from   different   Jewish   agencies,   as   well   as   legislation   that   eased   the   transfer   of  
Arab  land  to  Jews.    
Four   different   plans   were   drawn   up   by   Jewish   and   Israeli   leaders   to   promote  
settlements.   Those   plans   however  were   faced  with   challenges   both   from  within  
the   Zionist   movement   and   from   the   Arabs   inhabiting   the   area.   Ultimately,   the  
biggest   challenge   that   still   faces   settlements   today   is   their   illegal   status   in  
international  law.    
133	  
	  
Having  given  some  insight  into  the  settlements  themselves,  in  the  next  chapter,  I  
introduce   the   Palestinian   nonviolent   movement   that   challenges   the   settlements  
including  its  historical  roots  and  its  evolution  to  its  present  day  forms,  as  well  as  






An  overview  of  Palestinian  popular  resistance  
	  
5.1    Introduction  
This  chapter   takes  a  brief   look  at   the  history  of  Palestinian  nonviolent  resistance  
since  the  final  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Towards  the  end  of  the  Ottoman  
Empire,  Palestinians  used  nonviolent  means  to  express  their  objection  to  Ottoman  
policies  that  created  easier  conditions  for  the  transfer  of  Palestinian  land  to  Jewish  
immigrants.  During   the   British  Mandate,   following   the   collapse   of   the  Ottoman  
Empire,   nonviolent   resistance   again   became   a   clear   choice   for   Palestinians  
protesting  British  policies  that  favoured  Zionism,  most  notably  through  the  Great  
Revolt  of  1936.  After  discussing  these  events,   the  chapter  summarizes  the  nature  
of   popular   resistance   during   the   different   eras   since   the   creation   of   the   State   of  
Israel  in  1948,  mostly  from  the  start  of  the  first  Intifada  through  to  the  more  recent  
campaigns   against   Israel’s   Separation   Wall   and   settlements   on   the   West   Bank.  
Before   concluding,   the   final   section   considers   how   Israel’s   response   to   such  
nonviolent   protest,   brings   the   credibility   of   its   claim   to   being   a   democracy   into  
question.  
  




5.2  Palestinian  nonviolent  resistance  under  the  Ottoman  and  British  Empires  
Palestine  was  a  province  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  for  almost  500  years;  continuing  
as  such  up  until  the  end  of  World  War  1.  Following  this,  the  revival  of  European  
interest   in  Palestine  manifested  as   the  desire   to   instate  a   foreign  body   (that   is,   a  
sovereign  Jewish  state)  in  the  middle  of  the  Arab  states  of  the  Middle  East  to  help  
prolong   European   colonization   of   the   area.   Coupled   with   the   weakness   of   the  
Ottoman  Empire  and  the  influence  of  the  Zionist  movement,  this  made  Palestine  
especially  vulnerable  to  the  Jewish  settler  movement.    
5.2.1  Under  the  Ottoman  Empire  …  
In   the   nineteenth   century,   towards   the   end   of   the   Ottoman   era,   Palestine   was  
made  up  of   672   towns   and  villages   and  had   a  population  of   around  460,000,   of  
which   less   than   3%  were   Jewish   (Qumsieh,   2011,   p.   37).   The   number   of   Jewish  
inhabitants  at  the  time  was  around  15,000,  most  of  whom  lived  in  four  areas  that  
carried   religious   significance:   Jerusalem,   Hebron,   Tiberius,   and   Safad.   Their  
attachment  to  the   land  was  religious  rather  than  nationalistic   (Beinin  and  Hajjar,  
2014).  
Previous   to   this,   in   1849,   the   Ottoman   Empire   eased   its   restrictions   on  
landownership,  giving   Jewish  Europeans  a   chance   to  purchase   land.  This,   along  
with   laws   introduced   between   1858   and   1867   requiring   Palestinian   peasants   to  




land,  had  a  significant   impact  on  transferring  land  into  Jewish  ownership  (Stein,  
1984).  As  Qumsieh  explains,  
The  land  law  of  1858  was  followed  by  the  registration  law  in  1861  (Tabu)  and  
in   1867   a   law   that  made   foreign   landownership   easier.   These   changes   and  
enforcement   of   taxation   laws   bankrupted   many   villagers   and   enabled   the  
state  to  confiscate  their  lands  and  sell  them  in  public  auction  (Qumsieh,  2011,  
p.  40).  
Consequently,  the  Zionist  program  put  Palestine  under  the  threat  of  being  turned  
into   a   Jewish   state.   This   threat   was   borne   out   since,   after   the   first   wave   of  
immigration   to  Palestine,   in   the  1880s,   the   Jewish  population  rose   to  24,000,  and  
by  1914  it  had  risen  to  85,000  (Darweish  and  Rigby,  2015,  p.  11).    
Once   this   threat   became   clear   to   Palestinian   society,   its   intellectuals   (including  
Palestinian  representatives  to  the  Ottoman  Parliament)  and  farmers  united  to  face  
this   and,   in   1868,   formed   the   Syrian   Association   or  Al-­‐‑Jamiyah   Al-­‐‑Surriya,   with  
members   from   all   over   the   Levant.   Its   slogan   was   ‘Tanabahu   Istaiqithu   Ya   Arab’  
(Wake  up  and  be  alert  ye  Arabs)  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  38).  
Through  the  work  of  this  organisation  and  Palestinian  popular  resistance  against  
Jewish  settlements  and  the  policies   that  eased   land  transfer   to   Jewish  Europeans  




establishing   political   parties;   and   establishing   civil   society   organizations.   These  
were   mainly   directed   towards   preventing   further   concessions   to   Zionist  
aspirations  in  Palestine.    
Examples   of   such   actions   include   nonviolent   street   protests   in   1886   held   by   the  
people   of   Al-­‐‑Khadaira   and   Malbas   against   the   expansion   of   the   Petah   Tikva  
settlement  and  Muslim  and  Christian  petitions   to   the  Grand  Vizier,   such  as   that  
dated  24,  June  1891  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  41).  Most  notably,  in  1910,  there  was  a  call  
for  an  Arab  boycott  of  Jewish  businesses  and  goods.    
The  type  of  action  depended  on  the  class  and  profession  of  those  taking  part.  The  
public   figures   and   landowners   formed   political   parties   and   organizations   that  
were  in  direct  contact  with  the  Ottoman  rulers,  and  therefore  took  on  a  diplomatic  
role.   The   educated   middle   class   researched   the   issues,   and   wrote   articles   and  
petitions.   However,   the   peasants,   who   were   directly   affected   by   Zionist  
immigrants   and   their   settlements,   adopted   more   offensive   resistance   methods  
(Darweish  and  Rigby,  2015,  p.  12).    The  arrival  of  the  British  at  the  end  of  the  First  
World  War  initially  seemed  to  herald  an  improvement  in  the  situation.  However,  
as  discussed  in  the  next  paragraph,  circumstances  proved  more  complex.  




5.2.2  Under  the  British  Empire  1920  -­‐‑  1948…  
In   1917,   British   soldiers   made   their   way   into   Palestine   under   the   leadership   of  
General   Allenby,   commander-­‐‑in-­‐‑chief   of   the   Egyptian   expeditionary   force.   The  
Turkish  sultan,  Abd-­‐‑Elhameed,  decided  to  spare  the  city  of  Jerusalem  by  handing  
it   over   to   the   British  without   a   fight.  Moreover,   Palestinian   elites   and   religious  
leaders  welcomed   the  British   and   received   them  openly,   since   in   their   view   the  
troops  had  come  to  end  the  Turkish  occupation  of  Palestine.  Britain  however  had  
other  plans,  which  supported  its  commitment  to  establishing  a  foreign  body  in  the  
middle  of  Arab  states.    
In  hindsight,  it  is  clear  that  Britain  honoured  this  commitment,  as  reflected  by  the  
fact  that  Jews  had  become  a  third  of  the  entire  population  of  Palestine  by  the  time  
the  British  left  in  1948.  This  was  also  the  case  in  relation  to  land  ownership  since,  
by  this  time,  Jews  owned  7%  of  the  total  land,  in  comparison  to  around  2%  when  
the  British  arrived  (Middle  East  Web,  n.d.).  This  drastic  change  was  due  to  policies  
and   regulations   imposed   by   the   British,   favouring   Zionist   ambitions   while  
marginalizing  Palestinian  needs.    
Nevertheless,  the  Arabs  remained  hopeful  of  redeeming  their  alliance  with  Britain  
against   Ottoman   Empire   under   their   own   national   governance   and   autonomy.  




establishment  of  a  Jewish  State  in  Palestine,  reached  them,  they  kept  their  faith  in  
the  promise   the  British  had  made   to   them.  However,   they  became  aware  of   the  
need   to   get   organized   and   therefore   the   Muslim-­‐‑Christian   Association,   with  
branches   all   around   the   country,   was   established   to   oppose   Jewish   aspirations  
(  Darweish  and  Rigby,  2015,  p.  13).  
Yet  it  wasn’t  until  1920,  when  the  British  announced  their  desire  to  follow  through  
with  the  Balfour  Declaration,  that  the  Arabs  started  organizing  nationwide  strikes  
and   protests.   These   remained   predominantly   nonviolent,   with   examples   of  
resistance  activities  in  this  era  including  the  following  (Qumsieh,  2011):  
- The  Abd-­‐‑Elhameed,  adopted  the  Arab  national  anthem  and  the  Arab  flag  of  
revolt  in  May  1918,  despite  British  opposition.  
- Forming  nationalist  organizations  such  as  Al-­‐‑Nadi  Al-­‐‑Arabi  and  Al-­‐‑Montada  
Al-­‐‑Arabi,  also  in  1918.  
- Local   Muslim   and   Christian   societies   united   and   collaborated   under   the  
same  by-­‐‑laws  in  1919,  centralizing  their  efforts  in  protecting  individual  and  
national   rights,   calling   for   youth   education   and   national   development   in  
different  areas.    
- When  Palestinians  were  prevented   from  attending   the  Syrian  Congress   in  





- Several   publications   appeared   expressing   the   desire   for   Arab   unity   and  
independence.   These   included:   Surya   Al-­‐‑Janubiya   (Southern   Syria);  Mir’at  
Al-­‐‑Sharq  (the  Mirror  of  the  East);  and  Bait  Al-­‐‑Maqdes  (Jerusalem).    
- When  the  British  expressed  their  plans  for  a  mandate  to  the  Palestinians  in  
February   1920,   a   demonstration   was   held   in   Jerusalem.   This   sparked  
further   demonstrations   in   all   Palestinian   cities   on   the   11th   of  March   1920,  
starting   two   years   of   unrest,   protests,   petitions,   nationalist   festivals   and  
demonstrations.  
- The  appointment  of   the  hard-­‐‑line   Jewish  sympathizer,  Herbert  Samuel,   in  
June  1920  as  the  face  of  the  British  Civil  Administration  sparked  immediate  
protests,   boycotts,   strikes,   petitions,   and   mass   resignations   from  
government  posts.  
- On   18,   March,   1921,   while   Churchill   was   giving   a   speech   that   openly  
insulted  the  Palestinians,  a  day  of  general  strike  was  called  for  in  Palestine.  
- In  May  1921,  angry  demonstrations  protesting  Churchill’s  visit  to  Palestine  
prevailed   in   all   cities.   Around   20,000  Gazans   flocked   to  meet   Churchill’s  
train.  
  
At   times,   the   British   adopted   a   violent   approach   in   dealing   with   Palestinian  
nonviolent  resistance.  In  each  of  the  active  public  protests  in  the  examples  above,  





5.2.3  The  great  revolt  of  1936…  
By   April   1936,   the   situation   had   become   intolerable   for   the   Palestinians.   The  
deteriorated   economic   situation,   along   with   the   rapid   growth   of   the   Zionist  
movement   and   the   British   laws   that   led   to   the   drastic   increase   of   Jewish   land  
ownership,  paved  the  way  for  revolt.  
The  precise   incident   that   actually   instigated   the   revolt   remains   contested.  While  
activists  in  Nablus  issued  a  call  for  a  general  strike  throughout  the  country  on  13,  
November,  1935,   it  seems  that   it  was  a  meeting  of  key  Palestinian  leaders  on  20,  
April,  1936,  that  gave  the  call  that  actually  initiated  an  open-­‐‑ended  general  strike.  
This  was  inspired  by  the  45  day  Syrian  strike  that  led  the  French  to  cede  to  their  
demands  in  February,  1936.  Various  political  factions  supported  this  call  to  strike  
and  agreed   to   a  policy  of  non-­‐‑cooperation  and   civil   resistance.  To   facilitate   this,  
the   Arab   Higher   Committee   was   formed   on   25,   April,   1936,.   This   committee  
became  the  umbrella  organisation  for  all  the  different  political  factions  in  Palestine.  
Over  the  next  few  weeks,  angry  demonstrations  broke  out  in  different  cities,  some  
of  them  ended  with  Palestinians  being  shot,  and  others  with  Zionists  being  killed.  





A  conference  of  the  national  committees  met  in  Jerusalem  the  following  day  
and  declared   that,   from  May  15,  onwards,  people   should  stop  paying   taxes  
unless   their  demands  were  met.  National  committees  were  formed  in  many  
cities  to  promote  the  strike  and  develop  other  types  of  nonviolent  resistance  
and  service  committees.  
The   nonviolent   forms   of   resistance   employed   in   this   revolt   included  
demonstrations,   boycotts,   economic   sabotage,   tax   revolts   and   other   acts   of   civil  
disobedience.   The   British   authorities   responded   violently,   killing,   detaining,  
expelling   and   executing   protesters,   and   demolishing   hundreds   of   homes.  
However,   the   revolt  was   successful   in  making   the  British   realize   the   resentment  
towards   their   policies,   and   that   Palestinians  were   not  willing   to   give   in   to   their  
Zionist   plans.   At   this   point,   the   British   had   to   bring   reinforcements   in   from  
Cyprus,   Egypt,   to   help   deal  with   nearly   ten   disturbances   every   day   for   several  
months.  Eventually,   they  asked  their  Arab  friends  in  the  Middle  East  to  mediate  
the  end  of  the  revolt  in  return  for  vaguely  promising  to  look  into  their  demands.  
Consequently,  the  1936  revolt  ended  under  Arab  influence  and  in  response  to  the  
request  of  the  Arab,  King  Faisal  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  87).  While  this  study’s  focus  is  
on  the  nonviolent  nature  of  Palestinian  resistance,   it  must  be  noted  that  the  1936  
revolt  was  not  entirely  nonviolent.   In   fact,  after   the   initial   six  months,   resistance  




extent  that  its  targets  became  those  Arabs  who  were  not  loyal  to  ‘the  cause’  (Rigby,  
2010).  
5.3  The  First  Palestinian  Intifada  (1987-­‐‑1993)  
Over   the   20   years   following   Israel’s   occupation   of   the   West   Bank,   Palestinian  
positions  on  how  to  deal  with  Israel  varied.  These  variations  resulted  from  the  fact  
that  Israel  had  become  part  of  their  reality;  and  had  been  so  for  decades.  Also,  for  
many   reasons,   Palestinian   hope   for   anything   more   positive   was   diminishing.  
Among   those   reasons   was   their   diminishing   faith   in   the   Arabs,   and   their  
misplaced  expectations  of  the  United  Nations  and  international  law.  All  of  which  
undermined  the  myth  they  had  relied  on  that  liberation  is  to  be  waited  on  to  come  
from   outside.   This   led   the   Palestinians   to   turn   to   self-­‐‑reliance   within   the  West  
Bank  and  Gaza  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  134);  and  to  a  significant  understanding  of  the  
mechanisms   involved   in   maintaining   colonial   powers,   as   explained   by   Abu-­‐‑
Lughod  (1990,  p.  7):  
The  Intifada  and  its  leadership  understood  the  fundamental  law  applicable  to  
the  achievement  of  independence  in  colonial  situations:  a  colonial  system  can  
be   defended   and  maintained   successfully   as   long   as   the   benefits   a   colonial  




In  her   book,   ‘A  Quiet  Revolution:  The  First   Palestinian   Intifada   and  Nonviolent  
Resistance’,   Mary   Elizabeth   King   explains   the   changes   and   differences   in  
Palestinian  perceptions  and  strategies   that   led   to   the   first   Intifada.  She  describes  
how  the  Unified  National  Leadership  Command  came  to  surface  as  the  leadership  
of   the   Intifada   on   the   ground   (King,   2007,   p.   205).   The   different   positions   and  
opinions   were   manifested   in   the   strategies   suggested   by   the   many   leaders   of  
Palestinian   society.   The   most   visible   division   among   the   Palestinian   leadership  
was   that   between   the   external   leadership   (the   PLO)   and   the   internal   leadership  
(the  Unified  National   Leadership  Command)   in   the  West   Bank   and  Gaza   Strip.  
King   explains   the   emerging   conflict   between   those   in   favour   of   an   exclusively  
nonviolent   uprising   within   the   Command   and   with   the   PLO,   with   the   latter  
favouring  more  violent  forms  of  protest:      
The   combining   of  military   and   nonviolent  methods   of   struggle,   the   theory  
advocated  by  Palestinian   theorists  as  “all  means  of   struggle”,  was   the  main  
area   of   conflict  within   the  Command   and   the   issue   that   eventually   became  
the   most   conspicuous   disagreement   between   Palestinians   in   the   territories  
and  the  PLO  in  Tunis  (Daoud  Kuttab’s  private  papers,  cited  in  King,  2007,  p.  
211).  
Leaflets  were  distributed  by  the  Unified  National  Leadership  Command  on  a  bi-­‐‑




King   explains,   the   conflicting   positions   on   the   adoption   of   a   solely   nonviolent  
struggle  were  reflected  in  these  leaflets:  
Paragraphs  coexist  in  the  same  leaflet  calling  for  knives  or  Molotov  cocktails  
alongside  others   calling  explicitly   for  nonviolent  means.   Such   combinations  
reflect   a   compromise   between   those   on   the   Command   who   wanted   a  
reversion   to   violence   and   those   who   wanted   adherence   to   nonviolent  
strategies  (King,  2007,  p.  210).  
In  what  seems  rather  contradictory  terms,  even  Abu-­‐‑Lughod  (1990,  p.  10)  refers  to  
the   Intifada   as   having   “expressed   itself   in   extremely   militant   but   not   violent  
means”.  
According   to  King,   a   specific   incident  where   four  Palestinians  were  killed   at   an  
Israeli  checkpoint  on  the  9th  of  December  1987  ignited  the  Intifada,  although  it  had  
been   in   the  making   for   generations   (King,   2007,   p.   1).   However,   like   the   Great  
Revolt  of  1936,  the  particular  incident  that  started  this  seemingly  spontaneous  and  
indigenous  uprising  remains  contested.  Qumsieh  refers  to  an  incident  on  the  8th  of  
December   1987,   where   an   Israeli   truck   ploughed   through   two   cars   carrying  
Palestinian  workers  killing   four  and  wounding   five,   as  another  possible   starting  
point  for  the  intifada.  However,  what  is  not  contested  is  that  whatever  incident  it  




previous  years  that  led  to  the  intifada  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  136).  Abu-­‐‑Lughod  views  
that  decisive   landscape   as   far  back   as  when  British   soldiers   entered  Palestine   in  
1917,  when  he  states:  
Whether  the  intifada  was  initiated  on  December  7,  8,  or  9,  1987,  may  not  be  
that  significant;  what  is  significant,  at  substantive  and  symbolic  levels,  is  that  
the   outbreak   occurred   exactly   seventy   years   after   Palestine   was   militarily  
occupied  by  the  British  forces  (Abu-­‐‑Lughod,  1990,  p.  7).  
Abu-­‐‑Lughod  (1990,  p.  10)  further  explains  that  “[t]he  Intifada  is  essentially  about  
the  right  of  the  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  to  determine  their  destiny.  
The  exercise  of  that  right  would  entail  the  termination  of  Israel’s  occupation  of  the  
West  Bank  and  Gaza”.    
When   discussing   the   Intifada’s   aims,   King   refers   to   a   list   of   demands   that  was  
released  by  Palestinian  intellectuals  that  became  the  blueprint  of  the  first  Intifada:  
A  list  of  demands  was  released,  grouped  into  fourteen  clauses,  and  presented  
by  Palestinians  from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  document  has  come  to  be  
known   as   the   Fourteen  Points   by  Palestinian  Personalities.  …  The   fourteen  
demands  speak  to  issues  of  military  occupation,  such  as  the  need  to  abide  by  




prisoners,  imprisonment,  actions  by  Israeli  settlers  and  soldiers,  and  rights  of  
political  freedom  (King,  2007,  p.  193).  
Many   scholars   mention   and   explore   the   nonviolent   nature   of   the   first   intifada  
along  with  its  tactics  and  methods.  King  also  explores  its  relationship  with  Gene  
Sharp  and  how  he  influenced  the  first  Intifada’s  strategists  who  in  turn  translated  
his   theories   into   practice   (King,   2007,   p.   153).   General   strikes,   demonstrations,  
media  outreach  through  leaflets,  graffiti,  and  popular  committees  were  among  the  
many  nonviolent  actions  carried  out  and  thoroughly  discussed  by  scholars  during  
the   first   intifada.   The   most   violent   aspects   of   the   first   intifada   were   throwing  
stones   and   Molotov   cocktails   at   Israeli   soldiers.   However,   to   provide   specific  
evidence   of   its   nonviolent   nature,  Mary  King   reports   that   only   12   Israelis  were  
killed  over  the  five-­‐‑year  life  of  the  first  Intifada.      
  5.4  Post  Oslo  Peace  Accords  to  the  Second  Intifada    (1993-­‐‑2000)  
Popular   struggle   in   this   era  was   at   its   lowest.  However,   it   is  worth  mentioning  
that  this  was  the  direct  result  of  the  first  Intifada,  which  had  set  the  negotiation  of  
a  peace  settlement  with  Israel  as   its  main  strategy  towards  achieving  Palestinian  
independence;   and   it   was   successful   in   doing   so.   Therefore,   the   grand   strategy  
that   Palestinians   adopted   during   this   period   was   nonviolent   and   popular  




condition  that  the  new  PNA  was  to  abide  by,  stating  that,  in  the  PNA,  “[t]he  Oslo  
Accords   created   an   authority   expected   to   put   down   resistance   and   the   national  
struggle  became  complicated”  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  165).  Regardless  of  the  results  of  
the   actual   negotiations,   one   can   argue   that   the   nonviolent   nature   of   the   first  
Intifada   was   successful   enough   to   have   forced   Israel   into   negotiating   with   the  
Palestinians,  leveraging  the  occupied  to  sit  at  the  table  with  the  occupier  as  equal  
parties.    
5.5  The  Second  Intifada  (2000  –  2005)  
On   the   other   hand,   the   second   Intifada   was   known   to   have   involved   much  
violence  from  both  the  Israeli  and  Palestinian  sides.  As  Bröning  explains,  
during   the   first   month   of   the   second   Intifada,   the   Israeli   army   fired  
approximately  1.3  million  bullets  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  despite  the  fact  
that  at  this  stage  Palestinians  had  refrained  from  using  firearms  and  suicide  
attacks.   This   policy   reportedly   had   the   explicit   aim   of   ‘fanning   the   flames’  
and   of   transforming   the   demonstrations   into   a   confrontation   that   could   be  
dealt  with  militarily  rather  than  politically  (Bröning,  2011,  p.  135).  
Like   the   Great   Revolt   of   1936   and   the   first   Intifada,   the   second   Intifada   was  
preceded   by   years   of   resentment   that   lurked   behind   the   specific   incident   that  




about   the   incident   that   ignited   it:  Ariel   Sharon’s   provocative   visit   to   ‘Al-­‐‑Haram  
Al-­‐‑Sharif’,  the  holiest  Muslim  site  in  Jerusalem,  on  28,  September  2000  (Qumsieh,  
2011,  p.  169).  
It   is   not   this   study’s   focus   to   explain   why   the   second   Intifada   was   violent.  
However,  in  the  midst  of  its  violence,  much  nonviolent  action  against  occupation  
emerged.  Eventually,  violent  resistance  faded  away,  leaving  the  negotiating  field  
almost   entirely   to   popular   struggle   and   alternative   forms   of   resistance.   More  
importantly,  popular  resistance  once  again  became  systematic;  its  own  leadership  
emerged   and   it   involved   other   nationalities   besides   Palestinians.   This   was   the  
International  Solidarity  Movement  (ISM).    
Bröning   explains   the   shift   in   Palestinian   policy   in   the   second   half   of   the   last  
decade,  where  nonviolent  resistance  became  more  institutionalized  in  all  political  
parties’   programs.   He   states   that   “it   is   not   argued   that   the   tactics   of   NVR  
[nonviolent  resistance]  per  se  have  fundamentally  changed;  they  have  not.  Rather,  
it  is  shown  that  the  political  adaptation  of  NVR  has  developed  in  terms  of  political  
inclusiveness”   (Bröning,   2011,   p.   132).   In   relation   to   the   Palestinian   government  
and  nonviolent  resistance,  he  states:  
For   Prime  Minister   Fayyad,   the   13th  Government   Plan   ‘Palestine   –   Ending  




Incorporating   the   concept   of   sumoud   and   traditional   community-­‐‑building  
elements   of   NVR   implemented   even   before   the   first   Intifada,   preparing  
Palestinians   for   statehood   is   considered   the   constructive   counterpart   to  
rejecting   occupation.   Thus,   on   25   April   2010   the   Palestinian   Cabinet  
stipulated   that   ‘peaceful   resistance   and   state-­‐‑building   efforts   are   parallel  
tracks’  (Bröning,  2011,  p.  144).  
Furthermore,   many   activities   during   the   second   intifada   resemble   Palestinian  
nonviolent  resistance  today,  as  listed  by  Bröning  (2011,  p.  139),  also,  lists  activities  
during  the  second  intifada  that  resemble  Palestinian  nonviolent  resistance  today:    
1) The  Stop  the  Wall  Campaign  
1) Initiatives  to  break  Israel’s  blockade  on  Gaza.  
2) The  Boycott,  Divestment,  Sanctions  movement.    
3) The  PNA  nonviolent  resistance  efforts.  
  
Before  discussing   these   four  categories   in  depth,   the   ISM,  which  had  become  an  
integral   partner   and   main   actor   in   all   these   nonviolent   campaigns,   must   be  
introduced  more  fully.  
The  International  Solidarity  Movement  
According  to  their  website,  the  ISM  is:  “a  Palestinian-­‐‑led  movement  of  Palestinian  




Palestinian  freedom  and  an  end  to  occupation.  We  utilize  nonviolent  direct  action  
methods  of  resistance  to  confront  and  challenge   illegal   Israeli  occupation  forces”  
(Sandercock,  2004  ,  p.  20).  
The  organisation  was  established  in  early  2001   in  response  to   the  collapse  of   the  
Oslo   peace   process   to   support   the   launch   of   the   second  Palestinian   Intifada.   By  
this  point,   it  had  become  clear   to  Palestinians  and   their   international   supporters  
that  official  efforts  made  by  the  Palestinian  leadership  to  involve  the  international  
community  to  intervene  and  stop  Israel’s  aggression  were  futile.  Most  notably,  the  
PLO’s   request   to   the   United   Nations   to   open   an   immediate   investigation   and  
protect  Palestinian  civilians  from  Israeli  military  attacks  was  met  with  Israeli  and  
US  opposition  (Seitz,  2003).  
However,   the   continued   absence   of   international   intervention   made   room   for  
transnational   civil   society   to   step   in   by   sending   delegations   of   international  
volunteers   (Dudouet,   2006).   From   the   ISM’s   perspective,   it   was   clear   that   the  
Israelis  would  give  more  value  to  internationals’  human  rights  than  they  would  to  
Palestinians’.  Therefore,  since  Palestinians  were  unable  to  face  Israeli  injustices  on  
their  own,  having  international  volunteers  stand  beside  them  would  give  weight  
to   their  protest   and  highlight   their  demands,  while   adding  a  major   challenge   to  
the  Israeli  army.    The  ISM  maintains  this  approach  in  the  present  day,  as  stated  on  




We   recognize   that   as   internationals   working   under   Israeli   apartheid   our  
position   is  privileged.  We  have  rights   that  are  denied  to  Palestinians.  When  
we  are  arrested  we  are  taken  to  a  police  station  and  have  the  right  to  a  lawyer.  
When  Palestinians   are   arrested   they   are   taken   to  military  bases  where   they  
face  indefinite  detention  without  a  lawyer  or  fair  trial.  ISM  uses  the  privileges  
of   internationals   to   support   Palestinian   popular   resistance.”   (International  
Solidarity  Movement,  2015)  
In   explaining   the   origins   of   the   ISM,  Qumsieh   traces   its   founding   back   to   long  
before   it  was  officially  announced.  He   relates   its  beginnings   to  when   the  Centre  
for  Rapprochement  between  People  (PCR)  involved  internationals  during  the  first  
Intifada  in  1989.  He  further  explains  that  
[the   founders   of   ISM]   were   involved   in   neighborhood   committees   which  
mobilized   to   cope  with   life   under   siege   and   to   engage   directly   in   popular  
resistance  through  community  organizing  efforts  under  Israeli  occupation…  
PCR   took   a   leading   role   in   peaceful   resistance   and   set   up   a   peace   camp   to  
protest  against  the  construction  of  Har  Homa  settlement  in  the  Abu-­‐‑Ghneim  
area   in   1994-­‐‑97.   One   peace   camp,   which   housed   Palestinians   and  
Internationals,   remained   on   the   hill   for   four   months,   24   hours   a   day”  




Qumsieh  describes  how  the  ISM  was  born  in  2001,  through  the  efforts  of  Ghassan  
Andoni,   Neta   Golan,   and   Luisa   Morgantini,   when   the   PCR   organized   many  
demonstrations   involving   internationals   that   were   inspired   by   the   international  
involvement  of  1989  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  172).  
Since  2002,  the  ISM  has  managed  to  maintain  a  continuous  presence  in  a  number  
of  Palestinian  villages,  where  it  has  stood  in  solidarity  with  the  village  inhabitants  
against  the  specific  Israeli  injustices  they  face;  the  most  notable  of  these  was,  and  
is,   the   Israeli   Separation   Wall.      In   fact,   it   has   become   quite   normal   to   find  
volunteers  from  the  ISM  next  to  Palestinians  in  any  nonviolent  action.  For  instance,  
even   when   President   Arafat   was   besieged   at   his   presidential   compound   in  
Ramallah,   forty   volunteers   from   the   ISM   remained   with   him   throughout   his  
confinement  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  174).  
However,   certain   criticisms  are   sometimes   aimed  at   the   ISM.  Of   these,  Koensler  
and  Papa  (cited  in  Parry,  2010)  discuss  the  following  two:  
1) At   times,   participating   in   solidarity   activities   has   become   a   goal   in   itself,  
eclipsing   the   actual   Palestinian   cause;   even   though,   in   some   cases,   the  
activity   itself   is  not  of  use   to   the  Palestinian  residents,  nor  appreciated  by  
them.   For   example,   graffiti   by   one   of   the   British   street   artists   –   Banksy   –  




soldier   checking   a   donkey’s   ID   card.   Some   Palestinians   felt   this   was  
insulting  and  painted  over  the  graffiti.  Nevertheless,  Banksy  contributed  to  
raising  awareness  about  the  wall,  saying  that  ‘Palestine  is  now  the  biggest  
open-­‐‑air  prison  of   the  world’,  and  referring   to   the  barrier  as   ‘the  ultimate  
activity-­‐‑holiday  destination  for  graffiti  artists’.  
Another   example  of   this   shortcoming   is   the   ‘Peace  March’   in  2007,  which  
sought   to   dig   a   well   for   Palestinian   Bedwins   residing   in   the   Negev.   The  
participants,   who   included   Israeli   and   international   activists   but   no  
Palestinians,  ended  up  dancing  and  ‘having  a  good  time’  before  digging  the  
well  two  km  away  from  the  Bedwins’  homestead.  Consequently,  the  Bedwins  
later  found  it  easier  to  purchase  water  from  a  nearby  Israeli  settlement.    
  
2) ISM   members   tend   to   represent   the   Palestinian   people   in   international  
arenas   based   on   limited   involvement   and   understanding   of   the   complex  
situation.   To   illustrate   this,  Koensler   and  Papa   refer   to   an   interview   they  
conducted  with  an  ISM  member  who  spent  two  weeks   in  Hebron,  having  
never  heard  of  Hebron  before  her  visit:  
  
Thus   we   have   a   situation   in   which   an   activist   is   making   claims   in  
international  new-­‐‑media   forums  about   social   justice   in   the  name  of   a  




is  discussing  for  only  a  couple  of  weeks.”  (Koensler  and  Papa,  quoted  
in  Parry,  2010,  p.  14)  
  




5.6  Response  to  the  Separation  Wall  
As   a   response   to   Israel’s   Separation   Wall,   the   ‘Stop   the   Wall’   campaign   was  
launched  by  the  Palestinian  NGO  Network  (PNGO)  in  October  2002.  This  gave  a  
great   boost   to   the   Palestinian   struggle   against   the  wall   (Qumsieh,   2011,   p.   177).  
Qumsieh   gives  many   examples   of   the   ‘Stop   the  Wall’   campaign’s   activities   but  
singles  out  the  systematic  approach  that  first  emerged  in  the  village  of  Budrus  as  
particularly  significant.  Budrus,  with  a  population  of  1400,  launched  what  would  
become   its  weekly   demonstrations   on   9,  November   2003.   These   demonstrations  
were  carried  out  by  the  local  villagers  with  the  participation  of  the  ISM.  The  PNA  
was   almost   entirely   absent   not   only   from   the   planning   of   the   activity   but   even  
from  participation  in  it,  causing  frustration  for  the  villagers  and  emphasizing  their  
need  to  take  action  on  their  own  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  178).  
There  was   also   international   condemnation   of   the  wall   exemplified  when,   on   9,  
July  2004,  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)  issued  an  advisory  opinion  that  
deemed  Israel’s  construction  of  the  wall  illegal.  The  decision  states  that  
Israel  is  under  an  obligation  to  terminate  its  breaches  of  international  law;  it  
is  under  an  obligation  to  cease  forthwith  the  works  of  construction  of  the  wall  
being   built   in   the  Occupied   Palestinian   Territory,   including   in   and   around  




repeal   or   render   ineffective   forthwith   all   legislative   and   regulatory   acts  
relating  thereto.”  (International  Court  of  Justice,  2004)  
Not  only  did  the  ICJ’s  decision  deem  the  Israeli  wall  illegal,  it  went  beyond  that  to  
label   the   Israeli   settlements   and   their   activity   on   the  West   Bank   as   illegal.   This  
decision   reflected   the   legal   basis   that   inspired  Palestinian   (and   ISM)   campaigns.  
And  it  became  a  reference  that  remains  central  to  their  argument  against  both  the  
wall  and   the  occupation.  The  PNA  however   failed   to  capitalize  on   this  decision,  
which   again   left   it   to   the   civil   society   to   begin   organizing   campaigns   involving  
boycotts,  divestments  and  sanctions  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  181).  
In  respect  to  the  origins  of  the  Separation  Wall,  Palestinians  argue  that  it  was  built  
not  for  security  reasons  as  Israel  claims,  nor  do  they  consider  it  contrary  to  Israel’s  
overall  policy.  Rather,  they  view  it  as  another  tactic  within  the  same  strategy  that  
was  set  forward  even  before  the  establishment  of  the  state  of  Israel  in  1948:  to  grab  
and  annex  as  much  land  as  possible.    
To   understand   this   argument,   it   is   important   to   realise   that,   while   the   wall   is  
currently  measured  at  711km  long  and  is  built  within  the  1967  armistice  line,  it  is  
in   fact   double   this   length   since   it   swerves   into   the   West   Bank   so   as   to   annex  
around  47%  of  its  agricultural  land  for  the  benefit  of  Israeli  settlements.  With  this  
land,  it  also  captures  the  water  resources  that  local  Palestinians  depend  on  (PLO  




Four  conditions  must  be  met  for  a  colonial  or  settler  immigrant  society  to  survive  
(Usher,  2005):  
1) They   must   obtain   a   measure   of   political,   military,   and   economic  
independence  from  their  metropolitan  sponsors.    
2) They  must   achieve   military   hegemony   over,   or   at   least   normal   relations  
with,  their  neighbouring  states.  
3) They  must  acquire  international  legitimacy.    
4) They  must  solve  their  “Native  Problem”.  
  
While   Israel   has   been   overwhelmingly   successful   in   meeting   the   first   three  
conditions,  it  has  not  solved  its  native  problem  involved  in  attempting  to  fulfil  the  
Zionist  dream  of  having  an  exclusively  Jewish  state.  Although  it  had  achieved  this  
in  1948,  it  ironically  let  go  of  that  condition  when  it  took  and  maintained  control  
of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  in  1967.  However,  while  the  ethnic  cleansing  of  
Palestinians   in   1948  was   successful,   Palestinians   did   not   flee   their   homes   in   the  
West   Bank.   Ever   since   then,   Israel   has   not   decided   on   whether   to   settle   on   a  
demographic  solution  by  letting  go  of  land  inhabited  by  the  Palestinians  (that  is,  
the   West   Bank   and   Gaza),   or   to   settle   for   territorial   gain   by   upholding   its  
occupation   of   the   1967   area.   As   a   result,   Israel   has   settled   for   something   in  




maintaining   control   over   the   West   Bank   and   expanding   its   settlement   project  
(Usher,  2005).  
Popular  Struggle  against  the  wall…  
It   became   customary   for   villages   affected   by   the   wall   to   hold   weekly  
demonstrations   after   Friday   prayers.   In   the   case   of   Bili’n   these   weekly  
demonstrations   have   been   held   since   2005   till   the   present   day   (2015).   Many  
scholars   have   been   attracted   to   such   systematic   popular   resistance,   and   have  
analysed  their  different  characteristics.  
Of  these  scholars,  Maia  Carter  Hallward  (2009,  p.  541)  is  of  particular  interest  for  
her  paper,  “Creative  responses  to  separation:  Israeli  and  Palestinian  Joint  activism  
in  Bil’in”.  Here,  Carter  explains  that  the  Bil’in  struggle  against  the  Separation  Wall  
draws  special  interest  due  to  the  length  of  its  sustained  nonviolent  approach.  It  is  
an  example  of  joint  Israeli-­‐‑Palestinian  activism  against  occupation  at  a  time  when  
the  “no  partner”  narrative  dominates  the  Palestinian  and  Israeli  perceptions.  Joint  
efforts  at  such  times,  especially  after  the  outbreak  of  the  second  Intifada,  have  put  
people   at   risk   of   being   labelled   as   traitors.   Differences   are   clear   in   that,   for  
Palestinians,   there   is   a   strong   anti-­‐‑normalization   rhetoric,   whereas   for   Israeli  
activists,  government  imposed  physical  and  legal  barriers  are  prominent.    
Against   this   background  and  with   the  help  of   international   and   Israeli   activists,  




the  route  of  the  Separation  Wall  through  Bil’in  should  be  changed  (The  Associated  
Press,  2007,  referenced  in  Carter  Hallward,  2009).  
Thus,  despite   its  oppressive  nature,   the  Separation  Wall  provides  a   focus  for   the  
Palestinian  struggle.   In  a  simple  and  concrete  manner,   it   represents   the  complex  
Israeli   system   that   enforces   separation.  As  Carter  Hallward   (2009,  p.   543)   states,  
“[i]n   the   case   of   Israel/Palestine,   identity   classifications,   checkpoints,   and   the  
separation  barrier  demonstrate  the  interaction  between  geographic,  political,  and  
social  identities.”  
Palestinian,   Israeli,   and   international   demonstrators   seek   to   counteract   these  
territorial   tendencies;   for   instance,   Israelis  and   internationals  bypass  checkpoints  
specifically  set  up  to  keep  them  from  reaching  the  Palestinian  demonstrators.    For  
their  part,  the  Palestinians  seek  to  humanize  the  struggle  and  move  it  away  from  
its   territorial   tendency.   Thus,   the   different   cultural   positions   of   the   various  
demonstrators   create   different   approaches,   as   Carter   Hallward   (2009,   p.   547)  
explains:   "ʺTactical   and   strategic  differences   in   the  use  of  nonviolence   stem   from  
different   degrees   of   access   to   formal   structures   and   institutions   of   power,  
sociocultural  dynamics,  and  political  objectives"ʺ.  
Moreover,  both  Palestinian  and  Israeli  demonstrators  are  now  concerned  to  shift  
the  perception  of  the  Palestinian  resistance  movement  from  a  form  of  terrorism  to  




done  by  carefully  selecting  slogans  and  demonstration  themes  that  aim  to  ensure  
that  their  legitimacy  is  not  only  apparent  to  those  directly  involved  in  the  conflict  
or   concerned   politicians,   but   also   to   the   wider   international   audience   that   has  
wide  variety  of  experiences  and  perceptions.    
While  Israeli  and  Palestinian  activists  differ  on  what  the  ultimate  just  resolution  to  
the  conflict  is,  they  normally  focus  on  the  abuses  of  occupation  over  which  there  is  
no   contention,   such   as   the   separation  barrier'ʹs   route,   specific   checkpoints,   home  
demolitions  etc..  
To  return  to   the  example  of  Bil’in,  between  2005  and  2009,   the  village  witnessed  
acts   of   nonviolent   struggle   for   135   consecutive   weeks.   While   many   activities  
chosen  by  the  activists  are  similar  to  those  carried  out  throughout  the  West  Bank,  
Bil'ʹin  activists  were  innovative  in  their  nonviolent  actions  in  a  way  that  made  clear  
the  legitimacy  of  their  cause  not  only  to  those  following  their  media  coverage,  but  
also   to   the   soldiers   standing   in   front   of   them.   Such   actions   were   intended   to  
highlight  the  root  causes  behind  the  demonstrations:    
Activists   seek   to  move  beyond   the   impersonal  and  displacing   tendencies  of  
the   official   narrative   to   visually   depict   not   just   the   confrontation   that   can  
sometimes   occur   between   soldiers   and  protestors,   but   rather   the   reason   for  




By   protesting   together,   Israelis   and   Palestinians   continue   to   challenge   the  
traditional   ‘us   and   them’   boundaries.  On   a   practical   level,   this   is   justified   since  
soldiers   admit   that   they   are   constrained   in   using   force   against   activists   when  
Israelis  are  present  among  them.  At  a  more  symbolic  level,  this  cooperation  shows  
that   the   type   of   partnership  within  which  normal   relations   can   occur  do   in   fact  
exist.  Moreover,  joint  struggle  also  undermines  the  moral  authority  of  state  actions  
and   may   alter   soldiers'ʹ   interpretation   of   orders,   as   well   as   attracting   media  
coverage  in  Palestinian,  Israeli,  and  international  circles.  This,  in  itself,  challenges  
existing   perceptions   of   the   nature,   reasons,   and   goals   of   the   struggle   and  
Palestinian  resistance.    
5.7  On  Israel’s  response  to  Palestinian  nonviolent  popular  struggle  
This   section   looks   briefly   at   the   rationale   behind   Israel’s   response   and   its  
effectiveness   in   dealing  with   nonviolent   resistance.  One   of   the   crucial   factors   is  
Israel’s   ability   to   maintain   credibility   despite   its   illegal   occupation   is   its  
democratic   status.   Consequently,   certain   assumptions   are   made   that   constrain  
Israel  when  dealing  with  nonviolent  action.  As  Dana  (2011,  p.  11)  explains:    
In  a  region  of  authoritarian  dictatorships,  the  logic  goes,  Israel’s  maintenance  
of  a  liberal  democracy  gives  it  wiggle  room  in  dealing  with  difficult  security  




emptive  war.  Nonviolence  is  cracking  away  at  Israel’s  exceptional  position  by  
demonstrating  the  power  that  nonviolence  has  in  situations  of  oppression”.  
As   the   quote   above   indicates,   this   situation   gives   nonviolent   activists   a   clear  
target:   to   undermine   Israel’s   image   as   a   democracy.      Their   activities   aimed   at  
doing  this  include  the  following:  
1) The  July  2011  arrival  of  European  activists  at  Ben  Gurion  Airport  with  the  
intention  of   traveling   to   the  occupied  West  Bank.  The  activists  wanted   to  
challenge   Israeli   sovereignty   over   the  West   Bank   by   demonstrating   their  
inability   to  openly   travel   there.   Israel’s   reaction  was   to  detain  and  deport  
the  activists.  
  
2) The  march   towards  and   the   infiltration  of   Israeli  borders  surrounding   the  
Golan  Heights  on  15,  March  2011  to  mark  the  Nakba’s  anniversary.  In  this  
case,   Israel   shot   and   killed   23   unarmed   demonstrators   and   wounded  
hundreds.    
  
3) A  second  attempt  to  bring  a  flotilla  of  ships  to  break  the  Gaza  blockade  that  
took   place   one   year   after   the   deadly   Israeli   interception   of   the   Mavi  
Marmara   and   its   accompanying   ships   in   2010.   In   this   case,   Israel  




Greece.   The   only   one   to   arrive   was   a   French   vessel   called   “La   Dignité”,  
which  carried  16  passengers.  Israel  sent  ten  warships  with  over  150  soldiers  
to  detain  and  deport  the  activists.  Following  this,  “[t]riumph  filled  the  air  in  
Telaviv   and   Jerusalem   over   avoidance   of   the   violence   such   as   last   year’s  
flotilla  met”  (Dana,  2011,  p.  10).  
  
4) The  activities  of  the  BDS  movement  coupled  with  its  ability  to  gain  traction  
in   highlighting   the   economic   integration   that   the   occupied   Palestinian  
territories   represent   to   Israel.   As   a   result,   the   Knesset   passed   a   bill  
criminalizing  Israeli  citizens  who  call  for  or  participate  in  boycotts  of  Israeli  
or  settlement  products.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  consequent  bad  publicity  and  
damage   to   Israeli   democracy,   Israeli   legislators’   panic   and   fear   of   such  
nonviolent   action   was   so   great   it   led   them   to   pass   such   anti-­‐‑free   speech  
legislation.    
  
These   examples   illustrate   how,   in   Dana’s   (2011,   p.   10)   words,   “Israel’s   recent  
reactions   to   Palestinian   nonviolence,   both   locally   and   internationally,   reflect   its  
problem:  maintaining  an  ethnic  democratic  state  battling  nonviolent  resistance  to  
its  colonial  management  of  the  territories.”  
In   response,   there  was   significant   protest   from  within   Israel   and,   in   December,  




published  by  the  Huffington  Post  on  Oct  28th  2009,  entitled:  “It  will  take  more  than  
a   wall   to   silence   us”.   In   this   he   calls   for   the   release   of   Palestinian   nonviolent  
activists  who  have  been  held  in  Israeli  detention.    
Despite  this,  in  2010,  40  anti-­‐‑wall  activists  had  been  sitting  in  Israeli  prisons  over  
the   course   of   the   previous   six  months;   and   a   further   34   Bil’in   activists,   and   94  
Ni’lin   activists   had   been   detained   over   the   previous   18-­‐‑month   period.   These  
activists  had  been  among   those  participating   in   the  weekly  nonviolent   activities  
and  protests  against  the  Israeli  wall.  The  detainees  had  not  been  sent  to  trial  and  
so  were  serving  ‘administrative  detention’.  Jamal  Jum’a  was  among  these  and  was  
released  on  13,  January,  2010,  as  a  result  of  international  and  diplomatic  pressure  
that  made   it   extremely   uncomfortable   for   Israel   to  maintain   his   detention.   This  
was   not   the   case  with   the   remaining   detainees  who  were   less   known   to   policy  
makers,   or   to   international   and   Israeli   activists.   Such   targeted   arrests   however  
prove   that   the   weekly   protests   and   nonviolent   activity   against   the   wall   and  
occupation  were  growing  disturbingly  effective.    
Thus,   it   is   clear   that   Israel  has  been   trying   to  undermine,   fragment,  and  destroy  
this  kind  of  mass  popular  struggle.  And  arresting  leaders  can  be  added  to  Israel’s  
already   existing   tactics   that   include   the   use   of   tear   gas,   sound   bombs,   rubber-­‐‑
coated   and   live   bullets,   night   time   raids,   curfews,   closures,   mass   arrests,   and  





Ever  since  the  foundations  of  the  state  of  Israel  were  first  being  laid,  Palestinians  
adopted   nonviolent   strategies   that   ranged   from   vocalizing   their   concerns   and  
demands  to  employing  means  of  confrontational  resistance.  This  chapter  provided  
a  brief  overview  of  this,  explaining  how,  during  the  Ottoman  Empire’s  rule,  when  
the   constraints   on   the   transfer   of   land   ownership   to   Jewish   immigrants   were  
relaxed,   Palestinians   lobbied   against   these   by   forming   political   parties   and  
institutions   that   documented   their   fears   and   represented   their   objection   to  
Ottoman   regulations.   Later,   during   the   British  mandate,   Palestinians   adopted   a  
more   direct   approach   of   strikes   and   boycotts   that   targeted   its   policies   on  
immigration  and  its  approach  to  the  creation  of  a  Jewish  state  in  Palestine.      
With  the  creation  of  the  state  of  Israel  in  1948,  Palestinian  nonviolence  continued,  
varying   in   its   intensity   throughout   the   years   and   in   response   to   political  
developments.  However,  the  first  nationwide  organized  nonviolent  campaign  did  
not  start  until  1987  with  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Intifada.  This  development  was  
due   to   the   Palestinian   conviction   that   change   can   only   happen   from   within  
Palestine   rather   than   from   Arab   or   international   intervention.   This   Intifada  
concluded   with   the   creation   of   the   Palestinian   National   Authority   that   took  
limited   control   over   parts   of   the  West   Bank   as   a   step   towards   the   creation   of   a  




became   a   permanent   state   with   diminishing   hope   for   the   creation   of   the  
Palestinian  state,  continued  Israeli  policies  of  occupation,  and  the  continuation  of  
Israeli   settlement   expansion,   the   second   Palestinian   Intifada   broke   out   and  
brought   an   end   to   the   Oslo   Peace   process.   The   subsequent   construction   of   the  
Israeli   Separation   Wall,   which   started   in   2001,   provoked   renewed   organized  
nonviolent   activity,   which   involved   not   only   Palestinians   but   also   international  
supporters  through  the  ISM.    
The   ICJ’s   advisory   opinion   in   2005,   which   deemed   the   Israeli   Separation   Wall  
illegal,  amplified  nonviolent  campaigns  against  Israeli  occupation  policies.  It  was  
then   that   systematic,   synchronized,   and   frequent  protests  began   to   take  place   in  
Palestinian  villages  directly  affected  by   the  wall.  Also,   in  2005,   the  BDS  call  was  
made,   rallying   organizations,   political   groups,   and  unions   as   the  main   actors   in  
the  Palestinian  struggle  against  Israeli  occupation.  The  BDS  call  and  its  campaigns  
is  the  subject  of  the  following  chapter.  
To   sum   up   the   present   chapter,   this   brief   overview   has   illustrated   how   the  
transformative   powers   of   nonviolent   resistance   throughout   recent   years   have  
become  apparent.  As  summarised  by  Parry  (2010,  p.  16)  this  approach  
delegitimizes   Israel’s   use   of   brute   force,   creating   cracks   and   dissent  within  
Israeli  society  and  generating  international  criticism  of  Israel,  while  spawning  




popular   struggle   gains   legitimization   and   gathers   support   locally   and  
internationally.  





Boycotts  and  Boycotters  
  
There   are   generally   two   schools   of   thought   regarding   boycotting   economic   ties  
with  Israel:  one  calling  for  a  full  boycott  of  economic  ties  with  Israel;  and  the  other  
that  calls  for  a  boycott  limited  to  the  Israeli  settlements.  The  former  is  represented  
by  the  Boycott,  Divestment  and  Sanctions  movement  while  the  latter,  being  more  
diverse,  is  mainly  referred  to  simply  as  the  boycott  of  Israeli  settlements.    
This  part  of  the  thesis  presents  an  exploration  of  the  two  approaches  to  boycotts  
that  have  been  adopted  by  Palestinians  and  international  solidarity  organizations.  
A   significant   number,   although   not   the   majority,   of   organizations   and   groups  
standing  in  solidarity  with  Palestine  has  adopted  the  BDS  call.  In  doing  so,  these  
organizations   have   become   affiliates   or  members   of   the  BDS  movement.   Today,  
this  movement   includes   all   those   organizations,   activists,   and   solidarity   groups  
calling   for  a   full  boycott  of   Israel.  However,   it  must  be  noted   that   there   is  much  
overlap  between  the  two,  as  will  be  demonstrated  in  the  following  chapters.  For  
instance,  groups  or  individuals  who  affiliate  themselves  with  the  limited  boycott  
movement  may  selectively  support  one  or  more  aspects  of  BDS.  Moreover,  as  will  
become   apparent   in   the   following   discussions,   the   absence   of   an   international  
grassroots  campaign  for  the  limited  boycott  of  Israeli  settlements  means  that  many  




the  full  boycott  movement  as  a  means  to  demonstrating  their  support  for  Palestine.  
Thus,  their  arguments  become  diminished  by  and  confused  with  those  of  the  BDS  
campaign.    
However,  for  clarity’s  sake,  in  Chapter  6,  I  present  the  two  camps  as  two  distinct  
sides   so   as   to   explain   the   origins,   rationale,   and   motives   behind   each   type   of  
boycott.   I  also  explain  the  wider  context  that  the  subsequent  chapters  7,  8,  and  9  
relate  to.  Thus,  while  Chapter  6  explains  the  theory  behind  the  boycotts  of  Israel,  
and   the   rationale   supporting   each   type,   the   chapters   that   follow   focus   on   the  
boycotters   themselves   and   how   they   form   the   movement.   Hence,   it   is   worth  
highlighting  that,  to  support  my  discussion,  chapters  7,  8  and  9  are  based  on  the  
interviews   conducted   with   leaders   of   the   movements   in   Palestine,   Israel,   and  
Europe.  Therefore,  these  chapters  present  the  original  research  undertaken  as  part  
of  this  study.    
Thus,   following   on   from   Chapter   6,   Part   3   of   the   dissertation   continues   with  
Chapter   7   focusing   on   the   actors   behind   the   boycott   campaign   in   Palestine   and  
Israel.   It   is   based   on   my   interviews   with   leaders   of   the   Palestinian   popular  
resistance   movement,   and   representatives   of   Israeli   organizations   calling   for   a  
limited   boycott.   The   lack   of   a   Palestinian   national   program   and   the   conflicting  
positions   and   groups   pose   specific   obstacles   for   instituting   Israeli   boycotts   and  




they  adopt  in  relation  to  boycotts.  The  chapter  also  gives  an  overview  of  the  ways  
in  which  Israeli  boycotters  operate,  and  of  how  they  are  regarded  and  dealt  with  
by  Israel.  Overall,  the  chapter  explores  what  the  success  of  the  boycott  movement  
means  to  our  interviewees.    
Chapter   8   looks   at   the   issues   explored   in   Chapter   7   through   an   international  
perspective.   It   focuses   specifically   on   the  dynamics   of   the   boycott  movement   in  
Europe   and   how   its   different   components   interact,   presenting   examples   of  
interviewees’   personal   involvement   in   various   aspects   of   the   boycott  movement  
that   range   from   European   parliamentary   discussions   to   Trading   Away   Peace  
reports.    
Finally,  Chapter  9  comprises  a  case  study  of  the  issues  involved  in  the  functioning  
of   Al-­‐‑Karameh   National   Empowerment   Fund,   which   was   set   up   for   the   sole  
purpose   of   promoting   the   boycott   of   settlement   products,   and   of   which   I   was  
director  for  two  years.  This  chapter  provides  an  in  depth  account  and  analysis  of  
the  efforts   to   implement  a   limited  boycott,   including   the  PNA’s  program   to  ban  
and   combat   settlement   products.   The   observations,   positions,   challenges,   and  
contradictions   presented   by   interviewees   in   previous   chapters   are   incorporated  
into  this  case  study.  
        





Full  versus  Limited  Boycott:  an  introduction  
6.1  Introduction  
As   indicated   above,   this   chapter   constitutes   a  discussion   and   comparison  of   the  
two  forms  of  boycott  movement  regarding  Israel;  the  BDS  movement  and  limited  
boycotts.  After  discussing  the  BDS  movement  itself,  followed  by  an  outline  of  the  
limited   boycott   movement,   I   review   the   stance   and   regulations   of   European  
countries   in   relation   to   boycotts,   as   well   as   outlining   how   EU   law   regards   the  
targeted   goods   or   economic   ties   in   question.   The   chapter   then   provides   a   brief  
account  of  key  positions  taken  by  some  of  the  various  groups,  organizations,  and  
governments   that   have   significant   involvement   in   the   evolving   limited   boycott  
movement.    
  
6.1  Boycott,  Divestment,  and  Sanctions    
The   formation   of   the   BDS   movement   was   heralded   by   the   BDS   Call   that   was  
signed  by  170  Palestinian  civil  society  organizations  in  2005.  The  following  extract  
from   the   Call   explains   the   background,   motives,   suggested   methods,   and  
demands  of  the  movement  at  the  time  (BDS,  2005):  
“We,  representatives  of  Palestinian  civil  society,  call  upon  international  civil  




broad  boycotts  and  implement  divestment  initiatives  against  Israel  similar  to  
those   applied   to   South   Africa   in   the   apartheid   era.   We   appeal   to   you   to  
pressure  your   respective   states   to   impose  embargoes  and   sanctions  against  
Israel.  We  also  invite  conscientious  Israelis  to  support  this  Call,  for  the  sake  
of  justice  and  genuine  peace.  
  
These  non-­‐‑violent  punitive  measures  should  be  maintained  until  Israel  meets  
its   obligation   to   recognize   the  Palestinian  people’s   inalienable   right   to   self-­‐‑
determination  and  fully  complies  with  the  precepts  of  international  law  by:  
  
1. Ending   its   occupation   and   colonization   of   all   Arab   lands   and  
dismantling  the  Wall;  
2. Recognizing   the   fundamental   rights   of   the  Arab-­‐‑Palestinian   citizens   of  
Israel  to  full  equality;    
3. Respecting,  protecting  and  promoting  the  rights  of  Palestinian  refugees  
to   return   to   their  homes  and  properties  as   stipulated   in  UN  resolution  
194.  
  






While  this  call  defined  the  intentions  of  what  became  known  as  the  BDS  campaign  
(Horowitz  and  Weiss,  2010),  its  origins  are  understood  to  date  back  to  2001  when  
a  side  event  at  the  World  Conference  against  Racism  adopted  the  principles  that  
came   to   underpin   the   Call   through   Article   424   that   calls   on   the   international  
community  to  
impose  a  policy  of  complete  and  total  isolation  of  Israel  as  an  apartheid  state  
as  in  the  case  of  South  Africa  which  means  the  imposition  of  mandatory  and  
comprehensive   sanctions   and   embargoes,   the   full   cessation   of   all   links  
(diplomatic,  economic,  social,  aid,  military  cooperation  and  training)  between  
all  states  and  Israel  (Bröning,  2011,  p.  143).  
Other  similar  demands  made  at  international  gatherings  were  instrumental  in  the  
success  of   the  BDS  movement;  such  as   the  Fifth  World  Social  Forum  in  Brazil   in  
2005  that  asserted  the  need  “to  impose  political  and  economic  sanctions  [on]  Israel’  
and  called  on  ‘social  movements  to  also  mobilize  for  de-­‐‑investments  and  boycotts’  
in   order   to   ‘pressure   Israel   to   implement   international   resolutions’”   (cited   in  
Bröning,  2011,  p.  143).  
According  to  Omar  Barghouti,  co-­‐‑founder  of  the  BDS  movement  and  drafter  of  its  
call,  the  BDS  movement  outlines  three  requirements  that,  if  met,  can  ensure  a  just  




As   Barghouti   explains,   the   reasons   both   the   BDS   Call   and   the   BDS   movement  
came  to  exist  include  -­‐‑  but  are  not  limited  to  -­‐‑  the  following:    
1) The  fertile  ground  for  a  nonviolent  citizens’  movement;  which  was  a  result  
of  the  shift   in  the  US  and  European  grassroots’  position  on  Israeli  policies  
in  Palestine.  This  was  most  notable  after  the  outbreak  of  the  second  Intifada  
which  reflected  the  violent  nature  of  Israel’s  approach  (Barghouti,  2011,  p.  
4).  
2) The   failure   of   the   UN   and   the   international   community   to   hold   Israel  
accountable  for  its  violence;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  seen  as  protecting  it.    
3) The   failing   peace   process   that   had   only   delivered   deteriorating   living  
conditions   for  Palestinians,  as  well  as  poorer  political  conditions  whereby  
occupation  only   strengthened   Israel’s   grip  over   the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  
Ironically,   through   this   process,   Israel   simultaneously   secured   a   better  
place   among   the   international   community,   and   more   countries   accepted  
having  ties  with  it  because  the  Palestinians  were  doing  so  (Barghouti,  2011,  
p.  56).  
4) When  the  ICJ’s  decision  (that  is  referred  to  in  the  BDS  call)  condemning  the  
Israeli   separation   wall   was   issued   in   2004,   while   it   was   almost   entirely  
ignored   by   Israel   and   the   international   community,   the   PNA   did   not  





5) Barghouti   also   gives   credit   to   the   previously   launched   Palestinian  
Academic  and  Cultural  Boycott  of  Israel  (PACBI)  in  2004  for  instigating  the  
BDS  call  in  July  2005.  In  fact,  he  states  that  the  BDS  version  was  modelled  
on  the  PACBI  call  (Barghouti,  2011,  p.  76).  
  
Under   such   circumstances,   it   is   clear   that   Palestinian   grassroots   felt   the   need   to  
exhort  pressure  with  whatever  means  were  available  to  them  to  change  the  status  
quo.  Indeed,  nearly  a  decade  had  passed  since  the  establishment  of  the  PNA  with  
very  little  to  show  for  it  in  relation  to  boycotts;  moreover,  the  Oslo  peace  process  
had   not   concluded   with   a   situation   that   ended   Israeli   occupation,   or   its   unjust  
policies  regarding  Palestinians.  On  the  contrary,   Israel  seemed  to  have  benefited  
economically   in   the   aftermath   of   the   Oslo   accords.   Consequently,   this   was   the  
particular  area  identified  by  activists  where  Israeli  gains  could  be  undermined  by  
a  boycott  campaign.    
   Opposition  to  the  BDS  movement:  
The  scope  of  this  research  does  not  include  the  dynamics  and  arguments  against  
the  BDS  movement;  however,  it  should  be  noted  that  these  do  exist,  and  for  many  
different  reasons.  The  main  reasons  that  are  commonly  articulated,  both  in  Israel  





1) Ideological:   BDS   is   anti-­‐‑Semitic,   delegitimizes   Israel   and   is   a   form   of  
terrorism.  
On  many   occasions,   Israeli   officials   have   labelled   the   BDS  movement   in   this  
way   and   this   has   been   translated   into   Israeli   laws   and   procedures   that  
criminalize  and  penalize   those   involved  with  boycotting   Israel.   I  will   explore  
this  in  more  depth  in  the  following  chapter  when  I  discuss  Israel’s  law  against  
boycotters.  So,  here,  I  will  simply  indicate  some  instances  where  the  argument  
is  made  so  as  to  illustrate  the  kind  of  objections  made:    
- Anat  Berko,  Israeli  Knesset  member,  academic  and  author  on  terrorism  
described  the  Palestinian  bid  to  exclude  Israel  from  FIFA  as    
  
an  extension  of  the  massacre  of  the  Israeli  athletes  at  the  Munich  
Olympics.  It  is  diplomatic  terrorism,  but  it  is  still  terrorism  in  every  
sense  of  the  word,  since  it  undermines  the  most  basic  aspects  of  
Israel’s  existence.  It  is  another  way  of  saying,  “The  Jews  cannot  exist  
here.”  As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  it  is  nothing  less  than  a  blood  libel.  If  
there  was  some  remission  in  the  disease  known  as  anti-­‐‑Semitism  after  
World  War  II  and  the  Holocaust,  what  we  are  seeing  now  is  a  new  
iteration  of  anti-­‐‑Semitism  (Berko,  2005).  
  




the  attempt  to  eradicate  the  “boycotter’s  law”.  This  was  ultimately  to  
uphold  the  law,  and  in  its  verdict  it  likened  the  BDS  movement  to  terrorism  
and  those  who  deny  the  holocaust.  In  fact,  in  the  verdict,  the  word  
terrorism  was  used  11  times  (Marom,  2015).    
  
- Former  Israeli  finance  minister,  Yair  Lapid,  at  a  Jerusalem  Post  conference  
in  New  York  described  the  BDS  movement  as  anti-­‐‑Semitic,  and  linked  them  
with  the  Mufti  of  Jerusalem  who  collaborated  with  the  Nazis.  He  stated  
that  he  thinks  of  the  movement  as  one  of  Hamas’  tools,  and  explained:  
“This  is  not  about  policies,  or  about  the  settlements,  or  about  the  peace  
process,  this  is  classic  anti-­‐‑Semitism  in  a  modern  disguise.”  (Cited  in  Wiess,  
2015)  
  
It  is  worth  noting  that,  prior  to  the  Oslo  peace  accords,  Israel  was  not  officially  
recognized   as   a   legitimate   state   by   the   PLO,   the   internationally   recognized  
representative  of  the  Palestinian  people.  For  the  PLO,  that  recognition  came  to  
be  granted  in  return  for  what  it  understood  to  be  the  imminent  end  of  Israeli  
occupation.   However,   even   while   that   occupation   did   not   end,   the   PLO  
continued  to  recognize  the  Israeli  state.  This  is  an  example  of  the  political  gains  
that   Israel   reaped   as   a   result   of   the   Oslo   peace   accords.   It   is   clear   from   the  




commitment   to   end  occupation   is   a  prerequisite   for   recognition  of   the   Israeli  
state  by  Palestinians.    
Also,   it   is   significant   that   Israel’s   categorization   of   nonviolent   boycott  
campaigns   as   terrorist   activity   or   anti-­‐‑Semitism   equates   the   Palestinian  
nonviolent   action   to   action   of   a   violent   nature.   Moreover,   by   labelling  
boycotters   as   terrorists   Israel   prescribes   the   kind   of   action   it   chooses   to   take  
against  them.    
2) Practical:  BDS  is  seen  as  an  obstacle  to  peace:    
Since   all   efforts   for   an   Israeli-­‐‑Palestinian   peaceful   resolution   since   the   Oslo  
peace  process  have  suggested  a  two  state  solution,   it   is  essential   that   the  two  
sides  negotiate.  However,  this  practical  argument  against  BDS  asks:  How  can  
this   happen   if   one   side   is   boycotting   the   other?   Therefore,   it   is   claimed   that  
bridges   need   to   be   built   between   the   two   sides   rather   than   broken   and  only  
through  dialogue   can   a   solution   be   found.   In   relation   to   this,  Avishai   (2010)  
describes  the  BDS  movement’s  approach  as  “trying  to  fix  a  TV  by  smashing  it  
on  the  floor”  (Avishal,  2010).    
The  popular  authors,  Margaret  Atwood  and  Amitav  Ghosh,  describe  the  BDS  
movement  as  an  “all  or  nothing”  group  that   is   impractical  and  unreasonable.  
This  is  a  common  tag  given  to  the  movement,  since  the  BDS  call  includes  three  




agree   to   all   of   them.   Many   groups,   for   instance,   would   agree   to   a   limited  
boycott  of   settlement  products,   but  not   to   all   Israeli  products.  This   approach  
even  includes  Israeli  groups.  Also  some  agree  to  an  economic  boycott  but  not  
to   an   academic   one   while   others   support   boycotts   but   not   the   Palestinian  
refugees’  right  to  return  (Horowitz  and  Weiss,  2010).  
From   the   above   examples,   it   is   clear   that   the   concepts   of   dialogue   and   boycott  
clash.   However,   arguments   suggesting   that   such   a   clash   implies   that   boycotts  
undermine  the  situation  do  not  recognise  the  need  to  change  the  balance  of  power  
between   the   parties   to   enable   effective   dialogue   and   a   fair   outcome;   therefore,  
some   form   of   boycott   remains   critical   to   changing   the   current   asymmetric  
relationship.  In  line  with  this  thinking,  a  number  of  organisations  consider  limited  
boycotts  to  be  a  more  appropriate  solution,  as  discussed  in  the  next  section.  
  
6.2  Limited  boycotts  of  Israeli  settlement  products  
Several   groups,   organizations,   individuals,   and   even   political   parties   have  
advocated   for   a   limited   boycott   of   Israeli   products   produced   in   the   territories  
Israel   has   occupied   since   1967   rather   than   all   Israeli   products.   Even  movements  
upholding   the   BDS   Call   have   supporters   who   limit   their   activities   to   those  




organizations,  such  as  WhoProfits6  and  Gush  Shalom,7  have  pioneered  this  type  of  
limited   boycott   since   the   late   1990s.   These   organizations   have   created   lists   of  
Israeli   settlement   products   and   called   on   Israelis,   themselves,   as   well   as  
internationals,   to   boycott   them.   Indeed,   Gush   Shalom   first   advertised   a   list   of  
settlement  products   in   the   Israeli  newspaper,  Ha’aretz,  on  26t,   September  and  4,,  
October  1997  (Qumsieh,  2011,  p.  208).  
However,   the   organization   that   became   best   known   for   leading   this   particular  
type  of  boycott  is  none  other  than  the  PNA  itself,  which  launched  “The  National  
Program   to   Ban   and   Combat   Settlement   Products”   in   early   2010.   The   clearest  
difference   between   the   PNA’s   campaign   and   that   of   the   BDS   is   that   the   former  
supported  a   limited  boycott   of   settlement  products,  whereas   the  BDS   calls   for   a  
total   boycott   of   all   Israeli   products,  making   it   subject   to   far  more   criticism  both  
internationally  and  from  Israel.  In  fact,  the  PNA  is  not  only  open  to  economic  ties  
with  Israel  but  encourages  them  (Bröning,  2011).  It  must  be  clarified  though  that,  
while   the   name   of   the   PNA’s   program   only  mentions   settlement   products   in   its  
demands   for   boycott,   it   in   fact   calls   for   cutting   all   ties   with   settlements.   This  
includes   investment   in   settlements   and   even   ending   Palestinian   labour   in   their  
companies.  While  these   issues  are  explored  in  detail   in  Chapter  8,   in  the  present  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  www.whoprofits.org	  




section,  I  aim  simply  to  give  an  overview  of  the  situation  to  indicate  the  context  in  
which  the  later  discussions  are  developed.  
While   their   different   stances   on   economic   ties   with   Israel,   itself,   is   perhaps   the  
most  obvious  difference  between  the  BDS  movement  and  the  PNA,  the  two  have  
far  more  fundamental  differences  that  stem  from  their  divergent  approaches:  the  
former  is  predominantly  focused  on  rights  while  the  PNA  is  more  concerned  with  
achieving  a  state-­‐‑based  agreement.  As  Bröning  explains:    
While   the   BDS  movement   focuses   on   a   comprehensive   Israel   boycott   in   its  
struggle   for   implementing   a   rights-­‐‑based   and   not   necessarily   a   solutions-­‐‑
based  struggle,  the  PNA  remains  committed  to  achieving  a  two  state  solution  
and  thus  has  a  much  greater  need  for  (and  greater  prospects   in)   identifying  
Israeli  partners  than  BDS  activists  (Bröning,  2011,  p.  147).  
Since,  according  to  international  law,  the  Israeli  settlements  are  illegal,  politicians  
and  political  groups  around  the  world  are  more  likely  to  favour  a  boycott  limited  
to   these.  Moreover,   it   is   perceived   to   be  more   in   line  with   a   two   state   solution  
since   some   see   it   less   directed   towards   Israel   and  more   towards   occupation   in  
particular.   Thus,   not   only   can   some   Israelis   sympathise  with   this   rationale,   but  
some  Palestinians   also   see   it   as   the  more   feasible   option   since   their   basic   living  
requirements   -­‐‑   such   as   water,   electricity   and   petrol   -­‐‑   are   currently   provided  




Therefore,  while  the  BDS  call  chooses  to  ignore  Palestine’s  dependence  on  Israel’s  
economy,   the   PNA’s   campaign   encounters   continual   restraints   that   prevent   it  
from   escalating   its   scope   to   anything   more   than   settlement   products   and  
enterprises.   The   BDS   position   on   limited   boycotts   as   the   ultimate   goal,   is  
explained  by  Barghouti,  as  follows:    
While   the   Palestinian   BDS   movement   has   consistently   expressed   its   deep  
appreciation  for  every  effort  to  treat  Israel  as  apartheid  South  Africa  was,  it  
views  the  approach  of  focusing  on  banning  only  settlement  products  as  the  
ultimate  goal  –  rather  than  as  a  first,  convenient  step  toward  a  general  Israeli  
products   boycott   –   as   problematic,   practically,   politically,   and   morally  
(Barghouti,  2011,  p.  186).  
Meanwhile,   the   PNA’s   position   was   developed   on   a   more   institutional   basis  
during   2010.   Early   in   the   year,   Palestinian   Prime   Minister   Fayyad   set   up   Al-­‐‑
Karameh  Fund   (known   in  English  as  Dignity)  as  a   joint  PNA  and  private  sector  
initiative,   and   declared   that   the   boycott   of   settlement   products   from   then   on  
would  be  “a  daily  expression  of  rejecting  the  occupation”  (Bröning,  2011,  p.  145).  
Following  this,   the  Palestinian  president,  Mahmoud  Abbas,  approved   legislation  
in  April  2010,  which  made  it  illegal  to  deal  or  trade  in  settlement  products.  From  
then   on,   Al-­‐‑Karameh   Fund   became   responsible   for   enforcing   the   presidential  




of  several  hundred  volunteers.  According  to  researcher,  Khalil  Shiqaqi,  72  percent  
of   Palestinians   supported   these   measures,   even   while   it   was   being   subject   to  
severe  Israeli  criticism  (Bröning,  2011,  p.  146).    
Similar   to   the  BDS  movement,  Al-­‐‑Karameh  Fund   issued   the   ‘Pledge  of  Dignity’;  
yet,  by  comparing  the  two,  it  is  easy  to  sense  the  grave  differences  that  are  rooted  
in  their  different  goals.  The  Pledge  of  Dignity  reads:    
We  the  people  of  Palestine,  of  all  religions,  affiliations,  professions,  and  ages,  
have  all  come  together  to  affirm  our  desire  and  determination  to  rise  up,  and  
shiver   off   the   effects   of   settlement   contamination   in   our   Palestinian   cities,  
villages,   and   refugee   camps,   first   and   foremost,   via   replacing   settlement  
products   in   our   local   markets   with   those   that   are   proudly   produced   in  
Palestine,   with   Palestinian   Hands!   …  We   hereby   take   upon   ourselves   the  
responsibility   of   leading   this   popular   campaign,   towards   a   dignified   and  
prosperous  national  economy,  upon  which  our  beloved  Palestinian  state  will  
be  built  on,   thereby  ensuring  and  sustaining   the  peace  we   long   for.  This   is  
our   pledge.   From   now   on   we   are…   ambassadors   of   Palestinian   dignity  
(Bröning,  2011,  p.  146).  
The  statement   reflects  a  clear  message   from  the  PNA  to  boycott   settlements  and  




Thus,   it  demonstrates  a  clear  distinction  from  the  BDS  objectives  and  strategy  in  
restricting  its  assertion  to  settlement  products.  
A   number   of   Israeli   and   Palestinian   organizations   have   investigated   what  
settlement  products  and  services  exist  locally  in  Israel  and  within  areas  A  and  B  of  
the   West   Bank,   the   areas   under   the   Palestine   Authority’s   security   and/or  
administrative  jurisdiction.  For  instance,  the  Israeli  left  wing  charity,  Who  Profits  
From  Occupation,  is  one  of  the  leading  advocates  against  trading  with  settlement  
companies  and  having  any  financial  involvement  with  them.  Below,  they  further  
explain  the  foundations  of  their  argument:  
Israeli   industrial   zones   within   the   occupied   territories   hold   hundreds   of  
companies,  ranging  from  small  businesses  serving  the  local  Israeli  settlers  to  
large   factories  which  export   their  products  worldwide.  Several   settlements,  
especially  in  the  Jordan  Valley  and  the  Golan  Heights,  produce  agricultural  
goods,   such   as   fruits   and   flowers,   and   sell   them   in   Israel   and   abroad.  
Settlement   production   benefits   from   low   rents,   special   tax   incentives,   lax  
enforcement   of   environmental   and   labor   protection   laws   and   other  
governmental  supports  (Who  Profits,  n.d.).    
As  indicated  above,  there  are  hundreds  of  Israeli  companies,  factories,  workshops,  
and   various   businesses   in   the   West   Bank   that   are   referred   to   as   settlement  




settlement  companies,  what  products  they  produce,  and  where  their  products  are  
marketed.  Other  Israeli  organizations  that  have  openly  lobbied  against  settlements,  
and   trade   with   them   and   their   industries,   include   B’tselem,   Gush   Shalom,   and  
Peace  Now.  Among  others,  these  organizations  provide  Who  Profits  with  further  
similar  information  on  settlement  products.    
While  the  BDS  call  by  Palestinian  civil  society  organizations  has  existed  since  2005,  
more   recent   calls   to   end   economic   ties  with   Israeli   settlements   in   the  OPT  have  
emerged.   Moreover,   organizations   based   in   countries   all   over   the   world   have  
joined   the   call   to   end   economic   ties   with   settlements,   and   continue   to   lobby  
against  settlement  products  where  they  find  them  being  sold  in  their  local  markets.  
Many  supermarket  chains,  trade  unions,  and  even  public  institutes  have  refrained  
from   having   economic   ties   with   Israeli   settlements   as   a   result   of   the   continued  
lobbying  efforts  against  ties  with  settlements  as  listed  later  in  this  chapter.    
There   are   also   many   other   campaigns   that   function   internationally.   Some   are  
dedicated   towards  particular  products   and  have  developed  detailed  accounts  of  
these,  and  of  who  facilitates  their  trade.  There  have  also  been  two  comprehensive  
reports   that   explain   the   settlements   existing   economic   ties   with   European  
countries.   These   reports   include:      1)   “Unveiled”,   which   was   commissioned   by  
ProsperPalestine,  and  “Trading  Away  Peace”,  which  was  prepared  by  a  coalition  




background   to   EU-­‐‑Israeli   relations   and   discusses   the   two   reports   on   these   two  
reports  within  this  context.    
6.3  European-­‐‑Israeli  Relations  
There   has   been   significant   improvement   in   Europe-­‐‑Israeli   relations   over   recent  
decades,  which  is  demonstrated  by  two  particular  agreements.  The  first  is  the  EU-­‐‑
Israel   Association   Agreement   that   constitutes   the   legal   framework   regulating  
relations  between  the  EU  and  Israel.  This  was  signed  in  Brussels  on  20,,  November  
1995   after   approval   by   15  EU  member   states   and   came   into   force  on   the   first   of  
June  2000.  The  Agreement  provides  for  significant  liberalization  in  terms  of  trade  
and  cooperation  with  Israel;  the  main  features  include  the  following:  
[P]rovisions  on  regular  political  dialogue,  on  freedom  of  establishment  and  
liberalization  of  services,  the  free  movement  of  capital  and  competition  rules,  
the  strengthening  of  economic  cooperation  and  cooperation  on  social  matters.  
The   agreement   establishes   Association   Council   to   be   supported   by   an  
Association  Committee.  It  also  reinforces  the  arrangements  for  free  trade  in  
industrial   products,   which   had   been   in   force   since   the   late   1970s.   The  
agreement  also  mentions  many  other  areas  of   cooperation   that   are  open   to  





The   second   agreement   was   concerned   with   agriculture   and   was   signed   on   4,  
November   2009   by   the   European   Commission   and   Israel.   This   removed  
constraints   on   agricultural   trade   including  processed   agricultural   products,   fish,  
and  fishery  products.    
According  to  both  these  agreements,  Israeli  products  enjoy  preferential  treatment  
and  are   exempted   from  many   taxes   that  would  otherwise  have  applied   to   trade  
between  Israel  and  the  EU.  It  is  within  this  context  that  the  reports,  ‘Unveiled’  and  
‘Trading  Away   Peace’  were   produced.   Both   reports   refer   to   the   limited   boycott  
and   focus   on   economic   relations   between   European   countries   and   Israeli  
settlements  from  different  perspectives,  the  first  being  linked  to  the  PNA  and  the  
second  being  a  Christian  based  initiative.  
1)  Unveiled:  European  Trade  &  Investment  Relationships  with  Companies  in  
Israeli  Settlements  in  the  Occupied  Palestinian  Territories  
As  mentioned   above,   this   report  was   prepared   by   ProsperPalestine,  which   calls  
for  ending  economic  ties  between  European  countries  and  Israeli  settlements.  The  
organization,   itself,   comprises   part   of   this   research’s   case   study,   and   as   such   is  
discussed  in  full   in  a  later  chapter.  However,  here,   it   is  worth  noting  that  its  100  
page  report  was  released  in  April  2011,  and  considers  the  economic  ties  between  
Israel  and  11  European  countries:  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxemburg,  




Tables   3a   and   3b   in   Annex   D   provide   ProsperPalestine’s   summary   of   the  
numerous  business  relationships  Israeli  companies  maintain  with  these  countries.  
Following   the   release   of   its   report,   ProsperPalestine   distributed   its   research  
findings   to   politicians   and   stake   holders   across   Europe   in   order   to   lobby   for   a  
complete  ban  on  European  economic  ties  with  settlements.  However,  as  discussed  
in  Chapter  9,  this  distribution  was  relatively  limited,  and  ProsperPalestine  did  not  
capitalize  on  the  research  it  had  commissioned.    
2)  Trading  Away  Peace  
This   report  was   commissioned   by   a   coalition   of   the   twenty   two  Christian   faith-­‐‑
based  organizations  in  Europe.8  The  document  highlights  the  impact  of  the  Israeli  
settlements   and   their   economy   on   Palestinian   life,   reaffirms   their   illegality  
according   to   international   law,   and   summarizes   the   types   of   economic   ties  
between  Europe   and   settlements.   It   also  provides   a   list   of   recommendations   for  
actions  that  European  countries  can  follow  to  support  a  more  equitable  situation  
(Crisis  Action  Group,  2012):      
1) Ensuring  correct  consumer  labelling  of  all  settlement  products.  
2) Discouraging  companies  from  trading  with  and  investing  in  settlements.  
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  These comprise: 1. Aprodev; 2. Broederlijk delen (Belgium); 3. Caabu (UK); 4. CCFD- Terre Solidaire 
(France); 5. Christian Aid (UK and Ireland); 6. Church of Sweden; 7. Cordaid (Netherlands); 8. DanChurchAid 
(Denmark); 9. Diakonia (Sweden); 10. FinnChurchAid (Finland); 11. ICCO (Netherlands); 12. IKV Pax Christi 
(Netherlands); 13. International Federation for Human rights (FIdH); 14. Medical Aid for Palestinians (UK); 15. 
Medico international (Germany); 16. Medico international (Switzerland); 17. The Methodist Church in Britain; 
18. Norwegian people’s Aid; 19. Norwegian Church Aid; 20. Quaker Council for European Affairs; 21. Quaker 





3) Banning  imports  of  settlement  products.    
4) Ensuring   settlement   products   do   not   benefit   from   preferential   market  
access.    
5) Excluding   settlements   from   bilateral   agreements   and   cooperation  
instruments.    
6) Excluding  settlement  products  and  companies  from  public  procurement.    
7) Closing   down  mechanisms   by   which   organizations   can   fund   settlements  
through  tax  deduction  schemes.  
8) Preventing   financial   transactions   that   support   settlements   and   related  
activities.    
9) Discouraging  citizens  from  buying  property  in  settlements.    
10) Issuing  guidelines  for  European  tour  operators.  
11) Drawing  up  a  list  of  companies  mis-­‐‑stating  the  origin  of  settlement  goods.    
12) Insisting  that  Israel  disaggregates  data  for  the  OECD.    
  
These  two  reports,  which  are  further  discussed  in  Chapter  8,  illustrate  the  main  
kinds  of  European  support  for  the  limited  boycott  while  the  next  section  
overviews  the  various  political  approaches  that  are  currently  active.  
  




There   is   a   growing   international   solidarity   movement   with   Palestine   and  
increasing  voices  for  boycott  of  settlement  goods,  to  the  extent  that  it  is  difficult  to  
gather  all   the  varied  political  decisions  and  activities   that  discourage   trade  with  
settlements   into   one   chapter.   All   around   the   world   there   are   activists,   student  
groups,   charities,   unions,   and   even   political   parties   that   have   issued   statements  
and   actively   promote   ending   economic   ties   with   Israeli   settlements.   There   are  
even  many  pro-­‐‑Israeli  organizations  and  religious  Jewish  groups  that  have  called  
for  ending  such  ties  and  that  are  instrumental  in  the  struggle  against  them.    
Here,   I   would   like   to   highlight   are   few   examples   of   such   decisions   or   actions  
relating  to  economic  ties  with  settlements  including  one  at  an  EU  legislative  level  
and  one  at  a  UK  government  level,  as  well  as  a  Trade  Union  Congress  statement  
and  a  Presbyterian  General  Assembly  motion  and  a  supermarket  chain  boycotting  
settlement  products.    
i. Exemption  from  preferential  treatment:  
On  the  25th  of  February  2010,  a  German  court  made  a  decision  confirming  
that   Israeli   settlement   products   are   not   to   be   considered   Israeli   and,  
therefore,   settlement   products   should   not   enjoy   the   same   preferential  
treatment  that  the  EU-­‐‑Israel  Association  Agreement  secures.  The  court  was  
considering   a   specific   settlement   product,   Brita   filters,  when   the   decision  




Brita  Company  is  located  in  the  Barkan  industrial  zone  near  the  settlement  
of  Ariel  (Kownacki,  2010).    
ii. The  UK’s  labelling  guidance:    
On  the  10,,  December  2009,  the  UK  Department  for  Environment,  Food  and  
Rural  Affairs  (DEFRA)  issued  a  non-­‐‑binding  voluntary  advice  for  retailers  
to  label  settlement  products  as  such,  and  not  as  Israeli.    
  
DEFRA  explains  that  its  document  was  a  result  of  receiving  requests  from  
consumer   groups,   retailers   and   NGOs   on   how   the   origin   of   settlement  
products   should   be   listed   as.  Most   importantly,   points   4   and   5   state   the  
following:  
  
4. For  produce  from  the  West  Bank,   labeling  currently  states  country  of  
origin  as   ‘Produce  of  the  West  Bank’.  Traders  and  retailers  may  wish  
to   indicate  whether   the  product  originated  from  an  Israeli  settlement  
or  from  Palestinian  producers.  This  could  take  the  form,  for  example,  
of  ‘Produce  of  the  West  Bank  (Israeli  settlement  produce)’  or  ‘Produce  
of  the  West  Bank  (Palestinian  produce)’,  as  appropriate.  
  
5.   Separately,   the   Government   considers   that   traders   would   be  




committing  an  offence,  if  they  were  to  declare  produce  from  the  OPT  
(including   from   the   West   Bank)   as   ‘Produce   of   Israel’.   This   would  
apply   irrespective   of   whether   the   produce   was   from   a   Palestinian  
producer  or  from  an  Israeli  settlement  in  the  OPT.  This  is  because  the  
area  does  not  fall  within  the  internationally  recognized  borders  of  the  
state  of  Israel.  
  
See  Annex  E:  DEFRA  Voluntary  Advice  for  DEFRA’s  full  document.    
  
iii. Trade  Union  Congress:  
On  the  8th  of  April  2010,  the  Palestinian  Solidarity  campaign  (PSC)  and  the  British  
Trade  Union  Congress   (TUC)   issued   a   statement   that   called  upon   consumers   to  
boycott  settlement  products.  The  issued  statement  included  the  following  excerpt:  
This   is   not   a   call   for   a   general   boycott   of   Israeli   goods   and   services  which  
would  hit  ordinary  Palestinian  and   Israeli  workers.  Nor   should  workers   in  
Britain   put   their   own   jobs   at   risk   by   refusing   to   deal  with   goods   from   the  
settlement  goods.  Instead,  we’re  calling  for  targeted,  consumer-­‐‑led  sanctions  
to  send  a  clear  message  against  the  settlements...  we’re  also  calling  on  the  UK  
Government  to  make  sure  that  the  EU  bans  the  sale  of  these  goods  (Jews  for  






v. The  Presbyterian  Church:    
On  6,,  July  2012,  the  Presbyterian  General  Assembly  voted  in  favour  of  boycotting  
settlement   products.   Another   motion   to   divest   from   settlement   companies   was  
narrowly  voted  down  (Mozgovaya,  2012).    The  following  day,  the  Church  issued  
the  following  statement  (Barrows-­‐‑Friedman,  2012):  
  
The  plenary  has  voted  in  favor  of  a  separate  resolution  to  boycott  products  
made  in  Israeli  settlements  in  the  occupied  territories,  including  Ahava  Dead  
Sea   beauty   products   and   dates   grown   by   Israeli   cooperative  Hadiklaim….  
The  razor  thin  margin  of  last  night’s  vote  on  divestment,  which  was  defeated  
by  just  two  votes,  demonstrates  that  the  General  Assembly  remains  divided  
on  both  divestment  and  investment.     
vi.   The  Cooperative  supermarket  chain:  
In  April  2012,  the  UK’s  fifth  biggest  supermarket  chain  decided  to  end  economic  
ties  with  settlements.  The  settlement  companies  that  were  affected  were  Agrexco,  
Arava   Export   Growers,   Mehadrin,   and   Adafresh.   These   four   companies  
previously  provided   the   supermarket   chain  with  agricultural  produce   (McVeigh  
and  Sherwood,  2012).  This  decision  was  made  after  the  supermarket’s  board  voted  




illegal  Israeli  settlements,  27th  April  2012.  In  the  statement,  the  board  explained:    
  
[W]e   have   audited   our   supply   chain   and   identified   a   small   number   of  
businesses  that  we  can  no  longer  source  from,  as  there  is  evidence  that  they  
source   from   the   settlements.   This   position   is   not   a   boycott   of   Israeli  
businesses,   and  we  continue   to  have   supply  agreements  with   some   twenty  
Israeli  suppliers  that  do  not  source  from  the  settlements.  
  
The  above  list  of  examples  is  by  no  means  exhaustive  but  it  does  indicate  the  wide  
range  of  institutions  that  have  made  political  decisions  to  express  their  support  for  
the   Palestinian   cause.   Although,   these   are   all   for   a   boycott   limited   to   the  
settlements,   it   is  worth  noting  that   they   involve  diverse  forms  of  action  many  of  
which  go  beyond  simply  boycotting  products.    
  
6.5  Conclusion  
Although  the  two  campaigns  have  different  approaches,  implicitly  both  argue  for  
and   support   the   end   of   the   Israeli   occupation   and   there   is   a   certain   amount   of  
complementarity   between   the   two   camps.  Ordinary   citizens   in   Europe   tend   not  
distinguish  between  them,  with  supporters  and  solidarity  activists  choosing  from  
a  variety  of  actions  that  range  from  not  buying  settlements  products  to  boycotting  




Corbyn,  MP  for  Islington  North  and  one  of  the  candidates  for  leading  the  Labour  
party   at   the   time   of  writing,   expressed   his   view   on   boycotting   Israel.  He  made  
clear  that  he  is  in  favour  of  boycotting  Israeli  settlements  not  only  by  not  buying  
products   but   also   by  divesting   from   settlement   businesses,   introducing   an   arms  
embargo  on  Israel,  and  boycotting  Israeli  universities  that  are  located  on  the  West  
Bank  or  conducting  research  that  advances  Israel’s  arms  industry  (Donaghy,  2015).  
It   is   therefore   difficult   to   place   Corbyn’s   stance   in   one   camp   or   the   other;   full  
boycott   of   Israel   represented   by   BDS,   or   limited   boycott   of   settlements,   mainly  
represented  by  the  PNA.    
  
However,   the   most   widespread   call   among   international   solidarity   groups   and  
activists   remains   the  BDS  call  and   there   is  almost  no  grassroots  presence   for   the  
limited   call   for   boycotting   settlements.   On   the   other   hand,   among   the   political  
echelons,   the   latter   is  widely   accepted   and   has   gained   traction.  When   the   PNA  
launched  its  program  to  ban  and  combat  settlement  products  in  2010,  it  assumed  
that  the  leaders  of  the  BDS  movement  would  consider  the  PNA’s  limited  boycott  
as  a  common  goal  that  the  two  shared.  However,  as  it  will  be  demonstrated  in  the  
rest  of  Part  3,   the  PNA’s  program  was  seen  as  a   threat   to   the   full  boycott   rather  
than   simply   contributing   to   it.  This  view  was  popular  among  BDS   leaders   since  
they   thought   a   limited   boycott   would   confuse   the   message,   as   they   felt  
introducing   any   other   category   of   boycott   would   do.   Thus,   their   approach   is  




cautious   not   to   be   associated  with   the   BDS  movement,   and   in   fact,   in   all   of   its  
literature  and  information,  it  makes  sure  to  emphasize  that  it  was  not  in  favour  of  
boycotting  Israel.    
  
The  discussion  in  this  chapter  indicates  that  each  camp  has  had  some  success,  and,  
to   some   extent,   did   indeed   deliver   results.   The   BDS   has   been   able   to   recruit  
supporters   and   lead   action   on   the   ground  while   the   PNA   has   encouraged   new  
international  legislation  that  prohibits  economic  links  with  settlements.  However,  
many   questions   remain:   Would   the   two   groups   have   been   more   successful  
through  a  combined  approach  whereby  they  unites  under  the  same  message?  On  
the  other  hand,  does   each   camp  believe   the  other   should   join   them,  or  does   the  
current  arrangement  indirectly  support  both  camps?  These  will  be  explored  in  the  
next   two   chapters   in   which   the   activists   themselves,   in   Palestine,   Israel,   and  
Europe,  will  answer  these  questions.    





Boycotts  and  Popular  Struggle  in  Palestine  
  
7.1  Introduction:  
This  chapter  takes  a  closer  look  at  the  various  groups  and  individuals  in  Palestine  
and  Israel  who  are  carrying  out  boycott  campaigns.  These   include  the   leaders  of  
the  Palestinian  popular   struggle  whose   activities   are  not   limited   to  boycotts   but  
also   involve  protest   campaigns,  media  outreach,   and  other  nonviolent   action;   as  
such,   their   activities   form   a   platform   from   which   to   carry   out   the   boycott  
campaigns.   Consequently,   a   closer   look   at   the   committees,   groups   and   political  
factions   that   participate   in   popular   struggle   is   important   for   understanding   the  
dynamics  and  effectiveness  of  the  boycott  movement.    
  
The   chapter   opens   by   outlining   the   formation   and   structure   of   the   popular  
committees  and  their  interactions.  The  different  positions  adopted  by  these  groups  
as  regards  the  limited  or  full  boycott  of  Israel,  and  the  reasons  that  motivate  them  
to  adopt   their  positions,   as  well   as   the  main   challenges   they   face,  whether   from  
internal   conditions  or   Israeli   responses,   are   then  explored  using   interviews  with  
leading  members  of  the  groups  involved.  In  particular,  the  lack  of  an  overarching  
national   program   for   popular   struggle   and   the   implications   of   its   absence   is  




assess  the  effectiveness  of  their  activity  from  their  point  of  view  and  compare  this  
with  practical  gains  their  programs  have  achieved.  
  
7.2  Structure  of  popular  resistance  networks/committees  
Although,   a   number   of   national   organisations   aimed   at   combatting   the   Israeli  
occupation  were   formed   after   the   Separation  Wall  was   built,   originally   popular  
struggle   took   the   form   of   independent   local   activities.   Consequently,   numerous  
committees  formed  to  support  these  activities  and  these  played  a  significant  role  
in  the  spread  of  nonviolent  resistance,  spearheading  nonviolent  activities  against  
Israeli   settlements   and   occupation.   The   groups   developed   locally   and   inspired  
other   villages   to   organise   in   a   similar  manner;   thus,   their   structure   has   evolved  
over   time.   This   evolution   has   involved   a   number   of   attempts   to   keep   them  
representative  of  the  popular  struggle  around  the  West  Bank,  nevertheless,  due  to  
the   lack   of   a   comprehensive   national   popular   resistance   program,   tensions  
between  the  different  groups  have  arisen.    
  
In   an   interview  with   the   author,   the  head  of   the  Popular   Struggle  Coordination  
Committee   (PSCC)   formed   in   2008,   Mohammad   Al-­‐‑Khatib,   described   the  
formation  of   these   committees   and   explained   that   each  was   the   result   of   a   local  
initiative  at  each  particular  location,  and  this  local  initiative  was  the  result  of  the  




the   reason   these   committees   were   formed   was   to   nonviolently   oppose   Israeli  
occupation,  they  all  have  a  common  goal,  although  with  different  ways  of  going  
about   it.   When   the   Israeli   Separation   Wall   was   built,   this   triggered   the  
establishment   of   more   committees   because   of   the   need   to   campaign   against   it.  
Thus,  in  each  location,  the  committee  was  formed  from  representatives  of  the  local  
organizations,   activists,   political   parties   and   concerned   individuals.   While   the  
initiatives   were   the   result   of   activities   and   discussions   within   local   groups   of  
activists  with  no  external  request  for  committees  to  be  formed,  when  they  began  
to  be  established,  they  quickly  inspired  other  communities  to  form  their  own.  As  
Al   Khatib   stated   in   an   interview   with   the   author   regarding   such   inspirational  
examples:  “That   is   the  external   influence  we  had.  So,   for   instance,   in  our  case   in  
Bil’in,  we  followed  what  had  been  done  in  Budrus,  Qatanna,  and  Biddu”9  
  
At   the   time   that   the   wall   was   being   built,   the   core   of   what   later   became   the  
National  Campaign  Against  the  Wall  was  being  formed.  This  was  a  combination  
of  left  wing  NGOs,  including  Medical  Relief,  Agricultural  Relief,  and  the  Union  of  
Agricultural   Work   Committees.   Meanwhile,   parallel   to   this,   there   were  
organizations  and  activists   that  were  affiliated  with  Fatah  and,  as  a  group,   these  
were   called   the   National   Committee.   Eventually,   this   committee   took   a   more  
official   nature   and   role  when   it  was   transformed   into   the   State  Ministry   for   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Wall   and   Settlement   affairs   in   the   PNA   government.   Thus,   the   National  
Committee,   which   began   as   a   popular   initiative   of   the   Fatah   affiliated   groups  
dissolved  into  an  official  entity  that  is  now  part  of  the  PNA.  
  
The  popular  committees,  on  the  other  hand,  remained  engaged  with  the  issues  of  
concern  for  their  local  people.  Although  they  received  the  support  and  help  they  
needed   from   the   National   Committee,   they   remained   separate   as   legally  
independent   and  popular  groups   and,   as   such,   are  not   officially   registered  with  
the  Ministry  of  Interior.    
  
The   nature   of   the   national   organisations   that   were   formed   depended   on   the  
affiliations  of  their  initiators.  They  were  either  affiliated  with  left-­‐‑wing  NGOs,  or  
Fatah  or   the  PNA,  or   they  were  simply   independent  activists.  However,   in  most  
committees,   the   entire   organisation   would   be   affiliated   with   only   one   of   these  
groups;   although   exceptions   do   exist   such   as   the   National   Committee   that  
originated  in  Bil’in  as  described  by  the  activist,  Al-­‐‑Khatib,  in  an  interview  with  the  
author:  
  
At  one  of  the  Bil’in  conferences,  we  decided  to  create  a  committee  that  would  
represent   and   coordinate   among   all   the   popular   committees,   a   committee  
that   would   be   democratically   elected   where   all   local   committees   would  




the   name   changed   from   the   National   Committee   Against   the   Wall   and  
Settlements   to   the   National   Committee   for   Popular   Resistance,   which   is  
broader   and   more   inclusive.   However   this   committee   lasted   only   a   year,  
from   2007   to   2008.   It   did   not   work   out,   since   it   conflicted   with   private  
interests  of  the  local  groups.10  
  
The  Popular  Struggle  Coordination  Committee  (PSCC)  for  Popular  Resistance  was  
created  at  the  Bil’in  conference  later  in  2008,  following  the  demise  of  the  National  
Committee   for   Popular   Resistance.   This   included   one   representative   from   each  
local   committee   in   order   to   coordinate   among   them.   The   significant   difference  
between  this  current  coordinating  committee  and  the  previous  attempts  is  that  it  
does  not  provide  any  leadership  to  the  local  groups,  it  only  facilitates  coordination  
between   them   and   does   not   take   any   specific   role.   Thus,   it   supports   and  
empowers   the   local  committees,  yet   it  does  not   lead.  Through   this,   it   can  enable  
groups   to   make   use   of   resources   that   have   been   made   available   to   NGOs,   the  
National  Coordination  committee  for  Popular  Resistance  was  officially  registered  
at   the   Ministry   of   Interior.   The   coordination   committee   used   its   resources   and  
connections  to  help  the  local  committees  build  their  strategies  so  that  they  were  all  
able  to  contribute  towards  the  overall  strategy  of  the  committees  as  a  whole.    This  
attempt  to  create  a  form  of  national  coordination  finally  failed  due  to  lack  of  trust  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





between   the   committees   and   the   PNA.   This   was   also   hindered   by   negative  
political  ideological  competition  and  rivalries  between  the  groups.  
  
Thus,   there   are   still   two   levels   of   resistance   in   Palestine:   at   the   local   level,   this  
mostly   involves   activists   and   communities   that   work   together   collaboratively.  
However,  at  the  national  level,  the  organisations  reflect  the  political  divisions  and  
fragmentation  in  national  politics.  This  involves  a  complicated  mixture  of  political  
alignments  as  discussed  in  the  next  section.  
  
7.3  Internal  Palestinian  Relations  
The   structure   of   the   popular   committees   as   described   above   reflects   a   complex  
system   of   internal   relations   not   only   among   the   committees   themselves,   but  
within  the  PNA,  and  between  the  PNA  and  the  various  groups.  Some,  such  as  the  
National   Committee   which   was   supported   by   Fatah,   were   so   aligned   with   the  
PNA  that   they   later  directly  came  to  belong   to  a  government  ministry  and  were  
organised  under  its  jurisdiction.  Others,  as  one  of  the  BDS  leaders  and  coordinator  
of   the   ‘Stop   the  Wall’   coalition,   Jamal   Juma’,   explained   in  an   interview  with   the  
author,   not   only   lacked   a   positive   relationship  with   the   PNA,   but   felt   that   they  





To  a  large  extent,  the  BDS  movement  reflects  the  position  of  the  radical  left  and  as  
such  is  not  supported  by  the  PNA.  This  political  wing  includes  groups  such  as  the  
Popular   Front   for   the   Liberation   of   Palestine   (PFLP),   the   Communist   Party,   the  
Democratic   Front   for   the   Liberation   of   Palestine   (DFLP)   and  Al  Mubadara   (the  
Initiative   Party);   these,   along   with   several   other   NGOs,   constitute   the   Stop   the  
Wall   Coalition.  While   lack   of   political  will   was   cited   by   all   interviewees   as   the  
reason  for  the  PNA’s  lack  of  support  for  the  movement,  the  BDS  movement  that  
Barghouti   and   Juma’   represent   is   supported   by   one   significant   political   group:  
namely,  Fatah  –  and,  in  particular,  the  Fatah  Youth  Movement.  What  makes  this  
relationship  interesting  is  that,  not  only  is  Fatah  a  strong  supporter  of  the  National  
Committee,  but   it   is  also   the  main  political  party  of   the  PNA.   It   is   the  backbone  
both  of  the  PNA  and  of   its  security  forces,  yet  there  is  clearly  a  big  difference  in  
how  the  two  have  constructed  their  relationship  with  the  BDS  movement.    
  
In   interviews   with   the   author,   both   Omar   Barghouti   and   Mahmoud   El-­‐‑Aloul,  
President  Abbas’  close  confident  and  a  member  of  Fatah’s  governing  committee,  
confirmed  the  strength  of   the  relationship  between  Fatah  and  BDS.  For   instance,  
El-­‐‑Aloul  explained  that  
  
[t]here  has  always  been  a  relationship  between  the  BDS  and  Fatah,  we  even  




relationship  has   been   strengthened   and  our  youth   are   even  more   involved  
with  the  BDS’  activities  and  campaigns.11    
  
Barghouti   went   further,   asserting   that   BDS’   relationship   with   Fatah   actually  
protects  them  from  the  PNA:    
  
The   tension  between   the  PNA  and  BDS   is  very  high.  But   the  PNA  has  not  
attacked  us   since  BDS  has   a   strong  presence   from  Fatah.   In   fact,   Fatah  has  
become  much  more   involved  over   the  past   year.   So   they  would  not   go   on  
record  attacking  the  BDS  movement.12    
  
The   common   ground   between   the   BDS   movement   and   Fatah   that   primarily  
consists   of   the   commitment   to   adopting   nonviolent   resistance   and   popular  
struggle   was   confirmed   during   Fatah’s   sixth   conference,   which   was   held   in  
Bethlehem   in   2009.   In   an   interview   during   the   field   research,   Hasan   Faraj,  
president   of   the   Fatah   Youth  Movement,   explained   that   the   Fatah   youth   chose  
popular   resistance  as   its   strategic  option   in   resisting  occupation.  This  was  borne  
out   by   the   fact   that   popular   struggle   had   been   adopted   as   one   of   Fatah’s  main  
means   of   resisting   occupation   at   the   sixth   conference.  Although   Faraj   explained  
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that  alternatives  -­‐‑  such  as  armed  resistance  -­‐‑  were  still  an  option,  he  summarized  
some  of  the  nonviolent  action  that  Fatah  youth  have  been  involved  in,  as  follows:  
  
Fatah   has  worked   over   the   past   years   -­‐‑   and   especially   so   during   this   past  
year   -­‐‑  with   the  other  popular   resistance  groups  by  having   the  Fatah  youth  
participate  and  lead  their  activities.  For  instance,  in  erecting  tent  villages  on  
land   that   is   designated   by   the   Israelis   for   the   creation   or   expansion   of  
settlements,  such  as  Bab  Shams,  Ahfad  Younes,  Al-­‐‑Karameh  village,    and  Al-­‐‑
Manateer.13    
  
Fatah   Youth   also   organised   the   National   Youth   Week   which   included   many  
activities   such   as   blocking   settler   roads,   a   mass   occupation   entry   and  
demonstration  in  the  Rami  Levi  supermarket  which  is  a  settlement  supermarket,  a  
motor  cycle  flotilla  that  crossed  areas  where  Palestinians  are  normally  not  allowed  
to  enter  for  settlement  security  reasons.  
  
Faraj   explained   that   Fatah   constantly   promote   boycotts   of   both   Israeli   and  
settlement   products   and   Fatah   youth   encourage   international   youth   partners   to  
adopt  a  boycott  of  settlement  products.  Most  recently  at  the  Global  Socialist  Youth  
Union  in  Dortmund,  they  convinced  the  union  to  adopt  a  call  to  label  settlement  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




products   as   such   so   as   to  make   it   clear   to   consumers  where   their   products   are  
coming  from.  “We  consider  ourselves  one  of  the  main  global  players  that  call  on  
boycotting  settlement  and  Israeli  products.”14  
  
Thus,  while  Fatah  supports  both  the  National  Committee  and  the  BDS,  the  PNA  is  
at  odds  with  BDS  and  includes  the  National  Committee  under  its  jurisdiction.  
These  complex  relationships  indicate  the  ambivalent  nature  of  the  PNA’s  
approach  to  boycotts,  as  discussed  in  the  next  section.  
  
7.4  The  Position  of  the  PNA  regarding  Boycotts  
Since  its  inception,  the  PNA  has  been  criticized  for  maintaining  economic  ties  with  
Israel;   indeed,   it   was   slated   for   signing   the   Paris   Protocol,   which   dictates   the  
nature   of   those   ties.   Perhaps,   mostly,   BDS   supporters   have   condemned   it   for  
retaining  the  Protocol  and  abiding  by  it  even  after  it  had  proved  ineffectual,  and  
for  not  allowing  its  economic  relations  with  Israel  to  reflect  the  turbulent  political  
circumstances  of  the  past  decades.  
  
The  Paris  Protocol  was  signed   in  April  1994  and  provides   the   framework   for  an  
interim  economic  agreement  established  as  part  of  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.  It  sets  
out   the   financial   relationship   between   Israel   and   the   PNA,   and   is   based   on   a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




‘customs  union’  model  between   the   two.     Under   this  arrangement,   Israel  was   to  
collect   taxes  on  behalf  of   the  PNA   for  goods   that   are   intended   to  be   sold   in   the  
areas   the   PNA   controls.  A   telling   ramification   of   this   arrangement  was   that   the  
PNA  would  remain  dependent  on  the  Israeli  economy.  Moreover,  although  it  was  
supposed   to   be   an   interim   arrangement   that  was   to   expire  with   the  Oslo   peace  
initiative’s   five-­‐‑year   interim   period,   this   arrangement   has   continued   until   2009.    
On   Israel’s   part,   the   thinking   behind   this   agreement   that   keeps   the   Palestinian  
economy  dependent  on  Israel  was  that  allowing  the  Palestinians  an  independent  
economy   would   be   a   sign   of   sovereignty,   which   it   was   not   willing   to   grant  
(B'ʹTselem,  2012).  
  
In  September  2009,  the  PNA  took  measures  targeting  these  economic  ties  with  the  
Israeli  settlements,  aiming  to  end  them  by  criminalizing  them  as  part  of  a  national  
program  to  ban  and  combat  settlement  products.  Those  who  had  been  sceptical  of  
the   PNA’s   conciliatory   stance   saw   this   as   a   positive   change   in      its   economic  
behaviour,   although   often   stating   that   it   as   ‘better   late   than   never’.   Barghouti  
described   it   as   “an   oasis   in   a   desert,   because   apart   from   this   the   PNA   was  
undermining,  not  only  the  BDS,  but  every  form  of  Palestinian  resistance  to  Israel’s  
occupation  and  apartheid.”15  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Yet  the  fact  that  the  PNA’s  program  was  limited  to  boycotting  settlement  products  
meant  that  people  who  were  in  favour  of  a  full  boycott  of  Israel,  such  as  Barghouti  
and   others,   remained   sceptical   of   the   authority’s   commitment   to   cutting   its  
economic  relationship  with  Israel.  Even  Fatah,  the  dominant  political  party  in  the  
PNA,  went  beyond  boycotting  settlement  products  and  called  for  a   total  boycott  
of   Israel.   In   an   interview  with   the   author,   El-­‐‑Aloul,   who   is   responsible   for   the  
support  for  popular  struggle  within  Fatah,  explained  the  organisation’s  approach:    
  
We,   in   Fatah,   talk   about   boycotting   all   of   Israel’s   products   and   not   just  
settlement  ones.  From  our  experience,  we  now  know   that  what  affects   this  
occupation   most   is   hitting   it   economically.   We   saw   how   important   the  
economic   factor   is   to   occupation.   Therefore,   as   long   as   occupation   exists,  
Fatah’s  stance  is  that  we  must  boycott  its  products.16  
  
However,  on  a  more  practical  level,  since  the  PNA  is  responsible  for  the  livelihood  
of   Palestinians   on   the   West   Bank,   its   understanding   of   the   situation   is   very  
different.   As   El   Aloul   continued,   the   other   side   of   the   story  was   that   “at   times  
[Fatah’s]   hands  were   tied   since   the   PNA  had   to   ensure   that   basic   commodities,  
such   as   food,   were   available   for   the   people.”   Though,   where   possible,   as   he  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




explained,  the  calls  to  boycott  Israeli  products  continued  selectively,  based  on  how  
necessary  they  were:    
  
There  are  always  products   that  we  need   to  keep   flowing   into  our  markets,  
such  as  medicine   and   so  on;  however,   it   is   evident   that   there   are  products  
that  are   in  excess  of  what  we  need  or  that  we  have  alternatives  for  that  we  
should  favour  over  Israeli  products.17  
  
While   the  PNA   is  mainly   led  by  Fatah   leaders,   there   is   a   tension  between   those  
supporting   the   call   for   a   full   boycott   and   its   international   and   national  
responsibilities  to  govern.  It  is  worth  noting  that  all  political  parties  belonging  to  
the  PLO  adopt  similar  positions  to  that  of  Fatah:  they  all  call  for  a  full  boycott  of  
Israel.  However,  at  the  same  time,  it  should  be  understood  that  they  are  not  tasked  
with   governing   peoples’   lives   and   ensuring   that   the   people’s   requirements   are  
met.    
  
This   contradiction   is   seen   differently   by   activists   within   the   West   Bank.   For  
instance,   Juma’   perceives   this   internal   disparity   as   “the   biggest   and   most  
dangerous  threat  to  popular  resistance  and  the  boycott  campaign.”18  On  the  other  
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hand,  when  asked  by  the  author  if  the  apparent  contradiction  indicated  a  breach  
between  the  PNA  and  other  parties,  El-­‐‑Aloul  commented  as  follows:  
  
Not  at  all,  even  people  working  within  the  PA’s  official  bodies  have  the  same  
position   as   Fatah’s.  However,   the  PA   is  much  more   tied  when   it   comes   to  
boycotts   because   of   the   economic   agreements   it   has.   There   is   however   no  
clash   between   the   two   whatsoever.   In   fact,   our   groups   within   Fatah  
contribute   towards   the   PA’s   program   to   boycott   settlement   products   by  
participating  in  its  campaigns;  the  difference  is  that  our  position  goes  beyond  
the  PA’s  as  regards  boycotting  all  Israeli  products.19  
  
Thus,  within  Palestinian   society,   the  PNA   is   the  only  organisation   that  does  not  
call   for   a   full   boycott   of   Israel.  At   the   same   time,   it   is   the   only   one   tasked  with  
governing   Palestinians,   and   the   only   one   that   is   bound   by   treaties   with   Israel.  
Clearly,  this  lack  of  national  cohesion  has  detrimental  effects  on  Palestine’s  ability  
to   challenge   the   Israeli   occupation   effectively   and   this   is   explored   below.   The  
challenge   for  Palestinian  actors   is   to   transform   these  differences   into  a   source  of  
power  based  on   a  positive  perspective   rather   than   seeing   them  as  disadvantage  
and   contradiction.   However,   to   enhance   such   a   perspective,   it   is   critical   to  
improve  communication  and  trust.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




7.5  The  lack  of  a  national  strategy  
As   indicated   above,   although   President   Abbas,   as   well   as   all   other   Palestinian  
leaders,  has  endorsed  nonviolent  popular  struggle  against  Israeli  occupation  and  
has  highlighted  the  importance  of  this,  there  is  still  no  national  popular  resistance  
strategy  or  action  plan.  In  all  my  interviews,  there  was  unanimous  agreement  as  
to  the  need  for  such  a  plan  in  order  to  organize  popular  resistance  and  overcome  
the   challenges   and  drawbacks   it   faces.   For   instance,   in   one   interview,  Al-­‐‑Khatib  
described  the  situation  as  “chaotic  because  there  isn’t  an  overall  national  strategy  
for  popular  resistance  that  can  organize  the  local  committees.”20    
  
The  reason  for  the  lack  of  such  a  strategy,  as  explained  by  all  my  interviewees,  is  
lack   of   political  will.   Nonviolent   action   carried   out   so   far   is   seen   as   a   result   of  
initiatives  taken  by  individuals  in  key  positions  who  support  the  popular  struggle.  
As   Faraj   stated,   “political   will   for   [boycott   of   settlement   products]   is   very  
important   yet   it   exists   on   an   individual   level   and   not   within   the   leadership  
institution  as  a  whole.”21    
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Al-­‐‑Khatib  went  further  by  dismissing  all  political  parties  when  he  stated:  
  
The  political  parties  do  not  have  the  capacity  or  ability  to  carry  out  and  lead  
the  popular  struggle  although  they  always  talk  about  it.  There  is  no  political  
resolve  among  them  in  the  first  place  to  lead  such  a  struggle.  
  
Juma’  also  asserted  that  the  lack  of  political  will  is  what  prevents  a  national  plan  
from   being   established.   However,   according   to   him,   the   lack   of   will   is   due   to  
corruption  within  the  PNA  and  the  same  businessmen  that  are  affiliated  with  the  
PNA   are   the  wholesalers   and   distributors   of   settlement   products,   and   therefore  
have  the  most  to  lose  from  a  boycott.  He  went  on  to  state  that,  “[t]hese  people  will  
do  anything  to  undermine  any  implementation  of  the  boycott;  they  will  eventually  
control   the   police   and   customs   and   prevent   them   from   banning   settlement  
products.”22  
  
Moreover,  Juma’  questions  the  genuineness  of  some  members  of  the  PNA’s  stated  
desire  to  protect  and  ensure  the  well-­‐‑being  of  its  people  in  a  more  general  sense,  
and  he  asserts  that  corruption  is  not  limited  to  thwarting  popular  struggle.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Perhaps   70%  of   the  PNA  are  well   intentioned   and   are   not   happy  with   the  
status  quo,   but   the   remaining  30  percent   are   the  decision  makers.  And   the  
discontented  good  people  don’t  have  the  means  to  change  things.  We  are  not  
talking   about   a   political   movement;   we   are   talking   about   a   bureaucratic  
authority  that  places  its  interests  above  all  else.23  
  
Al-­‐‑Khatib  described  how  different  Palestinian  governments  have   taken  different  
positions   on   popular   resistance   and   have   therefore   varied   in   the   support   they  
have   given.   He   explained   that   this   illustrated   that   such   support   depends   on  
individuals  rather  than  a  cohesive  policy.    
  
We   feel   a   difference   as   government   members   change.   The   support   that  
popular   resistance   gets   is   from   individuals   in   influential   positions   and  not  
because  of  having  a  political  or  official  strategy.  This  is  something  I  am  100%  
convinced   of.   For   instance,   when   Salam   Fayyad   was   Prime   Minister,   he  
personally   believed   in   popular   struggle   and   so   he   supported   it   whole-­‐‑
heartedly.  We  haven’t  seen  anything  from  this  government.”24    
  
When  asked  if   they  had  approached  the  PNA  to  put  a  national  popular  struggle  
plan   together,  Al-­‐‑Khatib   explained   that   they   have   done   so   but   to   no   avail.   The  
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reason  that  he  thought  was  behind  this  reluctance  was  that   the  government  was  
seeking  to  avoid  having  to  bear  with  the  consequences  of  making  such  a  decision.  
Moreover,   he   felt   it   should   be   up   to   the   PLO   to   lead   the   struggle   for   popular  
resistance  and  it  was  their  lack  of  initiative  in  doing  so  that  underpins  the  current  
problems:  
  
Anyone  who  decides  to  lead  the  popular  struggle  will  have  to  deal  with  its  
consequences  such  as  detention  and  various  forms  of  pressure  by  Israel.  The  
popular  committees  therefore  took  the  role  that  the  PLO  should  have  taken.25  
  
However,  the  lack  of  a  national  plan  stems  from  a  deeper  cultural  problem;  this  is  
the  entrenched  approach  that  does  not  appreciate  teamwork  and  the  inclusion  of  
others.   Political   activities   are   usually   individualized,  meaning   credit   is   given   to  
individuals  who  seek   it   for   themselves,  and  do  not  want   to  share   it  with  others.  
However,  when  an  issue  or  policy  is  liable  to  affect  everyone  -­‐‑  as  the  boycotts  do  –  
several  people  representing  the  populace  should  be  involved  in  the  planning  and  
execution,   and   not   just   one   individual.   Faraj,   as   a   Fatah   representative,  
understands  the  importance  of  such  a  plan  but  sees  there  would  still  be  a  need  for  
a  competent  coordinating  body.  He  states:    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




If   there   was   an   official   political   will   on   a   level   that   includes   the   PLO,   all  
political  and  Islamic  parties,  NGOs  and  civil  society  at  large,  we  would  have  
much   better   results.   This   would   need   relevant   experienced   groups   to  
spearhead  the  coordination  among  all  parties  and  to  come  up  with  a  national  
plan  that  resembles  official  political  will  for  popular  struggle  and  boycotts.26  
  
Thus,  developing  a  coherent  approach   to  boycotts   is  continually  undermined  by  
corruption   and   lack   of   political   will,   by   the   fragmented   way   the   resistance  
originally  developed,  and  by  internal  disagreements.  This  undermines  the  ability  
of  the  movement  to  function  in  a  variety  of  ways  as  discussed  below.  
	  
7.6  Repercussions  of  the  lack  of  a  national  strategy  for  popular  resistance:    
As  is  clear   from  the  discussion  above,   there  are  a  variety  of  views  regarding  the  
lack  of  a  unified  position  on  boycotts  and  a  national  popular  struggle  program  in  
terms   of   its   consequences.   Since   the   effectiveness   of   policies   depends   on  
individuals,   the  more   successful   these   individuals   and   their   committees   are,   the  
more  they  are  attacked  by  other  committees  and  individuals  that  have  not  been  as  
successful.   This   increases   the   problems   for   those   with   the   political   drive   to  
challenge  the  occupation.  As  Al  Khatib  stated:  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In  addition   to   the  most  basic  challenges   imposed  by   the   Israeli  occupation,  
and   the  effort   they  exert   to   fragment   the  popular   resistance  movement,  we  
have  to  deal  with  enemies  from  within  the  movement,  and  with  those  who  
fall  for  the  rumours  that  the  occupation  spreads  about.”27  
  
Therefore,  those  in  opposition  to  the  PNA,  such  as  Juma’  and  Barghouti,  consider  
the  attitude  of  that  organisation  to  be  the  main  reason  for  the  boycott  campaign’s  
problems.  Indeed,  Barghouti  considered  it  to  have  such  a  detrimental  effect  on  his  
work  that  he  stated  that  the  best  way  popular  resistance  could  get  help  from  the  
PNA  would   be   for   them   to   “just   leave   us   alone   and   not   interfere”.      Similarly,  
Juma’   explained   that   the   PNA’s   approach   goes   beyond   just   being   unhelpful;  
instead,  he  asserts,  it  actually  persecutes  them  and  stands  in  their  way  in  much  the  
same  way  the  Israelis  do.  He  emphasized  that  this  allows  no  space  or  freedom  for  
popular  resistance  to  operate  in.    
  
Whenever  we  work  on  something  that  the  PNA  or  even  Israel  doesn’t  want,  
Israel  pressures  the  PNA  into  stopping  our  work.  It  interferes  with  it.  And  as  
a   movement,   we   always   feel   that   we   are   under   the   microscope,   we   are  
always  being  closely  watched.  The  more  the  popular  struggle  grows  and  the  
more  achievements  it  has,  the  more  it  is  pressured,  and  the  more  the  activists  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




are  summoned  by  the  security  forces  -­‐‑  and  the  more  they  try  to  fragment  the  
movement.  This  isn’t  apparent  to  the  world,  but  to  us  it’s  very  clear.28  
  
In  relation  to  this,  Al-­‐‑Khatib  mentioned  an  incident  when  their  nonviolent  activity  
was  obstructed  by  the  PNA  and  explained  why  he  thinks  it  did  so,  as  follows:    
  
In  Bitin,  for  instance,  when  we  went  to  erect  a  tent  village  similar  to  that  in  
Bab   Al-­‐‑Shams,   everyone   was   against   us:   the   Governor,   the   head   of   the  
municipality,   the  Palestinian  security   forces   -­‐‑   they  were  all  against  us.  And  
why?  Because  there  were  Israeli  threats  to  withdraw  some  of  the  preferential  
treatment  they  get,  such  as  permits…etc.29  
  
The  village  of  Bab  Al-­‐‑Shams  (The  Sun’s  Gate)  that  Mohammad  refers  to  is  actually  
the  result  of  positive  support  by  the  PNA  in  regards  to  resistance.  Indeed,  it  was  
an  initiative  taken  by  the  PNA  in  collaboration  the  different  national  committees  
and   the   international   solidarity   movement   in   response   to   activists   announced  
desire  to  construct  a  village  on  land  in  an  area  in  Jerusalem  District  threatened  to  
be  confiscated  by   the   Israelis.  Furthermore,   it  was  partially   funded  by   the  PNA.  
The   project   was   a   successful   nonviolent   activity   that   attracted   international  
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attention   to   the  matter   (Darweish  and  Rigby,  2015,  p.  94).  However,   in   the  Bitin  
case,  the  same  support  was  not  forthcoming.  
  
BDS  members,  also,  argue  that  the  PNA  is  obstructing  boycott  campaigns  that  are  
being  carried  out  internationally.  For  instance,  the  Palestinian  ambassador  to  India  
actively  worked  against  the  BDS  movement  and  led  to  the  failure  of  the  initiative  
to  end  trade  agreements  between  India  and  Israel.  Juma’  explained  the  situation:    
  
We   were   outvoted   in   Parliament   due   to   the   opinion   expressed   by   the  
Palestinian   representative.  He  was   invited   to  express  his  opinion  when   the  
vote  came  to  be  held.  He  said  we  need  India’s  help   in  building  bridges   for  
peace  with   Israel  and  not  destroying   them.  This  was  a  very  big  slap   in   the  
face  for  our  supporters  and  the  internationals  working  in  solidarity  with  us.30  
  
The   same   pattern   of   Palestinian   official   positions   regarding   boycotts   and  
international  relations  that  were  disappointing  to  the  BDS  movement  has  become  
visible   in   other   areas   of   the   world.      When   Latin   American   countries   were  
considering  ending  their  arms  deals  with  Israel  as  a  result  of  BDS  campaigns,  the  
Palestinian   representatives   there   explained   that   they   had   no   problem   with  
economic  ties  with  Israel  as   long  as   they  excluded  settlement  products.  As  Latin  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




American  countries  know  little  about  settlements  and  are  unlikely  to  be  concerned  
about   buying   their   products,   this   was   an   empty   gesture   that   did   nothing   to  
support  Palestine’s  stand  against  Israel.    
  
Nevertheless,  there  have  been  various  attempts  and  efforts  to  develop  a  common  
understanding   between   the   BDS   and   official   Palestinian   representatives.   Juma’  
describes  one  of  these  and  its  reception  as  follows:  
  
We  tried  to  agree  with  the  PNA  through  the  Karameh  Fund  and  the  Ministry  
of  Foreign  Affairs  on  a  common  position  paper.  It  was  sent  to  all  Palestinian  
embassies   so   that  we  would  all  be  united,  and  so  we  don’t   contradict  each  
other.     We   agreed   on   the   paper   and   even   on   a  Q&A   sheet,   but   it  was   not  
taken  seriously  by  the  embassies.31    
  
Thus,  these  efforts  were  undermined  by  the  approach  of  the  PNA  and  its  political  
elite  which  were  more  concerned  to  normalize  relations  with  Israel  than  challenge  
them.    
  
The  BDS  movement  in  OPT  claims  that  there  were  similar  incidents  involving  the  
PNA’s  detrimental  effects  on  the  movement,  to  the  extent  that  they  considered  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




embassies   to   have   been   ‘missing   in   action’.   They   assert   that   this   does   not   just  
apply   to  promoting  BDS,   and   that   some   ambassadors  were  directly   involved   in  
undermining   BDS.   In   interview,   Barghouti  mentioned   previous   ambassadors   to  
South  Africa,  Australia,  Washington,  Brazil,  as  examples  of  this.  In  addition,  in  the  
case  of  South  Africa,   the   former  ambassador  undermined  an  official  civil  society  
boycott  against  an  Israeli  foreign  ministry  delegation  that  was  sent  to  counter  BDS  
on   South   African   campuses.   Although   many   people   and   groups   boycotted   the  
delegation   –   and   many   campuses   refused   to   receive   it   -­‐‑   the   Palestinian  
ambassador   in   Johannesburg  did  so.  This  was  secretly  videotaped  by  one  of   the  
Israeli   participants   and   was   put   on   YouTube.   Afterwards   BDS   representatives  
approached   Fatah’s   leadership   to   ask   their   opinion   on   this   event.   Barghouti  
explained  the  response  they  received:  
  
[T]he   particular   leader   we   approached   took   a   very   strong   position   and  
attacked   that   ambassador   by   sending   him   a   very   strong-­‐‑worded   letter.  
Besides   very   few   exceptions,   we   have   not   seen   ambassadors   do   anything  
positive  to  promote  Palestinian  rights  and  effective  accountability  measures  
against  Israel.  So  even  ambassadors  officially  speaking  for  Palestinian  rights  
do  not  counter  Israeli  diplomacy.  There  is  no  confrontation  anywhere  in  the  
world,  our  ambassadors  are  largely  missing  in  action.32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





El-­‐‑Aloul   also   confirmed   the   existing   problems   with   Palestinian   embassies   and  
their  lack  of  support  for  the  BDS  movement  and  commented  on  the  fact  that,  not  
only  were   the   embassies   not   supportive   but   that,   in   return,  many   international  
organisations  were  not  keen  to  have  good  relations  with  them:    
  
I   think   that   there  may  be   some   setbacks  when   it   comes   to   the   relationship  
between  the  two,  yes  -­‐‑  though  it  is  not  one  sided.  Some  of  these  international  
groups  do  not  seek  to  have  a  strong  relationship  with  our  embassies,  and  the  
opposite  is  true.33  
  
Thus,  the  dichotomy  between  the  official  Palestinian  position  and  that  of  the  BDS  
movement   has   far   reaching   effects   on   the   ability   of   the   boycott   movement   to  
organise,   both   locally,   nationally   and   internationally.   At   the   same   time,   the  
Israeli’s  response,  while  attempting  to  restrict  activities  supporting  boycotts  of  any  




     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




7.7  The  Israeli  response  
Over   the   years,   the   Israeli   authorities   have   responded   with   harsh   measures   to  
counter  BDS  activists  and  their  organisations.  For  instance,  in  July  2011,  the  Israeli  
Knesset  passed  the  Prohibition  on  Instituting  a  Boycott  Bill.  This  law  criminalized  
participation  in  campaigns  that  called  for  the  boycott  of  Israel,  even  if  those  calls  
were  limited  to  boycotting  settlement  products  only.  These  stated  that  any  Israeli  
citizen   or   resident   initiating   or   assisting   in   a   boycott   would   be   subject   to   the  
following:  
a. Punitive  damages  of  up  to  30,000  NIS  to  an  injured  party  subject  to  the  
proof  of  any  damage;  
b. Additional   compensatory   damages   according   to   the   damage   rate   and  
subject  to  its  proof.    
(See  Annex  I:  Translation  of  Boycotter’s  law)  
  
While  anyone  from  outside  Israel  would  be  penalised  according  to  the  following:  
  
a. His  right  of  entry   to   Israel  will  be  canceled   for  a  period  of  at   least   ten  
years;  
b. Until  the  end  of  the  period  of  cancelation  of  the  right  of  entry  to  Israel,  




transaction  in  an  Israeli  bank  account,  in  traded  shares  in  Israel,  in  real  
property,  or  in  any  other  asset  that  requires  registry  for  its  transfer.  
(See  Annex  I:  Translation  of  Boycotter’s  law)  
  
The  Israeli  activist  and  member  of  the  Coalition  of  Women  for  Peace,  Rona  Moran,  
explains   that   this   law  was  part  of  a  series  of  anti-­‐‑democratic   laws  passed  by   the  
Knesset.  Moreover,  she  described  it  as  being  one  among  several  methods  that  are  
used  by  right  wing  politicians,  including  the  government,  to  make  activists  think  
twice   before   they   speak   out   about   the   occupation   or   about   any   commercial  
involvement  of  companies   that  support   the  occupation.   In  an   interview  with  the  
author,   she  made  clear   that  “[t]hese   laws  show  how  afraid  of   such  activities   the  
Israeli  government  is”.34  
  
Despite   this,   the   law  was  very  effective  and  resulted   in  the  cessation  of  many  of  
the   activities  of   Israeli   activists   and  organisations   sympathetic   to   the  Palestinian  
cause.    Moran  explained  why  this  was  so  successful,  as  follows:    
  
Every   activist,   whether   an   individual   or   an   organization   who   calls   for  
boycott  publically  will  be  exposed  to  legal  procedures,  they  won’t  be  sent  to  
prison,   but   they   will   have   to   pay   hundreds   of   thousands   of   shekels   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




different  settlers.     Our  legal  advisor  calls   it  a   ‘chilling  affect’  since  although  
the  legal  procedures  haven’t  happened,  the  effect  is  there  -­‐‑  if  you  open  your  
mouth  or  speak  about  it  you  are  in  trouble.  
  
The  effects  of  this  are  apparent  in  the  response  of  newspapers  and  magazines.  For  
instance,  the  ‘972  magazine’,  which  now  refuses  to  publish  articles  or  even  op-­‐‑eds  
on   the   issue   because   they   are   afraid   of   attracting   trouble   since   the   newspaper  
would  be  considered  to  be  promoting  boycotts  if  it  publishes  anything  relating  to  
the   boycotts.   As   Moran   states:   “The   ‘chilling   effect’   is   extremely   efficient   in  
limiting  our  ability  to  complain  about  this.  So,  basically,   I  cannot  tell  you  what  I  
think  about  the  boycott.”35  
  
The   law  is  currently  being   legally  challenged  at   the   Israeli  High  Court  of   Justice  
with  an  appeal  made  by  several  peace  and  human  rights  organisations   in   Israel,  
including   Coalition   of   Women   for   Peace,   Gush   Shalom,   Adalah   (Justice)  
Palestinian   human   rights   organization   in   Israel,   and   the   Association   of   Civil  
Rights   in   Israel   (ACRI).   There   are   debates   amongst   Israeli   peace   and   rights  
organisations  about  the  strategy  towards  boycotts,  some  arguing  for  full  BDS  and  
others  for  a  boycott  limited  to  settlements.  When  asked  whether  the  Israeli  public  
might  receive  it  better  if  the  latter  approach  was  taken,  Yara  Saidi  explained:    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




There  are  a  number  of  Israeli  organizations  that  are  limiting  in  their  call  for  
boycott  and  yet  are  still  not  well  received  by  the  Israeli  public.  Also,  during  
the   course   of   our  work   at  WhoProfits,   we   found   out   how   difficult   it   is   to  
draw  a  clear  line  between  settlement  products  and  Israeli  ones.  We  were  also  
introduced   to   a   complicated   system   of   agreements,   such   as   the   Paris  
protocol,  the  way  the  banks  function,  and  other  issues  that  make  it  difficult  
to   draw   a   clear   line   between   the   two.   WhoProfits   is   basically   a   research  
organization,   and   our   research   has   shown   that   all  major   Israeli   companies  
are  tied  to  the  settlement  economy  in  some  kind  of  way.36  
  
This  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Israeli  public  reflects  their  sense  that  even  limited  
boycotts  betray  them.  As  Moran  explained  in  interview,  unless  pressure  was  put  
on   Israeli   society   to   change,   public   opinion   would   persist   in   believing   that   no  
good  can  come  out  of  the  boycotts.  She  asserted  that  even  if  all  that  remains  of  the  
Israeli  left  wing  were  to  galvanise  themselves  and  organise  together  to  support  the  
cause,  Israeli  public’s  perception  would  remain  unchanged.    
  
Barghouti,  who  holds  Israeli  citizenship,  confirmed  this,  explaining  that  since  the  
law   targets  any   Israeli   that   is   involved   in  any   form  of  boycott,  not   just  BDS,   the  
effect  would  be  the  same  whichever  form  was  argued  for:    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




If  an  Israeli  calls  for  boycotting  tomatoes  coming  from  settlements,  he  will  be  
held   accountable   as   anyone   calling   for   a   full   boycott   would.   They   would  
have  to  pay  huge  fines,  and  of  course  if  they  don’t  pay  the  fines  they  will  go  
to  prison.37  
  
After   the   law  was  passed,   several   Israeli  human   rights  organizations,   as  well   as  
Palestinian  ones,  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court  against  the  law  arguing  that  it  is  
unconstitutional,  and  that  it  violates  the  basic  freedom  of  speech  and  the  right  of  
expression.  Since  the  law  is  being  appealed  against  it  has  not  yet  been  enacted.  
  
To  Barghouti,  the  most  significant  aspect  about  this  law  is  that  it  puts  to  rest  the  
claim  by  the  Israeli  government  and  the  Israeli  lobby  that  BDS  is  ineffective,  and  
that   the   support   of   Israeli   activists   for   BDS   is   insignificant.   As   he   stated   in  
interview,  
  
[i]f  Israeli  support  for  BDS  is  that  marginal,  why  do  they  have  to  pass  such  a  
repressive,   draconian   law   that   exposes   Israel’s   face   as   an   anti-­‐‑democratic  
state?  Clearly,  this  law  was  passed,  and  they  knew  the  price  for  passing  such  
a  law.38    
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While  Israel’s  law  against  boycotters  was  introduced  to  put  an  end  to  boycotts,  it  
seems   to   have   had   a   boomerang   impact.   In   general,   the   law   targets   leaders   or  
leading  activists  of  the  boycott  movement  and  those  activists  dedicate  their  action  
to   convincing   the   public   of   the   importance   and   impact   of   consumer   behaviour.  
The   need   for   the   law   reflects   the   fact   that   the   boycott   movement   has   tangible  
political   implications.  Indeed,  for  those  leaders  and  activists,  nothing  could  have  
proven  their  point  better  than  the  introduction  of  this  law.  Moreover,  as  Barghouti  
noted,   since   the   law  was   passed,   they   have   seen   support   for   BDS  within   Israel  
grow.  He  went  on  to  explain  how  much  BDS  appreciate  the  support  from  within  
Israel:  
We  always   credit   them   -­‐‑   the   information   from   the  Coalition  of  Women   for  
Peace   and  WhoProfits   was   and   remains   crucial   for   the   success   of   groups  
around  the  world.  So  our  Israeli  partners  are  playing  a  very  important  role,  
that’s  undeniable,  and  the  Israeli  government  realizes  that.39  
  
It  is  worth  noting  that  all  of  our  interviewees  saw  Israel’s  response  and  efforts  to  
counter   the   boycott   movements   as   an   indicator   of   their   own   success   and   the  
tangible  impact  that  their  work  has  had.    According  to  Juma’,  an  indicator  of  the  
BDS  movement’s  success  is  the  reaction  it  got  from  Israel  at  the  highest  levels  of  
its  political  echelon.  Israel  has  created  structures  and  committees  to  counter  it,  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




it  has  invested  much  time  and  money  in  this.  To  illustrate  this,  Juma’  stated:  “For  
instance,  in  the  US  alone,  the  Israeli  foreign  department  allocated  six  million  USD  
to  counter  the  BDS’  work  there.”40    
  
Likewise,   El-­‐‑Aloul   referred   to   Israel’s   unbalanced   and   “desperate”   reaction   to  
boycotts  as  an  indicator  to  its  impact.  This  was  borne  out  by  the  extent  to  which  
Israel   went   during   the   second   Intifada   in   making   it   extremely   difficult   for  
Palestinian  products   to  reach   local  Palestinian  markets,  while   it  made   it  easy  for  
Israeli  products  to  reach  them.  
  
Israel  used  different   tactics   to  undermine  and  discredit  Palestinian  activists.         In  
particular,   Al-­‐‑Khatib   went   on   to   describe   some   of   the   tactics   used   to   make   it  
difficult   for   Palestinian   activists   to   carry   out   their   nonviolent   work   against  
occupation  by  spreading  rumours  about  them:  
  
They  start  by  spreading  rumours  about  the  internationals  that  participate  in  
our   activities   of   being   Israeli   spies.   Other   rumours   included   that  
internationals   been   paid   to   participate   in   the   nonviolence   activities.   Israel  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




also  spread  rumours  that  internationals  been  sexually  abused  by  Palestinian  
activists.41  
  
Al-­‐‑Khatib  explains  that  the  price  that  is  paid  for  being  part  of  the  popular  struggle  
is  high.  Consequently,   they  must  always  weigh  up   the  dangers   they   face,  which  
include   being   killed,   wounded,   or   arrested.   However,   all   the   efforts   that   Israel  
makes   to   undermine   the   boycott   movement,   whether   limited   or   full,   actually  
makes   the   activists   more   determined.   As   Al-­‐‑Khatib   stated:   “What   keeps   us  
committed  is  that  all  of  the  previous  efforts  have  been  invested  by  Israel  to  stop  us  
because  we  are  effective  -­‐‑  therefore,  we  must  continue.”42    
  
7.8  Achievements  of  boycott  campaigns  
There  are  a  number  of  different   levels  at  which   the   success  or   failure  of  boycott  
campaigns   can   be   evaluated.   If   we   compare  what   they   call   for   with  what   they  
have   achieved,   none   of   them   can   be   said   to   have   been   entirely   successful   in  
realizing  all   their  goals.  The  goal  of  boycott   campaigns   is  quite   straightforward:  
ending  economic  ties,  as  long  as  injustices  -­‐‑  or  in  this  case  occupation  -­‐‑  exists.    
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Since   by   its   nature,   the   boycott  movement   largely   aims   to   have   an   effect   at   an  
international   level,   the  majority  of  BDS  movement’s  achievements  are  presented  
in   Chapter   8   where   I   discuss   the   role   of   international   support   in   more   detail.  
However,   local   achievements   are   also   very   important   in   terms   of   morale   and  
providing  inspiring  models.  
            State  and  institutional  level  
Besides   the   Arab   League,   which   has   officially   confirmed   its   boycott   of   Israel  
politically   and   economically   since   its   creation   in   1948,   no   country   so   far   has  
adopted   an   official   policy   of   boycotting   Israeli   products   or   divesting   from  
companies   complicit  with   it   as   the   BDS   campaign   aims.  Nevertheless,   there   are  
many   individual   cases   of   groups,   institutions,   or   political   parties   taking   stances  
supporting  BDS;  in  some  cases  investment  has  been  withdrawn,  or  products  have  
been  boycotted  due   to   campaigns   carried  out  by  groups   affiliated  with   the  BDS  
call.    
  
A  good  example  of   an   institution   that   supported   the  BDS   call   is   the  Norwegian  
State   Pension   Fund,   which   divested   its   holdings   in   Elbit,   the   most   important  
Israeli   based   international   military   equipment   producers.   Juma’   explained   that  
they   approached   the   pension   fund   by   challenging   its   code   of   ethics,   which  
prevents   it   from   investing   in   companies   that   have   products   used   in   breach   of  




Separation  Wall,  and  the  boycotters  could  refer  to  the  international  court  decision  
against  the  wall’s  legitimacy  in  2005,  they  were  able  to  persuade  the  pension  fund  
that   it   should   divest   from  Elbit.     Nonetheless,   to   Juma’,   it  was   a   partial   victory  
since,  in  their  communication  with  the  fund,  they  had  listed  35  Israeli  companies  
they   claimed   should   be   divested   from;   among   these   was   the   Israeli   electric  
company  that  provides  electricity  to  settlements.  In  responding  my  question  as  to  
why  he   thought   the   fund  did  not  consider  other  divestments  besides   from  Elbit,  
Juma’  said:  
  
It’s   because   there   is   a   court   ruling   on   the   wall,   an   international   decision  
about  it.  But  its  ok,  we  think  of  the  Elbit  divestment  as  a  great  achievement.  
It’s  big  because  it  laid  the  ground  for  a  military  embargo  against  Israel,  and  
has   triggered   campaigns   for   the   embargo   ever   since.   Today  we  have   a   big  
campaign   in   Brazil,   which   follows   India   by   being   the   second   biggest  
importer  of  Israeli  military  equipment.43    
  
Although   boycott   campaigns   have   not   achieved   all   the   long   term,   aspirational  
goals   they   have   set   forward   so   far,   there   have   been   a   number   of   achievements  
along  the  way  according  to  our  interviewees.  Among  the  most  important  ones  is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




that   their   campaign   has   been   instrumental   in   creating   Palestinian   International  
solidarity  groups  as  we  know  them  today.      
  
The   BDS   movement   established   the   basis   for   real   and   effective   international  
solidarity   and,   as   such,   it   was   well   received.   It   was   hard   for   anyone   to   argue  
against   it   because   it   is   based   on   international   law   and   human   rights.   It   is  
nonviolent  and  follows  highly  regarded  resistance  movements  elsewhere  around  
the   globe;   such   as   India’s   struggle   for   independence,   the   American   civil   rights  
movement,  and  South  Africa’s  struggle  with  apartheid.     Barghouti  described  his  
understanding  of  BDS  in  the  international  arena:  
  
No   one   can   tell   you   that   you   are   a   terrorist   or   that   you   are   exercising  
something   that   is   not   rightful.   It   therefore   created   the   basis   for   the  
international  solidarity  movement,  something  for  them  to  work  around,  and  
it  provided  a  Palestinian  reference  to  all  they  are  doing.  It  is  an  international  
movement   but   it   is   led   here   in   Palestine.   Whenever   international   groups  
want  to  do  anything,  they  write  to  us,  they  coordinate  with  us  here.  So  this  
organized  and  united  the  international  solidarity  movement.44  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In  Barghouti’s  opinion,  the  BDS  call  did  not  create  the  solidarity  movement,  since  
it   already   existed,   but   it   serves   to   provide   a   focus   by   organizing   it.   Barghouti  
asserts   that   the   legitimacy   and   credibility   that   the   movement   enjoys   among  
international  solidarity  movements  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  2005  call  was  signed  
by   an   overwhelming  majority   of   Palestinian   society,   including   all   trade   unions,  
political   parties,   women’s   unions,   and   all   grassroots  movements.   Subsequently,  
traditional   solidarity   groups   started   shifting   their   focus   from   demonstrations,  
writing   letters,   and  protests   against   occupation   to   boycotts.   This  proved   to   be   a  
much  more  effective  way  of  taking  action  against  companies  and  institutions  that  
are  complicit  in  maintaining  the  occupation.  It  was  also  applied  to  other  forms  of  
Israeli  violations  of   Israeli   law;   in  particular,   the  system  of   inequality  within   the  
Israeli  society  itself  and  their  denial  of  refugee  rights.    
  
Thus,   the   BDS   call   provided   a   very   effective   platform   that   empowers   people   in  
solidarity  with  it.  As  Barghouti  explained,  it  gave  them  a  focused  way  of  working  
to  put  more  direct  pressure  on  companies  that  supported  Israel  through  economic  
ties:  
  
Instead   of   shouting   and   burning   Israeli   flags,   people   can   actually   affect  




rights.   I   think   that   by   now,   BDS   has   become   the   most   important   form   of  
solidarity  with  Palestine.45  
  
Jamal   Juma’   compared   the   success   that   they  have  had   so   far  with   the   efforts   to  
boycott  apartheid  in  South  Africa:    
  
If  we  compare  what  we  have  achieved  in  seven  years,  it’s  a  lot.  We  are  very  
young  compared  to  the  boycott  movement  against  apartheid  in  South  Africa,  
for  instance.  There  have  been  achievements  beyond  what  we  expected,  even  
on  official  political  levels  in  such  short  time.46  
  
Over   the   past   years,   since   the   2005   BDS   call   was   made,   many   organizations,  
parties,   and   political   groups   have   joined   and   lobbied   for   the   realization   of   the  
call’s  demands.    
  
There   have   also   been   many   companies   that   severed   their   ties   with   Israeli  
companies   in   respect   of   the   call  made  by   the  Palestinian   civil   society.  There   are  
quite  a  number  of  BDS  events  over  the  past  decade  that  are  considered  successful.  
Annex   H   gives   our   interviewees’   perspective   on   what   they   consider   the   most  
important  achievements.    
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A   main   foundation   of   the   analytical   framework,   introduced   in   Chapter   3   and  
based   on   the   literature   reviewed,   is   the   basic   assumption   informing   nonviolent  
civil   resistance   in   pursuit   of   social   and   political   change   that   all   forms   of  
domination  and  oppression  are  dependent  on  various  sources  of  support;  internal  
and  external,  willing  or  forced.  To  raise  the  economic  price  for  the  Israeli  policies  
regarding  the  OPT,  Palestinians  need  to  take  a  more  strategic  approach  aimed  at  
being   less   dependent   on   the   Israeli   economy   and   more   specifically   on   the  
settlement  economy.  Thus,  there  is  a  need  to  undermine  these  sources  of  income  
for   settlers,   and   therefore   Israel,   through   the   divestment   boycott   of   goods.   The  
legal   sanctions   introduced   by   Israel   must   surely   expose   the   undemocratic   and  
discriminatory   nature   of   such   laws   aimed   at   Israeli   peace   and   human   rights  
organizations  as  well  as  internationals  active  in  solidarity  with  the  Palestinians.  To  
build  on  this,  the  approach  used  by  the  resistance  movement  needs  to  hold  Israel  
responsible   and   accountable   for   its   policies   of   discrimination   and   violation   of  
international  law  and  international  humanitarian  law  in  the  OPT.  In  line  with  this,  
it   is   important   to   develop   a   strategy   that   “shames   the   power”   of   Israel,  
internationally   and   appeals   to   liberal   voices   in   the   world   including   those   of  





It   is   clear   that   different   popular   struggle   groups   do   not   agree   on   the   approach  
adopted  by  others  and  there  are  many  drawbacks  that  need  be  addressed  in  order  
to   organize   their   action   and   improve   its   productivity.   However,   the   main  
indicator  of   their   impact  and  effectiveness   lies   in   the   response  adopted  by   those  
who   they   target;   in   particular,   that   Israel   has   introduced   legislation   that  
criminalizes   those   involved  with   boycott   campaigns.  While   this   persecutes   and  
penalizes  the  individuals,  organizations,  and  even  countries  that  adopt  measures  
against  economic  ties  with  Israel,  whether  limited  or  full  boycotts,  it  also  indicates  
Israel’s  fear  of  the  ability  of  boycott  movement  to  affect  their  economy.    
  
In   terms   of   the   internal   differences,   there   are   clear   parameters   that   explain   the  
PNA’s  position  on  boycotts:  It  is  bound  both  by  economic  agreements  with  Israel  
and  the  responsibility  of  providing  its  people  with  the  commodities  and  services  
that   are  key   for   their  wellbeing.  Groups  other   than   the  PNA  do  not   share   these  
constraints   and  would   prefer   that   the   PNA  would  widen   its   boycott   activity   to  
include  all  Israeli  products.  Whether  this  is  viable  or  not,  it  is  important  that  each  
school  of  thought  can  and  should  see  the  other  as  integral  to  its  activity.  Through  
this,   the   PNA   can   capitalize   on   the   pressure   exerted   by   its   popular   committees  
and  consider   it   instrumental   in  pressuring  Israel   for  diplomatic  gains.  As  for  the  
popular  struggle  groups,  while  better  understanding  between  them  and  the  PNA  
would  mean  they  enjoyed  more  freedom  and  support  in  what  they  call  for.  As  it  




with  it  they  are  likely  to  achieve  more  effective,  durable,  and  attainable  gains.  It  is  
also   possible   to   positively   use   the  difference   between   civil   society   organisations  
and  the  PNA  to  increase  the  leverage  on  Israel  rather  than  to  fuel  an  approach  of  
condemning  and  undermining  each  other.  
  
Moreover,  the  boycott  movement  is  not  limited  to  the  PNA’s  jurisdiction  and  the  
BDS   call,   which   initially   involved   170   Palestinian   organisations   and   political  
groups,  went  on   to  attract  a   far  greater  number  of   international   supporters   than  
the   activities   of   the   PNA.   Those   supporters   in   turn   worked   to   pressure   their  
respective  countries  and  companies  to  boycott  both  Israel  and  Israeli  settlements,  
and  divest  from  them  and  this  has  become  a  major  part  of  the  boycott  movement.  
The   next   chapter   therefore   explores   the   relationships   those   international   groups  
have  with  Palestinian  popular  struggle  committees,   their  different  positions,  and  













  The  role  of  the  international  solidarity  movement:    
International  activists’  views,  activities,  and  interactions  
  
8.1  Introduction  
The   purpose   of   this   chapter   is   to   take   a   closer   look   at   the   role   played   by  
international   supporters   and   their   involvement   in   the   boycott   movement.   The  
chapter   will   be   dedicated   to   the   information   drawn   from   interviews   that   I  
conducted   with   key   leading   international   activists   in   2013   as   part   of   the   field  
research  for  this  study.  A  list  of  these  interviewees  is  given  in  Annex  A.  
     
As   discussed   in   previous   chapters,   there   are   two  main   approaches   adopted   by  
groups   boycotting   Israel.   The   first   champions   a   full   boycott   of   Israel   and   is  
represented   by   groups   that   have   signed   the   BDS   Call   produced   by   Palestinian  
civil   society   in   2005;   while   the   second   group   favours   a   boycott   limited   to  
settlement   products   and   ending   economic   ties   with   settlement   businesses.   To  
complement  the  arguments  for  and  against  these  two  approaches,  as  presented  in  
Chapter  7  from  the  point  of  view  of  those  campaigning  from  within  Palestine  and  






The  second  section  of  the  chapter  then  examines  the  specific  objectives  and  overall  
goals  of  the  different  international  groups  supporting  boycotts.  This  is    important  
to   give   a   background   context   through   which   to   evaluate   the   impact   of   their  
campaigns,   and   assess   whether   the   objectives   of   individuals   leading   the  
campaigns   are   coherent  with   their   organization’s   stated   goals.   This   section   also  
discusses   the   links   between   the   boycotters’   stated   objectives   and   their   more  
general   understanding  of   how   their   activities   contribute   to   the   resolution   of   the  
Palestinian   Israeli   conflict.  After   looking   specifically  at   the   stance  of   the  PNA   in  
relation  to  international  boycotts,  this  chapter  then  discusses  the  specific  European  
initiatives   that   were   introduced   in   the   previous   chapter   and   closes   with   an  
evaluation  of  the  success  of  the  various  approaches.  
  
8.2   Boycott   of   settlement   products   versus   full   boycott   of   Israel   in   the  
international  context  
When   the   PNA   launched   its   program   to   ban   settlement   products   in   the   global  
markets,   it  was   looking   to  change   the  business  practices  of  countries  around  the  
world  solely  in  terms  of  economic  ties  with  settlements.  However,  the  Palestinian  
BDS   National   Council   (BNC)   was   very   wary   of   the   PNA’s   campaigning   on   an  
international  level  because  they  were  concerned  that  this  would  hinder  the  efforts  
invested  by  the  BNC.  To  pre-­‐‑empt  this  occurring,  the  BNC  held  meetings  with  the  





The  most  specific  and  central  concern  was  that  those  who  had  already  signed  the  
BDS   call  would   retract   from   this   and   turn   their   attention   to   activities   limited   to  
settlement   products,   so   as   to   be   in   line   with   the   PNA’s   limited   approach.  
Furthermore,   at   a   more   general   level,   the   BNC   was   afraid   that   having   two  
different   calls  made  by   the  Palestinians  would   confuse   international   supporters,  
and  possibly   fragment   the  boycott  movement.47  Supporting   this  argument,  Sarah  
Colborne,   director   of   the   Palestine   Solidarity   Campaign   (PSC),   explained   in   an  
interview  with  the  author  that:    
  
The  danger  arising  from  making  (limited)  calls  for  boycott  is  that  it  may  lead  
movements  that  take  a  stronger  position  to  withdraw  from  this  a  bit.  So,  for  
instance  with  the  TUC,  we  were  afraid  that   they  would  go  back  to   limiting  
their  boycott  to  just  settlement  products  rather  than  all  companies  complicit  
with  occupation.48  
  
Nevertheless,  the  PNA’s  program  did  in  fact  raise  the  issue  of  a  boycott  limited  to  
settlements   for   discussion;   indeed,   it   took   these   discussions   to   the   level   of  
questioning  the  effectiveness  of  the  BDS  movement  as  opposed  to  that  of  a  limited  
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  This	  was	  expressed	  by	  both	  Omar	  Barghouti	  and	  Jamal	  Juma’	  during	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  author	  at	  
the	  NEF	  headquarters	  in	  July	  2010.	  	  




boycott.   Perhaps   Sarah   Colborne’s   and   the   BNC’s   fears   were   borne   out   in   the  
change   of   position   of   the   political   officer   for   the   Council   for   Advancement   of  
Arab-­‐‑British   Understanding   (CAABU)   and   director   of   ProsperPalestine’s   UK  
office,   Joseph   Brown.   Although   he   had   been   active   in   supporting   BDS   as   a  
university   student,   after   getting  more   involved   politically,   he   felt   that   the   BDS  
position  was  difficult  to  promote  due  to  lack  of  political  arguments  in  its  favour.  
He  explained  his  change  in  thinking  in  an  interview  with  the  author:    
  
I  did  change  after  getting   involved  in  politics   in  a  more  practical  way.  You  
need  to  be  able  to  explain  the  goals  and  how  they  are  going  to  help  people.  
Today,  I  don’t  think  you  can  do  that  through  an  academic  boycott  or  through  
a  full  boycott  of  Israel  -­‐‑  simply  because  the  political  discussion  is  not  there.  
So  we   need   to   be   able   to   frame   things   and   prove   to   people   that   it  makes  
sense.  Although  a  full  boycott  is  not  unprecedented  since  it  worked  in  South  
Africa,  in  Israel’s  case  I  think  we  will  lose  the  argument  very  quickly.49  
  
This   argument   is   in   line   with   the   approach   of   those   who   favoured   a   call   for   a  
limited  boycott  of  settlement  products  made  the  following  reasoning.     A  boycott  
solely  of  the  settlements  could  win  over  some  sections  of  Israeli  society.  In  relation  
to   this,   some   interviewees  argued   that   it   is   important   to  support  and  strengthen  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the  voices  in  Israeli  society  that  support  the  Palestinians’  struggle  to  end  the  Israeli  
occupation  of  the  1967  area.  A  limited  boycott  is  something  that  Israeli  pro  peace  
activists   can   support;   however,   they   are   unlikely   to   be   part   of   a   campaign   that  
calls  on  them  to  boycott  themselves  as  Israelis.    
  
Luisa  Morgantini,  former  Vice  President  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  a  public  
figure  that  has  herself  committed  to  the  BDS  call,  takes  a  slightly  different  stance  
on  this.  She  explained  in  an  interview  that  her  work  and  campaign  focus  on  ties  
with  settlements  and  specific  Israeli  products.  While  supporting  the  BDS  call,  she  
exempts  herself  from  fully  committing  to  its  conditions  on  the  grounds  that  not  all  
Israelis  were  anti-­‐‑Palestinian  and  so  she  feels  a  cultural  boycott  would  be  counter-­‐‑
productive:    
  
I  do  personally  support  the  BDS  call,  however,  not  all  of  it.  For  instance,  I  am  
against   an  academic  and   cultural  boycott.   I   think   that   some   Israelis  have  a  
good  position  on  Palestine  and  their  activity  is  not  carried  out  for  the  sake  of  
normalization  with  occupation.  
  
It  is  for  this  reason  that  Israeli  pro-­‐‑Palestinian  organizations,  such  as  ‘Who  Profits  
from  Occupation’,  Gush  Shalom,  and  ‘the  Coalition  of  Women  in  Black’,  exist  and  




while   maintaining   their   support   for   Israel   proper,   they   are   able   to   support   the  
anti-­‐‑occupation  movement  without  being  closed  down.    
  
Thus,  the  limited  boycott  movement  takes  a  pragmatic  approach,  arguing  that  it  is  
more  politically  viable  to  introduce  a  ban  on  trade  with  settlements  rather  than  a  
ban   on   trade  with   Israel.   This   becomes   especially   true  when   one   considers   that  
according   to   international   law   the   settlements   are   illegal,   as   discussed   in   the  
previous   chapter.  Therefore,   a  ban  on   settlement  products  would  allow  activists  
and  supporters   to  capitalize  on   the  existing  official  position  of  states  around   the  
world  by  suggesting  selective  boycotts  of  critical  markets  such  as  the  arms  trade.  
For  instance,  as  Morgantini  explains:    
  
I   would   like   the   European   Commission   to   go   beyond   just   boycotting  
settlement   products   to   selective   boycotts   of   Israel,   such   as   the   arms   trade.  
And   if   you   look   at   the  BDS   campaign   in   general,  where   they   succeeded   is  
only  when  they  called  to  boycott  settlement  products  …  I  do  think  that  they  
[the  BDS  movement]  should  focus  their  campaign  more  clearly.50  
  
Moreover,   states   around   the   world,   including   the   EU   states,   have   repeatedly  
confirmed  their  objection  to  full  boycotts  of  Israel.  In  fact,  as  illustrated  in  Chapter  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




6,   Israeli   products   actually   receive   preferential   treatment   when   entering   the  
European  markets;  while  such  treatment  is  denied  to  settlement  products.    
  
On  a  more  practical   level,   there  are  particular   significant  difficulties   involved   in  
boycotting   Israeli   technology   because   it   is   included   in   such   a   wide   range   of  
products.  Indeed,  Israel  has  recently  been  dubbed  “the  start-­‐‑up  nation”  due  to  the  
large  number  of   successful   companies   that  have  been   set  up   in   the   country   that  
have  delivered  globally   renowned  products   and   services.   Israeli  products   are   in  
fact  found  in  most  consumer  items  that  are  now  considered  essential,  such  as  cell-­‐‑
phones,  mobile  applications,  and  computers.  The  global  smartphone  industry,  for  
instance,  is  divided  between  Google’s  Android  operating  system  and  Apple’s  IOS,  
both  of  which  have  research  and  development  facilities  in  Israel.  To  illustrate  this  
further,  Google’s  very  own  co-­‐‑founder,  Eric  Schmidt,  dedicated  a  letter  published  
by  Calcalist  magazine  to  praising  Google’s  partnership  with  Israel  and  calling  the  
nation   a   “tech   miracle”   (Jewish   Business   News,   2014).   Indeed,   the   Israeli  
Advanced   Technology   Industries’   first   quarter   2014   report   shows   that   over   80  
Fortune   500   companies   have   research   and   development   bases   in   Israel.   These  
include   the   following   companies,   among   others:   “Intel’s   largest   development  
Center   that   counts   for   70%  of   its   revenue,   IBM’s   largest   research   lab   out   of  US;  
Microsoft’s   2   development   centers;   HP’s   2nd   largest   development   center;   an  





These   considerations   make   clear   the   challenge   involved   in   boycotting   such   big  
international   companies  given   their  widespread   influence  and   their   far   reaching  
infiltration  into  daily  life  –  including  that  in  Palestine  itself  through  the  technology  
that  we  all  use  and  which  supports  our  infrastructures.  This  point  was  confirmed  
by  Morgantini:  “I  cannot  boycott  Intel  for  instance,  or  other  Israeli  products,  since  
they  are  so  widespread  and  we  depend  on  them.”51  Thus,  at  an  international  level,  
limited  forms  boycott  are  clearly  more  popular  than  the  full  version  advocated  by  
BDS.  However,  whether  this  is  more  effective  in  achieving  the  goals  described  in  
the  next  section  will  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter.  
  
8.3  The  overall  goal  of  the  boycott  movement  
Over   the  past   two  decades,   the  PLO  and   Israel  have  been   trying   to   reach  a   two  
state   solution,   in   which   a   Palestinian   state   would   live   peacefully   in   the   areas  
occupied  by   Israel   in   1967,  next   to   Israel.  Regardless  of  how   the   two   sides  have  
gone  about  trying  to  achieve  this  vision,  it  has  at  least  been  the  official  position  of  
both.   Nevertheless,   for   the   past   two   decades,   the   two   state   solution   has   had  
supporters   and   objectors   within   each   side’s   civil   society,   organizations,   and  
political  groups.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The  vast  majority  of  Palestinian  (and  pro-­‐‑Palestinian)  supporters  of  the  two  state  
solution   understand   the   borders   between   the   two   states   as   lying   more   or   less  
along   the   1967   borders.   This   is   a   major   reason   why   they   object   to   any   Israeli  
civilian  presence  on  the  Palestinian  side  of  the  1967  borders  since  this  constitutes  
part  of  the  land  where  they  hope  to  see  their  future  state.        Supporters  of  the  two  
state   solution   are   therefore,   understandably,   at   least   in   favour   of   a   boycott   of  
settlement  enterprises.    Although  their  ultimate  goal  is  a  two  state  solution,  which  
in   effect   recognizes   Israel,   some   go   beyond   supporting   a   limited   boycott   of  
settlements  to  calling  for  a  full  boycott  of  Israel.  Their  argument  is  that  settlements  
and   their   economy   are   the   work   of   the   state   of   Israel   and   its   government;  
therefore,  it  should  be  targeted  as  a  whole.  This  position  was  supported  by  Steve  
Hucklesby,  policy  officer  at  the  Methodist  Church,  in  an  interview  with  the  author  
-­‐‑  when  referring  to  his  personal  position  rather  than  that  of  the  Methodist  Church.  
He  stated  that  “when  it  comes  to  a  boycott  of  Israel,  I  can  see  the  validity  of  that  
[full]  call.”52  
  
Palestinians  who  object   to   the   two  state  solution  do  so  on   the  grounds   that   they  
are  seeking  to  establish  a  one  state  solution;  this  may  be  either  a  Palestinian  state,  
or  an  Israeli  one  in  which  Palestinians  take  part  in  its  political  system  and  aim  to  
become  a  majority  in  the  future.  Therefore,  those  in  favour  of  the  latter  possibility  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




may,  actually,  ultimately  desire  a  Palestinian  one  state  solution  because   they  see  
the   two   state   solution  as   either   too  much  of   a   compromise  or   too  unrealistic.   In  
assessing  the  effectiveness  of  campaigns  and  linking  them  with  their  overall  goal,  
it   is   useful   to   consider   whether   there   is   any   correlation   between   a   particular  
strategy   and  how   its   proponents   foresee   the   resolution   to   the   Israeli   Palestinian  
conflict.  
  
Colborne   does   not   seem   to   find   any   contradiction   between   support   for   limited  
versions  of  the  boycott  campaign  and  the  PSC’s  desired  resolution  to  the  conflict,  
since,  as  she  explained  in  an  interview  with  the  author,   the  organization  has  not  
taken   a   position   on   whether   it   favours   a   two   state   or   one   state   solution;   and  
although  officially  it  supports  a  full  boycott,  it  has  no  problem  if  members  do  not  
do  so  as  it  does  not  consider  this  to  undermine  its  aims:53  
  
Basically,   people   join   PSC   if   they   are   in   agreement   with   our   aims   and  
objectives.  We  never   really  had  an   issue  with  members   saying  “I’m  sorry   -­‐‑  
I’m  only   in   favour  of  a  boycott  of   settlement  products.”   In   fact,   I   think   the  
desire   for   a   full   boycott   is   stronger   now.   The   important   thing   in   our  
movement  is  the  sense  that  everyone  can  be  included.54  
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Thus,   the  PSC  sees   this  as  an   individual  choice   that  members  can  make  on  their  
own,   a   choice   that   does   not   affect   the   organization   or   its   behaviour   in   any  
significant   way.   Indeed,   Colborne   suggested   that   an   international   organization  
such   as   the   PSC   that   favoured   one   form   of   resolution   over   the   other  would   be  
involved   in   “a   form   of   colonialism”   since   it   is   something   that   the   Palestinians  
should   be   able   to   decide   on;   while   non-­‐‑Palestinian   supporters   should   support  
them  in  whatever  choice  they  make.  She  elaborated  on  this  as  follows:    
  
As  non-­‐‑Palestinians,  we  should  support  their  democratic  right  to  determine  
their   own   future,   and   it   is   up   to   us   to   crack   open   the   opportunities   for  
Palestine   to   be   debated   at   an   international   level   and   to   amplify   the  
Palestinian  voices.  It’s  not  up  to  us  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Palestinians,  but  
it  is  up  to  us  to  ensure  that  the  media  here  carries  the  Palestinian  story.55  
  
Similarly,   the  Methodist   Church   does   not   favour   one   resolution   over   the   other;  
however,   rather   than   seeing   it   as   solely   an   issue   for   Palestinians   to   decide,  
Hucklesby   emphasized   that   it   should   be   open   to   debate   among   those   directly  
involved.  As   he   explained:   “We   believe   that   any   solution   should   be   a   result   of  
negotiations   between   Israelis   and   Palestinians”.56  A   clear   distinction   therefore  
exists   between  what   the   PSC   seeks   to   amplify   -­‐‑   that   is,   the   “Palestinian   voice”  
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regardless   of   Israeli   input   -­‐‑   and   the   approach   of   the   Methodist   Church   in  
supporting   the   result   of   negotiations   between   Israelis   and   Palestinians.   These  
differences  are   likely   to  have  evolved   into   the   respective   types  of  boycott   called  
for  by  each  of  the  two  organizations.    
  
Adri  Nieuwhof,   one   of   the   founders   of   the  BDS  movement,   and   supports   a   full  
boycott  as  she  stated  in  an  interview:  “Like  in  the  case  of  apartheid,  its  Israel  that  
is   violating   international   law   by   maintaining   occupation.   Therefore   there   is  
enough   reason   to   boycott   any   activity   of   Israel.”  However,   she   recognized   that  
some  of  their  goals  had  been  achieved  through  the  limited  boycott.  For  instance,  
when  asked  about  a  recent  EU  decision  that  discourages  official  EU  economic  ties  
with  settlements  (discussed  in  more  detail  below),  she  explained  that:    
  
I   think   [the   EU   decision   is]   very   important.   And   the   BDS   movement   has  
some  lessons  to  learn  from  it.  Because  by  focusing  on  settlement  activities  we  
have  achieved   this   step.   It’s  not   the   end   for  me  and   I   think   the  EU  should  
sanction  Israel  for  its  violation  of  international  law  but  that  will  not  happen  
in  the  near  future.  It’s  a  great  step  but  it’s  not  the  end  for  me.  I  think  we,  the  
people,   are   the   governments   of   our   countries   and   so  we,   the  people,  must  
make  a  stand.57  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Clearly,   this   quotation   explicitly   states   that   the   achievement   in   terms   of   the   EU  
policy  was  a   result  of  “focusing  on  settlement  activities”.     However,  while   there  
may   seem   to   be   a   contradiction   in   this,   the   financial   loss   is   not   the   issue.   As  
Nieuwhof  explained,  what  is  important  is  to  have  activities  that  can  really  tell  the  
story  of  the  Israeli  occupation  of  Palestine.  This,  she  made  clear,  is  the  aim  of  the  
BDS  movement.   Thus,  when   Israeli   settlement   enterprises   lose   contracts   it   does  
help   the   Palestinian   cause   but   what   really   hurts   Israel   is   the   tainting   of   their  
image.    
  
Luisa  Morgantini,  on  the  other  hand,  does  see  a  link  between  the  type  of  boycott  
and  the  sought  resolution  and  explained  her  position  in  her  interview:    
  
I  think  it’s  extremely  important  to  focus  on  settlement  products  because  that  
is  where   Israel   is   totally   illegal.   I   think   that   it   is   important   that   this   comes  
first   from   Palestinians,   and   that’s   why   I   thought   it   was   great   when   the  
Palestinian   government   –   you   –   decided   to   boycott   settlement   products.   It  
tells   the  world   that  Palestinians  are  acting   in  accordance  with   international  
law;   the   state   of   Israel   does   exist,   however,   they   do   not   recognize   the  
illegality  of  settlements  where  the  future  Palestinian  state  should  be.58  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




It  must  be  noted,  however,   that  Morgantini   is   a  veteran  politician   that  has  been  
influenced  by  political   circles  and   international   legal   realities.  The  PSC  and  BDS  
National  Council   on   the  other  hand   represent   civil   society   and,   as   such,   are  not  
bound  to  adhere  to  international  politics  and  state  decisions  on  Palestine.    
  
8.4  The  international  boycott  movement  and  the  PNA  
Although   the   campaigning   work   of   the   PNA   is   examined   in   detail   in   the   next  
chapter,  here,  it  is  useful  to  clarify  its  relations  with  the  international  movement  to  
provide  more  understanding  of  international  activists’  viewpoints.  As  mentioned  
earlier,   the  PNA   through   the  NEF  seeks   to  build   constructive   relationships  with  
global  organizations  that  have  signed  on  to  the  BDS  call  made  by  Palestinian  civil  
society   organizations   and   political   parties   in   2005.   Although   the   PNA’s   call   for  
boycott  was   limited   to   settlements,   it   officially   had   no   desire   to   undermine   the  
work  carried  out  by  the  international  boycott  movement  over  the  years  since  the  
call  was  made.    
  
Previous  to  the  existence  of  any  official  body  such  as  the  NEF,  which  served  as  a  
focal  point   for  matters   relating   to  boycott,   had   led   to   a  bumpy  and   inconsistent  
relations  between  the  PNA  and  international  organizations  that  had  adopted  the  
BDS  approach.  However,  despite  the  role  played  by  the  NEF,  there  is  still  tension  




around   the  world,   and   the  BDS  movement.     This  view  was   clearly   expressed   in  
my  interviews  conducted  with  leading  members  of  the  BNC  such  as  Jamal  Juma’  
and  Omar  Barghouti.  
  
Since  the  launch  of  its  program  to  ban  and  combat  settlement  products,  the  PNA  
had   every   intention   to   have   its   local   efforts   in   Palestine   replicated   in   other  
countries.  However,  there  were  a  number  of  constraints  that  formed  barriers  to  its  
making  its  campaign  global.    
  
To   overcome   those   issues   the   PNA   followed   the   following   two   strategies:   1)   It  
established  an  international  organization  that  both  hides  its  link  with  the  PLO  and  
provides   a   new   focal   point   for   international   affairs   on   boycotting   settlement  
products.59  This  newly  established  organization  was  ProsperPalestine,  which  was  
launched  in  April  2011  at  an  event  in  the  British  Houses  of  Commons.  (See  Annex  
D:  ProsperPalestine  report).  2)   It  carried  out   its  activities   in  partnership  with  the  
global  BDS  movement.    
  
ProsperPalestine  was  created   to  serve  as  a   link  between  the  NEF’s   local  work   in  
Palestine,   the   BNC,   international   organizations   carrying   out   its   campaigns,   and  
Palestinian  Embassies.  ProsperPalestine  was  the  international  arm  of  AL-­‐‑Karamah  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




campaign.  It  was  to  have  branches  in  several  countries  around  the  world  and  was  
designed   to   capitalize   on   the   NEF’s   activity   in   Palestine   and   through   this   to  
encourage  support  in  the  EU.  It  aimed  to  refine  the  discussion  about  settlements  
and  to  expose  and  clarify  how  they  disrupt  the  Palestinian  economy  and  thereby  
any  prospects  for  peace.    Joseph  Brown,  (the  director  of  ProsperPalestine’s  branch  
in  the  UK)  explained  their  approach  as  follows:    
  
We   were   trying   to   present   a   new   understanding   and   a   new   network   of  
understanding   around   settlements.   So   for   the   first   time   we   were   pushing  
forward  with  a  single-­‐‑issue,  watertight  set  of  arguments,  and  taking  that  to  a  
number  of  organizations  as  a  forum.60  
  
However,   the   first   step   taken   by   ProsperPalestine   was   to   ameliorate   the  
relationship   between   the   PNA   and   the   BNC,   and   improve   its   channels   of  
communication   with   Palestinian   Embassies;   and,   to   support   this,   the   BNC  was  
consulted  during   the   early   stages   of   creating  ProsperPalestine.   In   a   letter   to   the  
Palestinian   embassies   through   the   Palestinian   Ministry   of   Foreign   Affairs,61  the  
newly   created   organization   explained   the   details   of   its   objectives.   In   summary,  
these  were  as  follows  (see  Annex  C  for  the  full  letter):    
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1) To   remove   the   obstacles   standing   in   the   way   of   the   PNA   directly  
campaigning  in  other  countries  for  a  ban  on  settlement  products.    
  
2) To  create  a  constructive  relationship  with  the  BDS  movement.  
  
3) To  make  clear   the  official  Palestinian  position  on  questions  relating  to   the  
BDS  movement   based   on   advice   from   the   Palestinian   government  media  
centre.  Through  this,   to  ensure   that  Palestinian  officials  do  not  go  beyond  
the  legal  and  political  constraints  that  limit  the  PNA’s  position,  while  at  the  
same  time  not  undermining  the  BDS  movement.    
  
The   relationship   between   the   PNA   and   ProsperPalestine   was   kept   highly  
confidential.  Regular  reports  of  its  activity  were  shared  only  with  a  few  Palestinian  
stakeholders.  However,  ProsperPalestine  initiative  was  not  followed  through  and  
it  lasted  for  less  than  a  year.  It  was  officially  launched  only  in  the  UK,  Spain,  and  
Italy,  mainly  due  to  financial  constraints  that  occurred  because  funds  were  never  
officially  allocated  to  it  by  the  PNA.  This  was  perhaps  the  price  that  was  paid  for  
operating   under   the   radar,  with   no   direct   link   to   the   PNA;   it  meant   that   rather  
than  having  its  own  budget,  it  shared  a  limited  amount  of  the  budget  allocated  to  
run  the  NEF.  Moreover,  the  funds  that  were  transferred  to  ProsperPalestine  were  
made   through   individuals   so   that   they   would   not   be   easily   traced   back   to   the  




We  weren’t  able  to  finish  it  because  of  funding  constraints,  but  had  we  been  
able  to  finish  it  I  think  we  would  be  talking  about  something  very  different  
today   in   terms   of   British   policy.   What   I   mean   by   that   is   this   current  
government  would  have  at  its  heels  a  coalition  of  organizations  from  above  
and  below  together  talking  about  the  economic  ramification  of  settlements  -­‐‑  
and  how  they  stand  in  the  way  of  building  a  Palestinian  state.  On  top  of  that,  
the   complicity  of   the  European  Union   through   their   trade  with   settlements  
[undermined  us].  
  
It   is  perhaps  because  he  was  one  of   the   few  people  who  knew  who  was  behind  
ProsperPalestine   that  Omar  Barghouti  described   the  PNA’s  program   to  ban  and  
combat   settlement  products   as   an   “oasis”   in   relation   to   its   approach   to   the  BDS  
movement.   ProsperPalestine’s   efforts   and   aims   to   develop   a   constructive  
relationship   with   the   movement   were   in   his   view   a   very   positive   step.   As   for  
others   in   the   BDS   movement,   they   remained   sceptical   and   wary   of   the   PNA’s  
program,  given   the  mistrust   that  had  accrued   from   their  previous  dealings  with  
the   PNA.   When   commenting   on   the   NEF   and   its   programs,   Adri   Nieuwhof  
explained  her  misgivings  as  follows:    
  
I  felt  it  to  be  a  bit  tricky  for  a  government  to  be  actively  involved  in  a  boycott  




seemed   as   if   they  wanted   to   compete  with   it   or   adopt   it.   You  might   have  
noticed  that  in  our  first  contacts.62  
  
Some  argue  that  the  BDS  movement  represented  a  political  and  ideological  view  
that  is  fundamentally  in  conflict  with  the  PNA,  and  see  this  as  not  reflecting  well  
on   the   movement.   Morgantini   summarized   her   disappointment   with   the   BDS  
movement’s  non-­‐‑cooperation  with  the  PNA  and  the  NEF  as  follows:    
  
The  people  who  called  for  BDS  are  against  the  PLO,  they  are  anti-­‐‑institution  
and  anti-­‐‑establishment.  I  remember  when  an  incredible  and  great  campaign  
was  carried  out  by  the  Palestinian  government  against  settlement  products,  
instead   of   them   saying   ‘Great!’   and   seeing   their   goals   as   shared,   they  
understood   it   as   the   Palestinian   Authority’s   way   to   undermine   the   BDS  
movement.  So  I  think  ideology  delivers  a  negative  role  sometimes.  Instead  of  
working  together  and  seeing  the  common  ground  they  criticize.63  
  
At  the  same  time,  Morgantini  did  note  the  absence  of  Palestinian  embassies  when  
it   came   to   the   boycott   movement.   However,   she   did   not   perceive   this   as   an  
obstacle  as  some  BNC  members  expressed  in  interviews  referred  to  above;  rather  
she  explained  that  “not  every  country  is  the  same,  its  different  from  place  to  place.  
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I   don’t   think   that   [the   embassies]  were   actively   against   our   campaigns   but   they  
were  generally  not  present.  That  in  itself  can  be  seen  as  a  negative  role.”64  
  
Others  argue  that  there  was  no  need  for  the  PNA  to  launch  such  a  campaign  in  the  
first  place.  For  instance,  Adri  Nieuwhof  explained  her  viewpoint  that  although  the  
NEF’s  support  had  been  useful  at  times,  its  support  would  have  been  much  more  
effective  if  it  had  actually  joined  the  BDS  movement:    
  
I  liked  the  photos  of  the  president  setting  fire  to  the  Ahava  products,  but  you  
didn’t   need   a   campaign,   you   could   have   done   that   anyhow.   And,   for  
instance,  in  the  court  case  against  Veolia,  the  Negotiation  Support  Unit  was  
extremely  helpful.  So  there  are  many  ways  that  the  PLO  could  have  helped  
without  the  need  to  launch  a  campaign  had  it  joined  the  BDS  movement.  
  
The  photos  of  the  president  burning  settlement  products  that  Nieuwhof  praised  
were  interestingly  later  perceived  as  a  mistake  by  the  NEF  which  accordingly  
tried  to  hide  them  as  they  were  considered  to  jeopardize  the  positive  state  
building  image  that  it  wanted  its  program  to  reflect.  In  Chapter  9,  I  go  on  to  
discuss  the  message  that  the  PNA  actually  wanted  to  reflect  through  its  program  
concerning  settlement  products,  in  detail.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Others   argue   that   the   main   problem   was   that   the   PNA   had   limited   effect   and  
exposure   internationally   although   the  program  did   consolidate   the   international  
call   to   boycott   since   under   the   PNA’s   program   Palestinians   started   by   ridding  
their  local  markets  of  settlement  products.  Colborne  from  PSC  explained  this  in  an  
interview  as  follows:  
  
I   don’t   think   that   the   PA’s   campaign   had   a  massive   international   reach.   I  
think   it   was   helpful   when   it   did   happen   locally.   It   was   something   we  
publicized  at   the   time.  Such   calls   always  help  but  what  we  were   saying   to  
partners  is  that  these  calls  don’t  mean  that  they  shouldn’t  boycott  companies  
complicit  with  occupation.  
  
  
Thus,  attitudes  towards  the  PNA’s  international  campaign  vary  greatly  even  
within  the  BDS  movement;  ranging  from  relief  on  the  part  of  Barghouti  to  
misgivings  on  the  part  of  Nieuwhof.  Moreover,  while  the  creation  of  
ProsperPalestine  may  have  been  well  intentioned  it  was  undermined  both  by  its  
lack  of  funding  and  the  European  complicity  with  settlement  businesses.  
  




8.5  European  initiatives  for  discussion  about  settlement  products  
On  19,  July  2013,  the  European  Union  issued  guidelines  on  the  eligibility  of  Israeli  
entities  and  their  activities  in  the  territories  occupied  by  Israel  since  June  1967  for  
grants,   prizes   and   financial   instruments   funded   by   the   EU   from   2014   onwards.  
Section  A.1  of  the  guidelines  states  that    
  
These   guidelines   set   out   the   conditions   under  which   the   Commission  will  
implement  key  requirements  for  the  award  of  EU  support  to  Israeli  entities  
or  to  their  activities  in  the  territories  occupied  by  Israel  since  June  1967.  Their  
aim  is  to  ensure  the  respect  of  EU  positions  and  commitments  in  conformity  
with   international   law   on   the   non-­‐‑recognition   by   the   EU   of   Israel’s  
sovereignty  over  the  territories  occupied  by  Israel  since  June  1967.    
  
See  Annex  K  for  the  full  text  of  these  guidelines.    
  
While  this   is   the  most  recent  decision  made  by  the  European  Commission  at   the  
time  of  this  study,  the  issue  has  since  been  discussed  by  individual  EU  states,  as  
well   as   on   the   European   Parliament   level.      There   have   also   been   a   number   of  
precedent  cases  such  as  the  Brita  case  where  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  
ruled  that  settlement  products  are  not  to  enjoy  the  same  preferential  treatment  as  




difference   is   that   the   settlements   are   not   recognized   by   the   EU   as   being   under  
Israeli  sovereignty.  
  
The  EU’s  position  on  settlement  products  and  how  it  has  developed,  is  discussed  
in  detail  in  ‘Feasting  on  Occupation’,  a  report  published  by  Al-­‐‑Haq  (a  Palestinian  
human  rights  organization).  The  publication  argues  in  favour  of  a  full  EU  ban  of  
settlement  products  and  explains  how  this  could  be  achieved  in  accordance  with  
EU  and  international  law.    
  
During   my   interview   with   Morgantini,   she   explained   the   discussion   that   had  
taken  place  at  the  European  Parliament  on  settlement  products  while  she  was  in  
office.   Discussions   focused   primarily   on   labelling   settlement   products   to   make  
their   origins   clear,   but   also   considered   the   need   to   stop   buying   settlement  
products  altogether.  On  the   issue  of   labelling,   the  response  was  positive  and  the  
introduction   of   such   a   measure   was   widely   supported   even   by   right   wing  
members.   However,   the   parliament   took   years   to   provide   this   response,   and   it  
took  even  longer  for  it  to  take  a  decision  regarding  cooperation  with  settlements.  
This  was  in  part  due  to  disinformation  that  resulted  from  resistance  on  the  part  of  
some  members.  As  Morgantini  elaborates:    
  
I   remember   one   of   the   first   discussions   was   when   the   Commissioner   for  




products   being   sold   in   European  markets.   So   I   smuggled   some   settlement  
products  into  the  parliament  chamber  with  me,  and  when  I  stood  to  speak,  I  
pulled   out   those   products   and   explained   that   I   bought   them   from   local  
supermarkets.   It  was  Charles   Shammas  who  gathered   the  products   for  me  
from  European  markets.  
  
The   incident   sparked   heated   discussion   in   the   parliament,   as   Morgantini  
explained,  but   in   the  end   they  were  unsuccessful   since   the  EU  members  argued  
that   it  was   up   to   individual   national   governments   to   decide   on   how   they   treat  
settlement   products.   She   explained   that   consequent   guidelines   issued   by   the  
European   Parliament   at   the   time   were   non-­‐‑binding:   “I   think   they   could   have  
issued  something  binding  and  my  opinion  is  that  they  should  have,  but  you  need  
stronger   lobbying   both   on   the   national   level   and   on   the   European   parliament  
level”.65  
  
Morgantini   also  described  an  example   that  had  arisen  as  a   result  of   a   campaign  
she   is   involved  with   against   economic   ties  with   settlements.   This  was   about   an  
Italian  company  called  Pizzaroti  which  contracted  with  the  Israeli  government  to  
construct   part   of   the   railway  project   that   connects  Tel  Aviv  with   Jerusalem  and  
passes  through  settlements.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Pizzaroti  specializes  in  drilling  and  digging  tunnels  for  such  projects.  When  
we  approached   the   company   to   explain   their  violation  of   international   law  
by  constructing  in  settlements,  they  told  us  that  they  already  have  a  contract  
and  have  made  big  investments  that  they  cannot  retract  from.  We  started  a  
local   Italian   campaign   against   the   project   and  Pizzaroti   admitted   that   they  
didn’t  know  that  the  project  would  involve  settlements,  or  they  didn’t  know  
what  they  were  in  the  first  place.  
  
This  explains  that  there  was  some  ignorance  regarding  the  issue  of  settlements  on  
the  Pizzaroti’s   side.  Yet   since   they  had   already   signed   the   contract,   it  would   be  
extremely  costly  for  them  if  they  withdrew  and  had  to  pay  compensation  for  this.  
Morgantini   states,   “What  we  are  now  doing   is   asking   the   Italian  government   to  
compensate  for  any  financial  loss  that  a  company  such  as  Pizzaroti  will  encounter  
for   abiding   by   the   European   Commission   guidelines   on   non-­‐‑cooperation   with  
settlements.”  
  
Other  initiatives  were  set   in  motion  when  Nieuwhof  got   involved  with  Palestine  
in   2003   following   her   visit   with   a   group   of   Palestinian   activists   to   share   her  





It  was  my   first   visit   to   the   occupied   territories,   and   I   remember   feeling   so  
angry,  and  it  reminded  me  of  my  experience  with  fighting  apartheid  in  the  
Netherlands   where   we   worked   to   boycott   companies   involved   with  
apartheid   such   as   the   Shell   oil   company.   From  my   experience   I   knew   that  
you  do  not  need  masses  of  people  to  make  a  difference.66    
  
Since  2003  Nieuwhof  has  been  working  with  Palestinian  organizations  and  
individuals  and  strategizing  with  them  to  overcome  the  fact  that  at  that  time  they  
had  not  been  successful  in  highlighting  their  problems.  Indeed,  it  was  her  
influence  that  led  them  to  the  BDS  call  one  year  after  the  Palestinian  Campaign  for  
the  Academic  and  Cultural  Boycott  of  Israel  (PACBI)  call.    She  also  introduced  
strategies  based  on  her  South  African  experience  to  deal  with  other  European  
companies  that  were  involved  building  rail  links  in  the  occupied  territories.  In  
relation  to  this,  she  cited  a  Dutch  bank  that  had  divested  from  Veolia,  one  of  two  
French  multinational  companies  helping  to  build  and  operate  the  Jerusalem  Light  
Rail  linking  the  illegal  settlements  with  Israel.  She  also  explained  that  there  were  
some  Scandinavian  pension  funds  that  were  discussing  divestment  from  Veolia  
and  Alstom,  another  company  with  similar  rail  construction  activity  in  
settlements.  Thus,  their  work  is  clearly  educating  audiences  about  the  injustices  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the  Palestinian  people  are  facing.  She  explained  her  strategies  regarding  these  in  
an  interview,  as  follows:  
  
I   used  my   lessons   and   implemented  what   I   had   learned   during  my  work  
against  Shell   for   the  Palestinian  case.   It  was  then  that   I  heard  about  Veolia,  
which  was  involved  in  the  Israeli  light  rail  project.  I  did  my  research  on  the  
company   and   found   that   they   are   involved  with  many   countries.   For   BDS  
campaigns   that’s  what   you   need,   a   clear   target   towards  which   people   can  
direct  their  energy  and  have  clear  goals.  And  Veolia  seemed  like  an  excellent  
target  since  it  was  constructing  part  of  the  railway  in  East  Jerusalem  for  the  
sake  of  settlers  therefore  strengthening  Israel’s  hold  of  the  city,  so  I  thought  
Bingo!  
  
As  Nieuwhof   explained,   the   protest  work   against  Veolia   set   an   example,  which  
she  hopes  inspired  people  on  how  to  get  involved  with  the  BDS  movement.    
  
From   a   different   perspective,   the   Methodist   Church   Congress   in   2009   set   up  
another  initiative  after  establishing  a  working  group  to  prepare  a  report  on  Israel  
and  Palestine,  entitled  ‘Justice  for  Palestine  and  Israel’.  This  was  presented  at  the  
2010   conference.   Steve   Hucklesby   was   assigned   to   lead   that   working   group.  




years,   and  has   in   fact  debated   it  more   than   any  other   single   international   issue,  
with  resolutions  passed  each  year.    
  
The   2010   report   was   a   comprehensive   document   that   started   by   looking   at   the  
different  historical  narratives  around  the  conflict  and  then  focused  on  occupation,  
the  various  political  positions  on  occupation,  and  its  impact  on  the  Palestinians.  It  
also   referred   to   Cairo’s   document   concerning   the   Hamas   –   Fatah   reconciliation  
efforts,  which  was  produced  while  the  report  was  being  prepared;  as  well  as  the  
Goldstone  Report,  which  was  published   around   the   same   time.  The   report   then  
made  recommendations  that  were  put  to  the  vote  at  the  2010  Congress;  these  were  
all  passed  and  so  became  congress  resolutions,  as  Hucklesby  explains:    
  
All   of   them   passed.  And   there  was   an   overwhelming  majority;   in   fact   the  
vote  was  taken  by  a  show  of  hands  because  of  that  overwhelming  majority  
supporting  the  resolutions.  The  only  resolution  where  we  saw  a  substantial  
divide  was   the  boycott   resolution.  But  even   then,   it  was   less   than  25%  that  
voted  against.  
  
Most  significantly,  section  7.4.1  of  the  report  states  the  following:    
  
In   listening   to  Church  Leaders  and  out   fellow-­‐‑Christians   in   Israel  Palestine  




calling   for   the   imposition   of   boycott,   divestment,   and   sanctions   as   a  major  
strategy   of   non-­‐‑violent   resistance   to   the  Occupation.   The  Conference   notes  
the   call   of   the   WCC   in   2009   for   an   international   boycott   of   settlement  
produce   and   services   and   calls   on   the   Methodist   people   to   support   and  
engage  with  this  boycott  of  Israeli  goods  emanating  from  illegal  settlements  
(some  Methodists  would  advocate  a   total  boycott  of   Israeli  goods  until   the  
Occupation  ends)  (Hucklesby,  2010).  
  
And   the   particular   resolution   (14/9)   that   was   passed   concerning   the   boycott   of  
settlement  products:    
  
The  Methodist  Conference  noted  the  call  of  the  World  Council  of  Churches  
in  2009  for  an  international  boycott  of  settlement  produce  and  services  and  
the  support  given  for  such  a  boycott  by  Christian  leaders  in  Palestine  in  the  
“Karios”   document,   Palestinian   civil   society   and   a   growing   number   of  
Jewish   organizations   both   inside   Israel   and   worldwide   and   called   on  
Methodist  people  to  support  and  engage  with  this  boycott  of  Israeli  goods  
emanating  from  illegal  settlements  (Hucklesby,  2010).  
  
As   well   as   having   less   support   from   the   Congress   members,   this   resolution  
provoked  angry  reactions   from  pro-­‐‑Israeli  groups  and  Jewish   leaders   in   the  UK.  




outraged  and  reacted  by  stating:  
  
This  is  a  very  sad  day,  both  for  Jewish-­‐‑Methodist  relations  and  for  everyone  
who  wants   to   see   positive   engagement  with   the   complex   issues   of   Israeli-­‐‑
Palestinian   relations.   The  Methodist   Conference   has   swallowed   hook,   line  
and   sinker   a   report   full   of   basic   historical   inaccuracies,   deliberate  
misrepresentations   and   distortions   of   Jewish   theology   and   Israeli  
policy…The  deeply   flawed   report   is   symptomatic   of   a   biased  process:   The  
working  group  which  wrote  the  report  had  already  formed  its  conclusions  at  
the  outset.  External  readers  were  brought  in  to  give  the  process  a  veneer  of  
impartiality,   but   their   criticisms   were   rejected.   The   report’s   authors   have  
abused   the   trust   of   ordinary   members   of   the   Methodist   Church,   who  
assumed   that   they   were   reading   and   voting   on   an   impartial   and  
comprehensive   paper,   and   they   have   abused   the   goodwill   of   the   Jewish  
community,   which   tried   to   engage   with   this   issue,   only   to   find   that   our  
efforts  were  treated  as  an  unwelcome  distraction  (Paul,  2010).  
  
The   Methodist   Church   was   not   the   first   church   to   take   a   stance   on   settlement  
products.   There   have   been   many   resolutions   and   calls   made   by   individual  
churches  and  church  umbrella  organizations;  most  notably,  the  World  Council  of  
Churches.   In  particular,   the   response  of   the  Presbyterian  Church   is  discussed   in  





Other   solidarity   and   activists   groups   led   the   boycott   campaign   in   Europe,   for  
example   the   TUC   as   discussed   in   Chapter   6.   Sara   Colborne,   the   director   of   the  
PSC,   explained   that   the   PSC   was   started   in   2001   in   the   UK   with   the   aim   of  
targeting  Israeli  goods.  This  was  primarily  based  on  existent  parallels  between  the  
Palestinian  struggle  and   the  anti-­‐‑apartheid  movement   in  South  Africa.  Colborne  
perceived   the   boycott   campaign   against   apartheid   as   being   very   strong   and  
effective  and  was  clear  that  it  was  something  that  any  individual  could  do.    
  
It’s   something   that  we   can  mobilize   all   our   branches   to   be   involved  with.  
And   then   in   2005   there   was   the   Palestinian   call   for   boycott,   which   was  
fantastic  because   it   took  the  boycott  of   individuals   from  being  a  call  by  the  
PSC   to   become   on   a   global   level.   So   we   started   working   through   other  
organizations,  particularly  the  trade  unions  to  amplify  the  call  for  BDS.  
    
Chronologically,  the  war  on  Gaza  in  2008/2009  was  a  turning  point  for  the  boycott  
movement.   Colborne   referred   to   a   poll   that   was   conducted   by   the   Jewish  
Chronicle   during   that   war   and   was   published   in   February   2009.   It   asked   the  
readers   the   following  question:  “Do  you   think   it’s   a  good   idea   to  boycott   Israeli  
goods?”   As   Colborne   explained,   the   survey   indicated   that   many   of   its   readers  





The  result  showed  over  30%  supported  boycott.     Given  that   it’s   the   JC  that  
conducted  that  poll,  that  is  a  result  highly  in  favour  of  the  boycott.  I  think  the  
number  has   increased   since   then   although   I   haven’t   seen   any   similar   polls  
except   unofficially   through   our   branches.   We   have   over   40   branches  
nationwide   and   they   normally   organize   campaigns   around   stores   that   sell  
Israeli  products  and  it  has  increasingly  become  common  to  hear  people  say:  
well  we  already  boycott  Israeli  products.  
  
The  PSC  has  a  strong  position  of  boycotting  Israeli  goods.  Although  it  is  agreeable  
to   working   with   organizations   that   only   boycott   settlement   products,   the  
reservation  that  it  has  regarding  limited  boycotts  stem  from  the  following  issues:    
  
1) Mislabelling;   so  how  do  you  know  what   is   really   from  Israel  and  what   is  
really  from  a  settlement.    
2) Labeling;   something   might   be   produced   in   settlements   but   packaged   in  
Israel  or  produced  under  an  Israeli  company.  
3) The  issue  of  the  actual  companies  profiting  from  the  goods.67    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Referring  to   the  TUC  support  of   the  PSC’s  work  on  boycott,  Colborne  explained  
how  their  support  developed  and  its  importance  in  influencing  the  government’s  
stance:  
  
[T]he  policy  to  boycott  settlement  products  passed  in  September  2009  at  the  
Trade   Union   Congress,   which   is   the   body   that   represents   6.5   million  
workers.   In   2010   that   policy   was   taken   further   to   include   a   boycott   of  
companies  complicit  with  occupation  and  the  Wall.  In  2011,  that  policy  was  
taken   another   step   further   through   boycotting   organizations   that   are  
complicit   with   occupation   such   as   the   Histadrut   and   universities.   In   my  
view,  it  was  the  pressure  exhorted  by  the  consumers  and  through  the  trade  
unions   that   led   the   government   to   issue   the   voluntary   guidance   on  
settlement  product  labelling.68    
  
Following   this   she   went   on   to   explain   the   support   from   supermarkets,   in  
particular,  that  of  the  Co-­‐‑operative  supermarket  chain:    
  
All   of   the   supermarkets   agreed   to   adopt   the   voluntary   labelling,   but   it  
became  difficult   for   them  to  sell  settlement  goods.  Then,   the  Co-­‐‑op  took  an  
ethical  step  further  to  ban  the  sale  of  settlement  products  all  together,  which  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




is  important  because  1)  we  knew  that  settlement  products  were  still  sneaking  
in   as   Israeli   products,   such   as   dates,   and   2)   we   were   concerned   that  
settlement  products  were  being  diverted  to  other  EU  markets.  
  
  
Boycotting   companies   complicit   with   occupation   or   settlements   made   the  
situation   easier   for   the   PSC   since   it   removed   the   need   to   trace   back   to  where   a  
particular   product   came   from.   To   them,   the   fact   that   a   company   deals   with  
settlements  is  enough  justification  to  boycott  it  altogether.    
  
Trading  Away  Peace,  the  report  prepared  by  22  European  organizations  that  was  
introduced   in   Chapter   6,   carries   the   same  message   as   that   of   ProsperPalestine.  
What   it  however  adds   is  a  comparison  between  the  settlement  economy  and  the  
Palestinian   one.   Crisis   Action   is   an   international   organization   with   offices   in  
Brussels,  Johannesburg,  London,  Nairobi,  New  York,  Paris  and  Washington  DC.  It  
aims   to   serve   as   a   catalyst   and   coordinator   of   joint   action   on   the   part   of   civil  
society  organisations  around  the  world  to  protect  civilians  from  armed  conflict.  As  
such,  it  has  been  in  a  position  to  provide  a  great  deal  of  expertise  to  support  the  






They   will   suggest   a   project   and   setup   a   network   of   people   who   will  
contribute  to  it.  And  they  will  compile  and  do  the  leg  work  and  make  sure  
that  everyone  is  on  the  same  page.  They  also  make  sure  that  its  written  and  
published  using   the  expertise  of  all  of   the  other  groups.  When  you   look  at  
the  Trading  away  peace,  you  will   see  ProsperPalestine’s   research   in   it.  Not  
word-­‐‑by-­‐‑word,  but  in  terms  of  messaging.  What  I  was  keen  to  do  during  my  
discussion  with  Crisis  action  was  get  the  ProsperPalestine  argument  across.  
Trading   away   peace   I   think   is   a   culmination   of  what  we   tried   to   do  with  
ProsperPalestine,  except  its  three  years  later,  and  with  a  broader  coalition.  
  
Today,  the  twelve  points  of  action  suggested  by  the  Trading  Away  Peace  report  -­‐‑
and   presented   in   Chapter   6   -­‐‑   are   the   talking   points   of   any   discussion   on  
settlements   in  Europe.  As  Brown  explains,   they  provide  a  variety  of  ways  that  a  
government   or   organisation   can   support   Palestine:   “EU   governments   are   given  
choices.  If  you  don’t  want  to  ban  settlement  products,  then  you  have  12  options.  
At  a  minimum,  one  of  the  points  asks  governments  to  at  least  disseminate  data  of  
trade  volumes  with  Israel.”    
  
Thus,  while  initiatives  in  Europe  for  supporting  boycotts  are  more  restrained  than  
the  BDS  movement  would  wish,  they  are  widespread  and  originate  from  a  wide  
range   of   organizations   representing   all   level   of   society.   In   the   next   section,   I  




8.6  The  effectiveness  of  the  boycott  campaigns  
When  trying   to  measure  effectiveness,  one  must   first  ask:  What  exactly   it   is   that  
the  activist  /  boycotter  is  trying  to  achieve?  Do  these  campaigns  aim  to  hurt  Israel  
economically?   Or   are   they   merely   political   manoeuvres?  Morgantini   explained:  
“Perhaps   it   is  more  politically   effective   to   call   for   a   full   boycott,   but   if   practical  
results   are   anticipated   then   a   focused   boycott   on   settlement   products   and  
cooperation  with  BDS  is  better.”69  
  
As   demonstrated   in   Chapter   6   and   7,   there   are   two   basic   positions   that   have   a  
bearing  on  whether  a  group  supports  limited  or  full  boycotts:  On  the  one  hand,  a  
pragmatic  one  and,  on  the  other,  a  principled  one.  The  principled  approach  sees  
the  BDS  as  a  way  to  expose  Israel’s  violations  of  the  Palestinians’  rights,  including  
their   right   for   statehood   and   return   of   the   refugees;   and   the   other,   more  
pragmatist   approach   focuses   on   settlement   boycotts   while   also   supporting  
statehood.  
  
In  relation  to  this,  Nieuwhof  thinks  the  boycott  movement  should  “tell  the  story  of  
Israel’s  violation  of   the   rights  of   the  Palestinian  people.”  Unlike  Morgantini,   she  
questions   the   effectiveness   of   a   boycott   limited   to   settlements:   “It   has   been   ten  
years  since  the  EU  has  been  discussing  the  issue  of  labelling  settlement  products.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





This   is   a   complex   story,   and   the   question  we  must   ask   is:  How  does   it   educate  
people?  What  is  the  story  that  it  shares?”70  
  
Nevertheless,  it  is  difficult  to  communicate  to  the  European  and  American  public  
the   rationale   of   the   full   boycott   campaign   and   to   show   the   impact   of   such   a  
strategy.   It   is   more   concrete   and   tangible   to   focus   on   a   list   of   products   from  
settlements  so  the  public  will  know  how  to  take  action.  Hucklesby  explained  the  
reasons   for   the   Methodist   Church’s   position   that   favours   a   limited   boycott   of  
settlement  products  on  both  practical  and  principled  grounds:    
  
1) A  call  for  full  boycott  should  come  from  people  under  oppression  and  not  
by  the  people  in  the  purchasing  community.  
2) The  boycott  must  communicate  clearly  through  the  nature  of  what  it  is  that  
is  being  boycotting.  “This  works  very  well   for  settlement  products,  not  as  
good  for  boycotting  Israel”.71  
3) There  must  be  some  parallel  and  tangible  political  call  going  alongside  the  
boycott.    
4) There   must   be   a   constructive   way   forward   “so   you   are   not   just   against  
something  but  suggest  what  you  are  in  favour  of  as  well”.72    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Interview	  with	  Adri	  Nieuwhof	  over	  Skype	  on	  11/12/2013	  
71	  Interview	  with	  Steve	  Hucklesbey	  in	  London	  on	  3/4/2013	  




Moreover,  from  an  ideological  point  of  view,  the  research  highlighted  that  there  is  
a  danger   in   the  connection   that  people  make  between   Israel  and   Jews   that   leads  
them  to  question  whether,  if  they  are  boycotting  Jews,  it  is  actually  a  form  of  anti-­‐‑
Semitism.   For   religious   organizations,   such   as   the  Methodist   Church,   these   are  
particularly  sensitive  considerations.  Hucklesby  explained  the  Methodist  Church’s  
position   in  relation  to   this,  as   follows:  “As  churches,  we  are  very  cautious  about  
interfaith   relations,   very   aware  of   the  history  of   anti-­‐‑Semitism  and   the  potential  
for   it   in   our   society.  We  have   to   be   cautious   in   the   action   that  we   take   that  we  
don’t  fuel  anti-­‐‑Semitism.”  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  diversity  within  the  Israeli  
population  on   this   issue  and  Hucklesby  understands   the   justification  behind   the  
argument  for  a  full  boycott:    
  
The  argument  for  boycotting  all  Israeli  products  is:  Israel  is  a  democracy  (of  
sorts)   and   there   is   a   very   clear   policy   that   is   around   occupation   and  
maintaining  occupation   if  not  even  expanding  occupation.  So   that’s   I   think  
the   clearest   justification   of   boycotting   Israel.   What   you   are   boycotting   is  
Israeli  government  policy.  
  
However,   while   recognizing   this   on   the   one   hand,   Hucklesby  maintains   that   a  





Another   issue   the   research   brought   to   light   refers   to   the   practical   position  
regarding   whether   a   European   ban   on   settlement   products   would   have   been  
secured   had   they   directed   their   efforts   only   towards   boycotting   settlement  
products.  When   I   challenged  Colborne  as   to  whether,   in  her  position  as  head  of  
PSC,  she  thought  this  was  the  case,  she  explained  that  she  did  not  think  it  was  so  
and   went   on   to   explain   that   any   movement   has   to   have   a   strong   and   clear  
message.   In  her  opinion,   the   issue  of   labelling  and   tracing  which   companies  are  
complicit   with   occupation   would   weaken   such   a   straightforward   message.   In  
relation  to  this,  she  pointed  out  that  groups  calling  for  a  limited  settlement  boycott  
had  had  enough  space  to  have  achieved  their  goals  if  these  were  a  possibility.  She  
also  asserted  that  the  intention  of  the  BDS  call  was  not  to  provide  a  rigid  format  
that  supporters  must  hold  to  throughout  but  one  that  allowed  a  variety  of  actions.  
As  she  explained:    
  
What  was   important  about   the  movement   is   to   tell  people   to  do  what   they  
could  where   they   could   -­‐‑   so   not   to   have   a   restrictive   framework  whereby  
everyone  had   to   sign  up   to   a   campaign   to  boycott   settlement  goods  but   to  
accept  that  everyone  is  at  different  stages  in  the  BDS  campaign.73  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Adri   Nieuwhof   also   thinks   that   one   would   be   deluded   to   think   the   EU  would  
have   responded   by   banning   settlement   products   had   their   boycott   campaigns  
been   limited   to   these.   She   compares   the   situation  with   the  EU’s  position  during  
apartheid,  where  no  official  measures  were  taken  on  its  part.    
  
In  EU  countries   in  general   -­‐‑   and   in   the  UK   in  particular   -­‐‑   the  Palestinian   Israeli  
conflict  gets  exceptional  attention,  and  often  leads  to  polarized  and  heated  debates  
on  university   campuses.   Students,   often   represented  by   student  groups,   such  as  
the   Palestinian   Society   or   the   Islamic   Society,   have   led   campaigns   that   oppose  
Israel   and   specifically   call   for   boycotting   Israel   as   a   whole.   As   I   discussed   in  
Chapter  5,  the  BDS  call  is  considered  to  have  provided  direction  and  organization  
to  the  global  Palestinian  solidarity  movement  by  providing  it  with  a  unifying  and  
clear   plan   of   action.   Moreover,   in   the   same   way   that   one   may   consider   the  
practical  effectiveness  of  the  BDS  movement  in  terms  of  economic  impact,  so  too  
one  can  weigh  up  the  practical  effectiveness  of  the  nonviolent  student  activities  on  
campuses.    
  
A   good   example   of   a   prominent   student   activist   supporting   Palestine   is   Joseph  
Brown,  who  as  well  as  his  position  in  CAABU  and  ProsperPalestine  was  a  student  
at   the  LSE.  One  of  Brown’s  protests   took   the   form  of  performing   in   a   theatrical  
representation   of   the   occupation   at   the   LSE   in   response   to   Israel’s   Cast   Lead  




author,  he  reflected  on  that  action  and  expressed  his  doubts  as  to  the  effectiveness  
of  the  various  strategies  they  had  adopted  at  the  time.  Comparing  their  practical  
and   ideological   demands,   he   explained   the   difference   in   terms   of   impact   as  
follows:  
  
We  had  six  demands,   some  of   them  I   think  were   ludicrous  such  as  getting  
the  director  to  condemn  Israel,  I  mean,  Why?  But  we  did  have  other  practical  
demands  among  them.    The  problem  I  think  we  had  at  LSE  is  that  we  spent  
much   time   getting   our   voices   heard,   condemning   Israel   and   making  
speeches,  which  is  all  very  well,  but  the  question  is  how  many  Palestinians  
are  practically  benefiting  from  that?74    
  
  
Thus,  an  evaluation  of  the  success  of  the  boycott  movement  depends  on  what  the  
movement   seeks   to   achieve.   Particular   campaigns   have   been   successful   while  
others  have  not.  In  many  cases,  it  comes  down  to  a  vote  that  is  either  passed  or  not  
by  a  governing  body,  such  as  the  Methodist  Conference,  a  student  body,  congress,  
or  general  assembly.  The  dynamics  of  each  case  must  be  expected  to  be  different,  
and  some  groups  calling  for  boycotts  may  have  more  skills  than  others.  Also,  the  
timing  of  when  a  vote  on  boycotting  Israeli  or  settlement  products  is  undertaken  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




is   key.   As   Sarah   Colborne   explained,   the   2008/2009   war   on   Gaza   served   as   a  
turning   point   for   the   boycott   campaign.   Another   incident   that   triggered   an  
increase   in  calls   for  boycotting  companies  complicit  with  occupation  was   that  of  
the  Mavi  Marmara  Gaza  Flotilla  in  2010.  
  
However,   looking  at   the  overall  picture,  our   interviewees  had  different  opinions  
on  whether  the  boycott  movement  has  been  successful  or  not.  Most  notably,  Luisa  
Morgantini,  one  of  the  three  founders  of  the  ISM  expressed  her  disappointment  in  
what  has  been  achieved.    “Regarding  the  ISM,  I  am  not  happy  with  where  we  are  
since   we   failed   in   sanctioning   Israel   or   clearly   ending   ties   with   settlements.”    
However,   she   noted   that   the   BDS  movement   did   grow,   is  more   legitimate,   and  
enjoys   more   presence   and   support.      And   as   a   result,   Israel’s   violation   of  
international   law   its   crimes   are   better   known.   She   highlights   that   there   is  more  
civil   society   support   in   the  European  Union  now   for  Palestinians.  But   she  gives  
more   credit   to  Salam  Fayyad’s  government   in   leading   the  European  parliament,  
and  individual  governments  to  take  stronger  stances  on  settlement  products.  
  
Joseph  Brown   explained   that   the  UK  government   understands   the   obstacle   that  
settlements  pose  to  achieving  peace  in  the  area.  However,  in  terms  of  acting  upon  
that  understanding  by  taking  further  action,  he  felt   the  government  responds  by  




procedures,   or   that   the   issue   is   too   complicated   to   further   tackle.”75  He   explains  
that  there  is  no  political  pushback  on  the  part  of  the  government  to  put  pressure  
on  Israel,  nor  is  there  any  organizations  try  to  push  them  towards  this.  However,  
even  pro-­‐‑Israeli  groups  did  not  attack   them  on  the   ‘Trading  Away  Peace’   report  
because   the   principles   it   is   based   on   are   unassailable.      He   states,   “They   don’t  
necessarily   agree   with   us,   but   they   didn’t   attack   us,   because   there   isn’t   an  
argument  against  it.  So  now  it’s  a  matter  of  trying  to  facilitate  the  policy.”  
  
While   Adri   Nieuwhof   explains   her   understanding   of   the   goal   of   the   BDS  
campaign   as   being   to   tell   the   story   of   Palestinians  under   occupation,   the   Italian  
journalist,  Angelo  Bucato,  explained  that  the  media  debate  is  normally  limited  and  
promoted  by  well-­‐‑known  Palestinian  supporters,  including  those  belonging  to  the  
Palestine  solidarity  movement.  “In  Italy,  it  is  much  less  visible  than  what  you  see  
in  the  UK  media.  The  public  there  views  boycotters  as  extremists,  and  they  don’t  
see  it  as  constructive  action  that  can  influence  positive  change.”76  
  
As   noted   during   my   interview   with   Sarah   Colborne,   the   growth   of   the   BDS  
movement  may   have  more   priority   over   the   practical   economic   achievements   it  
may  have.  For  the  PSC,  according  to  Colborne,  as  long  as  people  agree  with  PSC’s  
main  aims  and  objectives,  and  pay  their  annual  fee,  they  can  join.  
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To  close  this  section,  it  is  worth  considering  how  Israel  envisions  the  impact  of  a  
successful   boycott   campaign.   The   Israeli   Minister   of   Economy,   Naftali   Bennett,  
acknowledges   that   boycotts   are   among   the   implications   of   the   failed   peace  
negotiations  and  explains  how  the  likely  effects  of  a  full  European  boycott  would  
affect  the  economy  at  a  range  of  levels  from  the  cost  of  living  rising  to  significant  
budget   cuts.   He   described   the   situation   resulting   from   entering   the   reality   of   a  
European  boycott,  even  a  partial  one,  as  follows:    
  
[T]he  Israeli  economy  will  retreat;  every  Israeli  citizen  will  be  hit  directly  in  
his  pocket;  the  cost  of  living  will  rise;  budgets  for  education,  health,  welfare,  
and  security  will  be  cut;  and  many  international  markets  will  be  closed  to  us  
(Case  Bryant,  2014,  p.4).  
  
Furthermore,   the   Israeli   news   agency,   Ynet,   reported   that   Israeli   foreign   office  
officials  are  concerned  about  the  growing  support  for  the  boycott  especially  in  the  
light  of  the  continuing  building  of  settlements  in  the  West  Bank.  They  have  been  
quoted  in  Ynet  as  saying:    
  
As  long  as  Israel  continues  to  build,  this  phenomenon  will  persist  and  it  will  




way  to  explain  to  the  Europeans  why  the  settlements  are  good,  and  why  they  
should  buy  products  produced  beyond  the  Green  Line  (Somfalvi,  2014).  
  
Thus,   the   research   findings   in   the   above   demonstrate   significant   but   limited  
achievement  by  the  boycott  campaigns  in  Europe;  moreover,  it  is  clear  that  it  had  
an  effect  on  Israel’s  politicians  and  decision  makers  as  they  have  become  aware  of  
the  possible  impact  of  a  successful  boycott  campaign.    
  
8.7  Conclusion  
The   analytical   framework   presented   in   the  methodology   of   this   thesis   assumes  
that   nonviolent   civil   resistance   in   pursuit   of   social   and   political   change   is  
dependent  on  various  sources  of  support.  In  the  light  of  this,  the  current  chapter  
highlighted   the   critical   role   of   the   external   actors   to   exert   pressure   on   their  
governments  and  policy  makers  to  take  action  against  Israel  policies   in  the  OPT.  
Since  European  countries  provide  substantial  economic  support  to  Israel  through  
trade  agreements  and  access  to  funds  in  the  EU,  undermining  and  possibly  even  
stopping   such   economic   support  will   have   a  direct   effect   on   the   Israel   economy  
and   the   welfare   of   the   Israeli   society.   In   the   end,   this   might   force   Israel   to  
reconsider   its   policies   regarding   Palestine   because   the   cost   of   maintain   the  





If   Israel  wishes   to   be   part   of  Western   democracy   and   uphold   its   values   and   so  
presents   itself   to   the  world   as   the   only   democracy   in   the   “backward   primitive”  
Middle   East,   then   Israel   must   be   held   accountable   to   these   values   and   ideas.  
Continuation  of  the  occupation  and  the  concomitant  system  of  oppression  against  
the   Palestinians   is   attracting   more   criticism   than   ever   in   Europe.   There   is   a  
growing  international  solidarity  with  the  Palestinians  with  many  ordinary  citizens  
in  Europe  asking  their  political  representatives  at  national  and  local  level  to  exert  
pressure  on  Israel  to  stop  the  occupation  and  acknowledge  the  Palestinians’  right  
to  statehood.  This  telling  the  story  of  the  occupation,  both  by  activists  who  have  
visited  and  witnessed   the  daily  oppression  of   the  occupation  and  by  Palestinian  
speakers  touring  Europe,  is  vital  source  of  information  to  enable  ordinary  people  
to   inform   their   MP   or   local   councillors   and   demand   action   against   Israeli  
settlements.                  
  
Just  as  there  are  divisions  regarding  policies  and  approaches  to  boycotting  Israel  
within   Palestine,   the   same   can   be   said   regarding   international   supporters.   The  
decision   on  whether   a   full   or   limited   boycott   is  made   seems   to   depend   on   the  
group  or  organization’s   ideology  more   than  reasoning.  By  some,   it   is  not   results  
that  are  sought,  but  a  growing  pool  of  members  and  affiliates.  This  was  reflected  
by  the  head  of  the  PSC,  where  no  matter  what  your  stance  on  a  resolution  to  the  
Israeli  Palestinian   conflict,   or  what   type  of  boycott  you   favour,   you   can   join   the  




boundaries  are,  the  greater  is  the  area  of  common  ground  that  gathers  its  member.  
But  the  more  you  try  to  get  members  to  agree  on  details,  the  more  that  common  
ground  will  shrink.  Hence,  delivering  results  other  than  a  large  vocal  membership  
base  may   be   difficult.   But   perhaps   a   large   vocal   group   of   supporters   is   a   good  
enough   goal.   Surely   this   could   provide   the   necessary   supportive   pressure   that  
could   benefit   the  more   result-­‐‑oriented   organizations?  Therefore,   should   the   two  
cooperate?  Indeed,  do  they  cooperate?    
  
In   relation   to   this,   Joseph   Brown   explained   that   cooperation   amongst  
organizations   that   are   overtly   pro-­‐‑Palestinian   is   different   to   that   between   those  
that  are  more  generally  promoting  human  rights  and   justice:  “You  will   find  that  
the   latter   have   better   cooperation   than   the   more   specific   pro-­‐‑Palestinian  
organizations.” 77   My   interviews   with   other   organization   representatives  
confirmed  this.  Both  Sarah  Colborne  and  Adri  Nieuwhof  thought  the  PNA  should  
not  have  launched  a  boycott  program  in  the  first  place.    Adri  Nieuwhof  explains  
that  what  is  essential  to  BDS  is  that  any  group  they  cooperate  with  must  support  
its  three  basic  demands  -­‐‑  ending  Israeli  occupation,  recognizing  the  fundamental  
rights  of   the  Arab-­‐‑Palestinian  citizens,  and  respecting,  protecting  and  promoting  
the   rights   of   Palestinian   refugees.   In   her   own  words:   “I   do   not   have   a   problem  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




with  any  group  as  long  as  they  adopt  the  three  demands  of  the  BDS  movement.”78  
Her   condition   for   adherence   to   the   demands   of   the   BDS  movement  may   signal  
that  the  large  pool  of  membership  the  movement  enjoys  is  actually  solely  for  the  
benefit   of   the   movement.   This   would   belie   any   theory   asserting   that   the   BDS  
movement  could  cooperate  by  acting  as  recruiters   for   the  benefit  of  more  result-­‐‑
oriented   organizations.   For   her   part,   Luisa   Morgantini   described   the   BDS  
movement   as   being   made   up   of   “the   anarchists   and   anti-­‐‑establishments”79 .  
Moreover,   she   expressed   her   sadness   that   she   felt   because   the   BDS   movement  
seemed   to   view   the   PNA’s   program   as   competition   rather   than   a   source   for  
cooperation.    
  
Perhaps   this   split   characterizes   the   scattered   nature   of   the   campaigns   and,   to  
explore  this  further,  the  next  chapter  discusses  the  PNA’s  program  by  presenting  
it   as  a   case   study;   it  details   the  efforts   that   the   two  organizations  made   to  work  
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A  case  study  of  Al-­‐‑Karameh  National  Empowerment  Fund    
  
9.1  Introduction:  
In  Chapters  4  and  6,  this  research  demonstrated  the  large  scale  and  great  diversity  
of   the  settlements’  economy,  as  well  as   their  strong   links  with  EU  countries  and  
beyond.   These   chapters   also   highlighted   the   dependency   of   the   Palestinian  
economy   on   the   Israeli   economy   and  more   specifically   on   the   settlements.   This  
chapter   is   dedicated   to   the   selected   case   study;   Al-­‐‑Karameh   National  
Empowerment  Fund.  This  organisation  was  established  by  the  PNA  in  2010  with  
the   aim   of   leading   the   campaign   for   boycotting   settlements.   It   was   named   Al-­‐‑
Karameh,   which   means   Dignity,   with   the   intention   that   it   would   enable  
Palestinians   to   be   proud   and   have   the   dignity   to   refuse   to   cooperate   with   the  
occupying  power   by   boycotting   settlements   -­‐‑   to   have   the  dignity   to   have   shops  
and  homes  that  are  “clean”  from  settlements  products.  
  
The  NEF  was  selected  as  a  case  study,  from  an  academic  point  of  view,  because  it  
was  an  original  example  of  an  organization  promoting  nonviolent  action  against  
the  Israeli  settlements  through  their  economy.  In  fact,  it  is  the  only  Palestinian  -­‐‑  or  
even   international   organization   -­‐‑   that   has   been   established   for   that   express  




two   years   it   existed,   its  work   did   not   go   beyond   this.  What  makes   it   especially  
interesting   is   that   it   was   a   government   initiative;   this   is   relatively   rare  
phenomenon   since   nonviolent   actions   normally   tend   to   be   led   by   grassroots  
movements  against  governments.  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  study  the  formation  
of  this  organization  and  evaluate  the  impact  it  had  on  the  settlements  boycott.  The  
chapter  will  analyse   the  challenges   that   faced  the  organization,   its  successes  and  
shortcomings,  and  its  relationship  with  other  popular  resistance  organizations.  
  
A  more  pragmatic   reason   for   choosing   the  NEF   for   the   case   study   is   that,   as   its  
director,  I  have  a  great  deal  of  background  knowledge  regarding  its  methods  and  
challenges   and   access   to   documents   and   correspondence.   Consequently,   the  
documentation  that  this  study  can  provide  regarding  this  initiative  will  be  able  to  
contribute  significantly   to  existing   literature  on  nonviolence.  While   the  NEF  and  
its   activities  have   received  a  great  deal  of   coverage  by   the  media,   there   remains  
much   information   that   was   at   my   disposal   as   its   director   that   has   not   been  
mentioned  anywhere  else.  Moreover,  I  was  able  to  use  informal  contacts  as  well  as  
documents   available   to   me   as   director   to   present   a   more   rounded   and  
comprehensive   case   study   than   an  outsider   studying   the   organisation  would  be  
able  to  do.  The  fact  that  many  such  efforts  have  gone  undocumented  is  the  reason  
that   has   resulted   in   the   unfortunate   circumstance   whereby   literature   on  





The  Palestinian  Minister  of  National  Economy,  Dr  Hasan  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh,  appointed  
me  as  head  the  NEF  and  I  was  officially  assigned  the  responsibility  of  running  the  
organisation   on   8,   February   2010.   My   first   task   was   to   recruit   the   Fund’s  
employees   and   set   up   its   structure.   When   the   process   of   recruiting   staff   was  
underway,  we  focussed  on  drawing  up  the  executive  plans.  At  the  top  of  our  list  
of  tasks  was  to  draft  the  law  that  would  ban  and  combat  settlement  products,  and  
to  develop  a  program  to  implement  this.    
  
Normally,   when   the   programme   to   ban   and   combat   settlement   products   is  
described,  power  struggles  and  hidden  drawbacks  are  not  mentioned.  However,  
these  are  very  pertinent  to  an  understanding  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  NEF  and  
my  interview  with  Dr.  Hasan  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh  gives  much  insight  into  this  particular  
issue  of  power  struggles  within  the    PNA  over  the  Fund.  Given  its  nature  and  the  
national   interest   in   the  aims   it  wished   to   achieve,   such  drawbacks   tell   stories  of  
inconsistency  and  contradiction  within   the  Palestinian  political   echelons,  as  well  
as  within  the  Palestinian  public  in  general.    
  
9.2  The  formation  of  Al-­‐‑Karameh  National  Empowerment  Fund:  
On   the   12th   of   January   2010,   the   NEF   was   launched   by   the   Palestinian   Prime  
Minister   of   the   time,   Salam  Fayyad.  Representatives   of   all   sectors   of   Palestinian  




representatives  of   the  private  sector,  and   leaders  of  Palestinian  civil   society.  The  
Fund’s   overall   goal,   as   its   name   indicates   was   to   empower   the   Palestinian  
economy   so   that   it   could   have   the   means   to   function   independently   from    
international  support.  During  the  launch,  funds  were  raised  by  means  of  pledges  
to  support  the  NEF  in  carrying  out  this  mission  to  end  the  presence  of  settlement  
products  in  Palestinian  markets.  Pledges  for  donations  of  almost  USD  2  million  in  
cash  and  in  kind  were  made  during  the  launch.    
  
The   NEF   was   presented   as   a   crucial   pillar   for   the   establishment   of   the   future  
Palestinian  state  since  it  sought  to  create  a  bigger  space  for  domestic  products  in  
local   Palestinian   markets.   During   my   interview   with   Prime   Minister   Salam  
Fayyad,  he  explained  its  importance  in  terms  of  an  overall  strategy  to  prepare  the  
country  for  statehood:    
  
The  program  came  as  part  of  my  government’s   two  year  plan   to  build   the  
state   institutions   in  preparation   for  statehood.  We  were  working   to  build  a  
viable  Palestinian  economy  that  could  uphold  the  state,  and  this  consists  of  
two   things,   building   the   economy’s   pillars,   and   getting   rid   of   what   is  




economy  was   the   settlements.   So   we   had   to   get   rid   of   their   effect   on   our  
economy.80    
  
Dr.  Hasan  Abu  Libdeh,  who  was  Chairman  of  the  NEF  as  well  as  the  Minister  of  
National  Economy,  explained  the  rationale  behind  the  NEF’s  creation:    
  
It’s  very  simple;  to  create  a  sustainable  source  to  fund  all  activities  needed  to  
rebuild   the  Palestinian  economy  so   that,  on  one  hand,   it  would  become  an  
independent   national   economy   that   can   meet   the   domestic   market’s  
requirements,   and,   on   the   other   hand,   cut   any   economic   link   with   Israeli  
settlements.81  
  
The  original  idea  behind  the  NEF  was  that  of  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh  and,  remarkably,  there  
was   only   a   matter   of   days   between   his   conceiving   the   initiative   and   its  
materialization   as   the  NEF.  Moreover,   since   other   government   officials   and   the  
private  sector  appreciated  the  concept,  they  also  contributed  significantly  towards  
its  establishment.  Pledges  for  donations  on  the  day  of   the      launch  included  USD  
250,000  from  the  Palestinian  president’s  office,  and  a  further  USD  250,000  from  the  
government,  and   the  remaining  USD  900,000  were  made  up   from  pledges  made  
by  the  Palestinian  private  sector.  However,  according  to  the  NEF’s  financial  report  
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for  2010,  less  than  half  of  these  private  sector  pledges  were  honoured.  Even  before  
this,   Fayyad’s   hopes   for   private   investment   were   not   met   by   the   amount   of  
pledges  made;   he  had   anticipated  more   enthusiasm   to  make  donations   since  he  
thought  they  would  be  perceived  as  investments  by  that  sector  since  they  were  to  
be  the  first  to  reap  the  benefits  of  the  program  because  the  aim  of  the  NEF  was  to  
get  rid  of  a  main  competitor  to  their  own  products;  that  is,  settlement  products.82  
  
In   relation   to   this,  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   said   in   an   interview  with   the   author   that   he   felt  
that  the  donations  did  in  fact  reflect  the  support  that  the  private  sector  was  able  to  
give.   He   explained   that,   in   practical   terms,   since   companies   operated   under  
humble   circumstances,   and   considering   the   short   notice   of   the   establishment   of  
the  NEF  along  with  the  abundance  of  initiatives  that  they  are  asked  to  support,  the  
contributions  were  generous.  He  further  explained:  
  
I  think  the  actual  USD  900,000  donation  was  an  excellent  amount.  Especially  
since   we   didn’t   even   have   to   convince   the   private   sector   to   donate,   they  
heard   the   idea   and   they   were   immediately   convinced.   The   NEF   was   to  
become  an  icon  that  represented  self-­‐‑determination  and  productive  struggle  
for  independence  and  ending  occupation.83  
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Regarding   the   contribution   from   the   government,   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   explained   that  
while   the   government   itself   gave   nothing   in   terms   of   a   direct   financial  
contribution,  it  considered  its  in-­‐‑kind  contributions  sufficient.  This  took  the  shape  
of  providing  office  space,  and  allowing  its  employees  -­‐‑   including  the  Minister  of  
National  Economy  -­‐‑  to  dedicate  a  significant  part  of  their  time  to  running  the  NEF.    
  
At   the   time  of   the  NEF’s   launch,   only   15%  of   the   average  Palestinian   consumer  
basket  was  made  up   of   domestic   produce   and,   according   to   Fayyad,   settlement  
products   had   a   similar   percentage   of   that   same   consumer   basket,  which  would  
have  been  valued  at  around  USD  500  million.  The  remaining  60%  came  from  the  
international   market,   including   Israel.   By   the   end   of   the   NEF’s   first   year,   the  
consumption  of  domestic  produce  rose  to  around  19%.84    
  
Some  reflections  on  the  establishment  of  the  NEF:  
In   this   section,   I   would   like   to   highlight   two   points   as   concluding   remarks  
regarding   the   establishment   of  NEF,   based   on  my   experience   as   director   of   the  
Fund  and  the   insights   this  provided  about   the  organization  during  my  two  year  
role.  The   first   relates   to   the  political  environment   in  which   the  organisation  was  
formed  and  the  second  to  the  part  played  by  the  private  sector.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The  context  in  which  the  NEF  was  established  /  reasons  for  establishment  
The  officially   stated   reason   for   the  establishment  of   the  NEF  was   to   support   the  
Palestinian   economy   by   ridding   it   of   one   of   its  main   obstacles;   settlements   and  
their  economy.  The  NEF  conveyed  a  strong  political  statement  against  settlements,  
first   by   exposing   the   existence   of   their   economy,   and   second   by   calling   on   all  
countries   to   end   its   economic   ties  with   Israeli   settlements.  However,   before   this  
call   could   be   taken   seriously,   the   NEF   first   had   to   reduce   the   amount   that  
Palestinians   themselves   were   trading   with   settlements,   as   much   as   practically  
possible.    
  
If  we   consider   the  political   situation  at   the   time  when   the  NEF  was  established,  
the   reason   for   its   formation   becomes   clear.   On   16,   September   2010,   Haaretz  
reported  the  following:    
  
Palestinian  sources  said  Thursday  that  during  their  meeting  in  Jerusalem  on  
Wednesday,  Netanyahu  told  Abbas  that  Israel  would  resume  construction  in  
the  settlements  at  the  end  of  the  month.  Abbas  reportedly  replied  that  in  that  
case,   the   Palestinians   will   have   to   withdraw   from   peace   negotiations  
(Issacharoff,  2015).      
  
The   resumption   of   settlement   construction   that   Netanyahu   was   referring   to  




had   officially   started   on   26,   November   2009.   The   construction   freeze   was   the  
Palestinian  condition  for  entering  direct  negotiations  with  Israel  in  the  first  place.  
However,  the  Palestinians  were  not  convinced  that  Israel  would  respect  the  freeze  
and   also   claimed   that   Israel   was   continuing   its   settlement   policy   as   before.  
Confirming  these  doubts,  three  months  after  the  freeze  was  announced  by  Israel  -­‐‑  
about  the  same  time  the  NEF  was  established  -­‐‑  the  Huffington  post  reported:    
  
Construction   continues   in   violation   of   the   freeze,   with   no   apparent  
consequences   thus   far.   Settler   violations   of   the   moratorium   have   been  
constant  and  blatant,  with  the  government  of  Israel  admitting  they  are  taking  
place   in   at   least   a   quarter   of   the   settlements.   Peace  Now   has   documented  
evidence   of   settlers   laying   fake   foundations,   and   documented   evidence   of  
settlers  carrying  out  new  (unauthorized)  infrastructure  work  (Ofran,  2010).    
  
Therefore,   the   establishment   of   the   NEF   in   January   2010   marked   the   first    
Palestinian  National  Authority  nonviolent  unilateral  effort  against  settlements.   It  
was  a  decision  made  as  a  direct  result  of  the  Israelis  not  halting  their  construction  
work   during   the   peace   negotiations.   It   also   reflected   the   PNA’s   response   to   the  
awareness   that   never   before   had   there   been   an   Israeli   government   that   was   so  
blatant   about   its   settlement  policy.  This   left  no   room   for   the  PNA   to   justify   any  
belief   that   the  negotiation  process   could  halt   settlement  activity   in  open  view  of  




The  Palestinian  private  sector  and  the  NEF:  
As  previously  mentioned,  the  NEF  was  launched  at  a  fundraising  event  that  was  
intended   to   attract   representatives   and   contributions   from   the   private   sector.  
During  the  event,  the  NEF  secured  pledges  of  around  USD  1.8  million.  However,  
following   the   event,   it   turned   out   that   only   about   USD   900,000   of   the   pledges  
(both   in   cash   and   kind)   were   actually   honoured.   The   reasons   for   this   can   be  
attributed  to  two  main  causes:    
  
1) Many  of   the   in-­‐‑kind  donations  were   irrelevant   to   the  nature  of   the  NEF’s  
tasks   and   so   it  was   not   possible   to   utilize   it      and   therefore   consider   it   as  
donations.  For  instance,  a  dairy  company  had  donated  dairy  products,  and  
a   paint   producing   company   donated   barrels   of   paint.   In   other   cases,   the  
contributors  had  not  specified  what  form  their  in-­‐‑kind  donation  would  be.      
  
2) A  number  of  contributors  who  had  made  cash  donations  later  retracted  for  
the   fear   of   the   political   controversies   associated   with   such   involvement.  
Namely,   they  were   not   interested   in   any  dispute  with   Israel   for   fear   that  
their   pledges   would   falsely   associate   them   with   terrorism,   in   response,  
Israel  would   take  measures   against   them,   such  as  not   issuing  permits   for  





These  fears  were  by  no  means  unfounded  since  involvement  of  the  private  sector  
in   political   action   had   become   even   more   of   an   issue   after   the   9/11   attacks.   In  
response  to  this,  the  US,  Israel,  and  some  EU  countries  had  put  rigid  procedures  in  
place  that  reflected  their  suspicions  of  any  financial  contributions  made  to  political  
causes,  in  fear  that  they  might  be  supporting  terrorism.  Since  then,  private  donors  
have   preferred   not   to   get   involved   in   funding   such   political   campaigns,   even  
when   nonviolent,   if   there   is   the   slightest   chance   of   being   accused   of   funding  
extremism.  Palestinian  banks,  for  instance,  had  been  investigated  and  indicted  for  
channelling   funds   to  Hamas   in   the  Gaza   Strip   after   the   latter  was   labelled   as   a  
terrorist   organization.   Even   after   Hamas   became   legitimate   by   winning   the  
elections   and   forming   its   own   government   in   2006,   this   concern   remained  
influential  to  the  extent  that  some  banks  still  preferred  not  to  have  dealings  with  
any  of  the  Hamas  government  bodies.    
  
Consequently,   one   of   the   organizations   that   had   failed   to   honour   their   pledges,  
was  the  Palestinian  Banking  Society,  which  had  originally  promised  USD  250,000.  
The   NEF   suggested   a   number   of   alternative   ways   through  which   the   donation  
could  be  made  to  the  Palestinian  government,  which  would  then  allocate  it  to  the  
NEF.   However,   none   of   the   suggestions   captured   the   consent   of   the   Banking  
Society   and   their   donation   went   un-­‐‑honoured,   although   other   banks   did   find  





The  Palestinian  banking  sector  pledged  USD  250,000  but  did  not  pay  a  dime,  
because  of  their  fear  of  being  punished  by  Israel  for  doing  so.  There  are  two  
individual   banks   that   appreciated   the   NEF   and   made   their   donations  
through  other  indirect  routes,  but  not  through  the  official  body  representing  
them   that   made   the   pledge.   I   don’t   know   if   the   Palestinian   Monetary  
Authority  had  anything  to  do  with  this.85  
  
In   considering   this   drawback,   a   fundamental   flaw   obstructing   the   work   of   the  
NEF   becomes   clear:   the   Palestinian   private   sector   was   unwilling      to   challenge  
Israel’s   settlement   policy   in   practice.   While   it   was   wholeheartedly   against   the  
settlement   enterprise   in   principle,   when   it   came   to   practically   translating   that  
objection   into   reality,   leaders   of   the   private   sector   were   extremely   wary   and  
cautious.  No  matter  how  hard  the  NEF  tried  to  secure  the  pledged  contributions,  
organizations  were  not  willing  to  follow  through  with  their  donations.  The  private  
sector  was  therefore  willing  to  be  part  of  the  nonviolent  effort  as  long  as  they  had  
no  price  to  pay  in  return  -­‐‑  and  as  long  as  no  sacrifice  was  made.  
  
In   relation   to   the  establishment  of   the  NEF  at   the  political   level,  Dr  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh  
described  the  Palestinian  approach  to  its  identity  as  a  state  as  being  schizophrenic  
in   some  ways,   arguing   that   a   state   does   not   only   exist   because   it   has   a   flag   or  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




membership  of   the  UN.  While  he   recognises   that   these  are   important,  he  asserts  
that  it  also  requires  more  practical  issues:    
  
To  have  a  state  you  must  feel  that  you  have  a  state  in  every  way;  you  need  to  
have  a   state   in   reality.  This  of   course   involves   also  having  an   independent  
economy   that   reflects   the   state’s   national   identity.   One  must   feel   that   this  
identity   is   expressed   through   the   smallest   economic   activity.  We  must   feel  
that  everything  within   this  economy  contributes   towards  building   the  state  
that  represents  us,  our  identity,  and  everything  we  long  for.86  
  
Thus,  the  work  of  the  NEF  and  its  effects  on  the  economy  can  be  understood  to  be  




The  NEF  was   governed   by   the   Palestinian   Consumer   Protection   Council  which  
was   headed   by  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   and   used   office   space   provided   by   the  Ministry   of  
National  Economy  with  which  it  worked  closely.  Partnerships  were  built  between  
the  NEF   and   law   enforcement   institutions   such   as   Palestinian   customs   and   the  
security  forces,  in  addition  to  relevant  ministries  and  public  institutions.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The  organisation  was  relatively  sophisticated  with  eight  departments  listed  below.  
Each  had  a  different  area  of  focus  and  a  specific  role,  all  of  which  are  reflected  in  
the  campaigns  conducted  during  the  NEF’s  existence.    
  
- PR  and  media  department  
- Recruitment  and  volunteer  mobilization  department  
- Training  department  
- Israeli  outreach  department  
- International  outreach  department  
- Design  and  production  department    
- Civil  society  affairs  and  networking  department    
- Law  enforcement  department    
  
9.4  Strategy  
On   the   establishment   of   the  NEF,  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   devised   its   plan   of   action   aimed  
primarily  at  the  West  Bank  and  proceeded  to  establish  the  NEF’s  presence  there.  
The   immediate   task   at   hand  was   quite   straightforward:   to   end   the   existence   of  
settlement  products  in  Palestinian  markets  by  the  end  of  the  year  2010.  To  this  end,  
a   rather   sophisticated   strategy   was   developed   with   the   ambitious   intention   of  
implementing  it  within  a  year.  This  strategy  was  a  mix  of  devising  and  enforcing  




combined   with   public   awareness   campaigns   to   rally   Palestinians   to   abandon  
settlement  products  through  self-­‐‑motivation.  However,  while  the  NEF’s  rationale  
was  easily  understood  by  Palestinians,   the  program  also  had   to   focus  on  how   it  
would  be  perceived  by  the  international  community  and  Israel;  especially  so,  since  
this   was   an   official   program   that   represented   the   PNA  which   had   to   abide   by  
economic  agreements  that  it  had  signed  with  Israel.  To  be  specific,  the  PNA  had  to  
in   agreement   with   the   Paris   Protocol,   which   set   out   the   nature   of   economic  
cooperation  between  the  PNA  and  Israel.    
  
As   a   party   to   the   Oslo   accords,   the   PNA   was   not   allowed   to   take   part   in  
campaigns   that   delegitimized   and   undermined   Israel’s   standing   within   the  
international  community.  Therefore,  among  the  first  steps  the  NEF  undertook  was  
to   clearly   explain   the  program’s   approach   and  how   it   justified   that   approach   in  
political   terms.  Talking  points,  media   lines,  and  other  documents   that  explained  
this   were   prepared   and   distributed   to   all   Palestinian   officials   to   guarantee   all  
explanations   and   responses   regarding   the   program  were   in   sync   and   delivered  
with  the  utmost  sensitivity.  The  following  points  outline  the  main  messages  that  
the   NEF   decided   to   communicate   to   the   media   and   public,   and   illustrate   the  
arguments  the  NEF  adopted  to  support  its  work  (NEF,  2010):	    
  




o The   campaign   is   an   important   step   in   the   direction   of   building   a   viable  
Palestinian   state   that   has   an   economy   able   to   respond   to   the   needs   of   all  
Palestinian  sectors  while  preserving  our  national  interests.  The  aim  is  to  rid  
Palestinian   markets   from   all   products   that   are   weakening   our   economy,  
including  settlement  products,  while  on  the  other  hand  it  seeks  to  expand  
on  and  develop  all  that  strengthens  it.    
  
o It   is   any  nation’s   right   to  organize   its   internal  markets   in  a  way   that  best  
supports   its   economy.   This   is   a   campaign   to   self-­‐‑empower   Palestinian  
consumers   and   provide   them   with   the   information   about   products   that  
they  have   the   right   to  know.  This   is  especially   important   since  settlement  
companies   normally   camouflage   their   products   as   anything   but   of  
settlement  origin.  Having  provided  this  information,  we  consider  it  is  then  
up  to  the  consumer  to  decide  for  him  or  herself.  
  
o We   welcome   Israeli   products   into   our   markets   and   encourage   economic  
cooperation.  This   campaign   is  not   in  breach  of   any  agreements;   in   fact,   it  
advocates   for   and  protects   international   law   and   takes   a   practical   step   to  
stop  those  in  breach  of  this.    
  
o Due   to   the   land   and   water   scarcity,   as   well   as   obstacles   to   movement  




Palestinian   manufacturers   and   producers   are   unable   to   compete   with  
settlement   products.   Moreover,   settlement   products   do   not   go   through  
quality  assurance  measures  as  Palestinian,   Israeli,   or   foreign  products  do.  
Consequently,   their   industry   is  also  a  hazard   to   the  environment.   Indeed,  
factory  settlements  around  the  Tul  Karem  area  are  known  to  be  called  the  
“Death  Factories”  due  to  their  poisonous  emissions  that  affect  Palestinians.    
  
o Settlements  are  no  longer  residential  communities  that  attract  civilians  for  
ideological   reasons.   They   now   have   integral   business   entities   that   utilize  
Palestinian   land.  Over   the   last   10  years,   the  growth   rate   in   the   settlement  
population  has  been  three  times  that  of  Israel’s.  In  the  Jordan  valley  alone,  
the  settler  population  of  approximately  9600  settlers  consumes  a  quarter  of  
the  water   consumed   by   all   Palestinian  West   Bank   residents   (2.5  million).  
Settlement  businesses  profit   from  the  exploitation  of  Palestinian  resources  
and   promote   the   settlement   expansion;   these   depend   on   and   encourage  
development   of   basic   infrastructure   such   as   roads,   water,   electricity,  
telecommunications,   and   sewage   that   are   not   accessible   to   Palestinians.  
Thus,   the   infrastructure   created   by   Israel   came   to   serve   the   Jewish  
settlements,  which  highlights  the  colonial  nature  of  the  occupation  and  the  





o It  is  a  further  violation  of  the  Palestinians’  rights  that  settlement  jurisdiction  
covers  40%  of  the  West  Bank  while  the  built  up  area  takes  up  only  3%  of  the  
region.   Furthermore,   in   2009,   there  were   698   incidents   of   settler   violence  
against   Palestinian   civilians,   their   lands,   homes,   and   property.   From  
January   2010   to   May   2010   there   were   326   reported   incidents   of   settler  
violence.    
  
Thus,  to  tackle  these  issues,  the  overall  strategy  adopted  was  to  develop  a  specific  
law   combined   with   a   series   of   campaigns   that   covered   a   range   of   ways   of  
approaching   the   public,   including   an   advertising   campaign   making   clear   the  
NEF’s  aims,  and  various  forms  of  outreach  work  to  raise  awareness;  all  of  which  
are  described  below.    
  
i. Creating  the  message:  The  ‘Your  Conscience,  your  Choice’  campaign:    
The   very   first   of   the   NEF’s   campaigns   was   the   ‘Your   conscience,   your   choice’  
campaign  that  characterised  and  explained  the  NEF’s  approach  for  the  following  
year.   While   a   law   to   ban   settlement   products   was   being   prepared,   the   NEF  
decided  that  the  best  way  to  end  economic  trade  with  settlements  was  to  ensure  






This   campaign   involved   around   USD   130,000’s   worth   of   outreach   material  
promulgated   through   all   available  means,   including   television   and   radio   spots,  
newspaper   advertisements,   billboard   campaigns,   social   media   and   internet  
adverts,  and  even  a  radio  soap  opera.  Through  these  outlets,  the  NEF’s  work  was  
advertised  in  all  Palestinian  cities,  major  villages,  and  along  the  roads  connecting  
them.  All  of  the  messages  were  meant  to  be  self-­‐‑empowering  and  aimed  to  enable  
Palestinian   consumers   make   relevant   decisions   themselves   regarding   the  
settlement   economy.   Following   is   a   translation   of   some   of   the   statements   these  
messages  included:    
  
• “Buying  settlement  products  brings  the  settlements  into  your  home.”  
  
• “As   the   children   of   Palestine,   we   can   choose   not   to   contribute   to   the  
settlements.”    
  
• “A  settlement’s  lifeline  depends  on  your  consumption  of  their  products.”    
  
• “You   can   choose   not   to   help   to   destroy   refugee   camps   and   build  
settlements  instead.”87  
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All  of  these  statements  became  associated  with  the  program’s  brand  logo,  which  
had  a  finger  pointing  towards  the  reader  saying:  “Your  conscience,  your  choice”.  
For  one  month  prior  to  revealing  the  program  to  ban  settlement  products,  the  logo  
was  advertised  on  its  own  as  a  teaser  without  explaining  what  choice  it  referred  to.  





A  number  of  other  statements,  representing  various  Israeli  settlers  from  different  
settlement   companies   thanking  Palestinian  consumers   for   their   contribution  of  a  
certain  percentage  of  their  overall  annual  sales,  were  also  publicised.  Below  is  an  
example  of  a  mock-­‐‑up  of  the  marketing  director  of  the  Ahava  (Dead  Sea  products)  
company  thanking  Palestinians  for  contributing  67%  of  his  company’s  profit:    
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According   to   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh,   when   this   ‘Your   conscience,   your   choice”   campaign  
was   launched,   a   majority   of   the   Palestinian   people   were   very   hopeful   that   it  
would   succeed.   He   based   this   opinion   on   a   poll   conducted   by   the  Ministry   of  
National   Economy,   which   showed   that   90%   of   Palestinians   supported   the  
initiative.  
  
ii. The  law  to  ban  and  combat  settlement  products:  
Following   the   development   of   the   first   campaign,   on   26,   April   2010,   President  
Mahmoud  Abbas  announced  the  decision  to  institute  the  law  to  ban  and  combat  
settlement   products  while   attending   a   regular  meeting   of   Fatah’s   revolutionary  
council.   This   reflects   his   reliance   on   his   own   political   party   for   support   and  
endorsement   of   the   law.   In   relation   to   this,   it   is  worth  noting   that   normally   the  
Legislative  Council   is   the   official   body   that   produces   such   regulation;   however,  
since   it  had  been  suspended  since  2006  when  Hamas  won   its  elections,   this  was  
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not   an   option.  Under   such   circumstances,   the  president   can   issue   a  decision   for  
legislation  in  emergency  cases.  Thus,  these  circumstances  also  imply  the  urgency  
of   the   law,  as  the  NEF  did  not  wait  until   the  Legislative  Council  was  re-­‐‑instated  
before  announcing  the  law.  (For  details  of  this   law,  see  Annex  F:  The  law  to  ban  
and  combat  settlement  products.)  
  
As  its  name  implies,  the  law  aims  to  ban  settlement  products  and  services  and  lists  
harsh   punitive   measures   against   anyone   who   does   not   abide   by   its   articles.  
Punishment   can   involve   five   years   imprisonment   and   fines   of   up   to   JD   10,000  
(around  USD  15,000).  In  an  interview  with  the  author,  Wisam  Awwad,  a  program  
coordinator  at  the  NEF,  elaborated  on  how  the  law  was  implemented:    
  
[A]   law   was   approved   by   the   President   Mahmoud   Abbas   that   deems  
settlements   illegal   in   the  West  Bank,   it   is  called   the   law  to  ban  and  combat  
settlement  products.  The  law  was  to  be  enforced  by  all  relevant  government  
bodies,  mainly  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Palestinian  customs,  along  with  
the   security   forces.   There   was   also   a   free   telephone   number   that   was  
advertised   for   people   to   call   and   report   anyone  who   deals   or   trades   with  
settlement  products.88    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





When  this  law  was  introduced,  it  also  included  a  clause  that  forbids  Palestinians  
from  providing  services  to  settlements  (Article  4).  This,  of  course,  was  especially  
relevant   to   –   and   difficult   for   -­‐‑   over   30,000   Palestinians   working   in   settlement  
companies.  Consequently,   shortly   after   the   law  was   introduced   the   government  
had  to  soften  its  position  by  providing  a  grace  period  for  workers  to  find  jobs  in  
Palestinian  markets.  There  was  no  mention  of  any  deadline  for  that  grace  period,  
and  the  law  was  never  actually  implemented  in  relation  to  the  workers  involved.  
Indeed,  the  mere  inclusion  of  the  clause  was  perhaps  a  mistake  since  it  voluntarily  
revealed  the  vulnerability  of  the  Palestinian  economy,  and  its  dependence  in  some  
ways   on   the   settlement   economy.   Palestinian   unemployment   was   already   very  
high,  estimated  at  a  staggering  44%  for  young  people  (Balousha,  2013),    so  adding  
to   that   unemployment  would   have   grave   implications   to   the   economy,   a  move  
that  no  Palestinian  government  could  really  afford.    
  
The   NEF   was   later   tasked   with   presenting   proposals   to   reintegrate   Palestinian  
settlement  workers  back   into   the   local  economy,  although  none  of   the  proposals  
were  followed  through.  In  his  interview,  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh  explained  that  he  felt  he  was  
let   down   by   the   PNA   when   it   did   not   follow   through   a   decision   it   made   to  
dedicate  USD  50  million  to  the  reintegration  of  Palestinian  workers  on  settlements.  




the  NEF  as  a  whole;   in  his  own  words,  “criticism  began  when  we  expanded  our  
campaigns  to  target  settlement  workers  -­‐‑  we  had  opened  the  gates  of  hell.”89  
  
Enforcing  the  law  
When   the   law   to   ban   and   combat   settlement   products  was   introduced   in  April  
2010,  it  included  an  article  which  established  that  the  NEF  should  be  tasked  with  
monitoring  the  enforcement  of  the  law  itself.  The  NEF  therefore  took  the  leading  
role  in  making  sure  that  the  law  was  abided  by,  and  that  those  who  did  not  were  
brought   to   justice.   The  NEF’s   judgements  were   to   be   based   on   investigations   it  
carried   out   on   the   origins   of   products   or   services   that   had   been   bought   by   the  
person  or  persons  in  question.  Its  verdict  would  either  be  to  clear  a  case  or  refer  it  
to   prosecution.   The  Palestinian   customs   authority   and   the  police   force  were   the  
law  enforcement  units  that  would  follow  up  the  NEF’s  verdict.    
There   was   no   clear   and   comprehensive   account   of   how   many   cases   existed   of  
people  actually  being  punished  by  the   law,  yet  different  media  sources  reported  
on   this.   In  May  2010,   shortly  after   the   law  was   imposed,   the  Guardian   reported  
that:  “According  to  the  Washington  Post,  at  least  17  businesses  within  the  largest  
settlement  bloc,  Ma'ʹale  Adumim,  have  closed  as  a  result  of  the  boycott  campaign  
that  took  off  earlier  in  the  year,  while  the  PA  has  confiscated  $5m-­‐‑worth  (£3.5m)  of  
settlement  goods  across  the  West  Bank.”  (Shabi,  2010)  Three  years  after  the  law’s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




introduction  in  July  2013,  the  US-­‐‑based,  online  media  site  focussing  on  the  Middle  
East,  Al-­‐‑Monitor,  reported  the  following:  
Since  2010,  enforcing  the  law  resulted  in  the  confiscation  and  destruction  of  
smuggled   goods   worth   over   60   million   shekels   [$16.8   million],   an   official  
source   told  Al-­‐‑Monitor  on   the  condition  of  anonymity.  Products  costing  an  
equal  amount  were  not  destroyed  because  of  a  lack  of  the  proper  equipment  
to   do   so   on   the   Palestinian   side   …   The   director-­‐‑general   of   the   Customs  
Authority,   Ghaleb  Diwan,   pointed   out   to   Al-­‐‑Monitor   on   July   21   that   “817  
tons  were   seized  during   the  period  extending   from  June  2010  until   June  of  
this   year,   and   185   cases  were   referred   to   the  Public   Prosecutor’s  Economic  
Crimes   Office.”   …   But,   it   seems   that   the   law   was   not   deterrent   enough,  
leading   to  72   tons  of  goods  being  seized,  according   to   the  official   statistics,  
since   the   beginning   of   this   year   —   with   15   cases   being   referred   to   the  
Economic  Crimes  Office.  This  means  that  there  still  is  public  and  commercial  
appetite   for   settlement   products   ….   Sources   from   the   Palestinian   Judicial  
Media  Center  confirmed  to  Al-­‐‑Monitor  that  only  nine  people  were  convicted  
of   crimes   relating   to   the   anti-­‐‑settlement   goods   law   since   2010.   They   were  
sentenced   to   three  months   in   jail   and  paid   fines  as  high  as  2,000   Jordanian  





In   an   interview   with   the   author,   Mutaz   Qaroush,   a   coordinator   of   the   NEF,  
explained  that  before  introducing  new  products  in  local  markets,  according  to  the  
new  law,  Palestinian  companies  had  first  to  obtain  a  certificate  from  the  NEF  that  
indicated  that  the  product  did  not  come  from  the  settlements  before  they  could  get  
a   permit   from   relevant   government   bodies   to   allow   them   to   sell   their  
products.90This   involved   other   Palestinian   ministries   such   as   the   Ministry   of  
Health  if  a  company  was  requesting  a  permit  to  sell  a  drug  or  cosmetic  product  or  
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  if  a  new  brand  of  vegetable  or  fruit  was  to  be  allowed  
in  Palestinian  West  Bank  markets.  All   relevant  government  ministries  needed   to  
get  the  green  light  from  the  NEF  before  they  allowed  new  products  or  services  in  
their  markets.    
  
iii. The  guide  to  combating  settlement  products:  
Another   early   strategy   was   to   create   a   guide   identifying   settlement   products.  
Therefore,   among   the   first   tasks   that   the   NEF   was   faced   with   was   identifying  
which   settlement   products   existed   in   the   Palestinian   market.   Since   this   was   a  
campaign  that  called  for  the  boycott  only  of  settlement  products  and  not  those  of  
Israeli   produce,   it   introduced   the   challenge   of   identifying   the   specific   origins   of  
Israeli  products.  Otherwise,  had  it  been  a  campaign  to  boycott  all  Israeli  products,  
the   NEF   could   have   simply   asked   people   to   boycott   anything   with   Hebrew  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




written  on  it,  or  anything  that  stated  its  origin  as  Israeli.  Therefore,  the  first  three  
months   after   the   NEF’s   establishment   was   dedicated   towards   producing   an  
understandable,  easy-­‐‑to-­‐‑use  guide  that  explicitly  listed  settlement  products.    
  
Thus,  the  guide  to  ban  and  combat  settlement  products  was  produced.  It  was  an  
88-­‐‑page  booklet   that   included   around   500   settlement  products   -­‐‑   each   settlement  
company  was  listed  along  with  pictures  of  the  range  it  produced.  Information  for  
the   booklet   was   gathered   with   the   help   of   Israeli   organizations   that   oppose  
settlements,   such   as   ‘Who   Profits   From   Occupation’   and   ‘Gush   Shalom’,   and  
Palestinian  labourers  working  in  settlements.  The  booklet  also  included  guidance  
on  how  to  identify  other  products  that  may  be  of  settlement  origin.  In  addition  to  
Arabic,  the  booklet  was  translated  into  English,  Spanish,  and  French.  The  reason  
for   translating   the   booklet   was   to   further   emphasize   to   foreign   diplomatic  
missions  to  Palestine  and  international  journalists  that  the  campaign  targeted  only  
settlement  products,  and  not  all  of  those  from  Israel.  Around  500,000  copies  of  the  
booklet  were  made  and  distributed  during  the  campaigns  that  followed.  Below  is  








iv. ‘Door  to  door’  campaign’:  
On  the  18,  May  2010,  a  10  day  door-­‐‑to-­‐‑door  campaign  was  launched  by  the  NEF  
with   the   aim   of   reaching   all   Palestinian   homes   on   the  West   Bank.   About   3,000  
volunteers   took  part   in   this   campaign   that  was   eventually   able   to   reach   around  
75%  of  all  Palestinian  households  over  the  campaign’s  duration.  That  worked  out  
as  around  350,000  households  out  of  the  existing  420,000  on  the  West  Bank.    
  
The   governor   of   each   city   launched   the   campaign   at   precisely   10.00   am   on   the  
morning   of   the   18,  May.   Participating   at   the   launch  were   representatives   of   the  
Palestinian  government,  political  parties,  civil  society  organizations,  and  the  local  
and   international   press.   Public   figures,   such   as   the   prime   minister   and   other  
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government  officials,  also  volunteered  to  participate  in  this  campaign;  and  among  
the  homes  that  were  visited  was  that  of  President  Mahmoud  Abbas.    
  
During  the  campaign,  the  volunteers,  distributed  the  booklet  and  asked  people  to  
sign  a   “pledge  of  dignity”   that  was  a  vital  part  of   the   campaign.  The   translated  
text  of  this  pledge  is  given  in  the  next  section.  In  his  interview,  Awwad  describes  
how  the  campaign  was  conducted,  as  follows:    
  
Our   first   direct   action   campaign   was   called   from   door   to   door   and   was  
launched  at   the  same   time,  at  10:00  am   in  all  governorates   through  a  press  
conference  that  was  held  simultaneously.  Each  pair  of  volunteers  would  visit  
Palestinian   households   in   their   area   and   distribute   a   booklet   that   contains  
information   about   existing   settlement   products   in   our  markets   and  would  
ask  people   to  sign  on   to   the  “pledge  of  dignity”   through  which   they  could  
confirm  their  support  for  the  campaign.  Volunteers  would  also  ask  residents  
to  place  a  sticker  that  says  that  this  place  is  free  from  settlement  products  on  
their   doorsteps.   In   just   a  week  we   visited   around   80%   of   all   homes   in   the  
West  Bank.91  
  
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The   main   thrust   of   the   door-­‐‑to-­‐‑door   campaign   was   to   distribute   information  
regarding  the  aims  and  work  of  the  NEF  to  all  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank.  To  
this   end,   volunteers   distributed   a   package   of   outreach   material   to   individual  
households   throughout   the   area.   The   package   included   the   guide   to   ban   and  
combat   settlement   products,   a   brochure   about   the  NEF,   and   a   sticker   that   said:  
“My   conscience   is   at   peace,   this   place   is   free   from   settlement   products”.   The  
sticker  was  to  be  placed  at  the  entrances  of  homes  once  the  inhabitants  were  sure  
that   they  no   longer   consumed   settlement  products.  This  gave  a   strong   image  of  
the   campaign’s   presence   after   volunteers   had   visited   Palestinian   homes.  At   one  
point  after   the   campaign  ended,   entire  neighbourhoods  were   seen   to  have   these  
stickers,  and  homes  that  did  not  have  the  sticker  stood  out  as  abnormal.  An  image  
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Volunteers   also   asked   Palestinian   residents   they   visited   to   sign   Al-­‐‑Karameh  
pledge  that  expressed  the  spirit  of  the  campaign.  Volunteers  would  bring  back  the  
signed   pledges   to   the   NEF,   which   then   archived   them   for   future   reference.  
Following  is  an  English  translation  of  that  pledge:    
  
We  the  people  of  Palestine,  of  all  religions,  affiliations,  professions,  and  ages,  
have   come   together   to   affirm   our   desire   and  determination   to   rise   up   and  
shake   off   the   effects   of   settlement   contamination   in   our   Palestinian   cities,  
villages,   and   refugee   camps   -­‐‑   first   and   foremost,   by   replacing   settlement  
products   in   our   local  markets  with   those   that   are   produced  with   pride   in  
Palestine,   with   Palestinian   Hands!   …  We   hereby   take   upon   ourselves   the  
responsibility   of   guiding   this   popular   campaign,   towards   a   dignified   and  
prosperous  national  economy,  upon  which  our  beloved  Palestinian  state  will  
be  built  on,   thereby  ensuring  and  sustaining   the  peace  we   long   for.  This   is  
our   pledge.   From   now   on   we   are…   ambassadors   of   Palestinian   dignity  
(Bröning,  2011,  p.  146).  
  
Training  the  volunteers:  
Volunteers  were  mainly  recruited  through  the  Fatah  youth  movement,  which  saw  
itself  as  a  main  partner  in  this  campaign  and  were  already  familiar  with  popular  
activities   through   organizations   they   belonged   to,   whether   universities   or   civil  




trained  in  relevant  aspects  of  outreach  work,  such  as  how  to  present  the  campaign  
and  how   to   interact  with  people   at   the  homes   they  visited.  To   supplement   this,  
workshops  were  held  in  each  area  in  the  run  up  to  the  campaign’s  launch.  Also,  
an   organisational   structure   was   designed   to   govern   the   volunteers   and   their  
engagement,  as  follows.  A  coordinator  was  assigned  for  each  city  and,  under  him  
or  her,  a  supervisor  was  assigned  for  each  locality;  then,  group  coordinators  were  
chosen   and,   lastly,   volunteers  were   organized   in   pairs   to   approach   households.  
The  number  of  volunteers  in  each  area  depended  on  the  number  of  households  in  
that  area.92  
  
A  detailed  scenario  of  how  a  home  should  be  approached  was  distributed  to  the  
volunteers.   This   explained   how   they   should   greet   and  present   themselves,   how  
they   could  answer  anticipated  questions,   and  how   to  deal  with   criticisms  of   the  
campaign.   In   essence,   while   they   were   asking   people   to   boycott   settlement  
products,  volunteers  were  to  encourage  Palestinian  consumers  to  give  priority  to  
domestic  produce  in  order  to  contribute  towards  their  national  economy.    
  
Another  aspect  that  volunteers’  training  involved  was  how  to  deal  with  the  media  
covering   their   activity.   Since   this   campaign   represented   the   PNA,   how   it   was  
portrayed  was  a  particularly  sensitive   issue  and   it  was   important   that   it  did  not  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




come  across  as  a  campaign  to  boycott  Israeli  products;  therefore,  it  was  vital  that  
volunteers  stuck  to  the  official  media  lines  as  set  forth  by  the  NEF.  Furthermore,  
volunteers  were  asked  to  present  the  campaign  in  a  positive  sense;   in  particular,  
by  making  clear   that   it  was  a   campaign  aimed  at  helping   to  build   the  economic  
pillar  of  the  future  Palestinian  state.    
  
Ten  volunteers  were  based  at  the  NEF  headquarters  and  these  organized  the  rest  
of   the  volunteers   in   the  West  Bank.  Each   training  program   lasted  12  hours,   and  
was  conducted  over  a  two  day  period  by  NEF  staff  from  its  training  department  in  
collaboration  with   staff   from   the  Palestinian   central   statistics   bureau.   This   latter  
department  had  developed  a  partnership  with  the  NEF  for  the  express  purpose  of  
developing  this  campaign.        
  
Some  reflections  on  volunteer  recruitment:  
The  backbone  of  the  NEF’s  work  was  formed  by  some  3,000  volunteers,  recruited  
and   trained   specifically   to   carry   out   its   programs.  While   the   claim   and   original  
intention  was   that   the  NEF  was   non-­‐‑partisan,   nonetheless,  we  were   not   able   to  
secure  such  a  large  number  of  volunteers  through  non-­‐‑political  structures.  This  is  




belonged  to  this.  Hasan  Faraj,  as  head  of  this  movement,  estimated  that  they  had  
offered  between  2,500  and  3,000  volunteers.93  
  
Although   these   recruits   were   considered   volunteers,   any   personal   costs   they  
encountered  were  generously  compensated.  Indeed,  when  compared  to  the  wages  
received   in   the   Palestinian   labour  market,   one   could   argue   that   they  were   paid  
workers  rather  than  volunteers.  In  total,  the  3,000  volunteers  were  paid  over  USD  
250,000   for   the   10-­‐‑day   door-­‐‑to-­‐‑door   campaign.   Nevertheless,   there   were   many  
cases   of   potential   fraud   where   some   volunteer   group   leaders   were   accused   of  
taking  advantage  of   the  funds.  However,  none  of   the  cases  were  proven,  yet   the  
mere  existence  of  such  claims  put  forward  by  volunteers  themselves  suggests  that  
some  of  those  involved  were  not  there  for  the  sake  of  the  cause.    
  
Ending   economic   ties  with   settlements   is   something   that   all   Palestinian  political  
factions  agreed  on  and  supported.  Yet,  when  it  came  to  providing  volunteers,  only  
those  following  President  Abbas  as  the  head  of  Fatah,  had  participated.  As  noted  
above,   it   was   Abbas   who   had   approved   and   announced   the   law   to   ban   and  
combat   settlement   products,   at   a   high   level   Fatah   General   Assembly  
(revolutionary   council)   meeting.   Thus,   sadly,   party   politics   overruled   their  
common  interest  that  the  campaign  embodies.  It  should  be  emphasised  here  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




our   interviews   with   popular   resistance   leaders   demonstrated   a   divide   in   the  
Palestinian  popular  resistance  structure  that  follows  political  parties.  For  instance,  
Mohammad   Al-­‐‑Khatib,   coordinator   of   the   Bil’in   popular   struggle   committee,  
explained   the   political   affiliations   associated   with   the   popular   resistance  
committees  introduced  in  Chapter  7:    
The   committees   that   were   formed   depended   on   the   affiliation   that   their  
initiators  had  originally.  They  had  to  be  one  of  three  groups:  left-­‐‑wing  NGOs,  
Fatah   or   the   PA,   or   regular   independent   activists.   Therefore   within   each  
committee   you  might   have   found   all   three,   or   in  many   committees’   cases,  
they  represented  one  of   these  three  groups  which  the  committee  ultimately  
subscribed  to.94      
Thus,  a  major   reason   that  other  political  parties  did  not  participate  was  because  
the  PNA  was  behind  the  campaign  and  most  parties  were  cautious  and  suspicious  
of   the   PNA’s   intention   to   replace   the   BDS   campaign   with   a   limited   boycott   of  
settlement  products.  Our  interviews  also  confirmed  this  suspicion  among  leaders  
of  the  boycott  movement,  such  as  Jamal  Jum’a  who  perceives  the  call  for  a  limited  
boycott  as  “the  biggest  and  most  dangerous  threat   to  popular  resistance  and  the  
boycott  campaign”.95  In  the  same  vein,  when  asked  about  the  PNA’s  leadership  of  
the  campaign,  Adri  Nieuwhof,  as  a  founder  of  the  BDS  movement,  stated  “I  felt  it  
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to  be  a  bit  tricky  for  a  government  to  be  actively  involved  in  a  boycott  campaign  
when   you   already   have   a   civil   society   boycott   movement.   It   seemed   as   if   they  
wanted  to  compete  with  it  or  adopt  it”.96  
At  the  very  beginning  of  the  door-­‐‑to-­‐‑door  campaign,  NEF  members  had  hoped  to  
establish  its  own  national  structure  of  volunteers  and  to  select  them  regardless  of  
political   affiliation.   However,   this   would   have   required   much   more   time   and  
financial  backing  than  was  actually  available.  Therefore,  we  felt  it  expedient  to  get  
the  help  of  an  existing  political  group.  In  relation  to  this,   it  should  be  noted  that  
there   was   no   formal   structure   within   the   Fatah   youth   group   until   the   NEF  
organized  one.   It  was  the  call  by  the  Palestinian  president   (as  head  of  Fatah)   for  
Fatah   supporters   to   take   part   in   the   campaign   that   inspired   the   movement   to  
cooperate  in  forming  a  structure.  Later,  after  the  NEF  was  closed  down,  the  Fatah  
movement  maintained  the  structure  and  continued  to  take  advantage  of  it  for  all  
its  popular  campaigns.97    
  
Reactions  and  responses  to  “Door  to  Door”  campaign:  
Meetings   were   held   after   the   campaign   had   ended   where   ‘door   to   door’  
volunteers  reported  back  to  the  NEF  regarding  how  people  reacted  to  their  visits.  
In   general,   reactions  were   overwhelmingly   supportive.   In   fact,  most   Palestinian  
consumers   felt   disgusted   when   they   knew   that   they   were   unknowingly  
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supporting  the  settlement  economy.  Prior  to  the  campaign,  most  consumers  were  
unaware   of   the   existence   of   a   settlement   economy;   they   thought   that   they  were  
simply  buying  Israeli  products.  The  fact  that  they  had  not  previously  perceived  a  
correlation   between  what   they  were   consuming   and  what   they   support   caused  
them   strong   feelings   of   frustration.   Since   consumer   behaviour   had   not   been  
understood  as  having  any  economic  or  political  implications  the  campaign  had  a  
significant  awareness  raising  effect.98  
  
However,  there  were  some  negative  -­‐‑  or  unsupportive  -­‐‑  reactions  to  the  campaign.  
In   relation   to   these,   Mohammad   Irshaid,   originally   recruitment   officer   for   the  
campaign   and   later   its   director,   explained   that   unsupportive   reactions   could   be  
understood   to   fall   into   one   of   the   following   two   categories:   1)   consumers   who  
thought   that   the  PNA   should   first  work   on   finding   trusted   alternative  products  
and  services  which  they  did  not  believe  existed,  and  2)  those  who  thought  that  if  
the  PNA  was  genuine  in  its  efforts,  it  should  call  for  a  full  boycott  of  Israel.99    
  
The  overall  effects  of  the  campaign  are  complex,  and  discussed  in  more  detail   in  
the   conclusion   to   this   section,   however,   it   can   be   understood   to   have   had   a  
positive  influence  in  terms  of  the  raised  awareness  of  the  importance  of  consumer  
power  among  the  Palestinian  population.  
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v. The  ’Medal  of  Dignity’  campaign:  
About  two  months  after  the  ‘Door  to  door’  campaign,  a  ‘Shop  to  shop’  campaign  
was  launched  on  1,  July  2010  involving  the  participation  of  around  600  volunteers  
from   all   over   the   West   Bank.   Its   aim   was   to   reach   all   Palestinian   shops   and  
industrial  facilities  to  encourage  them  to  support  the  boycott  from  their  end  by  not  
selling  or  dealing  with  settlement  products  and  services.  Although  the  law  to  ban  
and  combat  settlement  products  was  already  in  place,  this  campaign  was  created  
to   further   self-­‐‑motivate   business   owners   to   abandon   trade   with   settlement  
products  out  of  their  personal  conviction,  and  not  only  because  a  law  was  in  place.    
  
As  with  the  door-­‐‑to-­‐‑door  campaign,  volunteers  were  trained  in  how  to  approach  
shops  and  were  given  outreach  material  to  distribute.  Each  package  also  included  
the  guide   to  how  and  why  settlement  products  were  banned,  but   instead  of   the  
pledge  of  dignity,  shop  owners  were  handed  out  application  forms  for  the  ‘Medal  
of  dignity’.  This  medal  was  in  fact  a  certificate  that  was  awarded  by  the  Ministry  
of  National  Economy  to  shops  that  showed  that  they  did  not  trade  with  settlement  
products.   Once   a   shop   submitted   its   application,   a   representative   from   the  
Palestinian  consumer  protection  unit,  which  had  been  set  up  by  the  NEF,  would  
visit  and  inspect  the  shop  before  authorizing  the  certificate  to  be  awarded.  Other  
visible  material   that  showed  a  shop’s  participation   in   the  campaign  was  handed  




(hanging   signs).   Consumers,   for   their   part,   were   encouraged   to   look   for   this  
certificate  in  their  local  shops.    
  
During  the  campaign  the  volunteers  were  able  to  reach  around  20,000  businesses,  
which  comprised  almost  all  West  Bank  shops  and  industrial  facilities,  in  one  week.  
Similar   to   the   ‘Door   to   door’   campaign,   volunteers   also   involved   public   figures  
such  as  the  Prime  Minister  and  government  officials.  The  launch  of  the  campaign  
was  synchronized  throughout  the  West  Bank  so  local  governors  and  all  volunteers  
could  participate  on  the  same  morning.  Following   is  a  picture  of  Prime  Minister  
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vii. School  competition:  
After  conducting  campaigns   that   targeted  Palestinian  West  Bank  consumers  and  
shop  owners,  the  NEF  saw  an  opportunity  to  further  reach  out  to  the  Palestinian  
society   through   its   education   system.   We   considered   it   important   to   involve  
younger  students  in  the  campaign,  and  also  to  reflect  their  perspective  on  dealing  
with   settlement   products.   Therefore,   we   established   a   partnership   with   the  
Ministry  of  Education,  and  developed  activities  to  involve  students.  
  
Throughout  the  campaign,  announcements  were  regularly  made  in  all  schools  to  
encourage   students   to  keep  an  eye  on  what  products   enter   their  homes.  Classes  
were  dedicated  to  explaining  how  students  could  make  sure  their  parents  did  not  
mistakenly   purchase   settlement   products.   And   most   important   of   all,   a   school  
competition  was  carried  out  across  all  West  Bank  schools.  This  competition  asked  
students  to  participate  with  essays,  drawings,  and  art,  or  anything  that  expressed  
what  they  would  like  to  tell  a  Palestinian  consumer  or  shop  owner  who  insisted  
on  dealing  with  settlement  products.    
  
Over   4,000   submissions   were  made,   and   the  Ministry   of   Education   at   the   time  
described   the  activity   as   the  most  popular   that   students  had  ever  been  engaged  
with.   Once   the   submissions   were   received,   a   committee   made   up   of   educators  
from   the   Ministry   of   Education   selected   the   winning   50   submissions.   Winning  




published  in  a  book  that  was  widely  distributed.  Twenty  thousand  copies  of   the  
book  were  published.  Furthermore,  some  of  the  powerful  messages  conveyed  by  
the  participating  students  through  their  submissions  later  fed  into  the  advertising  
campaigns  of   the  NEF.  A  ceremony  was  held  on  the  15th  of  July  2010  under  the  
auspices  of  the  Prime  Minister  to  announce  the  winners,  to  hand  out  their  awards,  
and   to   announce   the   published   book   (WAFA,   2010).   The   picture   below   shows  
some   of   the   award   winners   at   the   ceremony   where   the   Minister   on   National  




In  the  NEF’s  final  campaign,  undertaken  in  the  first  quarter  of  2011,  we  dedicated  
our   efforts   to   encouraging   the   consumption   of   domestic   produce   -­‐‑   rather   than  
products   from  other  sources  -­‐‑  as  an  alternative   to   the  settlement  products   it  had  
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banned.   This   was   a   nationwide   campaign   called   ‘Give   me   a   chance’   in   which  
outreach  material  was   produced   and   a  media   campaign  was   held   towards   that  
end.  The  NEF  enlisted  its  volunteers  in  a  similar  way  to  previous  campaigns  but,  
in  this  case,  the  aim  was  for  them  to  be  present  in  Palestinian  markets  encouraging  
consumers  to  give  priority  to  domestic  produce.    
	  
9.5  Investigation  into  settlement  products  and  relations  with  Israeli  companies  
A   very   significant   challenge   was   that   of   correctly   identifying   and   certifying  
exactly   where   products   came   from,   especially   as   it   was   difficult   to   establish  
whether  a  product  was  produced  in  Israel  itself  or  in  the  settlements.  Since  many  
settlement   companies   depended   heavily   on   the   Palestinian   market   they   were  
concerned   to   maintain   this   outlet.   Indeed,   the   Washington   Post   reported   that,  
shortly   after   the   law’s   enforcement,   at   least   17   settlement   companies   completely  
shut   down.   The   Post   further   reported,   as   follows:   “For   the   Israelis,   it'ʹs   "ʺan  
insufferable  situation,"ʺ  according  to  Avi  Elkayam,  who  represents  the  settlement'ʹs  
300   factory  owners.  But   for  Palestinians,   it  might  be   the  strategy   they  have  been  
looking  for.”  (Zacharia,  2010)  
  
For   settlement   companies   that   had   purely   economic   motives,   it   seemed   more  
worthwhile   to   abide   by   the   Palestinian   law   by   relocating   their   factories   or   by  
proving  to  the  NEF  that  they  no  longer  have  ties  with  settlements  and  produced  




remove  their  products  from  its  banned  list.  A  rather  paradoxical  relationship  was  
established  between   the  NEF   and   such   companies,   as   the   following   explanation  
indicates.    
  
Before  a  company’s  product  could  be  removed  from  the  banned  list,  the  NEF  had  
to  investigate  whether  the  company  was  genuine  in  its  claims  that  it  was  neither  
based   in   the   settlements   nor   produced   any   items   there.   This   was   a   rather  
controversial   and   sensitive   issue   since,   according   to   the   Oslo   peace   accords,  
official  PNA  bodies  are  not  allowed  to  operate  in  Israel,  or  even  outside  Area  A,  
that   is,   areas   under   PNA   administrative   and   security   jurisdiction;   at   least,   not  
without  Israel’s  consent.  However,  the  companies  in  question  were  claiming  that  
their  activities  were  limited  to  areas  within  Israel.  Thus,  the  NEF  had  to  find  a  way  
to  investigate  the  product  origins  in  an  area  that  under  no  circumstances  was  an  
official  PNA  body  legally  allowed  to  operate  in.  The  way  the  organisation  found  
to   overcome   this   was   by   indicating   the   investigation   criteria   and   evidence  
required  by   the  NEF  and  passing   this  on   for   ‘others’   to   research  and  submit   the  
results  to  the  NEF.  These   ‘others’,  who  carried  out  the  investigations,  were  Arab  
lawyers   holding   Israeli   citizenship,   who   could   therefore   be   contracted   by   an  
Israeli   company,   and   so   make   it   possible   for   the   NEF   to   have   some   form   of  
communication  with  the  Israeli  companies.    
  





After   I  was  approached  by  the  first   Israeli  company  to  clear   its  brand  from  
the  banned  list  -­‐‑  having  successfully  done  so  -­‐‑  the  word  spread  among  other  
Israeli  companies  who  started  approaching  me.  I  would  visit  each  company’s  
production   line   and   all   its   facilities   wherever   they   were.   I   requested   full  
access  to  their  locations  and  files,  their  written  consent  to  this  was  something  
that   the  NEF   insisted  on   seeing.   I  would   then  visit   their   facilities   and   take  
pictures   of   their   production   lines   and   distribution   mechanisms.   A  
comprehensive  report  on  my  investigation  with  illustrations  would  then  be  
submitted   to   the   NEF.   With   a   report,   I   included   a   declaration   that   the  
company   had   to   sign   confirming   that   it   no   longer   dealt   with   settlements.  
Some   investigation  reports   included  over  100  pages,  depending  on   the  size  
of  the  company.100  
  
The   example   of   a   ‘Field   Produce’   letter,   obtained   from   the   NEF   archive   and  
presented   in  Annex  G  below,  best   explains   the   common  procedure  put   in  place  
once   the   Fund   considered   there   was   enough   evidence   to   prove   a   company   no  
longer  had  links  with  settlements.  The  letter  is  addressed  to  the  PNA  Minister  of  
Economy  and  titled:  ‘A  request  to  remove  the  products  of  ‘Field  Produce’  from  the  
first  part  of   the  guide   to  ban  and  combat   settlement  products’.     The   letter   states  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




that   ‘based   on   the   attached   report   prepared   by   the   investigating   attorney,   we  
request  your  approval  to  remove  the  company’s  products  from  the  list’.  The  notes,  
visible   in   Annex   G   and   handwritten   by   the   Minister   of   Economy,   give   the  
following  instructions:    
  
1) The   Deputy  Minister   of   Economy   is   to   instruct   the   consumer   protection  
unit  to  execute  the  instructions.  
2) Before   the  company’s  products  are  allowed  in  markets   the  matter   is   to  be  
published  in  our  local  newspapers  confirming  the  company’s  commitment  
to  withdrawal  of  activity  on  settlements.    
3) All  relevant  official  bodies  are  to  be  informed.    




Thus,  by  using  an  indirect  method  we  were  officially  able  to  establish  the  origins  
of  many  products  and  record  this,  without  contravening  the  Paris  Accords,  so  as  
to   ensure   that   the   information   was   available   to   back   up   enforcement   of   the  







9.6  Relations  with  Israeli  society  
On   5,   September   2010,   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   spoke   to   Israeli   students   at   Tel-­‐‑Aviv  
University  in  his  role  as  Palestinian  Minister  of  National  Economy  and  Chairman  
of  the  NEF.  He  shared  a  panel  with  Israeli  Minister  Avishai  Braverman  and  spoke  
about  the  intentions  behind  the  NEF’s  program  to  boycott  settlement  products.  He  
explained  that  the  program  does  not  target  Israeli  products,  and  that  the  PNA  in  
fact  encourages  economic  ties  with  Israel  (Friedman  R.  ,  2020).  On  other  occasions,  
Minister   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   published   op-­‐‑eds   in   Israeli   papers   sending   out   the   same  
message.  These   acts  were   an   important  part   of   the   efforts   the  NEF  dedicated   to  
explaining   to   the   Israeli   public   that   their   program   was   not   intended   to   hinder  
peace,  nor  did  it  target  Israel.  This  form  of  outreach  was  an  important  component  
of   the   NEF’s   strategy:   reaching   out   to   the   Israeli   society.   This   approach   is  
remarkable   because   such   components   are   not   common   for   internal   Palestinian  
campaigns.    
  
For   instance,   an   op-­‐‑ed   by   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   in   the   Israeli   paper,   the   Jerusalem   Post,  
published   on   the   5th   of   March   2013,   was   entitled:   “The   Palestinian   campaign  
against  settlement  products  represents  a  practical  commitment  to  peace”  (Libdeh,  
2010).   Similarly,   in   an   interview   published   on   6,   August   2010   with   the   Israeli  
media   outlet,   Ynetnews,   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   was   quoted   as   saying:   “the      Palestinian  




despite   the  boycott.   Israel   is   here   to   stay  …  and  we   are   interested   in  peace   and  
cooperation  with   it,   therefore  we  will   not   participate   in   any   boycott   against   the  
Israeli   economy   as   a   whole”   (Libdeh,   2010).   Moreover,   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   explained  
during   my   interview   with   him   that   he   had   also   met   with   a   number   of   Israeli  
ministers   and   officials   –   including   Fuad   Ben   Eli   Ezar,   then   Israeli   Minister   of  
Industry   -­‐‑   to   explain   the  NEF’s  program,   and   to   reiterate   that   it  does  not   target  
Israeli  products.101  
  
Understanding  what   the   Israeli   public’s   reactions   to   its   program  might   be   was  
crucial   for   the   NEF   before   drafting   the   messages   it   sent   to   the   Israeli   side.   It  
therefore  secretly  contracted  with  an  Israeli  PR  firm,  another  event  that  is  rare  to  
happen.  The  firm  in  question  was  tasked  with  conducting  opinion  polls  to  assess  
the   Israeli   position.   It   then   advised   the  NEF   on  what  messages  would   be  most  
effective  to  convey  to  the  Israeli  side.  In  an  interview  conducted  with  the  author,  a  
senior   official   at   the   NEF,   speaking   on   condition   of   anonymity,   confirmed   that  
such  a  contract  had  been  made  although  the  name  of  the  Israeli  PR  firm  is  also  to  
remain   concealed   due   to   the   sensitivity   of   the   matter.   The   contract   lasted   for  
around   six   months   and   was   facilitated   through   a   ‘middle   man’   Palestinian   PR  
company.   Despite   the   secrecy   associated   with   it,   this   arrangement   shows   the  
emphasis  that  the  NEF  placed  on  having  the  Israeli  public  understand  its  program,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and   the   importance   it   saw   in   this.   Through   this,   the   NEF   was   seeking   to   find  
partners   in   Israel   that   accepted   its   efforts   to   ban   settlement   products   and,  
moreover,  saw  it  as  a  measure  that  did  not  contradict  the  two  state  solution,  but  in  
fact  could  contribute  towards  it.    
  
Taking  a  completely  different  approach,  during  my  interview  with  Salam  Fayyad,  
the  former  prime  minister  revealed  a  striking  story  relating  how  he  went  beyond  
calling  for  a  limited  boycott  of  settlements  to  publically  justifying  a  full  boycott  of  
Israeli   products.   He   explained   that   his   intention   was   that   Israeli   mainstream  
media   would   pick   it   up.   Explaining   the   Israeli   reaction,   and   how   he   used   that  
reaction  to  call  for  a  full  boycott  of  Israeli  products,  Fayyad  stated  that  the  Israelis  
were  furious  and  tried  to  pressurise  the  NEF  to  stop  the  campaign  in  any  way  it  
could.  One  of   the  ways   in  which   they   reacted  was   to  delay   the   tax   refunds   that  
Israel  was   to   transfer   to   the   PNA.  However,  when   this   happened,   Fayyad   took  
advantage  of   it   and  again   called   for   a   full  boycott  of   Israeli  products.  Of   course  
this   was   seen   as   beyond   inflammatory   not   only   by   the   Israelis   but   also   by   the  
international  community.  It  went  beyond  what  the  PNA  can  do  or  even  talk  about.  
  
Expanding  on  his  reasons  for  this,  Fayyad  adds:    
  
The  logic  that  I  used  to  justified  this  with  was  key.  I  relied  on  the  nature  of  




Protocol  states  that  Israel  is  to  compensate  the  PNA  with  the  taxes  that  occur  
to  Israeli  products  being  sold  in  Palestinian  markets.  These  taxes  should  go  
to  the  PNA  and  not  Israel  since  they  are  sold  in  its  market.  If  Israel  stops  the  
transfer  of  these  taxes,  then  we  are  obliged  to  seek  another  source  of  income  
since  the  source  provided  through  tax  on  the  purchase  of  Israeli  products  no  
longer  exists.  Presenting   the  boycott  of   Israeli  products  based  on   that   logic  
cuts   the   road  ahead  of   those  who  would  otherwise   label   it  as  anti-­‐‑Israel  or  
anti-­‐‑Semitic.   I  explained  this   to   the   international  community,  such  as   to  US  
congressmen.  And  I  gave  the  example  of  having  one  bank  account  that  is  in  
debt;  in  order  to  avoid  all  your  income  being  taken  to  cover  that  debt,  people  
are  eventually  forced  to  open  other  bank  accounts.  In  a  sense,  that  is  exactly  
what   I  was  doing  when   I   called   to   avoid   Israeli   products   and  prefer   other  
products  over  them  for  the  benefit  of  the  PNA’s  income.102    
  
Reflections  on  NEF’s  relationship  with  the  Israeli  public103	  
The   coordination   between   the   NEF   and   Israeli   organizations   was   kept   highly  
confidential,   not   for   the   sake   of   the  NEF,   but   for   the   sake   of   the   Israeli   groups  
because,  since  the  NEF  was  an  official  PNA  body,  the  Israeli  organizations  would  
be   perceived   as   collaborators   if   the   relationship   became   known.   Although  
organizations   like   ‘Who   Profits   from   Occupation’   and   ‘Gush   Shalom’   openly  
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oppose   economic   ties   with   settlements   and   have   led   the   way   in   exposing  
settlement  companies  and  products,  it  remained  highly  sensitive  to  have  relations  
with   the   PNA   and   pass   information   on.104  In  my   position   as   director,   I  was   the  
only   point   of   contact   between   the  NEF   and   these   two   Israeli   organizations.  My  
meetings  with  them  were  held  in  their  offices  in  Tel  Aviv,  and  I  reported  on  these  
meetings  only  to  the  Palestinian  Minister  of  Economy.    
      
Also,  as  mentioned  earlier,  the  NEF  had  contracted  an  Israeli  PR  agency  to  convey  
its  message   to   the   Israeli  public,   assuring   them   that   its  program  does  not   target  
Israel  and  was  limited  to  its  settlement  enterprise.  The  Israeli  PR  agency  was  also  
very  cautious  about  not  being  exposed  for  the  dealings  it  had  with  the  PNA  and  
the   arrangement   was   facilitated   through   a   Palestinian   PR   company,   which   the  
NEF  had  also  contracted.  However,   I   remained   its  only  contact   representing   the  
PNA.  The  arrangement  was  kept  from  both  the  Israeli  and  Palestinian  public,  yet  
highlights  the  importance  that  the  NEF  placed  on  reaching  out  to  the  ‘other  side’.  
We   considered   this   crucial   to   presenting   the   program  as   a  measure   that  merely  
aims   to   remove  one  of   the  obstacles   that   stand   in   the  way  of  building  a  healthy  
Palestinian  economy  and  consequently  essential  to  winning  over  sections  of  Israeli  
society.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The   image   that   the   NEF   wanted   to   portray   was   successfully   conveyed   to  
politicians   and   official   state   representatives   and,   behind   closed   doors,   they  
expressed  their  support  for  the  PNA’s  program  and  made  clear  they  perceived  it  
as  a  constructive  nonviolent  approach  to  protesting  against  the  settlements  while  
building   an   important   pillar   of   the   future   Palestinian   state.   In   public,   however,  
those  same  politicians  were   less  vocal   in   their  support  of   the  program,  although  
they   never   criticized   it.   On   one   occasion,   an   Israeli   minister   -­‐‑   whose   name   is  
withheld  by  request  -­‐‑  said  that  what  the  NEF  was  doing  was  “brilliant”  and  that  it  
is  “exactly  what  you  should  be  doing”.  Yet  he  explained   further:   ”What  do  you  
expect   me   to   say   when   I’m   up   there   [pointing   at   the   panel].   I   am   an   Israeli  
minister,  I  cannot  say  what  I  really  think”.  This  was  said  in  a  private  conversation  
between  the  author  and  the  minister,  just  after  the  latter  had  publicly  criticized  the  
NEF.      
  
9.7  The  closure  of  the  NEF  
When  the  NEF  was  created  in  January  2010  it  had  a  clear,  albeit  ambitious,  goal  to  
achieve  within  a  given  timeframe;   to  end  the  existence  of  settlement  products   in  
Palestinian  markets  by  the  end  of  2010.  To  some  extent  this  was  achieved  when,  in  
November  2010,  one  after  another  Palestinian  governorates  declared  their  markets  
free  from  settlement  products,  as  will  be  discussed  below.  Moreover,  by  the  end  of  




consequently,  a  decision  to  shut  it  down  was  made  by  the  Palestinian  government.  
The   decision   was   justified   by   the   NEF   having   achieved   a   major   goal   by  
successfully   establishing   a   system   that   was   now   part   of   the   Palestinian  
government,   and   which   still   ensures   the   sustainability   of   efforts   to   maintain  
Palestinian   markets   being   free   from   settlement   products.   As   Salam   Fayyad  
explained   in   an   interview,   the   closure   was   a   question   of   logistics   rather   than  
politics:  “There  is  no  political  reason  behind  its  closure  as  it  is  claimed,  it’s  only  a  
matter  of  changing  Ministers  of  National  Economy  who  have  different  approaches.  
I   personally   would   have   liked   it   to   follow   through   with   what   it   was   set   to  
achieve.”105  
    
When   asked   whether   he   thought   that   the   NEF   had   been   successful   in   ridding  
Palestinian  markets  from  settlement  products,  Awwad  said  that  he  thought  they  
had  been  successful  in  Area  A,  but  he  felt  that  they  were  less  successful  in  Areas  B  
and  C,  which   are   not   fully   under   the   PNA’s   jurisdiction.  He   elaborated   on   this  
success  saying  that  the  NEF  was  successful  both  on  an  official  and  a  popular  level.  
On   the   popular   level,   Palestinian   consumers   had   started   to   boycott   settlement  
products   on   a   regular   basis   whereas,   previously,   they   had   not   differentiated  
between  settlement  products  and  Israeli  products.  He  elaborated  on  this:    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The  NEF  also  explained  to  people  that  domestic  alternatives  do  exist.  I  think  
this  was  a  successful  model  that  we  must  capitalize  on  and  build  upon,  not  
only  in  things  involving  settlement  products,  but  anything  that  is  hazardous  
to  Palestinian  consumers  and  their  economy.106    
  
Fayyad  explained  that  a  particularly  significant  achievement  was  creating  public  
awareness  of   the  connection  between  consumer  behaviour  and   the  building  of  a  
Palestinian   economy.   ”I   am  most   proud   of   the   people   living   in   Jerusalem  who  
actively  started  seeking  Palestinian  products  in  their  shops,  which  previously  had  
seldom   stocked   them.   They   came   to   prefer   Palestinian   products   not   only   over  
settlement  products  but  also  over  Israeli  ones.”107    
  
Similarly,  when  commenting  on  the  closure  of  the  NEF,  Awwad  stated:    
  
In  the  end,  the  consumer  was  made  aware  of  settlement  products.  The  NEF  
dealt  mainly  with  these  people  on  a  popular  level.  The  law  remains  in  force  
and   so   things   remain   difficult   for   people   to   market   settlement   products.  
However,   the  NEF  was   the  agency   to   turn   to  when  wanting   to  enforce   the  
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law   and   it   continuously   monitored   our   markets.   Today   we   don’t   have   a  
single  official  body  that  has  that  responsibility.108  
  
Thus,   the   legacy   of   the   NEF   worked   on   two   levels,:   on   the   one   hand,   the  
Palestinian  public  became  aware  of  the  issues  involved  in  the  boycott  and,  on  the  
other,   it   set   up   the   mechanisms   whereby   the   boycotts   could   be   enforced   at   an  
official  level  
  
Reflections  on  the  closure  of  the  NEF	  
While  the  NEF  was  officially  closed  by  the  Palestinian  government  in  early  2012,  
the  procedure  of   its  closure  had  started  much  earlier.   In  fact,   in  September  2010,  
only   eight  months   after   its   launch,   I   was   handed   a   decision   by   the  Minister   of  
National  Economy  to   terminate   the  employment  of  all  but  one  of   its  employees,  
leaving  myself  and  one  employee  for  the  rest  of  the  NEF’s  existence.  Despite  this  
major   setback,   the   NEF   continued   with   its   efforts   to   monitor   the   Palestinian  
markets  and  to  coordinate  with  other  official  bodies  to  maintain  the  exclusion  of  
settlement   products   in   domestic  markets.   Other   campaigns  were   carried   out   to  
promote   the   consumption   of   domestic   produce   as   the   first   alternative   to   the  
boycotted  settlement  products.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Although  other  plans  were  prepared,  such  as  those  aimed  at  providing  alternative  
job  opportunities  to  Palestinian  workers  on  settlements  to  reintegrate  them  in  the  
Palestinian   economy,   the   NEF   had   lost   the   initial   support   it   had   when   it   was  
launched.   Palestinian   officials   claim   that   this   is   simply   because   the   NEF   had  
fulfilled  its  tasks  and  had  achieved  its  goal.    
  
Moreover,   during   that   same   period,   the   Palestinian   leadership   had   embarked  
upon   a   new   venture:   to   seek   recognition   by   the   international   community   of  
Palestine’s   statehood.   This   effort   was   led   by   the   contemporary   Palestinian  
president,  Mahmoud   Abbas,   and  mainly   involved   diplomatic   action   while   also  
working   to   mobilize   grassroots   support   to   promote   this   effort.   Consequently,  
campaigns   encouraging   this   were   launched   across   the   world   in   support   of   the  
Palestinian  bid  for  membership  at  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly.    
  
During   this   time,   late   2011   to   early   2012,  when   I  was   touring  various  European  
states  to  lobby  for  ending  economic  ties  with  settlements,  I  received  direct  orders  
by  the  President’s  office  to  shift  what  I  was  calling  for.  From  then  on,  rather  than  
focusing   on   settlement   products,   I   was   to   dedicate   all   the   forums   that   I   had  
organized  to  support  the  bid  for  Palestinian  statehood.  It  became  clear  to  me  that  
the  NEF  and   its  programs  were  no   longer   the  priority,   and   that   all   efforts  were  





9.8  The  NEF;  Personal  commitment  rather  than  national  strategy  
As   illustrated   in   previous   chapters,   all   my   interviewees   on   Palestinian   popular  
resistance   emphasized   a   point   that   is   worth   mentioning   here:   that   support   for  
popular   resistance   depends   on   personal   commitment   rather   than   an   overall  
nationalist   program.   As   expressed   by   Hasan   Faraj,   the   head   of   Fatah   youth  
explained:  “Political  will  for  [the  boycott  of  settlement  products]  is  very  important  
yet   it   exists   on   an   individual   level   and   not   for   the   leadership   institution   as   a  
whole.”109    
  
This   individual   commitment   was   exemplified   by   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh   who   took   an  
exceptional   personal   interest   in   the   NEF   which   showed   in   his   conscientious  
involvement  with  its  overall  running.  Every  morning,  at  precisely  8:00  am,  for  the  
entire  duration  of  my  involvement,  we  would  have  a  meeting  to  discuss  the  NEF’s  
daily   progress   and   its   various   programs.   The   minister   was   extremely   detail  
oriented  in  his  involvement  and,  no  matter  what,  our  morning  meeting  would  be  
given   priority   over   anything   else   on   his   schedule.   He   also   reported   the   NEF’s  
progress  at  each  and  every  cabinet  meeting  since   the   inception  of   the  NEF.  This  
also   shows   the   priority   given   to   the   program   by   the   government   itself   under  
Prime  Minister  Salam  Fayyad.  In  interview,  Mohammad  Al-­‐‑Khatib  described  how  
different  governments  have  different  positions   regarding  popular   resistance  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




therefore  vary  in  the  support  they  show  as  evidence  that  such  support  depends  on  
individuals:    
  
For   sure   we   feel   a   difference   as   governments   change.   The   support   that  
popular   resistance   gets   is   from   individuals   in   influential   positions   and  not  
because  of  having  a  political  or  official  strategy.  This  is  something  I  am  100%  
convinced   of.   When   Salam   Fayyad,   for   instance,   was   Prime   Minister,   he  
personally   believed   in   popular   struggle,   and   so   he   supported   it   whole-­‐‑




The  question  now  is:  Was  the  NEF  successful  or  not?  Some  of  the  aforementioned  
challenges   did   undoubtedly   undermine   the   NEF’s   work,   yet   nonetheless,   the  
organisation  did  mark  a  new  beginning.  Nothing  can  explain  this  better  than  the  
front  page  of  the  New  York  Times  reported  on  6,  April  2010:    
  
Something   is   stirring   in   the  West   Bank.   With   both   diplomacy   and   armed  
struggle   out   of   favor   for   having   failed   to   end   the   Israeli   occupation,   the  
Fatah-­‐‑dominated  Palestinian  Authority,   joined  by   the  business   community,  
is   trying   to   forge   a   third   way:   to   rouse   popular   passions   while   avoiding  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




violence.  The  idea,  as  Fatah  struggles  to  revitalize  its  leadership,  is  to  build  a  
virtual   state   and   body   politic   through   acts   of   popular   resistance.   “It   is   all  
about  self-­‐‑empowerment,”  said  Hasan  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh,  the  Palestinian  economy  
minister,  referring  to  a  campaign  to  end  the  purchase  of  settlers’  goods  and  
the   employment   of   Palestinians   by   settlers   and   their   industries.   “We  want  
ordinary  people   to   feel   like   stockholders   in   the  process  of  building  a   state.  
(Bronner,  2010)    
  
The   New   York   Times   dedicated   its   front   page   to   this   report   on   the   NEF   and  
Palestinian   nonviolence,   under   the   title:   Palestinians   try   a   less   violent   path   to  
resistance.   Having   nonviolence   reported   in   such   newspapers   is   very   rare,   the  
Washington   Post,   the   Guardian,   Al-­‐‑Jazeera,   BBC,   CNN,   and   every   other   major  
global  news  agency  regularly  reported  the  NEF’s  work,  referring  to  it  as  positive,  
nonviolent,   effective,   etc.   All   of   the   programs   and   campaigns   described   in   this  
chapter  were  reported,  as  was  Israel’s  response  when  it  made  boycott  campaigns  
illegal,  officially  labelling  it  as  ‘economic  terrorism’.  
  
Therefore,  I  would  assert  that  the  NEF  was  successful  on  many  levels,  as  summed  
up  by  the  following  points:  
  
1) It  involved  the  Palestinian  public  in  the  state  building  process  by  enabling  




The  Fund  not  only   called   for   an  end   to   economic   ties  with   settlements,   it  
also  called  on  giving  priority  to  domestic  produce.    
2) By   leading   the  Palestinians   themselves   to  boycott   settlement  products   the  
NEF’s   work   also   encouraged   other   nations   to   follow   suit.   This   was  
illustrated   by   the   EU,  which   introduced   several  measures   to   this   end,   as  
discussed  in  Chapter  6.    
3) The   effectiveness   of   the   boycotts   following   the   introduction   of   the  
controversial  ‘Boycotter’s  Law’,  meant  that  Israel’s  response  in  deciding  to  
legally   pursue   boycotters   brought   the   validity   of   its   democracy   into  
question  across  the  globe.  
4) Palestinian   nonviolence   was   for   the   first   time   being   reported   and   given  
centre  stage  by  news  agencies  that  would  not  normally  find  such  news  of  
interest.    
5) For   a   period   of   time,   Palestinian   markets   were   empty   of   settlement  
products,   and   a   system   was   put   in   place   to   make   it   difficult   for   such  
products  to  reappear  in  the  country.    
6) For   the   PNA,   and   Fatah   in   particular,   the   NEF   built   a   bridge   with  
Palestinian   grassroots.   Something   that   had   been  missing   since   the   end   of  
the  first  Intifada.    
7) For  the  first  time,  Israeli  companies  were  actually  applying  for  permits  and  
undergoing  procedures  to  clean  their  record  with  the  PNA  by  proving  that  




8) Israeli   settlement   factories   that   refused   to   relocate,   and   continue   to   solely  
depend   on   Palestinian   markets,   did   in   fact   close   down   as   reported   in  
international  and  Israeli  media.    
  
However,  it   is  worth  considering  areas  where  the  NEF  was  less  successful,  as  an  
guide  to  how  such  a  campaign  might  be  more  effective:    
  
1) Its  plan  to  end  Palestinian  labour  on  settlements  was  unrealistic.  In  fact,  it  
would  have  gravely  harmed  the  Palestinian  economy  as  long  as  other  jobs  
were  not  being  provided   to   reintegrate   those  workers   into   the  Palestinian  
market.    
2) Individual  Palestinian  companies  benefited  most  from  the  campaign  since  
it   eliminated   some   of   their   competing   products   from   domestic   markets.  
While  this   is  a  good  thing,  nevertheless,  those  companies  did  not  increase  
the  number  of  their  workers  so  that  the  Palestinian  economy  could  feel  the  
improvement   in   their   businesses.   This   is   something   that   the   PNA   could  
have  stipulated  at  the  beginning  of  the  NEF’s  programs.    
3) While   the   stated   reasons   for   the   closure   of   the  NEF  make   logical   sense   -­‐‑  
since   it  was   seen   to   have   fulfilled   its   objective   -­‐‑   its   closure  made   it  more  
difficult   to   maintain   its   achievements.   There   was   no   follow   up   or  




what  had  been  achieved.  Consequently,  at  the  moment  we  have  a  situation  
where  the  Palestinian  markets  are  flooded  with  settlements  products.    
4) The  failure  to  unite  elements  from  across  the  Palestinian  political  spectrum  
shows   that   party   politics   comes   above   national   interest.   Certain   political  
parties  chose  not  to  participate  in  the  campaign  nor  even  support  it,  while  
others  even  saw   it   as  a   threat.  This  was   clear   in  our   interviews  with  BDS  
supporters   in   left   wing   movements   who   were   worried   that   the   PNA  
deliberately  established  the  NEF  to  replace  calls  for  a  full  boycott  of  Israel  
with  one  that  was  limited  to  settlement  products.  This  situation  reflects  the  
existing  fragmentation  within  Palestinian  social  and  political  life.  
5) Lastly,   the   organisation   failed   to   convince   both   Palestinians   and  
internationals  that  were  sceptical  of  the  PNA.  These  continued  to  hold  one  
of   two   opposite   positions;   either   ‘Why   not   a   full   boycott?’   or   ‘Why   not  
secure  alternatives  before  calling  for  boycotts?’.    
  
Considering   these   strengths   and  weaknesses,   I  would   argue   that,  while   there   is  
still  some  way  to  go  in  terms  of  disassociating  the  Palestinian  economy  from  the  
settlements,   the  NEF   cannot  be   criticized   for   its   activities  or   approach  although,  
simply  put,   it  was  not  perfect.  Moreover,   if   asked   the   question   -­‐‑  Would   it   have  
been  better  if  it  were  never  established?  -­‐‑  my  answer  would  be  an  immediate  no.  




settlement  products,  while  the  NEF’s  economic  gains  may  certainly  be  questioned,  
there  were  many  indirect  positive  economic  and  ideological  outcomes.    
  
To  conclude,  I  would  like  to  offer  the  story  of  the  very  first  product  we  decided  to  
boycott   -­‐‑   watermelons   coming   from   settlements   –   as   a   means   to   illustrate   the  
complexities  of  the  situation.  The  way  we  distinguished  the  watermelons  from  the  
settlements  was  by  the  fact   that   they  were  the  earliest  out   in  season.  Settlements  
growing  watermelons  are  all  located  in  the  Jordan  Valley,  a  significantly  warmer  
area  than  the  rest  of  the  West  Bank;  consequently,  they  were  one  month  earlier  in  
markets   than   the   Israeli   and   the   Palestinian   ones.   Our   decision   was   to   ban  
watermelons  altogether  for  the  first  month,  and  then  wait  for  the  Palestinian  ones  
harvested   in   the   north   of   the  West   Bank   before   lifting   the   ban.  However,   these  
later  watermelons  never  arrived.  We  then  found  that  farmers  that  had  previously  
led   the   Palestinian   watermelon   market   had   already   abandoned   growing  
watermelons   since   they   were   not   able   to   compete   with   the   prices   offered   by  
settlements.  There  were  two  reasons  for  this,  1)  settlement  companies  are  mostly  
exempted   from   taxes,   and   2)   water   is   much   cheaper   and   more   available   on  
settlements.  However,  while  those  Palestinian  farmers  had  abandoned  their  land,  
they  had  not  abandoned  their  profession  of  watermelon  growing.  Only  now,  they  
were  growing  them  as  labourers  on  settlements.  This  was  far  more  economically  
viable  personally  for  them,  although  economically  devastating  for  the  Palestinian  




first   place,   was   the   existence   of   settlement   watermelons   and   the   unfair  
competition  they  provided  to  Palestinian  growers.    
  
This  shows  how  market  forces  make  the  boycotts  especially  difficult,  and  how  in  
the  short  term  this  strategy  had  a  destructive  effect.  However,  the  following  year,  
their  actions  demonstrated  how  change  at  this  level  can  be  promoted  since  when  
the   farmers   knew   that   settlement  watermelons  were   banned,   they  went   back   to  






















The  overall  aim  of  this  research  was  to  analyse  the  political  and  economic  issues  
involved   in   the   nonviolent   movement   against   the   Israeli   settlements   and   its  
products  on  the  West  Bank  between  2005  and  2012,  including  action  taken  both  in  
Palestine  and  internationally.  In  particular,  the  research  examined  the  emergence  
of   the   movement   to   boycott   settlement   products,   explored   the   debates   and  
different  perspectives  within  this  movement,  and  critically  assessed  the  role  of  the  
PNA  and  the  BDS  movement.  By  answering  the  research  questions  set  out  in  the  
methodology,  the  research  makes  an  original  contribution  to  academic  knowledge  
of   the   subject   and   to   understanding   this   issue   and   the   challenges   facing   the  
Palestinian  and  international  solidarity  movement  to  end  the  Israeli  occupation.        
  
Overall,   the  study  highlights   that   the  settlement   issue  remains  at   the  core  of   the  
Israeli   –   Palestinian   conflict.   In   particular,   it   described   how   settlements   have  
evolved  and  expanded  since  they  were  introduced  when  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  
were   occupied,   and   explained   how   the   different   settlement   plans   that   were  




occupied   Palestinian   land   today.   Thus,   different   types   of   settlers   inhabit   the  
settlements.  While  some  live  there  for  ideological  reasons,  the  vast  majority  have  
decided  to  live  in  settlements  in  the  OPT  for  economic  reasons.  The  reason  being  
that  it  is  much  cheaper  to  live  in  a  settlement  than  it  is  in  Israel  proper;  in  part  this  
is  due   to  cheaper   real  estate,  but  also  because  of   incentives   that   the  government  
provides.      
  
For  instance,  in  2013,  the  Israeli  government  labelled  90  settlements  as  “National  
Priority   areas”,  which  meant   that   the  government   subsidized  69%  of   the   cost  of  
land,  and  the  infrastructure  needed  for  those  areas.  It  also  provided  USD  25,000  as  
a   grant   for   settlers   to   build   homes.   In   terms   of   business,   Israel   established   13  
industrial   zones   in   the   settlements   and   provided   grants   by   the   government   to  
settlement  companies  for  the  purchase  of  land  and  construction.  They  also  receive  
preferential   treatment   in   terms   of   research,   hiring   assistance,   and   income   tax  
breaks.  The  education  sector  is  also  supported  by  the  government  where  teachers  
receive   higher   salaries   than   they   would   in   Israel   proper,   schools   receive   more  
government   funding,   and   free   education   begins   at   the   age   of   three   rather   than  
four,  as  is  the  case  in  Israel  proper  (American  Friends  Sevice  Committee,  n.d.).  
  
However,  all  the  settlements  construction  and  economic  activities  are  in  violation  




While   the   Oslo   peace   process   -­‐‑   through   which   a   Palestinian   state   was   to   be  
established   in   return   for   peace   -­‐‑   designated   the   West   Bank   for   that   future  
Palestinian  state,  settlement  construction  continued  to  accelerate.  In  2013,  20  years  
after   the   Oslo   peace   process,   the   number   of   settlers   more   than   doubled   from  
262,500  to  over  520,000  settlers,  and  settlements  controlled  over  42%  of  the  land  on  
the  West   Bank,   including   80%   of   Palestinian  water   resources,   of   which   520,000  
settlers  used  around  six  times  as  much  water  as  2.6  million  Palestinians.  Moreover,  
the   movement   of   Palestinians   became   restricted   by   a   system   of   barriers   and  
checkpoints,  whereas  there  was  no  such  thing  before  1991.  Finally,  Israel  built  its  
Separation   Wall,   which   completely   isolates   Palestinian   communities   (Oxfam,    
2015).    
  
Therefore,   the   Israeli   occupation   seems   to   continue   to   support   and  maintain   the  
settlements.  This  contrasts  with  the  earlier  Israeli  position  when  it  found  itself  in  
control  of  the  West  Bank  in  1967,  and  viewed  the  seized  land  as  a  bargaining  chip  
that   could   be   handed   back   in   return   for   peace  with   the   Arabs.   Today   an   Arab  
peace  initiative  has  been  on  offer  since  2005;  this  offers  peace  with  Israel  and  full  
recognition  of  Israel  by  the  Arab  states,  if  a  two  state  solution  is  realized.  However,  
that   initiative   has   been   completely   ignored   by   Israel.   Rather,   Israel   is   further  
institutionalizing   its   support   for   settlements   and   thereby   the   occupation   of   the  




Under  such  circumstances,  Palestinian  resistance  to  Israeli  occupation  continues  to  
take   a   variety   of   shapes   and   forms.   These   have   included   a   mix   of   violent   and  
nonviolent   activity   ever   since   the   beginning   of   the   conflict.   However,   while  
Palestinian  nonviolent  resistance  never  ceased  to  exist  throughout  those  decades,  
at   times   it   has  been  more  visible   and   systematic   than  others.  Today,  Palestinian  
nonviolent   resistance   is   very  well   observed   and   reported.   In   fact,   it   has   become  
institutionalized   with   regular   activity   such   as   weekly   protests   in   villages   and  
other   areas   affected   by   occupation.  However,   this   research   has   highlighted   that  
there  seems  to  be  a  culture  of  competition  and  inconsistency  among  the  different  
nonviolent  groups.  Moreover,   they  have  very   complicated   ineffective   leadership  
structures.      This,   along  with   other   issues   such   as   the   lack   of   a   national   plan   or  
strategy   for   popular   struggle,   presents   significant   obstacles   hindering   their  
efficiency  and  effectiveness.  
  
The  Palestinian  nonviolent  movement  has  repeatedly  sought   to  ascertain  aspects  
of   Israeli  occupation  that  are  most  appropriate   to   target  with   its  activities.  There  
are  two  main  aspects  that  have  been  identified  as  worthy  of  targeting;  the  first  is  
the   Israeli   Separation  Wall   following   the   advisory   opinion   by   the   International  
Criminal  Court   in  2005  deeming   the  wall   illegal,  and   the  other   is   the   trade  with  
Israel,   and   specifically  with   the   settlements.   This   research   focused   on   the   latter  




addressed  the  objectives  outlined  early  in  this  paper.  The  following  are  the  main  
concluding  remarks  and  reflections  from  this  research:    
  
1) The  Palestinian  popular  struggle  movement  and  the  international  movement  
for   solidarity   with   Palestinians   are   the   main   facilitators   of   activities   that  
promote   ending   economic   ties  with   Israel.   It   is   a   bottom   up  movement   of  
social   political   change.   Through   their   activity,   they   promote   boycotts   of  
Israeli  products  and  they  also  organize  protest,  lobby,  and  carry  out  a  variety  
of   activities   that   oppose   other   aspects   of   Israeli   occupation.   While   these  
groups  have  diverse  backgrounds,  in  general,  they  are  more  aligned  with  the  
left   of   the   political   spectrum.  While   in   Palestine   they   are   represented   by   a  
broader   spectrum   of   political   groups,   those   on   the   left   play   a   central   role.  
These   leftist   groups   oppose   the   PNA,   the   Oslo   accords   and   the   two   state  
solution   as   their   approach   tends   to   be   anti-­‐‑establishment..   Furthermore,  
those   groups   are   not   necessarily   concerned   with   the   applicability   or   the  
constraints   of   the   boycott   campaign.   For   instance,   the   infrastructure   that  
provides  water   to   the  Palestinians   is   Israeli,   just  as  many  other  basic   living  
requirements   are   provided   by   Israel.   Despite   this,   these   groups   reject   a  






2) It   is   important   to   note   that   the  motive   driving  many   of   these   groups   is   to  
highlight   the   oppression   of   the   occupation   rather   than   being   successful   in  
their  boycott  activity.  To  them,  it  is  a  matter  of  telling  the  story  of  occupation  
and  therefore  the  suffering  and  discrimination  against  the  Palestinians.  And  
they  have  indeed  been  successful  in  doing  so  as  boycott  activity  has  attracted  
much   media   attention.   This   is   true   both   for   local   Palestinian   groups   and  
international   supporters.   Despite   the   view   supported   by   pro-­‐‑Israel   groups  
that  the  boycott  campaign  is  futile,  in  fact,  it  was  successful  in  “storytelling”  
about  the  implications  of  the  Israeli  occupation.    
  
3) The   structure   of   the   Palestinian   popular   resistance   movement   is   very  
complex  as  it  is  a  result  of  the  internal  competition  among  the  groups  within  
it.   Consequently,   the   divisions   of   Palestinian   society   are   reflected   in   that  
movement.   Its   various   forms   are   affected   by   geographical   orientation   and  
political  affiliation,  as  well  as  lack  of  strategy  and  clear  vision.  Furthermore,  
it  is  clear  that  personal  desire  often  leads  the  movement  and,  in  many  cases,  
that  desire  overrules  the  intended  collective  objective.  In  addition,  there  have  
been   several   popular   resistance   committees   that   have   changed   their   status  
into  NGOs  so  as  to  enable  them  to  receive  foreign  aid  for  their  activities.  As  a  




achieve  their  objectives  or  be  recognized  as  a  leader  but  to  acquire  the  largest  
chunk  of  the  foreign  aid  allocated  for  Palestinian  popular  struggle.    
  
Moreover,   there   is   a   further  problem  associated  with   accepting   foreign   aid  
since   the   popular   struggle   organizations   that   do   so   become   bound   by   the  
guidelines  stipulated  by   their  donors.   In  an  earlier  paper,  entitled  “Pay   the  
piper  and  call  the  tune”(Kayali,  2013),  I  focus  on  the  relationship  between  a  
number  of  local  Palestinian  NGOs  and  international  donors  -­‐‑  and  the  study’s  
title   reflects   its   findings.   This   research   highlighted   the   NGOisation   of   the  
nonviolence   resistance  movement   and   the   challenge   of   being   independent  
from  external  influence.  
  
4) The   lack   of   an   overarching   national   program   for   popular   struggle   in  
Palestine  presents  a  major  challenge.  My  research  did  not   find  a  consensus  
among  our  interviewees  when  they  explained  the  absence  of  such  a  program,  
although   all   Palestinian   political   parties   emphasize   the   importance   of  
popular   struggle.   Some   claimed   that   there   is   no   political   will   for   such   a  
program  as  politicians  do  not  want  to  deal  with  the  consequences  of  Israel’s  
reaction   to   their   being   even   partly   responsible   for   such   a   plan.   Others  
claimed   that   it   was   an   integral   part   of   Palestinian   culture   where  




that  people   are  more   concerned   that   their   personal   involvement   should  be  
recognised  rather  than  dissolve  within  a  collective  effort.  However,  this  is  a  
question   that   remains   unanswered   but   this   study   may   encourage   further  
research   into   the  matter   to   justify   the   absence  of   a  national  program,  or   to  
determine  the  reason  for  this  lack.    
  
5) The   boycott   movement   is   generally   categorized   as   either   being   limited   to  
settlement  products  or  being  in  favour  of  a  full  boycott  of  Israel.  A  third  type  
of  boycott  that  some  of  our  interviewees  favoured  is  the  selective  boycott  of  
products  that  can  be  targeted  specifically,  in  particular  where  such  activities  
could  be  used   to   tell   the  story  of  occupation.  Moreover,   some  products  are  
simply  easier   to  boycott,  while   for  others  are   simply  not  practical   to   target  
for   boycott.   Due   to   these   varied   and   sometimes   conflicting   concerns,   the  
boycotter   of   one   Israeli   product   may   be   found   to   be   a   committed   user   of  
another.   This   creates   some   clear   contradictions   that   reflect   political  
incorrectness  or  even  hypocrisy,  as  many  anti-­‐‑boycott  activists  claim.    
  
6) Apart  from  its  storytelling  achievements,   the  success  of  the  BDS  movement  
which  calls   for  a   full  boycott  of   Israel  can  be  measured  in   two  ways:  1)   the  
number   of   its   affiliates,   and   2)   the   products   it   was   successful   in   getting  




In  terms  of  the  latter  indicator,  BDS  has  only  been  successful  where  it  came  
to   settlement  products.  This   research  did  not   find  a   single  case  where   they  
were  successful   in  getting  a  firm,  supermarket,  or   importer  to  end  dealings  
with   an   Israeli   company   operating   in   Israel   proper;   meanwhile   they   have  
been  successful  in  boycotting  settlement  products.    
  
However,  when  it  comes  to  the  number  of  affiliates,  the  BDS  movement  has  
rapidly   grown   over   the   years   since   its   call  was  made.   Such   a  membership  
growth   is   a   valid   goal   in   itself.   The   BDS   movement   indeed   organized  
international  supporters  and  provided  a   framework  of  action   that  gathered  
scattered   efforts,   initiatives,   and   focused   them   on   the   cause.   The  
impracticality  of  boycotting  a  product  –  nor   the   failure   to  do   so   -­‐‑  does  not  
therefore  mean  that  the  activity  was  futile.    
  
  
7) There  is  a  very  wide  gap  between  the  Palestinian  political  leaders  of  the  PNA  
and   official   representatives   of   the   PLO,   on   one   side,   and   the   boycott  
movement   on   the   other.   Consequently,   there   is   a   definite   lack   of  
coordination   in   many   cases   to   the   extent   that,   on   occasions,   Palestinian  
officials  have  been  perceived  as  working   to  undermine   the  activities  of   the  
BDS  movement.     While   this  may   sound  extreme,   the   simple   explanation   is  




lobby   and   call   for   ending   international   economic   ties   with   Israel.   In   fact,  
according   to   the   Oslo   peace   accords,   it   is   not   allowed   to   engage   in   any  
activity   that   incites   action   against   Israel.   In   addition,   the   Paris   Protocol,  
which   outlines   the   economic   arrangements   between   the   PNA   and   Israel,  
clearly   indicates   that   it   should   accept   economic   ties  with   Israel.   Therefore,  
when  an  official  PNA  representative  is  asked  to  comment  on  the  BDS  activity  
that   concerns   Israeli  products,   they  cannot  openly  encourage   it.  And   if  put  
on   the   spot,   as   some   have   been   in   the   past,   they   are   forced   to   distance  
themselves  from  it.  This  has  given  a  very  negative  message  to  international  
supporters   calling   to   boycott   a   specific   Israeli   product   in   solidarity   with  
Palestinians.   Indeed,   the   relationship   between   the   PNA   and   its  
representatives   and   the   leaders   of   the   BDS   movement   has   become   very  
strained.  Some  of  our  interviewees  asserted  that  the  PNA  openly  pressurised  
them  using  multiple  methods.  Moreover,  they  accuse  the  PNA  of  corruption  
and  for  doing  dirty  work  for  the  Israeli  occupation.  Such  a  relationship  has  
had   a   very   detrimental   effect   on   both   the   PNA   and   the   BDS   movement.  
Meanwhile,  on  an  international  level,  the  BDS  has  made  excellent  progress  in  
terms  of  popularity  and  representation  of  Palestinian  activism,  whereas  the  
PNA  has  become  less  and  less  popular,  and  seen  as  corrupt  and  incompetent.    
  
8) A  particularly  original  contribution  of  this  research  was  the  case  study  of  Al-­‐‑




Economy,   Dr.   Hasan   Abu-­‐‑Libdeh,   with   the   exceptional   support   from   the  
Prime  Minister,  Dr.  Salam  Fayyad.  The  fund’s  aim  was  to  end  economic  ties  
with   Israeli   settlements,   both   in   Palestine   and   internationally.   It   worked  
towards   this   through   a   mixture   of   grassroots   activity   and   legislation.  
Through   this,   the   NEF   was   acceptable   to   many   European   politicians   and  
represented  a  cause  that  their  countries  could  support.  However,  it  was  less  
popular  with  the  BDS  leadership,  which  viewed  it  as  a  threat  since  the  latter  
felt   it   confused   those   who   had   already   declared   their   support   for   a   full  
boycott  of  Israel.    
  
The  NEF  was  established  five  years  after   the  BDS  call  was  announced,  and  
succeeded   in   gaining   international   grassroots   support.  Nevertheless,  while  
the  NEF  did  attempt   to  reconcile  between  the  BDS   leaders  and  the  PNA,   it  
ultimately   failed   in   doing   so.   However,   as   interviews   in   this   research  
indicated,   some   BDS   supporters   viewed   its   work   as   a   step   in   the   right  
direction.   Thus,   the   case   study   demonstrated   that   the   NEF   represented   a  
powerful  and  constructive  alternative  aimed  at  ending  the  Israeli  occupation;  
however,   it   also   raised   the   challenge   of   the   need   to   find   alternative  





9) The  NEF  was   successful   in   ending   the   existence   of   settlement   products   in  
Palestinian   markets   after   less   than   a   year   since   its   establishment.   After  
realizing  that  goal,  it  was  shut  down.  However,  during  its  time,  it  installed  a  
system   within   the   different   departments   and   ministries   at   the   PNA   that  
provided   a   means   to   ensure   that   settlement   products   are   prevented   from  
entering  Palestinian  markets.   It  should  also  be  noted  that   its  closure  was  in  
fact  illegal  since  it  was  established  through  legislation  that  was  not  abolished.  
Indeed,  the  respective  law  is  still  in  effect.  Thus,  the  closure  of  the  NEF  is  a  
sad  testament  to  the  fact  that  popular  struggle  exists  in  Palestine  as  a  result  
of   individuals’   efforts   and   motivations   rather   than   a   national   program   or  
political  will.  For  instance,  when  Abu-­‐‑Libdeh  left  his  position  as  Minister  of  
Economy,  and  therefore  also  that  of  Chairman  of  the  NEF,  the  Fund  became  
less  of  a  priority  for  the  Ministry  of  Economy.    
  
10) Israel   not   only   labels   boycott   campaigns   as   anti-­‐‑Israel,   but   also   as   anti-­‐‑
Semitic.   Indeed,   Israeli  officials  went   further  by  calling  boycotts  a  “form  of  
terrorism”;  thus,  classifying  those  adopting  nonviolent  methods  in  the  same  
category  as  those  adopting  extremely  violent  means  of  resistance.  To  support  
this,  Israel  introduced  the  “prohibition  on  instituting  a  boycott”  law  in  2010.  
This   law   criminalizes   anyone  who   takes   part   in   a   boycott   against   Israel.   It  




the  limited  boycott  of  Israeli  settlements  is  viewed  as  being  the  same  as  a  full  
boycott  of  Israel.  The  law  applies  to  individuals,  organizations,  and  states.    
  
There  are   two  main  points   that   I  would   like   to  highlight   from  the  way  this  
law  was   presented:   Firstly,   the   argument   of  many   of   those  who   call   for   a  
limited  boycott  of  Israel  is  that  they  are  in  favour  of  a  two  state  solution  and,  
moreover,   that   they  do  not  want   to  punish   the  criminal,  but   just   the  crime.  
On  the  other  hand,  supporters  of  the  BDS  campaign  call  for  the  punishment  
of   the   criminal,   i.e.,   all   that   is   tied   up  with   Israel.  Moreover,   by   including  
settlements   in   its   law,   Israel   has   followed   the   same   logic   as   these   BDS  
supporters.   In   other   words,   it   is   adopting   their   approach.   This   actually  
strengthened   the   BDS  movement   since   it   became   easier   for   it   to   convince  
limited  boycott  campaigners  that  Israel  does  not  distinguish  between  limited  
or  full.    
  
Second,  since  Israel  applies  its  law  to  foreign  states,  it  has  been  placed  in  an  
awkward  position  now  that  the  EU  no  longer  recognizes  settlement  products  
as   Israeli.   Israeli   officials   considered   the   EU’s   decision   on   labelling,   to  
encourage  the  boycott  of  Israel  and  the  BDS  movement.  This  approach  was  




response   to   EU   decision   regarding   product   labeling”.   In   this   the   Israeli  
foreign  office  made  clear  that:  	  
Israel   condemns   the   decision   of   the   European   Union   to   label   Israeli  
products  originating  from  areas  that  are  under  Israeli  control  since  1967.  
We  regret   that   the  EU  has  chosen,   for  political   reasons,   to   take  such  an  
exceptional  and  discriminatory  step,  inspired  by  the  boycott  movement,  
particularly  at   this   time,  when  Israel   is  confronting  a  wave  of   terrorism  
targeting  any  and  all  of  its  citizens…  .  Product  labeling  does  not  advance  
any  political  process  between  Israel  and  the  Palestinians.  The  opposite  is  
the   case   -­‐‑   it   is   bound   to   reinforce   the   PA’s   refusal   to   conduct   direct  
negotiations   with   Israel,   negotiations   that   the   EU   claims   to   support.  
Product   labeling   will   strengthen   the   radical   elements   advocating   a  
boycott   against   Israel   and   denying   Israel’s   right   to   exist,   contradicting  
positions  that  the  EU  publicly  opposes.  This  recent  step  raises  questions  
regarding   the   role   that   the   EU   aspires   to   play.   It   may   also   have  
implications  for  Israel-­‐‑EU  relations  (Israel  Foreign  Ministry,  2015).  
  
While   this   clearly   makes   a   direct   link   between   the   EU’s   stance   and  





a. The   foreign   state   entity   or   anyone   acting   on   its   behalf   will   be  
prohibited  from  making  any  transaction  in  an  Israeli  bank  account,  in  
traded   shares   in   Israel,   in   real   property,   or   in   any   other   asset   that  
requires  registry  for  its  transfer;  
b. No   sum   of   money   or   asset   will   be   transferred   to   any   foreign   state  
entity  or   anyone   acting  on   its   behalf   from  any  organ  of   the   State  of  
Israel  according  to  any  law,  agreement,  or  government  decision  that  
was  rendered  prior  to  the  determination  according  to  Section  7  or  the  
enactment  of  the  foreign  law  (Israel  Foreign  Ministry,  2015).  
  
As   mentioned   before,   the   ICC’s   advisory   opinion,   issued   in   2005   and   which  
deemed  the   Israeli  Separation  Wall  and  settlements   illegal,   launched  and  helped  
institutionalize   nonviolent   activity   against   these   aspects   of   occupation.   The  
decision   was   seen   as   an   opportunity;   it   provided   a   credible   incentive   for  
recruitment   and   enlistment   of   members   for   popular   struggle   with   a   clear   goal  
supported  by  international  justice.  
Since   this   occasion,   with   the   clearly   incongruous   situation   presented   by   the  
existence   of   the   Israeli   Boycotter’s   Law,   the   EU’s   decision   on   labelling,   and   the  
Israeli   Foreign  Ministry’s   official   statement,   boycotters   now   have   a   new   target.  
There   is   a   loophole   in   Israeli   law,   a   contradiction   and   an   opportunity   that  may  




unlike  the  ICC  verdict,  the  EU  labelling  decision  and  the  Israeli  boycotter’s  law  are  
both   binding.   Therefore,   by   insisting   on   settlements   being   a   legitimate   part   of  
Israel,  it  is  jeopardizing  its  entire  trade  with  the  EU.  This  is  undoubtedly  a  major  
goal  of  the  BDS  movement.    
The	   analytical	   framework	  we	   presented	   in	   the	  methodology	   chapter	   indicated	   that	  
repressive	  occupation	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  direct	  violence	  and	  intimidation	  but	  also	  
on	   the	  preparedness	  of	   subjects	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	  occupying	   force	  –	  by	  paying	  
taxes,	   buying	   their	   products,	   undertaking	   employment	   as	   cheap	   labour	   in	   their	  
markets	  and	  supporting	   their	  economy.	   In	   this	  way,	  Palestinians	  comply	  with	   -­‐	  and	  
maybe	   even	   accept	   -­‐	   the	   rules	   and	   regulations	   of	   the	   occupying	   force,	   whether	   in	  
economic	   or	   administrative	   terms;	   such	   as	   import	   and	   export	   regulations,	   unequal	  
investment	   and	   the	   terms	   set	   out	   in	   the	   Paris	   Protocol,.	   Therefore,	   it	   was	   very	  
important	   in	   the	   thesis	   to	   identify	   the	   settlement	   economy	   as	   a	   key	   pillar	   that	  
supports	   and	   maintains	   the	   occupation	   and	   tries	   to	   undermine	   it.	   Al-­‐Karameh	  
presents	   an	   important	   case	   to	   analyse	   and	   through	   this	   to	   learn	   lessons	   and	   gain	  
insight	   that	   can	   inform	   the	   Palestinian	   nonviolent	   resistance	   movement.	   By	  
highlighting	  the	  achievements	  and	  obstacles	  of	  this	  organisation,	  the	  case	  study	  will	  
provide	  vital	  lessons	  for	  future	  actions.	  
	  
Divestment	   and	   boycott	   of	   settlements	   products	   led	   by	   the	   Palestinians	   and	  
internationals	  can	  potentially	  empower	  the	  nonviolent	  movement	  and	  exert	  pressure	  
on	   Israeli	   and	   international	   companies	   to	   reconsider	   its	   policies,	   as	   the	   thesis	  




government	  and	  raise	  awareness	  amongst	  the	  Israeli	  public	  to	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  
calling	   for	   an	   end	   to	   the	   occupation.	   It	   also	   demonstrated	   the	   need	   to	   “win	   over”	  
sections	  of	  Israeli	  society	  to	  strengthen	  the	  settlements’	  boycott	  campaign	  and	  in	  that	  
way	   to	   undermine	   another	   pillar	   of	   the	   occupation;	   the	   support	   from	   their	   own	  
society.	     Thus,   Israel  now  faces  a  dilemma  that   reflects   the  analytical   framework  
presented  earlier  in  the  thesis  –  in  particular,  the  second  of  the  factors  highlighted  
there:	  Israel’s  image  as  a  democracy.  If  Israel  did  not  care  about  maintaining  this  
image,  the  decision-­‐‑making  process  that  gives  rise  to  statements  such  as  those  of  
the  Israeli  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  or  to  the  introduction  of  the  Boycotter’s  Law,  
would  be  able  to  take  the  blame  for  ill-­‐‑thought  decisions.  The  boycott  movement  
does   indeed   aim   to   place   Israel   at   odds   with   itself,   and   with   the   international  
community,  regarding  its  determination  to  maintain  both  the  settlements  and  the  
occupation.  Moreover,   by   arguing  with   in   favour   of   its   settlement   policy,   Israel  
keeps  the  issue  at  the  forefront  the  international  community  politics.  Israel  would  
rather  not  have  to  speak  about  its  occupation  over  the  West  Bank,  let  alone  argue  
about  specific  details  and  particular  circumstances  that  result  from  its  occupation  
since,  the  more  such  details  are  discussed,  the  more  the  occupation  is  understood.  




Personal  reflection    
In   November   2015,   the   mayor   of   London,   Boris   Johnson,   visited   Israel   and  
Palestine   to   promote   trade   with   London.   While   in   Israel,   he   expressed   his  
objection  to  boycotting  Israel.  He  explained  his  opinion  as  follows:  
I   cannot   think  of   anything  more   foolish   than   to   say  you  want   to  have   any  
kind  of  divestment  or  sanctions  or  boycott  against  a  country  that,  when  all  is  
said  and  done,  is  the  only  democracy  in  the  region,  is  the  only  place  that  has,  
in  my  view,  a  pluralist  open  society  (Quinn,  2015).  
Palestinians  were  offended  by  his  comments  and,  as  a  result,  decided  to  boycott  
him,  and  consequently  Palestinian  officials   in  Ramallah  cancelled   their  meetings  
with  him.  A  reception  at  the  British  Consulate  in  Jerusalem  had  also  been  planned  
in   order   for   him   to  meet  with   Palestinian   businesses   to   promote   his   trade.   This  
event   was   also   boycotted.   I   had   received   an   invitation   myself   and   decided   to  
discuss   his   remarks,   given   my   area   of   research.   After   a   long   discussion,   I  
concluded  with  the  phrase,  “you  are  being  politically  incorrect”;  and  his  response  
was:  “I  made  a  career  out  of  being  politically  incorrect”.    
When   I   started  working  on   this   research,   I   always   felt   the  need   to  be  politically  
correct   and   support   the   Palestinian   national   consensus,   especially   so,   given  my  




from  all  aspects,  with  no   loopholes  and  no  room  for  criticism;  and  I   thought   the  
arguments  supporting  action  needed  to  be  air  tight  and  correct.  My  position  on  a  
full  boycott  of   Israel  was   influenced  by  pragmatism,  which   led  me  personally  to  
think  of  the  BDS  movement  as  futile  and  not  able  to  end  economic  ties  with  Israel.  
Apparently   however,   not   being   politically   correct   can   still   produce   success,   as  
illustrated  by  Mr.  Johnson.      
Indeed,   it   may   be   true   that   the   BDS   campaign   may   not   be   able   to   fulfil   its  
objectives   by   getting   countries   to   end   its   ties   with   Israel   at   this   stage.   And   it  
certainly  has  not  done  so  thus  far.  Nonetheless,  the  BDS  movement  is  perhaps  the  
most  significant  pro-­‐‑Palestinian  movement  in  terms  of  the  threat  it  poses  to  Israel.  
And   Israel’s   aggressive   response   to   it   is   testament   to   the   BDS   movement’s  
effectiveness.  However,   the  BDS  movement   is   a   grassroots  movement   that   does  
not  have  so  much  pressure  to  be  politically  incorrect  as  an  official  body.  As  such,  it  
has  far  more  leverage  than  the  PNA.  This  latter,  however,  has  the  ear  of  politicians  
around   the   world;   as   borne   out   by   the   fact   that   its   commitment   to   a   limited  
boycott  did  indeed  bear  fruit  in  the  EU  guidelines  on  labelling.  At  the  same  time,  
the   BDS   campaign   was   also   successful   in   getting   certain   companies   and  





There  is  no  reason  why  both  cannot  complement  one  another.  And  in  many  ways,  
that  is  what  has  been  happening  over  the  past  years,  albeit  not  by  design.  While  
neither   side   would   want   to   be   associated   with   the   other,   yet   each   side   has   its  
limitations  that  the  other  complements.    
When   the   PNA  decided   to   launch   the  NEF,   it  was   the   result   of   a   stalled   peace  
process   between   the   two   countries,   and   an   inability   to   move   forward   through  
negotiations.  Thus,  the  PNA  had  to  take  unilateral  steps  that  in  its  opinion  would  
advance  its  journey  towards  a  two  state  solution.  Today,  there  are  no  indicators  of  
any  breakthrough  in  the  peace  process.  But  will  the  PNA  find  itself  in  a  position  of  
wanting   to   boycott   Israeli   products?   It   would   be   hard   to   argue   that!   And   the  
answer  is  no.    
The  PNA  cannot  run  people’s  affairs  and  provide  what  they  need  to  live  without  
cooperating   with   Israel.   It   was   not   designed   to   do   otherwise   than   cooperate.  
Indeed,   the   day   that   the   PNA   decides   to   boycott   Israel,   is   the   day   it   will   be  
dissolved,  or  be  replaced.    
While  the  PNA’s  hands  are  tied  in  this  way,  it  needs  to  see  the  BDS  movement  as  
an  ally  that  can  go  further  in  its  demands.  And  the  BDS  movement  should  also  see  
an  ally  in  the  PNA,  since  it  is  a  body  recognized  by  the  international  community  




achievement.   In  other  words,  what   is  needed   is  a  strategy   that   the   two  agree   to,  
whereby   both   the   Palestinian   popular   and   political   echelons   can   unite   in   their  
struggle  towards  statehood.    
  
Future  research:  
Conducting   this   research   highlighted   the   need   for   further   research   on   the  
following  themes:  
1. Research   into  how  space  and   time   for   reflection  may  be  provided   for   the  
leadership  of  the  nonviolent  movement  to  understand  the  challenges  they  
face  and  to  enable  them  to  develop  coherent  strategy.  
2. Research   that   can   contribute   to   understanding   of   the   factors   influencing  
political   and   social   fragmentations   and   compare   it   to   the   first   Intifada  
where   the  nonviolent  movement  was  characterised  by  national  unity  and  
cohesion.  
3. Research   that   contributes   to   understating   Israeli   society   in   relation   to  
Palestine  and  the  impact  of  the  settlement  economy  on  social  inequality  in  
Israel.   Also,   along   similar   lines,   we   need   to   understand   consumer  





4. Lastly,   comparative   research   including   other   boycott   movements   under  
occupation   would   provide   a   more   comprehensive   understanding   of   the  
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Interviewed  22/02/2013  in  London.  
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-­‐ Wesam  Awwad:  Coordinator  at  Al-­‐‑Karameh  National  Empowerment  
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-­‐ Yara   Al-­‐‑Saidi:   A   ‘1948   Palestinian’   also   working   with   the   Coalition   of  
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Annex  E:  (DEFRA  voluntary  advice)    
  
Department  for  Environment,  Food  and  Rural  Affairs  





1. The  Government  has  received  requests  from  retailers,  consumer  groups  
and  NGOs   for   greater   clarity   about  which  origin   should  be   stated  on  
food  and  drink  goods  that  have  been  produced  and  packed  in  the  OPT.  
Their   enquiries   have   focused   particularly   on   the   distinction   between  
products   from   Palestinian   producers   and   products   from   Israeli  
settlements  in  the  OPT.  
  
2. The   following   advice   (produced   by   the  Department   for   Environment,  
Food  and  Rural  Affairs,  working  with  the  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  
Office,   the   Food   Standards   Agency,   HM   Revenue   and   Customs,   the  
Cabinet  Office  and  Department  for  Business,  Innovation  and  Skills)  has  
been   prepared   to   help   businesses,   should   they   wish   to   respond   to  
consumer   demand   for   information   about   the   origin   of   food   that   has  
been   produced   in   the   OPT.   The   issue   of   clarity   of   origin   between  
Palestinian  producers  and  Israeli  settlement  producers  within  the  OPT  
largely   concerns   the  West   Bank   area.  Although   this   advice  would   be  
applicable  to  imports  from  Gaza  and  East  Jerusalem,  we  are  aware  that  
the  majority  of  imports  into  the  UK  come  from  the  West  Bank  and  there  






3. The   EC   legal   requirements   for   retail   labeling   exist   to   provide   a   level  
playing   field   in   trade   across   the   Community   and   also   to   provide  
information  to  consumers  on  –  amongst  other  particulars  –  the  origin  of  
products:  
  
i. For   some   agricultural   produce,   country   of   origin  must  be   stated,   in  
accordance  with  the  specific  rules  applying  to  the  product  in  question.  
So,   in   respect   of   wine   and   most   fresh   fruit   and   vegetables,   for  
example,  most  produce   is   covered  by  EC   legislation  which   requires  
its  country  of  origin  to  be  stated;(1)  
  
ii. Furthermore,   even   in   the   absence   of   such   sector-­‐‑specific   legislation,  
EC   law(2)   requires   that   the   place   of   origin   or   provenance   of   food  
should   be   labelled   where   the   omission   of   such   details   might  
materially  mislead  the  consumer  about  the  true  origin  or  provenance  
of  the  food;  
  
iii. Finally,  even  where  it  is  not  a  legal  requirement,  food  produce  can  be  
voluntarily  labelled  with  its  country  of  origin.  
  
(1)     Commission  Regulation   (EC)  No  1580/2007   (as  amended)   in   relation   to   fruit  
and  vegetables  and  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  479/2008  in  relation  to  wine.    
(2)   Community   legislation   on   the   labeling   of   foodstuffs   includes   general  
provisions  on   the   labeling  of   foodstuffs   to  be  delivered   to   the   consumer,   as   laid  







4.   For  produce   from   the  West  Bank,   labeling  currently   states   country  of  
origin  as   ‘Produce  of  the  West  Bank’.  Traders  and  retailers  may  wish  
to  indicate  whether  the  product  originated  from  an  Israeli  settlement  or  
from  Palestinian  producers.  This   could   take   the   form,   for   example,  of  
‘Produce  of   the  West  Bank   (Israeli   settlement  produce)’   or   ‘Produce  
of  the  West  Bank  (Palestinian  produce)’,  as  appropriate.  
  
5.   Separately,   the   Government   considers   that   traders   would   be  
misleading   consumers,   and   would   therefore   almost   be   certainly  
committing  an  offence,   if   they  were   to  declare  produce   from  the  OPT  
(including  from  the  West  Bank)  as  ‘Produce  of  Israel’.  This  would  apply  
irrespective  of  whether  the  produce  was  from  a  Palestinian  producer  or  
from  an  Israeli  settlement  in  the  OPT.  This  is  because  the  area  does  not  
fall  within  the  internationally  recognized  borders  of  the  state  of  Israel.  
  
6.   Information   on   produce   origin   is   available   in   various   forms,   which  
should   be   available   to   retailers   as   a   result   of   their   individual  
relationships  with  suppliers.  In  addition,  in  many  cases  information  on  
the  origin  of  products  can  be  found  on  Customs  documentation:  
  
i.   Products  will   in  many   cases   be   accompanied   by   proof   of   preferential  
origin  issued  in  Israel  for  the  purposes  of  obtaining  a  nil  or  reduced  rate  of  
customs   duty   under   the   provisions   of   the   EU-­‐‑   Israel   Association  
agreement  (3).  This  will  either  be  an  EUR1  Movement  Certificate  (stamped  
by   Israeli   Customs)   or   preferential-­‐‑   origin   declarations   on   invoices   or  
other  commercial  documents.  
In  all  cases,  the  proof  of  preferential  origin  will  contain  details  of  the  place  




concerned.   This   zip   code  will   enable   a   distinction   to   be   drawn   between  
products  from  the   internationally  recognised  state  of   Israel  and  products  
from  Israeli  settlements  in  the  West  Bank.  
  
The  inclusion  of  the  place  of  production  and  zip  code  on  the  Israeli  proof  
of  preferential  origin   therefore  enables  a  distinction   to  be  made  between  
which   products   are   and   are   not   entitled   to   a   preferential   rate   of   duty  
under  the  EU-­‐‑Israel  Agreement  (see  para  12  below).  Only  those  products  
covered   by   a   proof   showing   a   place   of   production   and   zip   code   in   the  
territory  of  the  State  of  Israel  are  eligible  for  preferential  access  under  the  
Agreement.   HM   Revenue   and   Customs   will   reject   the   claim   to   Israeli  
preference   in   all   cases  where   the  proof   shows   a   Settlement   location   and  
zip  code.  
  
(3)  “The  Euro-­‐‑Mediterranean  Agreement  –  establishing  an  association  between  the  
European  Communities  and  their  Member  States,  of  the  one  part,  and  the  State  of  
Israel  of  the  other  part”  –  is  known  as  the  EU-­‐‑Israel  Association  Agreement.  
  
ii.  A  range  of  products  from  the  West  Bank  (also  covering  Gaza  and  East  
Jerusalem),   are   covered   by   the   Euro-­‐‑Mediterranean   Interim   Association  
Agreement   on   Trade  &  Co-­‐‑operation   between   the   European  Union   and  
the   Palestine   Liberation  Organisation.   This   grants   duty-­‐‑free   or   reduced-­‐‑
tariff  treatment  on  the  products  exported  to  the  EU,  in  many  cases  within  
the   limits  of  quotas.  As   in  paragraph  6(i)   above,   eligible  goods  exported  
under   this   preferential   arrangement   will   be   covered   by   an   EUR1  
Movement  certificate  or  invoice  declaration.  The  EUR1  will  be  stamped  by  
the  Customs  and  Excise  Department  of  the  Palestinian  National  authority.  
Goods   accompanied   by   such   certificates   are   likely   to   be   of   West   Bank  




checking  with  your  supplier.  
  
iii.  In   cases  where   the   goods   are   not   exported   under   the   provisions   in   i)  
and   ii)   above,   documents   such   as   invoices,   packing   lists,   delivery   notes  
and   transport   documents   may   provide   an   indication   of   the   place   of  
production   or   of   the   place   of   the   initial   loading   of   the   products.   If   the  
information   is   not   readily   available   from   accompanying   documents,  
retailers  may  wish  to  consider  whether  they  are  able  to  obtain,  direct  from  
their  suppliers,  information  about  the  place  of  production.  
  
7. In  all  cases  the  HMRC  enquiry  line  on  0845  010  9000  will  be  able  to  help  
retailers  to  establish  whether  the  declared  location  and  postcode  (where  
shown)  relates  to  an  Israeli  settlement  in  the  West  Bank  and  should  be  
used  as   the  primary   source  of   information  and  assistance.   In   the  vast  
majority   of   cases   HMRC   will   be   able   to   say   immediately   whether   a  
place   is   in   a   settlement.   However,   there   may   be   a   small   number   of  




HMG   Position   Statement:   Israeli   Settlements   in   Occupied   Palestinian  
Territories  
  
8. The  Occupied  Palestinian  Territories  were   occupied   by   Israel   in   1967.  
They  include  the  territories  of  the  West  Bank,  the  Gaza  Strip,  and  East  
Jerusalem.  Settlements  are   Israeli   communities  established,  usually  by  
Israeli   citizens,   in   the   West   Bank   and   East   Jerusalem   (there   are   no  





9. Israeli   settlements   in   the   OPT   are   unlawful   under   international   law.  
They   contravene   Article   49   (6)   of   the   Fourth   Geneva   Convention   of  
1949,  which   prohibits   an   occupying   power   from   transferring   its   own  
civilian  population  into  occupied  territory.  
  
  
10.   In   addition,   the   Government   believes   that   the   existence   –   and  
continued  growth  –  of  Israeli  settlements  poses  a  significant  obstacle  to  
peace   in   the  Middle   East.   This   is   because   the   settlement   of   occupied  
territories  makes  it  more  difficult  to  establish  a  viable  Palestinian  state.  
Israel  has  committed  to  freeze  all  settlement  activity  as  part  of  previous  
political  agreements,   such  as   the  Roadmap  of  2003  and  the  Annapolis  
Agreement  of  2007.  
Though  Israel  recently  announced  a  limited  ten-­‐‑  month  moratorium  on  
settlement  building  in  the  occupied  West  Bank,  Israel  has  not  yet  fully  
fulfilled   its   obligations   under   these   political   agreements.  At   the   same  
time,   the   clear   position   of   the  Government   is   that  we   are   opposed   to  
boycotts  of  Israel  or  Israeli  goods.  We  do  not  believe  that  boycotts  help  
engage  or  influence  Israel,  or  lead  to  progress  in  the  Middle  East  Peace  
Process.  
  
11. In  many   cases   information   on  whether   products   from   the  West   Bank  
are  from  Palestinian  producers  or  from  Israeli  settlements  can  be  found  
on   HM   Revenue   and   Customs   documentation   pursuant   to   the  







EU-­‐‑Israel  Association  Agreement  
  
12. The  EU-­‐‑Israel  Association  Agreement,  in  force  since  2000,  provides  for  
products  from  Israel  to  be  imported  into  EU  countries  at  a  preferential  
tariff   rate,   in   some   cases  within   the   limits   of   quotas.   But   the   EU   and  
Israel  differ   over   the   territorial   scope  of   the  Agreement.  The  EU  does  
not  recognise  the  OPT  as  part  of  the  State  of  Israel  (i.e.  those  territories  
occupied  by  Israel  since  1967).  
  
13. In   recent   years,   the   EU   has   become   aware   that   products   Israel   was  
exporting  to  the  EU  as   'ʹIsraeli'ʹ  products  included  products  originating  
from   the  OPT.  There   is   nothing   to  prevent   such  products   from  being  
imported   into   the   EU,   but,   according   to   the   European   Commission,  
they  should  not  benefit  from  the  preferential  treatment  afforded  by  the  
EU-­‐‑  Israel  Association  Agreement.  
  
14. In   November   2001   the   European   Commission   therefore   alerted  
importers,  through  a  notice  in  the  Official  Journal,  that  importers  in  EU  
countries  were  required  to  take  all  necessary  precautions  regarding  the  
origin   of   produce.   It   noted   that   putting   into   circulation,   under   the  
provisions  of  the  EU-­‐‑Israel  Association  Agreement,  goods  produced  in  
Israeli  settlements  in  the  OPT  risked  giving  rise  to  a  Customs  debt,  i.e.  
that   importers   might   have   to   pay   national   Customs   authorities   the  
difference  between   the  EU-­‐‑Israel  Association  Agreement'ʹs  preferential  
tariff  rate  and  the  standard  rate.  This  made  clear  that  the  onus  was  on  
importers   in   EU   countries   to   take   steps   to   establish   whether   the  






15. Since  2005,  there  has  been  a  requirement  under  a  technical  arrangement  
adopted   by   the   EU-­‐‑Israel   Customs   Co-­‐‑operation   Committee   on   12  
December   2004   that   all   proofs   of   preferential   origin   covering   imports  
from   Israel   under   the   provisions   of   the   EU-­‐‑Israel   Association  
Agreement  must  indicate  the  imported  goods’  place  of  production  and  
an  accompanying  postcode.  This   is   to   ensure   the   full   rate  of  Customs  
duty   is  payable  on  any  consignment  which   is   indicated  as  originating  
in  an  Israeli  settlement  so  that  it  does  not  benefit  from  the  reduced  tariff  
by  claiming  Israeli  preferential  origin.  
  
16. A  list  of  zip  codes  (postcodes)  was  supplied  by  the  Israeli  authorities  to  
the   European   Commission,   which   in   turn   passed   it   on   to   all   EU  
Member   States.   If   a   retailer   or   importer   is  unsure  whether   a  declared  
postcode   relates   to   an   Israeli   settlement,   then   they   should   contact  
HMRC’s  enquiry  line  on  0845  010  9000,  which  can  provide  the  answer.  
  
Euro-­‐‑Mediterranean   Interim   Association   Agreement   on   Trade   &   Cooperation  
between  the  European  Union  and  the  Palestine  Liberation  Organisation  
  
17. Since   1997   there   has   been   a   Euro-­‐‑Mediterranean   Interim   Association  
Agreement   on   trade   and   cooperation   between   the   European  
Community,   and   the   Palestine   Liberation   Organisation   (PLO).   This  
agreement  grants  duty  free  or  reduced  tariff  treatment  (within  quotas)  
on  Palestinian  products  originating   in   the  OPT  which  are  exported   to  
the  EU.  
  
                                 10  December  2009  
  




Annex  F:  The  law  to  ban  and  combat  settlement  products  
The  President  of  the  State  of  Palestine,    
The  Chairman  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Palestine  Liberation  
Organisation,    
The  President  of  the  Palestinian  National  Authority,      
  
Having   reviewed   the   Basic   Law   of   2003   as   amended,   particularly   Article   (43)  
hereunder;  and    
the  Law  concerning  consumer  protection  No.  (21)  of  2005;    
Based  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  in  its  session,  held  on  
15/2/2010;  
Based  upon  the  powers  vested  in  me  by  law;  and  
For  the  sake  of  public  interest;  and  
In  the  Name  of  the  Arab  Palestinian  people,  
  





The   following   words   and   expressions   mentioned   in   this   Law   shall   have   the  
meanings  designated  for  them  unless  the  context  determines  otherwise:    
The  Minister:     The  Minister  of  National  Economy.       
The  Ministry:     The  Ministry  of  National  Economy.     
The  Council:     The   Palestinian   Consumer   Protection   Council,  
which   is   established   under   the   Law   concerning  
consumer  protection  No.  (21)  of  2005   





The  Fund:     Al   Karameh   [Dignity]   National   Fund   for  
Supporting  self  empowerment  and  Funding  of   the  
Control   and   Prohibition   of   the   Products   of  
Settlements,   which   is   established   in   accordance  
with  this  law.   
The  Competent  
department:     
The   relevant   administrative   unit   for   Consumer  
Protection  at  the  Ministry.     
The  Settlements:     Any   residential,   industrial,   agricultural,   or   service  
providing   consortium   which   is   built   on   the   1967  
A.D  occupied  Palestinian  territory.     
Settlement  Products:     The   fully   or   partially   produced   merchandise   and  
services  of  settlements.     
Settlement  Goods:     Each   industrial,   agricultural,   food-­‐‑processed   or  
manufactured   product   that   is   made   partly   or  
wholly   or   stored   or   packaged   inside   any  
settlement.   
The  services  of  
settlements:     
Each   work   that   is   represented   by   a   technical,  
occupational   or   material   activity   in   settlements,  
and   which   may   present   a   benefit   thereto,   in  
consideration  of  a  financial  return.     
The  Palestinian  
market:     
Each  place  within  the  1967  border.     
Trading:     Any   trading,   promotion,   marketing,   storage,  
transportation,  packaging,   labelling  or  any  process  
which   may   render   the   products   of   settlements  
accessible  to  the  Palestinian  market,  or  the  delivery  
of  a  benefit  or  service  to  the  settlements  or  to  their  
products.     




The  person:     The  natural  or  legal  person.     
  
Article  (2)  
Objectives  of  the  Law  
  
This  Law  aims  to  achieve  the  following:    
1. Combat  settlement  goods  and  services  built  on  the  Palestinian  territory.    
2. Realise   the   national   efforts,   which   the   political   leadership   is   making   in  
order   to   remove   settlements   completely   from   the   Palestinian   territory   by  
combating   and   banning   the   settlement   goods   and   services   and   replacing  
them  with  national  products.    
3. Not   to   encourage   or   promote   the   establishment   of   factories   in   the  
settlements  built  in  the  occupied  territory  of  1967.    
4. Build  an  independent  national  economy  in  the  Palestinian  territories.    
5. Track  the  goods  and  services,  which  are  deemed  to  be  settlement  products;  
seize,  ban  and  control  them;  and  prohibit  their  trading.    
6. Supporting   the   Palestinian   National   Economy   and   provide   better  
marketing   opportunities   for   Palestinian  products   and   goods,   and   to   raise  




Scope  of  Application  
This  Law  shall  be  applicable  to  all   the  products  of  settlements,  which  are  traded  
on  the  Palestinian  market,  and  to  any  person  who  trades  in  them.    
  
Article  (4)  
Prohibition  of  Trading  and  Delivery  of  Goods  and  Services  to  Settlements  
1. All   settlement   products   shall   be   deemed   to   be   illegitimate   products,   and  
shall  be  identified  in  accordance  with  a  list  approved  by  the  council.  









Tasks  of  the  Council  
In  addition  to  the  tasks  of  the  Council  which  are  prescribed  under  the  applicable  
Law  on  Consumer  Protection  and  the  by-­‐‑laws  issued  forth  in  accordance  with  it,  
the  Council  shall  assume  the  following  tasks  and  powers:    
1. Devise   special   policies   to   support   national   products   and   to   combat  
settlement   products,   as   well   as   develop   the   plans   and   programmes   to  
implement  them.    
2. Supervise  and  oversee  all  the  bodies  concerned  with  the  implementation  of  
the  provisions  of  this  Law.    
3. Supervise  and  oversee  the  Fund.    
4. Submit   periodical   quarterly   reports   to   the   Council   of  Ministers   about   its  
role  and  achievements  within  the  framework  of  controlling  and  prohibiting  
settlement  products  as  well  as  their  trading  on  the  Palestinian  market.    
  
Article  (6)  
Establishment  of  the  Fund  
According   to   the   by-­‐‑laws,   a   fund  will   be   established   and   named   “Al   Karameh  
National  Fund  for  supporting  self  empowerment  and  the  combat  and  banning  of  
settlement   products”,   its   duties   and   work   will   be   determined   according   to   a  
decision  taken  by  the  Council  of  Ministers.    
  
Article  (7)  
Exemptions  and  facilities    
1) The   Fund   shall   be   accorded   the   same   exemptions   and   facilities   as   those  
provided  for  Ministries  and  governmental  units.  
2) Donations  made  to  the  fund  shall  be  payments  accepted  for  deduction  from  






Tasks  of  the  Competent  Department  
The  competent  department  shall  be  responsible  for  the  following  tasks:    
1. Receiving  complaints  filed  by  Consumer  Protection  Associations,  or  by  any  
person,  regarding  the  trading  of  the  products  of  settlements  using  the  form,  
which   the   Ministry   develops   for   this   purpose,   as   well   as   deciding   on  
measures  to  be  taken  concerning  them  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  
the  Law.    
2. Cooperating   and   coordinating  with   all   bodies   concerned  with   supporting  
national   products,   and   combating   settlement   products   and   services,   and  
developing  a  list,  in  accordance  with  which  the  settlement  products  will  be  
identified,  and  submitting  it  to  the  Council  for  approval.    
3. Updating,   disseminating   and   publishing   the   list  mentioned   in   Clause   (2)  
above   in   at   least   two   daily   newspapers   for   a   period   that   is   not   less   than  
three  days  and  by  any  other  means  which  it  deems  fit.    
4. Submitting  monthly  reports  to  the  Council.  
  
Article  (9)  
Prevention  or  Cancelation  of  Registration  
1. Any  government  body  shall  be  prevented  from  registering  any  commercial  
agency,   commercial   trademark,   commercial   brand   name   or   any   other  
service   for   any   person,   in   the   event   its   subject   matter   is   related   to   the  
products  of  settlements.    
2. The   Minister   shall   issue   forth   his   decision   on   the   cancelation   of   the  
registration  of  any  person  and  the  registration  of  any  commercial  agency  or  
any  commercial  brand  name  trademark  that  is  included  on  the  designated  
register,   based   upon   the   recommendation   of   the   relevant   body   at   the  
Ministry,   in   the   event   its   owner   has   committed   any   contravention   of   the  
provisions  of  this  Law  or  traded  in  the  products  of  settlements  or  used  his  
agency  to  trade  in  them.    
3. The  competent  department  at  the  Ministry  must  notify  the  person  to  whom  
the  provisions  apply  of  the  above  two  Paragraphs  under  this  Article  of  the  
Minister’s  decision  within  a  maximum  period  of  one  week  from  the  date  on  






Instruments  and  Documents  
Any  government  department,  civil  society  organisation  or  any  other  body  shall  be  
prevented   from   issuing   forth   any   instruments   or   facilities   so   as   to   render  
legitimate   the   products   of   settlements.   Any   instrument   that   is   issued   in  
contravention  of  the  provisions  of  this  Law  shall  not  acquire  the  legal  status.    
  
Article  (11)  
Acceptance  of  Aid  
Any  resident  on  the  Palestinian  territory  occupied  in  1967  shall  be  prohibited  from  
accepting  any  aid  of  any  type  whatsoever  in  relation  to  settlement  products.    
  
Article  (12)  
The  Judicial  Officers  
1. The   Judicial   Officers   must   capture   and   seize   or   damage   the   products   of  
settlements  in  coordination  with  the  competent  authorities,  each  within  the  
sphere  of  its  own  jurisdiction,  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  
respective  Laws.    
2. The  Customs  Police   officers   shall   seize   the  products   of   settlements   at   the  
exits   of   settlements   as   well   as   on   the  main   border   points   in   cooperation  




In   case   it   is   proven   that   the   seized  product   is   of   settlement   produce,   it   shall   be  
destroyed.  The  procedure  shall  be  registered  on  an  official  record  of  destruction,  
which  shall  be  signed  by  a  destruction  committee  to  be  formed  by  the  Minister  for  




Without  prejudice   to  any  more  severe  penalty,  which   is  prescribed  by   the  Penal  




this   Law,   each   person   who   infringes   on   the   provisions   of   this   Law   shall   be  
punished  as  following:    
  
1. Confinement  for  a  period  that  is  not  less  than  two  years  and  no  more  than  
five  years  as  well  as  a  financial  fine  of  not   less  than  ten  thousand  (10,000)  
Dinars  or  its  equivalent  in  the  legal  trendfor  each  person  who  trades  with  
settlement   products,   along  with   anyone  who   takes   part   in   or   contributes  
towards  their  trade  or  imports  any  service  to  settlements.    
  
2. A.  Confinement  for  a  period  that  is  no  less  than  three  months  and  no  more  
than   six  months   as  well   as   a   financial   fine   of   no   less   than   two   thousand  
(2,000)   Dinars   or   its   equivalent   in   the   legal   trend   for   each   person   who  
transferred   settlement   products,   or   takes   part   in   or   contributes   in   its  
transfer,  the  driver’s  license  and  the  vehicle’s  registration  will  be  withheld  
by  the  relevant  body  for  a  period  no  less  than  six  months.  
  
B.   In   the   event   of   repetition,   the   driver’s   license   and   the   vehicle’s  
registration  will  be  permanently  withheld,  and  the  vehicle  that  was  used  to  
transfer   settlement   products   or   to   deliver   any   product   or   service   into   a  
settlement  will  be  confiscated  in  accordance  with  relevant  laws.  
    
3. A.  Confinement  for  a  period  that  is  no  less  than  three  months  and  no  more  
than   six  months   as  well   as   a   financial   fine   of   no   less   than   two   thousand  
(2,000)  Jordanian  Dinars  or  its  equivalent  in  the  legal  trend  for  any  person  
who  stores  or  let  for  the  sake  of  storing  settlement  products,  in  addition  to  
closing  the  facility  for  no  less  than  six  months  
  
B.  In  the  event  of  repetition,  the  facility  will  be  permanently  closed.    
  
4. A.  Confinement   for  a  period   that   is  no   less   than  one  month  and  no  more  
than   three  months  as  well  as  a   financial   fine  of  no   less   than   five  hundred  
(500)   Jordanian  Dinars   or   its   equivalent   in   the   legal   trend   for   any  person  
who  withholds  information  according  to  any  of  the  listed  articles  above.  








1) The  Council  of  Ministers  shall  issue  the  needed  by-­‐‑laws  to  execute  this  law,  
as  assigned  by  the  Prime  Minister.  
2) The  Head  of  the  Council  shall   issue  all   instructions  needed  to  enforce  this  




Every   [provision]   that   is   contradictory   with   the   provisions   of   this   Decree   Law  
shall  be  repealed.    
  
Article  (17)  
View  to  the  legislative  council  
This   decision   of   law   shall   be   presented   to   the   legislative   council   during   its   first  




All  the  competent  authorities,  each  within  its  scope  of  authority,  shall  implement  
this   Law,   which   shall   enter   into   force   immediately   upon   its   publication   in   the  
official  gazette.      
  
Promulgated  in  the  city  of  Ramallah  on    26/4/  2010,    
  
Mahmoud  Abbas  
The  President  of  the  State  of  Palestine  
The  Chairman  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Palestine  Liberation  
Organisation  











Annex  H:  BDS  Achievements  
  
Omar  Barghouti  gave  the  following  account  when  asked  about  the  most  important  
achievements  for  the  BDS  movement:  
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Annex  I:  Translation  of  Boycotter’s  law  
The  Eighteenth  Knesset  
Bill  Proposed  by  the  Members  of  Knesset:  Zeev  Elkin,  Dalia  Itzik,  Aryeh  Eldad,  
Ofir   Akunis,   Tzachi   Hanegbi,  Moshe   Gafni,   David   Rotem,   David   Azulai,   Yariv  
Levin,   Haim   Katz,   Yoel   Hasson,   Tzipi   Hotobli,   Leah   Shemtov,   Robert   Ilatov,  
Avraham  Michaeli,  Menachem  Eliezer  Moses,  Ya'ʹakov  Katz,  Ruhama  Avraham-­‐‑
Balila,  Magli  Wahaba,  Carmel  Shama,  Danny  Danon,  Alex  Miller,  Yitzhak  Vaknin  
and  Uri  Maklav  
                
      
Definitions  
  
1. "ʺPerson"ʺ   –   the   meaning   as   in   the   Law   of   Interpretation,  
1981.  
"ʺArea  under   the   control   of   the   State   of   Israel"ʺ   –   including   the  
Judea  and  Samaria  areas  [the  West  Bank].  
"ʺBoycott"ʺ   –   demand   by   others   not   to   hold   ties   with   a  
person.  
"ʺBoycott   against   the   State   of   Israel"ʺ   –   boycott   imposed   on   a  
person  because  of  his   ties  with   the  State  of   Israel  or  with  
an  area  under  the  control  of  the  State  of  Israel.  
"ʺForeign  state  entity"ʺ  –  as  defined  in  Section  36(A)(a)  of  the  Law  





State  of  Israel  
2. It   is   prohibited   to   initiate   a   boycott   against   the   State   of  
Israel,   to   encourage   participation   in   it,   or   to   provide  




3. An   act   of   a   citizen   or   resident   of   Israel   in   violation   of  
Section  2  constitutes  a  civil  wrong,  and  it  will  be  subject  to  
the  provisions  of  the  Torts  Ordinance  [new  version].  
Compensation  4. The   court   will   award   compensation   for   the   civil   wrong  
according  to  this  law  in  the  following  manner:  
a. Punitive  damages  of  up  to  30,000  NIS  to  an  injured  party  
subject  to  the  proof  of  any  damage;  




damage  rate  and  subject  to  its  proof. 
Fine   5. In  addition  to  the  above  in  Section  4,  a  citizen  or  resident  
of  Israel  who  acts  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  Section  2  
will   be   subject   to   double   the   fine   stipulated   in   Section  
61(A)(3)  of  the  Penal  Code  –  1977.  




6. One   who   is   not   a   citizen   or   resident   of   Israel   and   the  
Magistrate  Court  determines  at  the  request  of  the  Minister  
of  Interior  that  he  has  acted  in  violation  of  Section  2:  
a. His  right  of  entry  to  Israel  will  be  canceled  for  a  period  of  
at  least  ten  years;  
b. Until   the   end   of   the   period   of   cancelation   of   the   right   of  
entry   to   Israel,   he   or   anyone   acting   on  his   behalf  will   be  
prohibited  from  making  any  transaction  in  an  Israeli  bank  
account,   in   traded  shares   in   Israel,   in   real  property,  or   in  
any  other  asset  that  requires  registry  for  its  transfer.  
Boycott  
Instituted  by  a  
Foreign  State  
Entity  
7. A  foreign  state  entity  having  legislated  a  law  instituting  a  
boycott  on  the  State  of  Israel  and  as  long  as  it  has  not  been  
canceled,   or   the   government   having   determined   by   a  
majority   of   its   members   that   a   foreign   state   entity   has  
violated   the   provisions   of   Section   2,   and   as   long   as   the  
government  has  not  rendered  a  decision  otherwise:  
c. The  foreign  state  entity  or  anyone  acting  on  its  behalf  will  
be   prohibited   from  making   any   transaction   in   an   Israeli  
bank  account,   in   traded  shares   in   Israel,   in   real  property,  
or  in  any  other  asset  that  requires  registry  for  its  transfer;  
d. No   sum   of   money   or   asset   will   be   transferred   to   any  
foreign  state  entity  or  anyone  acting  on  its  behalf  from  any  
organ   of   the   State   of   Israel      according   to   any   law,  
agreement,   or   government   decision   that   was   rendered  
prior   to   the   determination   according   to   Section   7   or   the  
enactment  of  the  foreign  law;  
e.   An   Israeli   citizen   or   the  National   Treasury,   having   been  
injured  by  the  boycott  by  the  foreign  state  entity,  may  sue  
for   damages   from   the   sum   awarded   in   accordance   with  
Sub-­‐‑Section  b  according  to  that  which  appeared  in  Section  




Prohibition	  on	  Instituting	  a	  Boycott	  Bill	  –	  2010	  
Annotation  
The   purpose   of   this   law   is   to   protect   the   State   of   Israel   and   particularly   its  
citizens   from   academic,   economic,   and   other   boycotts   based   on   their   ties   to   the  
State  of   Israel.   In  the  United  States   there   is  a  similar   law  that  protects   its   friends  
from  boycott  by  a  third-­‐‑party  where  the  fundamental  assumption  is  that  a  citizen  
or   resident   of   the   state   shall   not   call   for   the   institution   of   a   boycott   on  his   own  
state   or   its   allies.   This   assumption   has   been   refuted   concerning   citizens   and  
residents  of  Israel.   If   the  United  States  protects   its  friends  according  to  law,  then  
Israel  possesses  all   the  more  so  an  obligation  and  a  right   to  protect   itself  and   its  
citizens   under   the   law.   This   bill   differentiates   between   three   different   boycott  
issues:  boycott   that   is   instituted  by  a   resident  or   citizen  of   Israel,   boycott   that   is  
instituted   by   a   foreign   resident   or   citizen,   and   boycott   that   is   instituted   by   a  
foreign  state  entity,  according  to  the  determination  of  the  Israeli  government  or  by  
a  law  enacted  by  the  foreign  state  entity.  The  balance  between  the  interests  of  the  
public   and   the   state   in   individual   liberty   is  manifested   in   the   limitation   on   the  
applicability   of   the   law   to   the   initiation   or   advancement   of   boycott,   while  
refraining  from  addressing  the  considerations  of  an  individual  when  choosing  for  
himself  a  product  or  service.    
  
Regulations   8. The   Minister   of   Justice   is   appointed   to   determine   the  
regulations  necessary   for   the   implementation  of   this   law,  
and  he  will  consult  with  the  Minister  of  Interior  on  all  that  
is  related  to  the  implementation  of  Section  6(a).  
Application   9.                           a.        This   law  will  be   in   force  as  of   the  day  of   its  
publication;  
  b.         In   spite  of   the  aforementioned   in  Sub-­‐‑Section  a  above,  a  
refutable   presumption  may   be  made   regarding   one  who  
initiated  a  boycott  or  encouraged  participation  in  a  boycott  
according   to   Section   2   during   the   year   prior   to   the  
publication  of  the  law  that  he  is  still  initiating  a  boycott  or  
calling   for   a  boycott   even  after   the  date  of  publication  of  
the  law.  





Annex  J:  Drobless  Plan 
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THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA 
 
44 settlements have so far been established - or are in the 
process of being established - in Judea and Samaria: 21 
communal settlements, 12 urban settlements, 3 moshavim 3 
kibbutzim, 3 industrial villages, 1 regional center and 1 
industrial center. 35 settlements have been or are being 
established in Judea and Samaria over the past 3 years, 
since 1977 (see attached list of settlements in Judea and 
Samaria). The Jewish population in these regions totals some 
10,000 people today. 1/ 
 
The majority of the settlements in Judea and Samaria are 
communal villages. The communal settlement is a relatively 
new form of settlement. Such a settlement is designed to 
have a population of 300 families, in order to enable the 
development of an intensive and productive form of communal 
life, a closed rural society capable of generating a quality 
of life and services on a higher level than normally found 
in larger and open urban societies on the same economic 
level. In this form of a smaller and closed society there is 
room for mutual cooperation and for taking decisions in 
principle which call for greater efforts being exerted in 
order to preserve the definite nature of the settlement. All 
the members of a communal settlement are members of a joint 
cooperative association. For a new member to join the 
association, he has to undergo the accepted absorption 
procedures required by agricultural settlements and to have 
his membership approved by an absorption committee composed 
of representatives of the Settlement Division and the 




belongs and of one representative from the settlement 
itself. Each candidate has to meet the criteria as required 
by the nature of the settlement, by the regulations set by 
the association and in accordance with the nature of the 
founding settlement movement. This, in order to guarantee 
the greatest possible adjustment among the members, which is 
the precondition for the proper functioning of a small 
settlement. The association takes care of municipal services 
(gardening, roads, garbage, water, etc.), of welfare 
services (education, health, relief, etc.), of cultural, 
social and enter-tainment activities, and also assists the 
members in the productive-economic sphere (financing and 
marketing), preserves the nature of the settlement and 
represents it in dealings with external elements. The 
Settlement Division assists in the financing of public 
investments and infrastructure work in the communal 
settlements. The assistance is given in the form of a long-
term loan, in accordance with regulations and procedures 
applicable in agricultural settlements. The productive 
activity in the settlement is conducted by the members or by 
corporations of members with the responsibility resting with 
the members. The Settlement Division assists in financing 
the required investments in productive plants set up by the 
members or the association, in accordance with settlement 
standards. Such an assistance is only provided to permanent 
residents of the settlement working in that particular 
plant, and only after the economic rentability of the plant 
vas examined and confirmed by Settlement Division experts. 
 
The Settlement Division assists the rural villages in 
constructing their own means of production, with the aim of 
rapidly reducing the need of settlers to commute over long 
distances in order to make a living - an undesirable 
phenomenon from the social, the economic and the security 
aspects. Owing to the shortage of land and water in the 
hilly regions which reduces the possibility of making a 
living on agriculture: it becomes necessary to establish 
means of livelihood for these settlements based on industry, 
tourism and sophisticated agriculture requiring a relatively 
small quantity of land and water. 
 
It should be noted that notwithstanding the relatively 
scanty resources invested in the means of production, the 
settlers have managed to make a decent living. The social 
condition in most of the settlements is excellent and the 
atmosphere is pleasant and warm, abounding with intensive 
cultural and social activity. Therefore, most of the 
settlements established in Judea and Samaria are firmly 
established and function properly. At first we had to 
overcome numerous difficulties, but compared with other 




within a brief period of time and with a relatively small 
investment being required. At first we had to provide water 
for the settlements by tankers alone, but now the large 
majority of the settlements are connected to water pipes. In 
various settlements (Kedumim, Shiloh) water drillings were 
carried out. The proper infrastructure has also been 
established and all of the Samaria settlements will soon by 
connected to the national electricity grid. In many 
settlements infrastructure work is already under way for 
putting up permanent housing units in accordance with the 
"Build Yourself a Home" method. 
 
Hereunder details will be given about four communal 
settlements in Samaria, serving as a representative sample 




Ofrah - the first Jewish settlement in Samaria - was 
established 5 years ago on a high hill near the ancient city 
of Ofrah, at the foot of which lies the road lending to 
Eretz Hamirdafim (the terrain where the IDF pursues 
terrorists) and to the Jordan Valley and near the hilly road 
along the southern "border of Samaria. There are 72 2/ 
families living in the settlement today, with 300 children 
and with the total number of residents amounting to 500. 3/ 
The social and cultural life, public services, maintenance 
and economic activity are jointly conducted by the 
settlement. So far, 72 provisional housing units have 
already been established, and 10 more are due to be 
established this year. In addition, the construction of 50 
permanent housing units is already under way, so that by the 
end of this year 80 4/ families will reside in Ofrah. About 
80 percent of the residents of Ofrah make their living in 
the settlement proper and the rest earn their livelihood in 
the vicinity. There are 3 steel mills in the settlement, 3 
carpentry workshops, a printers' workshop and an institute 
for removing honey from hives. An office for computer 
programming services was also established in the settlement, 
in which l8 programmers and planners who reside in the 
settlement are employed. In addition, there arc also in 
Ofrah a field school employing 15 residents, a college for 
Jewish studies and a youth hostel, as well as accountants' 
and translation offices with clients in Jerusalem and a land 
surveyor's office. The Settlement Division planted for Ofrah 
a 90-dunum plantation of cherries, plums and apricots, and 
the territory of the plantation is to be expanded this year 
to 150-200 dunams. Industrial structures have also been put 
up during this year extending over a 2,100 sq. km. 
territory, in order to expand and establish the existent 








The settlement is located near the biblical Beit-El near a 
military base on the right of the Ramallah-Nablus road, some 
2 kms north of the road junction leading to Ofrah and some 
20 kms north of Jerusalem. The Beit-El residence took 
occupancy of the settlement some two and a half years ago 5/ 
in November 1977. There are 65 6/ families residing in the 
settlement, with 170 children and with the total number of 
residents amounting to 300. 7/ 74 housing units were 
established there. The construction of 50 permanent housing 
units has already been approved and infrastructure work is 
already under way. There is a large grocery store, a health 
clinic and a physician in the settlement and a child care 
clinic is soon to be opened there. In addition, there is 
also a library for children and adults, a youth club, a 
Bnei-Akiva Youth Movement club, and an intensive cultural 
and biblical studies activity. The settlers make their 
living on local and regional work and some of them work in 
other places outside the region. A toy factory employing 3 
residents and a cosmetics institute have already been 
established. The Settlement Division established in Beit-El 
a structure for industrial work extending over 660 square 
meters and fit to house between 3 and 6 factories. The 
setting up of a gas station with a snack bar and other 
facilities has already been approved and is soon to be 
started. Other possibilities for establishing economic 
projects in Beit-El during the coming budget year are also 




Was established four and a half years ago. It is located 
near the village of Kadum, some 7 kms west of Nablus. The 
number of families residing in the settlement is 120, 8/ 
with 
360 9/ children, 10 singles and 60 10/ yeshiva students - 
some 700 11/ people in all. So far, 130 "Ashkubit" housing 
units have been put up and 10 caravans. In addition, the 
infrastructure work for the construction of permanent 
housing in the "Build Yourself a Home" method is already 
under way. A sinagogue, a central eating hall and kitchen, a 
creche, administration offices, a school (9 classrooms), a 
yeshiva complex, a health clinic, a structure for a large 
grocery store and 8 structures for housing various types of 
shops for daily use have already been established. About 60 
percent of the residents make their living in the settlement 
proper. Two house plant nurseries, 3 hen runs, a steel mill, 




clothes, a book-keeping office, a stencilling workshop, a 
paper mill (in partnership with a Japanese citizen who is an 
Israel sympathizer), a carpenter's workshop and a paint 
factory have also been established. The Eretz Yisrael 
College in the settlement employs 6 families and offers 
courses on the Judea and Samaria region in particular and on 
Eretz Yisrael in general. 
 
4. ELOM MOREH 
 
The settlement was established in January 1980 in its 
present location on Mount Kabir and is situated some 4 kms 
east of Nablus. The number of families residing in the 
settlement is 35 12/ with 130 13/ children and 6 singles - 
totalling some 200 14/ people altogether. So far, 41 
Troumasbest housing units have been set up as well as 7 
public buildings: a sinagogue, a kindergarten (2 
classrooms), a creche (3 rooms), a school (4 classrooms), a 
health clinic, administration offices and a large grocery 
store. A wide access road was paved to the settlement, and 
the paving of the road bypassing the village of Dir-el-
Khatab is about to be concluded. 
 
The Settlement Division is constructing at present an 
industrial complex on Mount Kabir, extending over 1,200 
square meters and scheduled to house a locksmith's workshop 
and other plants (an insecticide factory, for example). The 
construction of an additional industrial complex is also 
being planned. Educational and cultural activities are 
conducted in a kindergarten, a creche and a youth club. The 
absorption of additional families in the settlement is 
planned for the near future, so that by the end of this year 
the number of families residing in it will amount to around 
40. 15/ 
 
THE SETTLEMENT STRATEGY IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA 
 
A large eastern rejectionist front which includes Syria, 
Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia is facing us today. These 
countries, which have huge resources at their disposal and 
which are united in their hostility towards Israel, are 
posing today a constant threat to our eastern border. The 
lessons we learned from previous wars indicate that we ought 
to ensure that the border be drawn as far as possible from 
our dense urban, industrial and economic centers on the 
coastal plain, so as to provide ourselves with an adequate 
breathing space for mobilizing our army reserve forces on 
which we have to depend owing to the large superiority in 
number enjoyed by the Arab armies. Therefore, a creator 
distance between our eastern border with Jordan and our own 




entire state of Israel. 
 
However, only a military presence in the territories west of 
the Jordan is not sufficient for the security of this 
sensitive region. The civilian presence of Jewish 
settlements is vital for the security of the state, since 
all the settlements in Judea and Samaria are located on high 
hills presiding over important axes which are not easily 
passable by armoured or any other types of vehicles. It 
should be noted that in light of the lessons drawn from the 
last war, all necessary measures have been taken to enable 
the settlers in the territories to defend themselves in the 
eventuality of a surprise attack being launched against 
them. Thus, it will not only become unnecessary to evacuate 
them in the eventuality of a war breaking out, but this 
dense chain of settlements situated on hilltops will be able 
to serve as a proper block against the united eastern front 
which is now threatening Israel, or at least to ward off an 
Arab attack until the reserve forces are mobilized and, 
ready to fight. This buffer of settlements will also give a 
greater sense of security to the settlements in the Jordan 
Valley, which serve as our foremost defence wall on the 
east, and will keep them from getting into the position of 
being pressed from both the east and the west by hostile 
populations. 
 
In light of the current negotiations on the future of Judea 
and Samaria, it will now become necessary for us to conduct 
a race against time. During this period, everything will be 
mainly determined by the facts we establish in these 
territories and less by any other considerations. This is 
therefore the best time for launching an extensive and 
comprehensive settlement momentum, particularly on the Judea 
and Samaria hilltops which are not easily passable by nature 
and which preside over the Jordan Valley on the cast and 
over the Coastal Plain on the west. 
 
It is therefore significant to stress today, mainly by means 
of actions, that the autonomy does not and will not apply to 
the territories but only to the Arab population thereof. 
This should mainly find expression by establishing facts on 
the ground. Therefore, the state-owned lands and the 
uncultivated barren lands in Judea and Samaria ought to be 
seized right away, with the purpose of settling the areas 
between and around the centers occupied by the minorities so 
as to reduce to the minimum the danger of an additional Arab 
state being established in these territories. Being cut off 
by Jewish settlements the minority population will find it 
difficult to form a territorial and political continuity. 
 




intention to keep the territories of Judea and Samaria for 
good. Otherwise, the minority population may get into a 
state of growing disquiet which will eventually result in 
recurrent efforts to establish an additional Arab state in 
these territories. The best and most effective way of 
removing every shadow of a doubt about our intention to hold 
on to Judea and Samaria forever is by speeding up the 
settlement momentum in these territories. 
 
Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria will mainly be 
carried out on state-owned lands or on uncultivated 
ownerless barren lands, and is by no means designed to 
dispossess people living on their land. Such a policy 
creates a reasonable prospect for a peaceful coexistence. 
Furthermore, the cohabitation of Jews and Arabs side by side 
for a long period of time is the only chance for developing 
a good neighbourly relationship as time goes by, for the 
gradual awakening of a mutual understanding and for the 
essential creation of common interests. It can be learned 
from historical experience that personal and close relations 
between hostile populations usually contribute to the 
creation of a do facto state of peace more than any 
political agreements signed by the leaders of these 
populations normally do. 
 
SETTLEMENT POLICY IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA 
 
Experience indicates that the situation must be averted of 
any one settlement "being left isolated in whatever region, 
both owing to the need of relying on shared services 
together with neighbouring settlements and because of the 
security aspect. Thus, it is necessary to establish 
additional settlements near every existing settlement in 
Judea and Samaria, so as to create settlement clusters in 
homogenous settlement regions and to make it possible to 
develop shared services and moans of production. It is not 
altogether unlikely that the expansion and development of 
these settlements will eventually result in some cases in 
their natural decision to merge and create a single urban 
settlement containing all the settlements of the same 
cluster. In order to make a large deployment of settlements 
possible and in order to establish settlements with a high 
quality of life, the majority of settlements in Judea and 
Samaria were and will continue to be established in the form 
of rural-communal villages. The population in these 
settlements will amount at the first stage to between 50 and 
300 families which will find their means of livelihood 
mainly in industry, tourism and services and to a much 
lesser extent in sophisticated agriculture, owing to the 
shortage of agricultural means of production in these 




and cultural spheres are planned and set up at the very 
first stage of the implementation of the settlement program 
- in each and every bloc, in one of the central settlements 
thereof. The setting up of these services as early as 
possible will contribute to the welfare of the new 
settlements. The establishment of the settlements is 
preceded by forming a group of potential settlers and 
getting them ready for taking occupancy of the land. The 
absorption unit of the Settlement Division sets up the 
framework, for social assimilation activities among the 
settlers (both new immigrants and veteran citizens), in 
coordination with the various settlement movements and with 
other social bodies. It should be noted that the current 
potential for settlement is very high. There is an 
increasing stream of applications submitted by people 
wishing to settle in Judea and Samaria, and the number of 
families wishing to settle in these territories - either by 
setting up new settlements or by joining existing ones - 
amounts to many thousands, both in Israel and in the 
diaspora. 
 
Over the next 5 years it is necessary to establish 12-15 
rural and urban settlements per annum in Judea and Samaria, 
so that in five years from now the number of settlements 
will grow by 60-75 and the Jewish population thereof will 
amount to between 120,000 and 150,000 people. More details 
about this plan can be found in the brochure submitted by me 
in October 1978 to the government and the inter-departmental 
settlement committee, entitled "A Masterplan for Settlement 
Development in Judea and Samaria for the years 1979-1983" 
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  the	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Guidelines	  on	  the	  eligibility	  of	  Israeli	  entities	  and	  their	  activities	  in	  the	  
territories	  occupied	  by	  Israel	  since	  June	  1967	  for	  grants,	  prizes	  and	  financial	  
instruments	  funded	  by	  the	  EU	  from	  2014	  onwards	  	  
(2013/C	  205/05)	  	  
Section	  A.	  GENERAL	  ISSUES	  	  
1. These	  guidelines	  set	  out	  the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  the	  
Commission	  will	  implement	  key	  
requirements	  for	  the	  award	  of	  EU	  
support	  to	  Israeli	  entities	  or	  to	  their	  
activities	  in	  the	  territories	  occupied	  
by	  Israel	  since	  June	  1967.	  Their	  aim	  
is	  to	  ensure	  the	  respect	  of	  EU	  
positions	  and	  commitments	  in	  
conformity	  with	  international	  law	  
on	  the	  non-­‐recognition	  by	  the	  EU	  of	  
Israel’s	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  
territories	  occupied	  by	  Israel	  since	  
June	  1967.	  These	  guidelines	  are	  
without	  prejudice	  to	  other	  
requirements	  established	  by	  EU	  
legislation.	  	  
2. The	  territories	  occupied	  by	  
Israel	  since	  June	  1967	  comprise	  the	  
Golan	  Heights,	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  and	  
the	  West	  Bank,	  including	  East	  
Jerusalem.	  	  
3. The	  EU	  does	  not	  recognise	  
Israel’s	  sovereignty	  over	  any	  of	  the	  
territories	  referred	  to	  in	  point	  2	  and	  
does	  not	  consider	  them	  to	  be	  part	  of	  
Israel’s	  territory	  (	  1	  ),	  irrespective	  of	  
their	  legal	  status	  under	  domestic	  
Israeli	  law	  (	  2)	  .	  The	  EU	  has	  made	  it	  
clear	  that	  it	  will	  not	  recognise	  any	  
changes	  to	  pre-­‐1967	  borders,	  other	  
than	  those	  agreed	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  
the	  Middle	  East	  Peace	  Process	  
(MEPP)	  (	  3)	  .	  The	  EU’s	  Foreign	  
Affairs	  Council	  has	  underlined	  the	  
importance	  of	  limiting	  the	  
application	  of	  agreements	  with	  
Israel	  to	  the	  territory	  of	  Israel	  as	  
recognised	  by	  the	  EU	  (	  4).	  	  	  
4. These	  guidelines	  do	  not	  cover	  
EU	  support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  grants,	  
prizes	  or	  financial	  instruments	  
awarded	  to	  Palestinian	  entities	  or	  to	  
their	  activities	  in	  the	  territories	  
referred	  to	  in	  point	  2,	  nor	  any	  
eligibility	  conditions	  set	  up	  for	  this	  
purpose.	  In	  particular,	  they	  do	  not	  
cover	  any	  agreements	  between	  the	  
EU,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  
Palestinian	  Liberation	  Organisation	  
or	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand.	  	  
Section	  B.	  SCOPE	  OF	  APPLICATION	  	  
5. These	  guidelines	  apply	  to	  EU	  
support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  grants,	  prizes	  
or	  financial	  instruments	  within	  the	  
meaning	  of	  Titles	  	  
(	  1	  )	  On	  the	  territorial	  application	  of	  the	  
EU-­‐Israel	  Association	  Agreement	  see	  
Case	  C-­‐386/08	  Brita	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐
1289,	  paragraphs	  47	  and	  53.	  	  
VI,	  VII	  and	  VIII	  of	  the	  Financial	  
Regulation	  (	  5	  )	  which	  may	  be	  awarded	  
to	  Israeli	  entities	  or	  to	  their	  activities	  in	  
the	  territories	  occupied	  by	  Israel	  since	  
June	  1967.	  Their	  application	  is	  without	  
prejudice	  to	  specific	  eligibility	  
conditions	  which	  may	  be	  laid	  down	  in	  
the	  relevant	  basic	  act.	  	  




(a) for	  grants	  —	  to	  all	  
applicants	  and	  beneficiaries,	  
irrespective	  of	  their	  role	  (sole	  
beneficiary,	  coordinator	  or	  co-­‐
beneficiary).	  This	  includes	  entities	  
participating	  in	  the	  action	  on	  a	  no-­‐
cost	  basis	  (	  6)	  	  and	  affiliated	  
entities	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  
Article	  122(2)	  of	  the	  Financial	  
Regulation.	  This	  does	  not	  include	  
contractors	  or	  sub-­‐	  contractors	  
selected	  by	  grant	  beneficiaries	  in	  
conformity	  with	  procurement	  
rules.	  As	  regards	  third	  parties	  
referred	  to	  in	  Article	  137	  of	  the	  
Financial	  Regulation,	  in	  the	  cases	  
where	  the	  costs	  of	  financial	  
support	  to	  such	  third	  parties	  are	  
eligible	  under	  a	  call	  for	  proposals	  
the	  authorising	  officer	  responsible	  
may,	  where	  appropriate,	  specify	  in	  
the	  call	  for	  proposals	  and	  in	  the	  
grant	  agreements	  or	  decisions	  
that	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  set	  out	  
in	  these	  guidelines	  also	  apply	  to	  
the	  persons	  that	  may	  receive	  
financial	  support	  by	  the	  
beneficiaries;	  	  
(b) for	  prizes	  —	  to	  all	  
participants	  and	  winners	  in	  
contests;	  	  
(c) for	  financial	  instruments	  
—	  to	  dedicated	  investment	  
vehicles,	  financial	  intermediaries	  
and	  sub-­‐intermediaries	  and	  to	  
final	  recipients.	  	  
7. These	  guidelines	  apply	  to	  grants,	  
prizes	  and	  financial	  instruments	  
managed,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  by	  the	  
Commission,	  by	  executive	  agencies	  
(direct	  management)	  or	  by	  bodies	  
entrusted	  with	  budget	  
implementation	  tasks	  in	  accordance	  
with	  Article	  58(1)(c)	  of	  the	  Financial	  
Regulation	  (indirect	  management).	  	  
8. These	  guidelines	  apply	  to	  grants,	  
prizes	  and	  financial	  instruments	  
funded	  from	  appropriations	  of	  the	  
2014	  
	  
(	  2	  )	  Under	  Israeli	  law,	  East	  Jerusalem	  
and	  the	  Golan	  Heights	  are	  annexed	  to	  
the	  State	  of	  Israel,	  whereas	  the	  Gaza	  
Strip	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  are	  
referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  territories’.	  	  
(	  3	  )	  See	  inter	  alia	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
Council	  conclusions	  on	  the	  MEPP	  
adopted	  in	  December	  2009,	  December	  
2010,	  April	  2011,	  May	  and	  December	  
2012.	  	  
(	  4	  )	  The	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Council	  
conclusions	  on	  the	  MEPP	  adopted	  on	  10	  
December	  2012	  state	  that	  ‘all	  
agreements	  between	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  
and	  the	  EU	  must	  unequivocally	  and	  
explicitly	  indicate	  their	  inapplicability	  
to	  the	  territories	  occupied	  by	  Israel	  in	  
1967’.	  	  
(	  5	  )	  Regulation	  (EU,	  Euratom)	  No	  
966/2012	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  
and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  25	  October	  2012	  
on	  the	  financial	  rules	  applicable	  to	  the	  
general	  budget	  of	  the	  Union	  and	  
repealing	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC,	  
Euratom)	  No	  1605/2002	  (OJ	  L	  298,	  
26.10.2012,	  p.	  1).	  	  
(	  6	  )	  In	  which	  case	  the	  Israeli	  entity	  will	  
finance	  its	  participation	  with	  funding	  
from	  other	  sources,	  but	  will	  nonetheless	  
be	  treated	  as	  a	  beneficiary	  and	  may	  
therefore	  have	  access	  to	  know-­‐how,	  
services,	  networking	  and	  other	  
opportunities	  developed	  by	  the	  other	  




financial	  year	  and	  subsequent	  years	  and	  
authorised	  by	  financing	  decisions	  
adopted	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  
guidelines.	  	  
Section	  C.	  CONDITIONS	  OF	  
ELIGIBILITY	  OF	  ISRAELI	  ENTITIES	  	  
9. As	  regards	  the	  place	  of	  
establishment	  of	  Israeli	  entities:	  	  
(a) In	  the	  case	  of	  grants	  and	  
prizes,	  only	  Israeli	  entities	  
having	  their	  place	  of	  
establishment	  within	  Israel’s	  
pre-­‐	  1967	  borders	  will	  be	  
considered	  eligible;	  	  
(b) In	  the	  case	  of	  financial	  
instruments,	  only	  Israeli	  entities	  
having	  their	  place	  of	  
establishment	  within	  Israel’s	  
pre-­‐	  1967	  borders	  will	  be	  
considered	  eligible	  as	  final	  
recipients.	  	  
10. The	  place	  of	  establishment	  is	  
understood	  to	  be	  the	  legal	  address	  
where	  the	  entity	  is	  registered,	  as	  
confirmed	  by	  a	  precise	  postal	  
address	  corresponding	  to	  a	  
concrete	  physical	  location.	  The	  use	  
of	  a	  post	  office	  box	  is	  not	  allowed.	  	  
11. The	  requirements	  set	  out	  in	  
section	  C:	  	  
(a) apply	  to	  the	  following	  
types	  of	  legal	  persons:	  Israeli	  
regional	  or	  local	  authorities	  and	  
other	  public	  bodies,	  public	  or	  
private	  companies	  or	  
corporations	  and	  other	  private	  
legal	  persons,	  including	  non-­‐
governmental	  not-­‐	  for-­‐profit	  
organisations;	  	  
(b) do	  not	  apply	  to	  Israeli	  
public	  authorities	  at	  national	  
level	  (ministries	  and	  
government	  agencies	  or	  
authorities);	  	  
(c) do	  not	  apply	  to	  natural	  
persons.	  	  
Section	  D.	  CONDITIONS	  OF	  
ELIGIBILITY	  OF	  ACTIVITIES	  IN	  THE	  
TERRITORIES	  OCCUPIED	  BY	  ISRAEL	  	  
12. As	  regards	  the	  
activities/operations	  of	  Israeli	  
entities:	  	  
(a) In	  the	  case	  of	  grants	  and	  
prizes,	  the	  activities	  of	  Israeli	  
entities	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  
framework	  of	  EU-­‐funded	  grants	  
and	  prizes	  will	  be	  considered	  
eligible	  if	  they	  do	  not	  take	  place	  
in	  the	  territories	  referred	  to	  in	  
point	  2,	  either	  partially	  or	  
entirely;	  	  
(b) In	  the	  case	  of	  financial	  
instruments,	  Israeli	  entities	  will	  
be	  considered	  eligible	  as	  final	  
recipients	  if	  they	  do	  not	  operate	  
in	  the	  territories	  referred	  to	  in	  
point	  2,	  either	  in	  the	  framework	  
of	  EU-­‐funded	  financial	  
instruments	  or	  otherwise.	  	  
13. Any	  activity	  or	  part	  thereof	  (	  1)	  	  
included	  in	  an	  application	  for	  an	  EU	  
grant	  or	  prize	  which	  does	  not	  meet	  
the	  requirements	  set	  out	  in	  point	  
12(a)	  will	  be	  considered	  as	  ineligible	  
and	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  application	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  its	  
further	  evaluation.	  	  
14. The	  requirements	  set	  out	  in	  
section	  D:	  	  
(a) apply	  to	  activities	  under	  
point	  12	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  
following	  types	  of	  legal	  persons:	  
Israeli	  regional	  or	  local	  
authorities	  and	  other	  public	  




bodies,	  public	  or	  private	  
companies	  or	  corporations	  and	  
other	  private	  legal	  persons,	  
including	  non-­‐governmental	  not-­‐
for-­‐	  profit	  organisations;	  	  
(b) apply	  also	  to	  activities	  
under	  point	  12	  carried	  out	  by	  
Israeli	  public	  authorities	  at	  
national	  level	  (ministries	  and	  
government	  agencies	  or	  
authorities);	  	  
(c) do	  not	  apply	  to	  activities	  
under	  point	  12	  carried	  out	  by	  
natural	  persons.	  	  
15. Notwithstanding	  points	  12-­‐14	  
above,	  the	  requirements	  set	  out	  in	  
section	  D	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  activities	  
which,	  although	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  
territories	  referred	  to	  in	  point	  2,	  aim	  
at	  benefiting	  protected	  persons	  
under	  the	  terms	  of	  international	  
humanitarian	  law	  who	  live	  in	  these	  
territories	  and/or	  at	  promoting	  the	  
Middle	  East	  peace	  process	  in	  line	  
with	  EU	  policy	  (	  2	  ).	  	  
Section	  E.	  IMPLEMENTATION	  
ARRANGEMENTS	  	  
16. Each	  Israeli	  entity	  referred	  to	  in	  
points	  11(a)	  and	  (b)	  and	  14(a)	  and	  
(b),	  which	  applies	  for	  an	  EU	  grant,	  
prize	  or	  financial	  instrument,	  shall	  
submit	  a	  declaration	  on	  honour	  as	  
follows:	  	  
(a) In	  the	  case	  of	  grants	  and	  
prizes,	  the	  declaration	  will	  state	  
that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Israeli	  
entity	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
requirements	  under	  points	  9(a)	  
and	  12(a)	  of	  these	  guidelines,	  
while	  also	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  
applicability	  of	  point	  15	  thereof	  (	  
3	  ).	  For	  grants,	  this	  declaration	  
will	  be	  drafted	  in	  accordance	  with	  
Article	  131(3)	  of	  the	  Financial	  
Regulation;	  	  
(b) In	  the	  case	  of	  financial	  
instruments,	  the	  declaration	  will	  
state	  that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  
Israeli	  entity	  as	  a	  final	  recipient	  is	  
in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
requirements	  under	  points	  9(b)	  
and	  12(b)	  of	  these	  guidelines.	  
	  
(	  1	  )	  For	  example,	  these	  could	  be	  nation-­‐
wide	  projects	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  
Israel,	  which	  involve	  both	  activities	  
within	  pre-­‐1967	  borders	  and	  activities	  
beyond	  pre-­‐1967	  borders	  (e.g.	  in	  
settlements).	  	  
(	  2	  )	  For	  example,	  these	  could	  be	  
activities	  under	  the	  European	  
Instrument	  for	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  
Rights,	  the	  Neighbourhood	  Civil	  Society	  
Facility	  and/or	  the	  Partnership	  for	  
Peace	  programme.	  	  
(	  3	  )	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Israeli	  public	  
authorities	  at	  national	  level	  (ministries	  
and	  government	  agencies/authorities),	  
the	  declaration	  will	  contain	  an	  address	  
for	  communication	  purposes	  that	  is	  
within	  Israel’s	  pre-­‐1967	  borders	  and	  
that	  complies	  with	  point	  10.	  
17. The	  declarations	  under	  point	  16	  
are	  without	  prejudice	  to	  any	  other	  
supporting	  documents	  required	  in	  
the	  calls	  for	  proposals,	  rules	  of	  
contests	  or	  calls	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  
financial	  intermediaries	  or	  
dedicated	  investment	  vehicles.	  They	  
will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  package	  of	  
application	  documents	  for	  each	  
concerned	  call	  for	  proposals,	  rules	  of	  
contests	  and	  call	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  
financial	  intermediaries	  or	  
dedicated	  investment	  vehicles.	  Their	  
text	  will	  be	  adapted	  to	  the	  
requirements	  relevant	  for	  each	  EU	  
grant,	  prize	  or	  financial	  instrument.	  	  
18. The	  submission	  of	  a	  declaration	  




incorrect	  information	  may	  be	  
considered	  as	  a	  case	  of	  
misrepresentation	  or	  a	  serious	  
irregularity	  and	  may	  lead:	  	  
(a) for	  grants	  —	  to	  the	  
measures	  set	  out	  in	  Articles	  
131(5)	  and	  135	  of	  the	  Financial	  
Regulation;	  	  
(b) for	  	   prizes	  	  —	  	   to	  
	  the	  	   measures	  	   set	  	   out	  
	  in	  	  
Article	  212(1)(viii)	  of	  the	  Rules	  of	  
Application	  of	  the	  Financial	  Regulation	  (	  
1	  )	  and;	  	  
(c) for	  financial	  instruments	  
—	  to	  the	  measures	  set	  out	  in	  
Article	  221(3)	  of	  the	  Rules	  of	  
Application	  of	  the	  Financial	  
Regulation.	  	  
19. The	  Commission	  will	  implement	  
these	  guidelines	  in	  their	  entirety,	  
and	  in	  a	  clear	  and	  accessible	  
manner.	  It	  will	  	  
	  
notably	  announce	  the	  eligibility	  
conditions	  set	  out	  in	  Sections	  C	  and	  D	  in	  
the	  work	  programmes	  (	  2	  )	  and/or	  
financing	  decisions,	  calls	  for	  proposals,	  
rules	  of	  contests	  and	  calls	  for	  the	  
selection	  of	  financial	  intermediaries	  or	  
dedicated	  investment	  vehicles.	  	  
20. The	  Commission	  will	  ensure	  that	  
the	  work	  programmes	  and	  calls	  for	  
proposals,	  rules	  of	  contests	  and	  calls	  
for	  the	  selection	  of	  financial	  
intermediaries	  or	  dedicated	  
investment	  vehicles	  published	  by	  
the	  bodies	  entrusted	  with	  budget	  
implementation	  tasks	  under	  indirect	  
management	  contain	  the	  eligibility	  
conditions	  set	  out	  in	  Sections	  C	  and	  
D.	  	  
21. In	  order	  to	  clearly	  articulate	  EU	  
commitments	  under	  international	  
law,	  taking	  into	  account	  relevant	  EU	  
policies	  and	  positions,	  the	  
Commission	  will	  also	  endeavour	  to	  
have	  the	  content	  of	  these	  guidelines	  
reflected	  in	  international	  
agreements	  or	  protocols	  thereto	  or	  
Memoranda	  of	  Understanding	  with	  
Israeli	  counterparts	  or	  with	  other	  
parties.	  	  
22. The	  award	  of	  EU	  support	  to	  
Israeli	  entities	  or	  to	  their	  activities	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  grants,	  prizes	  or	  
financial	  instruments	  requires	  
engagement	  with	  Israeli	  entities	  
referred	  to	  in	  points	  11	  and	  14,	  for	  
example,	  by	  organising	  meetings,	  
visits	  or	  events.	  Such	  engagement	  
will	  not	  take	  place	  in	  the	  territories	  
referred	  to	  in	  point	  2,	  unless	  it	  is	  
related	  to	  the	  activities	  referred	  to	  
in	  point	  15.	  
	  
(	  1	  )	  Commission	  Delegated	  Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  1268/2012	  of	  29	  October	  2012	  on	  the	  
rules	  of	  application	  of	  Regulation	  (EU,	  Euratom)	  No	  966/2012	  of	  the	  European	  
Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  25	  October	  2012	  on	  the	  financial	  rules	  applicable	  to	  




(	  2	  )	  Subject	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  comitology	  procedures	  that	  may	  be	  required	  by	  the	  
relevant	  basic	  act.	  
	  
  
  
  
